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Abstract 
Economic growth in China is attributed by many people to the reforms initiated in 
1978.  Some individuals, who were previously agents of the state, party cadres, or 
peasants, have become High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) within a relatively 
short period in the wake of certain institutional changes.  Before economic reform, 
China’s political elites seized administrative controls and material privileges and yet 
were relatively restricted in money income and private wealth; however, the market 
transition and privatization added additional value into those controls and privileges 
and created unique opportunities for those political elites.  These political elites 
retain intact power and privilege regardless of market reforms or regime change.  
During the transformation, redistributive mechanisms are shaped by these elites, who 
discriminate in favour of themselves, their families, and like individuals; 
subsequently, some of those from the political elites migrate into HNWIs, and unjust 
wealth re-distribution is created accordingly.  Development and the changing role of 
elites in transitional China, like all societies, is constrained and shaped by heritage 
(resources, pre-existing institutions, geography, culture, etc.); these constraints 
maybe stronger in transitional societies than in open market economies and enhance 
the importance for transitional society elites to maintain their footholds of power in 
state and regulatory institutions.  Therefore, these elites exert influence to maintain 
their existing privileges for accumulating wealth from competition.  This research 
adapts institutional change theory to incorporate the concept of resource dependences 
in order to give practical expression to an analysis of how the transition between 
these roles is played out during the institutional changes and to explore the relations 
between the leading social actors and their institutional environment.  It draws on the 
example of the housing market to illustrate that there is a trade-off between 
conformity to external institutional pressure and exercising influence over external 
resources whilst pursuing stability and legitimacy in China’s reforms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
After 1978, as Garrick (2012b:144) states, a new form of socialism entered into 
China’s proletarian ideology, allowing the private economy to co-exist with the 
socialist public economy.  The purpose of this research is to identify the relationship 
between transition and institutional change in China by analysing the roles in the 
transition of leading social actors, including state agents, party cadres, HNWIs, their 
institutional contexts, and the relationship between them.  Since the roles of leading 
social actors vary with institutions over time, institutions and time therefore affect 
the functions of these roles.  Institutions simultaneously create power by giving 
individuals control over resources and social function. Therefore, power is shaped 
through institutions that structure human organizations and relationships in most 
societies (Sachs and Woo 1994: preface).  On the other hand, institutions reflect the 
resources and power of those who make them and, in turn, affect the distribution of 
resources and power in society, becoming powerful external forces that channel and 
regulate conflict ensuring social stability (Campbell 2004:1).  Herein lies my 
fundamental research proposition is that people holding more privileges try to 
maintain stability and prevent any unexpected chaos by retaining existing favourable 
institutions or making new institutional arrangements that follow the existing pattern 
(North 1990:94;1994) through the exercise of existing influence over external 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:45).   
 
On the contrary, people possessing relatively fewer benefits also try to alter existing 
institutions in order to pursue an anticipated better institutional environment despite 
their relatively weaker motivation and power.  Because those existing interest groups 
can share relatively more benefits and have stronger motivation and power to 
manipulate institutional arrangements (Olson 1971), the stability and persistence of 
existing institutional environments may consequently incline towards provisional 
disequilibrium.  After struggling and bargaining (the process of compromise), the 
new institutional environment will reach stability and be in equilibrium (Campbell 
2004:1-2).  By this logic, I incorporate the power dependence concept into 
institutional change theory to justify my research arguments.   
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A few years ago it would have been difficult, if not possible, to imagine European 
leaders, begging bowl in hand, turning to Beijing for a financial bailout (Financial 
Times 2012).  What path led China to such impressive economic growth?  In China, 
reforms bring unprecedented opportunities to those people who know how to grasp 
them in pursuit of individual benefit.  As a result, there could be a high risk of social 
turmoil and conflict, e.g. Wukan protest 1 , in part due to such prosperous 
opportunities interfacing with a relatively uncomplicated economic system (see Note 
1).  These people are bureaucrats and also entrepreneurs, or ‘bureaupreneurs’ 
(Bouckaert 2007), that embody a gradual privatisation of political power, perhaps 
heading towards institutional arrangements of genuine private enterprise and the full 
separation of business and administration.  
 
The path of reforms consists of different institutions, that are institutional capital at 
this moment rather than institutional costs (Bresser and Millonig 2003b) to China.  
Many former socialist countries, e.g. the former Soviet Union (FSU) and Central 
Eastern European (CEE), introduced strikingly different economic reforming policies 
in the 1990s (see Note 2).  The fundamental divergence in China’s reforms has been 
to embark on economic reforms without political ones (Shirk 1993:4).  For instance, 
there was neither any sign of a demise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
regime nor any noticeable agitation within the existing political system in China after 
the commencement of reforms in 1978.  Conversely, the CCP not only remains intact 
and in control of the institutional environment but also dominates society and 
manipulates its institutional arrangements.  Although economic reforms have so far 
been working properly in this specific context, these institutions, however, could 
eventually become an institutional cost if there are no corresponding and 
comprehensive reforms.   
 
Presumably, the institutional changes, the emergence of HNWIs, and economic 
growth in China are inseparable following the economic reforms.  To comprehend 
the context of China’s transition may help us to reveal the distinct reform path of 
China’s institutions.  It is inadequate to analyze China’s transition simply by looking 
                                                 
1 In December 2011, a large-scale protest in Wukan Guangdong revealed the longterm outstanding 
economic performance in China seems dulcorated. 
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at explicit economic performance.  Without comprehensive institutional 
arrangements, economic growth in China may not be sustainable.  That is to say, 
excessive political intervention on the economy, biased jurisdictions, unquestioned 
and ingrained habits, and long established shared beliefs could ultimately constrain 
economic growth.   
 
In this research, I conduct in-depth interviews with some of the economic elites as 
supplementary evidence.  Every interviewee, in accordance with the definition of 
HNWI in China, has more than one million US dollars in liquid assets (Hurun 2008).  
In addition, many of them were previously bureaucrats, privileged party members, or 
both before the economic reforms were initiated.  Therefore, they were 
bureaupreneurs and became HNWIs in tandem with China’s transition.  In the polity 
of any one-party dictatorship, political constrains may hinder market activities as 
soon as they render the former vulnerable.  In China, economic problems can 
become political ones if they jeopardize the one-party regime.  Therefore, only astute 
businesspersons could make corresponding changes instantly in anticipation of 
adverse or inauspicious policy announcements.  Therefore, I argue that the main 
problem between China’s transitions and its HNWIs is the co-opetition: HNWIs have 
to cooperate with, as well as compete with the political powers in China (a 
compromised model).  
 
1.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT IN CHINA 
The concept of institution denotes stability and persistence (Scott 1995:78); therefore, 
an institutional environment may end up in anarchy if stability cannot be maintained 
and sustained.  To prevent any unanticipated disruption, people holding more 
interests, assets, and privileges in any given institutional environment may therefore 
try to maintain stability in order to secure their existing benefits by retaining the 
existing favourable institutions, making new institutional arrangements in the 
existing mould (North 1990:94;North 1994), or exercising their influence over 
external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:45).  However, those people 
who possess relatively fewer benefits than the well-established ones will try to 
change existing institutions in order to pursue a more advantageous institutional 
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environment.  Consequently, the stability and persistence of the existing institutional 
environment may tend toward provisional disequilibrium.  After a period 
characterised by struggles and bargaining (Campbell 2004:1-2), the new institutional 
environment will become stable and be in equilibrium (see Fig 1).   
 
In China, economic reforms are not ordinary but closely related to political power, 
especially those that influence and determine the allocation and distribution of scarce 
resources (Shih 2004a), and most groundbreaking policies are implemented quietly 
and implicitly, constantly evolving through a steady drip of leaks, hints, denials and 
oblique official statements (Dyer 2010b).  In this regard, state agents at different 
levels could translate and implement reforms at their discretion with varying 
consequences.  These discretionary interpretations may eventually result in grotesque 
phenomena reflected in economic reforms owing to political interventions, e.g. 
profiteering in dual-track pricing, unclear Land-Using Rights (LUR) auction, etc.  
Nevertheless, many unwavering political contrasts impact on the re-allocation and 
re-distribution of scarce resources and are deeply associated with the implementation 
of property rights.  In this research, I will lay emphasis on the protection and 
transition of property rights that are indispensable to long-term economic growth.  
Nevertheless, the cost of defending property rights is not insignificant (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962 ;Lin 1989 ;Cooter and Ulen 2007).  Next, I will illustrate the 
theoretical premise of this research. 
 
1.2 THEORETICAL PREMISE AND RESEARCH PROCESS 
In this research, I try to comprehend the institutional changes and/or roles of leading 
social actors and their inter-relationship in the transition in China may benefit.  For 
example, people focusing on institutional changes may find transition in China that 
hardly can be adequately interpreted through any single school of theory.  Instead, 
institutional changes in China are deeply related to politics, economy, culture, and 
others.  Arguably, social actors in China, as in other places, may not be rational and 
may change or improve existing institutions for reasons of personal utility, self-
consciousness, culture, and others.  As for people focusing on roles of leading social 
actors in China, they may find that the dominant social actors exerting influence over 
the actions and minds of other groups (Dijk 1996:84-85) are dynamic.  That is to say, 
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the roles of social actors in transitional China are deeply influenced by and 
associated with varying institutional arrangements.         
 
According to the previous statement, institutional change theory is suitable for 
interpreting China’s transition.  Many scholars analyze China’s transition simply 
from an economic perspective (Lin 1989 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Peng and Heath 
1996 ;Yang 1996a ;Qian 1999 ;Nee 2000 ;Nee and Cao 2005).  However, some other 
scholars focus on the institutional environment (Ding 1994 ;Wang 1998 ;Yang 2004), 
roles in the transition of social actors (Bouckaert 2007), or politics (Chen 2003a).  
Among them, Bian and Logan (1996) attempt to unpack the relationship between the 
roles in the transition of leading social actors, institutional changes, and market 
transition in China.  Bian and Logan offer an in-depth discussion regarding the 
transition of bureaucracy, income inequality, and reform policy in the urban cities of 
China; however, they do not interpret the associations between them from the 
institutional change perspective, and fail to address the interrelationship between 
state agents and leading actors in the markets’ framework.  On the other hand, Lin 
(1989) has examined China’s transition, especially in relation to the economics of 
information, property rights, transaction costs, induced innovations, and imposed 
institutions.  He analyses the functions and choices of social institutions and 
considers the mechanisms of institutional change, and demonstrates that institutions 
provide useful services and that institutional choices and changes can be analysed 
within the demand and supply framework and pays attention to the role of the state in 
the process of institutional change.  Nonetheless, Lin pays little attention to the 
market transition and institutional changes despite a full discussion regarding 
institutional changes and property rights.  Lin’s article eventually falls short of 
illustrating the roles in the transition of leading social actors within the institutional 
change process of China. 
 
In this research, I synthesise different theoretical perspectives to explain the 
relationship between institutional change and role transition of HNWIs in China.  
These institutions can be seen to form the cornerstone of social life through their 
formal and informal rules that define the context within which individuals and 
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groups operate and interact with each other.  In this way, such institutional change 
may re-define the sets of opportunity, re-distribute the scarce resources, re-allocate 
social wealth, and re-position people’s social status.  In this research, I will use elite 
interviews to complement the shortcomings of missing secondary data, which is 
fragmented due to discontinuities and inconsistencies in statistical information and 
political constraints.  I adopt the triangulation method (Denzin 1978:295) to reduce 
any negative side effects of biased interview data and the discontinuous secondary 
data.  
 
In chapter two, I will depict the background to the dissertation, which describes the 
reasons behind initiating the research and my own experiences in China.  It refers to 
the context of China’s transition, the emergence of HNWIs, and their impact on the 
emergence in China.  In the last two sections of next chapter, the research questions 
and purpose of the study are set out respectively.  The third and fourth chapters relate 
to the literature review and elucidation of the theoretical perspectives of this 
dissertation, the adopted theories, and their parameters.  In the fifth chapter, research 
methods, major controversies, and main research problems are tackled.  In the sixth 
chapter, I will analyze the methodology and associated issues.  In chapter seven, I 
will have the final analysis justifying my research propositions.  Finally, I will 
conclude this research and make suggestions for further research in the eighth 
chapter.     
 
  
Page 15 of 484 
2. Dissertation Background 
In this chapter, I will explain not only the dissertation background but also how 
different schools of institutional change theory could account for the emergence of 
and changes in China’s HNWIs together with their relationship to the markets.  In 
June 1999, I was appointed as the first managing director of the Asian-Pacific 
department of a German company, which was one of the largest architectural fabric 
companies in the world.  During my time in office, I had signed some remarkable 
projects for the company, e.g. National Stadium (Birdnest) of 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games.  I also had experience of living in Xiamen, Shanghai, Beijing, and Dongguan, 
and frequent business trips to different cities, e.g. Hangzhou, Chongqing, Yangzhou, 
and Mohe that experienced varied economic development.  In my experience, all my 
clients desperately wanted the most sophisticated and expensive roofing material for 
their public facilities whether or not they could afford it.   
 
Through the in-depth understanding of different kinds of people in various industries, 
regions, and socio-economic strata, I have been able to recognize that most people in 
China share one characteristic – that of capriciousness.  This specific characteristic 
reinforces the comment from Dixit et al. (2008) that China is too volatile to 
challenge its assumptions and compel it to innovate.  In 2006, I decided to leave my 
career after working for six consecutive years in China in order to undertake further 
disciplined academic training.  Because I was deeply involved in a variety of projects, 
I recognized that China is caught between misinterpreted socialism and crony 
capitalism2 with the result that it suffers from the worst of both systems. Urban 
residents, government agents, and Communist Party officials in China have 
harvested most of the fruits of reforms (Pocha 2005).  Because the CCP remains 
intact and in tight control, the self-correcting mechanisms within the CCP may 
eventually fail.  Consequently, they may lose their legitimacies as well as their 
control of regime.   
 
                                                 
2 Crony capitalism in terms of the control exerted over a large part of a country’s corporate assets that 
are held by a small group of families (Morck et al. 2005). 
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Many scholars (Kornai 1980 ;Burns 1989 ;Przeworski 1991 ;Dewatripont and 
Roland 1992 ;Kornai 1992 ;Stark 1996 ;Kornai 2000) argue that reforms in China 
and other former socialist countries are different in terms of the pattern that is 
gradual in China but radical in other countries. The only difference between these 
countries, from this perspective, is the point at which to get over the political 
constraints; however, the CCP eventually needs to leap over the Communist political 
barrier.  In the former Soviet Union (FSU) and central and eastern European 
countries (CEE), they jumped over the political hurdle at the beginning of reforms, 
even before the emergence of interest groups.  However, China may start to get over 
these political hurdles only in the middle of reforms following the emergence of 
interest groups.  These interest groups may put pressure on ruling elites to oppose 
any further reforms that will take away their existing privileges.  Because the 
pressure is dynamic, it inevitably skews the predictability of institutional change in 
China.   
 
In China, the constant economic growth has not brought wealth to most people.  The 
continuous GDP growth in China presents a striking contrast to its relatively poor 
GDP per capita.  As Huang (2010) argues, the greater the differences between the 
GDP and GDP per capita, the higher the risk to the stability and sustainability of the 
state.  From this perspective, successful long-term economic growth should bring 
substantial wealth to the mass majority instead of merely strengthening the economic 
power of the state.  Shirk (1993:11) argues that economic reforms in China 
politically re-allocate the major wealth and power involved in the transition from 
central planning to market competition.  Therefore, political leaders have to mobilize 
groups who will benefit from economic reforms, into an effective coalition of 
support and neutralise the groups who will lose out because of the reforms.   
 
China has evolved from a proletarian society to a bourgeoisie following the 
economic reforms, and has developed a unique and unusual framework of 
institutional changes (see Fig 2, 3 and Note 3).  In the early period, China’s reforms 
had essentially improved the standard of living of most people (see Fig 4, 5) because 
people in the lower tier(s) could influence institutions made by the top tier(s) whilst 
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the CCP focused more on the wider populace, especially people in rural areas.  Most 
institutional changes in this period were seem to be bottom-up and spontaneous, e.g. 
Household Responsibility, TVEs (Town-Village Enterprises), etc.  However, 
opportunities to appeal successfully were relatively reduced after the 1989 
Tiananmen protests because of the increasing constraints between tiers to curb and 
eliminate these strengths.  In China, the dynamic political institutions, which make 
economic reforms unpredictable and less comprehensible, dictate those 
accompanying economic reforms.  In addition, because of the pressure from existing 
interest groups and volatile political institutional changes, the context of economic 
reforms has been modified as will the bargaining power over economic reforms.  In 
this sense, economic reforms conducted by political elites will be tightly related to 
and seriously affected by political elements.   
 
China’s economic reforms brought vitality to a previously deteriorated economy and 
improved the living standards of most people in China before 1985. However, the 
political system remains preserved in the Communist nature whilst simultaneously 
presiding over the reforms of the economic system (Dickson 2004).  Economic 
reforms in China symbolize the introduction of a relatively complicated market 
competition system into a simple command economic system in which enterprise has 
no autonomy in terms of input, output, and human resource delegation.  Nevertheless, 
the main impediment to the economic reforms in China is that those relatively 
complicated social behaviours, formal and informal rules that people take for granted 
in the market competition system, were not so taken for granted in the command 
economy system.  Therefore, reforms in China mainly comprise two aspects: (1) a 
social reform from a traditional, rural, agricultural, and semi-closed society to a 
modern, urbanised, and open society, and (2) an economic reform from a highly 
centralised planned economic system to a socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics that integrates a market competition system into a command economic 
system (Deng 1983).     
 
The perspective of the remarkable economic growth or the party-state misinterprets 
China’s transition.  Optimistic researchers (Goldman and Goldman 1988 ;Naughton 
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1993 ;Cannon 2000 ;Chen 2002 ;Chow 2004 ;Lin 2004 ;Naughton and Yang 
2004 ;Chow 2007 ;Hwang 2007 ;Goodman 2008 ;Chang et al. 2009) analyse China’s 
transition from the perspective of economic growth.  In contrast, pessimistic scholars 
(Leung 2004 ;Hongyu and Yue 2005 ;Bouckaert 2007 ;Dyer 2010a) suggest that the 
CCP will confront economic impasses due to overcapacity, social inequality (Bian 
and Logan 1996 ;Chen 2003b ;Fleisher 2006b), or social discontent (Yang 2005).  
There are some scholars (Chen et al. 1992 ;Ding 1994,2000b ;Choi and Zhou 
2001 ;Dickson 2003 ;Chancellor 2010) in the pessimistic school who even consider 
that one crisis will lead to another.  Nevertheless, both schools contain grains of truth 
and, as Oi (2010) points out, may not convey China’s institutional changes 
impartially.  For instance, the optimistic school focusing on economic performance, 
relies heavily for its arguments on the economic index (i.e. GDP), which counts only 
goods and services that are traded in the market or supplied by government that have 
prices attached to them.  Therefore, it may take a superficial view in examining 
China’s economy because this kind of index can hardly measure all of the social 
activities that are not traded in the market but nonetheless contribute to the entire 
well-being of our society (Baumol et al. 2007:23).   
 
Although China’s reforms are politically logical but not necessarily economically 
logical (Shirk 1993), the result of economic reforms in China remains praiseworthy.  
More than one billion people’s lives are fundamentally improved within a relatively 
short period compared with many developed countries.  However, as Oliver (1992) 
argues, previously institutionalized practices established before the reforms seemed 
unsustainable or failed to function well after the reforms and can be referred to de-
institutionalization.  This de-institutionalization refers to the de-legitimation of 
established organizational practices because of organizational challenges to 
reproduce previously legitimated or taken-for-granted organizational actions.  In this 
regard, organizational behaviours and changes will not be explained by social 
consensus around the meaning and the value of an activity or by conformity to 
institutional pressures (Oliver:ibid).  Therefore, institutional pressures for conformity 
and shared interpretations of institutional rules and expectation fail in their 
predictable consequences on organizations.  This research not only reflects 
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established theories or the conclusions of past research regarding transitional China, 
but also discusses the previously mentioned institutional contradictions existing in 
contemporary China.  Therefore, I argue that China’s transitions are composed of  a 
series of de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization (see Note 4).   
  
2.1 THE CONTEXT OF CHINA’S TRANSITIONS 
In this section, I explain the context of China’s reforms that focuses on the 
parameters, timescale, and actors.  Some scholars (Lieberthal 1984 ;Shirk 
1989 ;Chen et al. 1992 ;Goldstein 1995 ;Naughton 1995 ;Rawski 1995 ;Yang 
1996b ;Cui and Gan 1997 ;Oi and Walder 1999 ;Zhang 1999) focus on China’s 
transition concluding that Deng Xiaoping primarily initiated economic reforms in 
1978.  In a nutshell, Deng and his collaborators were pragmatists (Lo 1989) and only 
legitimized various ‘faits accomplis’ rather than making innovative institutional 
changes.  It was Liu Shaoqi, the former President of China and General Secretary of 
CCP between 1959 and 1969, who initiated economic reforms (Fei 1986 ;Xu 1997).  
Nonetheless, the economic reforms since 1978 continue to be implemented under the 
Communist political constraints (Dickson 2004).  That is, the economic reforms 
could not but be skewed due in part to political intervention and result in inefficiency 
and loose planning.   
 
Because China’s reforms consist of various transitions, I adopt the institutional 
change approach to the understanding of the context.  However, institutional theory 
has long been criticized for its lack of attention to political process and other non-
institutional factors that respond to institutional pressures (Powell 1985 ;Di Maggio 
1988 ;Oliver 1991); thus, I need to incorporate political and social institutions into it 
to facilitate my research.  Since some important variables affecting economic 
development were not economic but concerned with politics (Fukuyama 2004:22-23), 
political institutions may, therefore, play a vital key role in China’s transition.   
 
The chronology of China’s reforms began with the Household Responsibility System 
(Dabaogan or Baochan Daohu), which was initiated in Anhui province in 1976, and 
followed by the TVEs (Town-Village Enterprises) in rural areas and shareholding 
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and privatizing of State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs), which were legally owned by 
the public, in urban areas (see Note 5).  Subsequently, the acquisition of SOEs, 
particularly those made by incumbent managers, became the prevailing pattern for 
reducing the financial burdens incurred by the legacy of full employment.  Many of 
these newly emerging enterprises, in particular those that were previously 
collectively-owned, were vague about property rights and emerged in circumstances 
of lax regulations that went on surprisingly to create economic growth (Wei 2001).  
Zhang (2003), a Chinese advocate of SOE privatization, argued that collectively 
owned enterprises or TVEs were literally privatized.  Because many former 
managers of SOEs became the nouveau HNWIs (Shirk 1993 ;Oi and Walder 
1999 ;Steinfeld 2002 ;Tsai 2008), I assume that manipulated institutional changes 
caused subsequent embezzlements and infringements after the reforms.   
 
In China, many groundbreaking shifts of policy do not take place with one big, 
cathartic announcement, but are noiseless, tacit, and constantly evolve through a 
steady drip of leaks, hints, denials and oblique official statements (Dyer 2010b).  
Different agents may exercise discretion in the interpretation of such vague policies, 
resulting in different consequences due to the blurred literal meaning of reform 
policy.  Hence, the relations between transitions of roles played by HNWIs and 
political elites, need to be unpacked to facilitate this research.  After the reforms, the 
CCP withdrew from accepting all associated social costs whilst retaining control and 
allocation of the main scarce resources (Zhou 2004:22).  Because the state per se is 
not an individual nor is it a single organization (Aharoni 1981) and consists of 
individuals and organizations, the state has, therefore, to rely on bureaucrats at 
different levels to manage the control and allocation of resources.  These bureaucrats 
are bounded by restricted tenures, rationalities, and lives (Williamson 
1981,1986,1991).  In order to maximize their utilities, they may endeavour to pay 
lower costs in the pursuit of personal benefits.  By paying less, the political elites 
exploit the monopoly of legitimate coercion given to them in order to influence 
economic reforms regardless of long-term national policy.  Therefore, the reform 
targets may fluctuate reflecting the bargaining and compromising between politics 
and economy (see table 1).   
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From table 1, it can be seen that China’s economic reforms are neither consistent nor 
deliberate; instead, they are experimental and tentative (Pei 1999 ;Zhang 
2003 ;Bouckaert 2007), and compromised, swinging between different factions.  
Because of the characteristics of the party-state regime and legacy of previous social 
conflicts such as the Cultural Revolution, state agents in China were able to exploit 
their coercive power that allows states to protect property rights as well as to 
confiscate private property (Fukuyama 2004:1-2), and to devise unique and 
favourable property rights.  These property rights reforms in China closely resemble 
the truncation of ownership rights (Demsetz 1988 18-19) as a consequence of the 
elimination of vital elements (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) (i.e. alienability and 
exclusivity) that were deliberately assigned to or taken over by the state agents, party 
cadres, or other elites.   
 
After 1979, property rights have been gradually, but informally, granted to Chinese 
people in order to motivate them to pursue private interests enthusiastically.  In 
addition to that, the coexistence of market competition and the planned economy also 
gave state agents the leeway to exploit the rights of re-distribution and re-allocation.  
Therefore, social discontent and conflicts with existing political constraints have 
been developed (see Note 6).  What actually produces the polarizations in China, e.g. 
high economic growth and low GDP per capita?  What are the reasons and causes 
behind the CCP’s doctrinaire adherence to the communist political system?  Who are 
those HNWIs in China?  How did they accumulate their wealth under these unstable 
conditions?  I intend to unpack these controversies in following sections.   
 
The property rights transition seems to be at the heart of China’s reforms.  There 
were very few peripheral self-employed entrepreneurs (ge-ti-hu) in the command 
economic system.  They were significantly prejudiced in proletarian China (Shirk 
1989 ;Hubbard 1995 ;Putterman 1995 ;Li 1996 ;Wank 1998 ;Choi and Zhou 
2001 ;Carrillo 2008 100).  After the late 1970s, Deng and his followers advocated 
increasing the market activities and giving more autonomy to self-employed 
entrepreneurs, peasants, and rural enterprises without changes to the existing political 
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institutional environment.  Subsequently, the privatization of urban SOEs apparently 
became apposite to the purpose of economic reform.  However,  privatization created 
huge information asymmetries in China (Sinn et al. 1997 ;Trujillo et al. 2002) as 
there was a substantial lack of institutional capability for implementing privatization 
appropriately.  Therefore, public assets and ownership rights cannot be properly 
identified, valued, and transferred.  Some bureaucrats may exert coercive power 
enabling them to re-allocate property rights and re-distribute public resources in their 
own interests or the likes. 
 
Although China is on the road to exiting from the communist economy to market 
competition and from rural society to urbanization since 1978, the party-state polity 
remains in tight control of most activities (Wang 2004:10).  Consequently, the 
reforms in China have been merely confined to economic activity instead of 
expanding to the more comprehensive domain of institutional changes such as 
political institutions and the legal framework.  As Rutherford (1994:1) says, most 
economic initiatives attempt to incorporate institutions and institutional changes.  
Therefore, it may not be inappropriate to explain China’s institutional changes from, 
but not to limit them to, the economic perspective.  
 
Because economic growth in China continues to broaden the income gap between 
rural and urban areas, poorer and conspicuously affluent people have been 
concurrently emerging as a major contradiction in China under the partial reforms.  
As reforms in China are too volatile and are the embodiment of politics, therefore, 
the more the reforms are made, the deeper the politics interfere.  The cause of the 
intricate relations between the economy and politics was artificially created in China 
because Deng and his collaborators intentionally put economic reforms far ahead of 
political reforms in order to retain control of political power at the beginning of the 
reforms.  As White (1991:13) said, they created a market economic system in China 
that was presided over by a Communist political system.  
 
Demsetz (1983) and Barzel (1989:5) contend that people are inclined to capture 
wealth from the public domain, especially people who actually enjoy control of 
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rather than legally have ownership of scarce resources.  In this regard, many scarce 
economic resources and opportunities monopolized and allocated by CCP at different 
levels during the pre-reform era have been largely privatized to privileged groups 
after reforms.  Zhang (1999:143-162) argues that state ownership in China resembles 
‘absentee ownership’ (Veblen 1990:157).  Zhang’s argument is controversial 
because state property is in everybody’s ownership rather than in absentee ownership 
(Zhou 2000:176).  In China, the problem with public property rights lies with the 
word ‘public’ but not “property rights” because public in this sense means nobody.  
Therefore, this lack of clarity allows leeway to agents to embezzle and usurp public 
assets because of the vague definition of public property rights.   
 
In China, bureau-preneurs actually have control over the legal rights of re-allocation 
and re-distribution of resources that led to direct engagement in profit seeking and 
market competition during the economic transition.  In order to perpetuate the rent-
seeking opportunities and economic growth, some bureaucrats have created a wide 
variety of ad hoc patronage for private and foreign investments within their 
administrative areas in order to attract foreign investments and encourage domestic 
entrepreneurship (Wu 1997) and therefore improve economic growth.  Consequently, 
bureau-preneurs can jump on the bandwagon of perpetuating economic growth and 
continue to seize rent-seeking opportunities.  In addition, the intricate network in 
China (guanxi) tilts the level playing field to an extremely distorted situation in terms 
of resources re-allocation and re-distribution in transitional China.  Chow (2004:67-
83) argues that the imbalance and special network is inevitable during China’s 
transformation, and believes this imbalance to be a trickle-down whereby some 
people have to be very rich in order to encourage others.  His argument corresponded 
to Deng’s advocating, “Make some people rich first”.  However, Chow later (ibid:69) 
admits that social discontents were generated among poor and rich because of 
unrealized trickle-down effect.  That is, the “make some people rich first” mantra 
could not be convincing if this specific scheme deliberately excluded other people 
from equal opportunities to do likewise.   
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In China, around 80% of Town-Village-Enterprises (TVEs) were essentially private 
enterprises in the disguise of the “red caps” (colloquial meaning for the collectively-
owned) of collectivized enterprises (Zhu et al. 2003).  They enjoyed an unrecognised 
social status in China before 1988 (Shirk 1989 ;Hubbard 1995 ;Putterman 1995 ;Li 
1996 ;Wank 1998 ;Choi and Zhou 2001 ;Carrillo 2008 100) because private 
enterprise was only legally granted after then.  Since 1988, the popular image of 
private entrpreneurs has been transformed to that of an upwardly mobile group. 
Today private entrepreneurs display ‘conspicuous consumption’ (Veblen 1899:53) in 
China in a way commensurate with their new social status.  Next, I will discuss if 
present-day HNWIs have evolved either from the previous self-employed 
entrepreneurs or from the bureaucrats-bureaupreneurs.  
 
2.2 Bureaupreneurs and HNWIs in Transitional China 
I continue to analyse the constituency, emergence and transition of China’s HNWIs 
in this section.  It is important to know the components of any social phenomenon in 
order to reach a better understanding and ability to predict its consequences (Hallinan 
1997).  In China, private enterprises were legitimately recognized after 1988 
although they were launched in 1980 (Zhu et al. 2003).  Today China has the largest 
and fast-growing numbers of HNWIs in Asia (Aerni et al. 2008). However, it is 
unclear how early HNWIs accumulated their wealth while capital market and private 
property rights were not comprehensively granted.  Some HNWIs became affluent 
through recent IPOs that only emerged up to 1990 (see Note 7).  Before 1978, people 
in China were equally poor and had no decent private properties owned by them 
except for valueless personal belongings (Zhou 2004:52).  Some political elites had 
better material lives (e.g. official car, fresh meat and vegetables, more staple food); 
they retained administrative controls and enjoyed material privileges, but were 
relatively restricted in money income and private wealth.  In this regard, those who 
became wealthy in the early reform stages could hardly accumulate their primitive 
capital before economic reform.   
 
Because market transition and privatization injected additional value into public 
assets and created unprecedented opportunities, those social elites retained a potent 
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social base of power and privilege from which to accumulate their individual wealth 
regardless of market reform or even regime change.  Thus, following the reforms 
initiated in 1978, many precious public assets have fallen prey to the manipulations 
of some people who have tended not to commence the comprehensive restructuring, 
which might disadvantage their acquisitions of these valuable assets.  I therefore 
argue that early HNWIs have one specific characteristic in common, which is either 
that they are able to control the resources allocation/redistribution or that they benefit 
from political protection from their parents, relatives, or close friends.  To be noted, 
those early reform policies are far different from current intricate ones (see Note 8).  
Nonetheless, a fundamental problem remains that since the beginning of reforms 
there is an institutional hole (Yang 2004), which gives a leeway to certain people to 
exploit the deficiency in the pursuit of their own interests and retention of their 
existing privileges.   
   
Before the reforms, social class struggles in China were ideologically oriented. 
Workers, peasants, and soldiers were the predominant strata in the society, and 
intellectuals and the minor numbers of self-employed (geh-ti-hu) were outcast groups, 
despised and with marginal social standing (Lieberthal 2004:121).  Today millions of 
rural migrant workers and mass urban unemployed labourers have been created by 
the industrial restructuring and economic reforms resulting in new social subservient 
stratum (Dyer 2010a);  the main distinction between different social strata now is 
material assets instead of ideological beliefs.  Ironically, the ways of accumulating 
wealth in contemporary China usually prevail in capitalist societies instead of in 
communist countries.  In other words, they are sponsored by and growing out of the 
‘womb of socialism’ (Dutton 1998:3).  Therefore, China’s society is becoming 
increasingly divided into both social and economic domains (Wang 2004:viii), and 
those bureaupreneurs represent the gradual privatisation of political power, resulting 
in the formation of a realm of genuine private enterprises with the full separation of 
business and administration (Bouckaert 2007).   
 
Because China’s Bureaupreneurs are state agents still controlling all resources 
critical for the development of business, but at the same time involved in firms, 
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operating in competitive markets, especially integrating into the rural enterprises or 
the Town-Villages-Enterprises (TVEs, xiangzhen qiye) that prevailed from 1979-
1985; therefore, they are the unique recumbent of bureaucrat and entrepreneur that 
has been emerging along with economic reforms and social conflicts.  TVEs in China 
are broadly referred to as small individual-owned-enterprises, rural collective-
enterprises, and rural industries in many documents (Putterman 1992).  With respect 
to TVEs, myriad scholars have provided abundant accounts of their emergence (see 
Note 9).  In China, political constraints and economic opportunities confronting 
entrepreneurs have a direct relevance to the selection and outcome of their strategies 
and survival, it is not practical to explain transitions that do not take political 
constraints into account (Roland 1994).  Therefore, without corresponding 
restraining institutional measures, any differential and biased treatment from reform 
policy may significantly tilt the balance of gains between people (Lin 2001:6).  Thus, 
bureaucrats controlling all resources critical for the development of business have the 
leeway to access wealth when the firms involved operate within competitive markets, 
and arguably become HNWIs consequently. 
      
In Mao’s last decade (1966 – 1976), political decentralization diluted monopoly and 
special privileges helping Mao to contend with his political rivals during the Cultural 
Revolution (Solnick 1996 ;Yang 1996b).  Consequently, political decentralization at 
different hierarchical levels in China had sown the seed of its own future 
predicament, which is believed to be the cause of rent-seeking activity and 
embezzlement of public assets thereafter (see Note 10).  When political struggles 
continued with varying degrees of intensity, the CCP regime became fragile and 
fragmented (Lampton 1987).  Therefore, in order to retain the balance of powers, 
political stability, and supports from localities, the reformists deliberately overlooked 
those implementations carried out by local state agents.  In this case, unconstrained 
politics allows leeway to bureaucrats at different hierarchical levels.  At first, the 
economic reforms were a “reform without losers” (Lau et al. 2000) because this was 
the most painless way towards reform without eliminating the pre-existing rents of 
state agents (Ronald 2000).  In other words, political supports were exchanged for 
maintaining the stability.  Under these unusual circumstances, many compromised 
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institutional changes were established and consequently enabled bureaupreneurs to 
accumulate their early base capital and become HNWIs.  For example, dual-track 
pricing systems, reforms with ambiguous ownership rights, and SOE privatization all 
went awry and were translated into profiteering (Guan Dao), embezzlement, and 
collusion respectively.    
 
Because bureaupreneurs control essential resources critical for business development 
and are simultaneously involved in competitive market operations, they are, on the 
one hand, referees setting up and implementing formal regulations and, on the other 
hand, they are entrepreneurs competing with other ordinary players in markets where 
the rules are established by themselves (Lin 2001:98,102).  In this regard, 
bureaupreneurs have been extremely successful in the newly introduced market 
economic system.  As Pierson (2004:112) argued, the institutional environment will 
differ over time as political actors and social environments change and China is no 
exception.  After the succession of President Hu Jingtao in 2003, poverty relief (Fu 
Pin) and equality-and-harmony (Jun Fu He Xie) have become the prevailing political 
policies rather than economic invigoration.  The Economy and Nation Weekly 
(2010), a major representative of the China State News Agency (Xin Hua She), 
firmly advocated that the subsequent income redistribution should be approached 
more impartially and drastically since huge social injustices existed in the preceding 
income redistribution.  In this regard, any existing interest groups or HNWI may be 
likely to be blamed or accused for whatever they have done in terms of the pursuit of 
private interest whether it was permissible or illegitimate (see Note 11).    
 
Arguably, the CCP has been adopting a zero-tolerance policy on politics since the 
first day they took control of China.  Under the circumstances, if culprits do not 
conflict with the political interests of those in power, most problems can be more or 
less solved in an economic way.  Therefore, once a new faction(s) takes over the 
political controls, tacticians should adapt their previous institutional arrangements to 
the new institutional environment promptly to avoid any potential damage from 
adverse institutional arrangement(s).  This statement confirms that the reform 
package in China is politically logical but not necessarily economically logical 
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(Shirk 1993:17).  So far, I have gained more information regarding the origin, 
emergence, and transition of bureaupreneurs and HNWIs in transitional China, and 
can see that whether the HNWIs evolved from ordinary people or bureaupreneurs, 
they (HNWIs) emerged along with political coercion.  This research argues that 
HNWIs in China largely depend on political institutions to achieve their economic 
achievements.  Therefore, any individual people or group (HNWIs) with existing 
interests customise their previous schemes agilely and rapidly to the new institutional 
environment in order to retain pre-eminence.  Otherwise, they may be replaced by 
emerging counterparts when new political potentates come into power.     
 
At this moment, I am focusing on the identity of HNWIs; therefore, I will discuss the 
legitimate identity of the private owner accordingly.  Before 1988, there is no official 
record of private enterprise because of the absence of any legitimate identity and 
recognition.  In the previous paragraph, I argue that people, who controlled resource 
allocation and distribution in the pre-reform era, will have a greater chance of 
becoming HNWIs after the reforms.  If this argument is correct, the early HNWIs 
must have been at certain hierarchical levels of government before the reforms.  
Actually, this argument has been justified by the survey done by the China Academy 
of Social Science (CASS) in 2002 (see Note 12).  This note has justified that people, 
who have control over resource allocation and distribution (highlighted in table 1, Note 
12) before initiating their companies, actually dominate the constituency of private 
owners.  From my interviews, I also have collected a lot of useful information to 
justify the preceding argument.  For the time being, I continue to maintain my 
argument that most early HNWIs previously dominated resource allocations and 
distribution before initiating their own private businesses. 
 
As a consequence of the decentralization, officials at different politically hierarchical 
levels, de facto embezzled state properties ‘within the red line’, that is to say within 
the party interest.  In the meantime, property rights were increasingly granted to 
ordinary people and this motivated people to pursue private interests enthusiastically.  
In addition, the co-existence of the market economy and the planned economy also 
gave officials the leeway to exploit the partial reforms.  Because property rights and 
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ownership matter in the transition since they are only feasible under well organized 
and functioning legal and administrative institutions and vice versa (Nellis 1999:V), 
private property rights give incentives to state agents to pursue their private profits 
through the institutional holes, which are generated in the process of incremental and 
partial reforms.   
 
People in China were equally deprived before economic reforms except those very 
few in the highest bureaucratic hierarchical positions.  After private property rights 
were re-introduced to China, people definitely needed decent private properties more 
so than the previous scanty ones.  Under the new given private property rights, the 
new private properties, which are at people’s disposal, are no longer those meagre 
ones that people possessed before reforms.  However, it is not possible for an 
individual to accumulate “primitive capital” (Marx [1906] 1990:714,715,873-940) 
and only state assets could be counted as genuine properties until the reforms were 
initiated.  A legitimate and newly introduced mechanism, that can be employed to 
transfer properties from state to private, is therefore imperative.  With such a 
legitimating mechanism, the acquisitions of state properties can be justified at 
different levels.  The nature of this acquisition is actually to transfer public assets 
from state ownership into private possession.  This privatization process can be 
either formal or informal although the process may be forbidden or discouraged by 
central government (Ding 2000c).  Occasionally however, a certain degree of 
pragmatic consents had been given to those prohibited or discouraged transfers of 
state assets by local authorities (Ding 2000a).  These arbitrary consents can be 
attributed to the political decentralization initiated in pre-reform China.  On the one 
hand, state policies were actually becoming the instrument by which those 
controversial acquisitions of state properties were legitimated through the deliberate 
distortion by authority at different hierarchical level; on the other hand, these policies 
helped people, who then controlled the state properties, to legitimate their 
embezzlements.  Next, I will discuss the impacts associated with the emergence of 
HNWIs in China.            
 
2.3 IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF HNWIS IN TRANSITIONAL 
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CHINA 
Although economic reforms have provided Chinese people with unprecedented 
economic growth and a variety of opportunities, the income gap, unequal wealth re-
distribution, and social polarization has soared in this rapidly commercializing 
society (Zhang 2008:23).  That is to say, the changing institutional arrangements, 
which were set to loosen policies and inspire privatization, did mostly enhance 
economic growth and this growth subsequently increased the average national wealth 
and created HNWIs (Chow 2007 ;Naughton 2007).  Why do I have to be attentive to 
the emergence of HNWIs in transitional China?  In what situation and time did they 
emerge?  What is the implication of their emergence?  How important was, is, and 
will be their emergence in China and how will they develop?  In this section, I 
attempt to unpack these questions and explain why and how important the impact 
and implications are in transitional China.   
 
Before the economic reforms, the term of “rich people”, to a large extent, was 
ideologically disgusting in China to a population where all were equally deprived 
and proletarian in orientation.  From 1976 onward, China gradually started to loosen 
policy controls and extended the reforms from policy domains to institutional 
domains in order to achieve permanent impacts.  In general, the previously missing 
capitalist stratum has been gradually resurfacing along with the economic reforms 
and these people have been adroitly amassing wealth and swiftly.  Consequently, 
speculation became prevalent and people signed up to the changes and joined the 
affluent social strata becoming HNWIs in transitional China (Oi 1999 ;Chow 
2005,2006 ;Naughton 2007 ;Goodman 2008).  
 
China, to some extent, is on the path that privatizes many SOEs, decreases legal 
unfairness against non-state and non-collective forms of ownership, and increases 
economic opening to the outside world whereas the CCP hardly foresaw the path of 
the reforms from the outset.  In 1978, all urban workforces were nearly employed in 
either the state or collective sectors.  By end of 2002, more than 33 per cent of urban 
employment was located in the private or non-SOEs sectors, including self-
employment (Ministry of Labour and Social Security and State Statistics Bureau, 
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2002).  In this regard, these ongoing economic reforms have created massive 
opportunities for private activity amongst bureaupreneurs and HNWIs.  After the 
economic reforms, many people began to pursue their private interests, with the 
acquiescence of the CCP, in different ways, e.g. dual tracking pricing, SOE reforms, 
MBO, corporatizing, and other innovative schemes.  Some bureaucrats consequently 
abandoned government duties and ideological beliefs, and directly participated in 
business operations (Xie Hai), collusions, embezzlement, or recombining public and 
private interests by means of complicated interpersonal relationships.  Therefore, the 
emergence of HNWIs in transitional China may well represent the changes and 
paradoxes of property rights, ideology, and re-distributions of social resources 
(Goldman and Goldman 1988 ;Nee 1989 ;Birdsall and Nellis 2003 ;Economy & 
National Weekly2010) (see Note 13).  
 
China’s contemporary HNWIs are different from their counterparts in advanced 
capitalist countries or their previous comrades in the former FSU and CEE; and in 
this regard, their specific features are bound up with the processes of institutional 
change of social, political, and cultural economics in China (Chow 2007 ;Zhang 
2008).  Apparently, many HNWIs in China, whether they were previous state 
bureaucrats, peasants, scholars, and technicians, have been seizing the opportunities 
and their gains have outweighed the costs by virtue of institutional changes.  
Therefore, with so many economic changes varying according to the unusual set of 
political circumstances, it is hard for people to comprehend straightforwardly the 
economic reforms.  For example, many unusual economic institutional arrangements 
often run counter to the general wisdom, such as long-term negative interest rates, 
illegitimate SOEs privatization, or profiteering from the corporatizing system (Shih 
2009).  At the very outset, the ruling elites, first and foremost, chose to tackle the 
politically less risky reforms in order to maintain the stability of CCP’s regime (Pei 
1999).  Zhang (2003) and Bouckaert (2007) both contend that the emergence of  the 
newest institutions in transitional China seem to be parallel to or follow the 
emergence of the market instead of any deliberate planning.  Therefore, there were 
and are neither consistent nor deliberate reforms as such reforms that do occur are 
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strongly experimental and tentative, nor is the outcome necessarily in line with initial 
expectations.   
 
In China, bureaucrats, whether they are conservatives or pro-reformists, represent the 
interests of different factions of the ruling class instead of the interests of the 
working class or populace, which the CCP claimed to represent (Lee 1992:55).  
Therefore, any conflict among these bureaucrats hardly benefits ordinary people.  In 
retrospect, the reforms were initiated in the late 70s because of a deficit of legitimacy 
for Deng Xiaoping (Naughton 1993 ;Woo 1999 ;Dittmer 2003) to topple Hua 
Guofeng, who then was the legitimate successor after Mao’s death.  Therefore, Deng 
had to advocate different political propositions, which became the insurance for 
Deng Xiaoping in the power struggle with Hua Guofeng.  In fact, the struggle 
between them was raised to the international level.  The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese war 
was due in part to Deng trying to establish credibility for himself and his supporters 
(Chen 1992:17-23).  In this regard, the initiation of reforms was unlikely to improve 
the well being of ordinary people.  Unsurprisingly, given this fickle political 
environment, Chinese entrepreneurs concerned about their existing benefits, will 
endeavour to exert influence on any adverse reform policy, whether these 
entrepreneurs are parasitic or self-made (Chen 2002).  Therefore, these entrepreneurs 
have to act swiftly and agilely as speculators to retain existing privileges and survive 
robustly in such an inconsistent and unpredictable environment (Tsai 
2004:20;Kshetri 2007 ;Tsai 2008).  That is to say, adaptability, flexibility, and 
legitimacy of entrepreneurs will be patently associated with politics (see Fig 3).    
 
In order to keep the stability of the CCP’s regime, political conflicts between interest 
groups in transitional China will assume a peaceful version of struggle rather than 
the gory one, e.g. Cultural Revolution (Shih 2004b,2004a).  However, as Fligstein 
(1991:313) argues, unless there is a new set of agents taking over the controls, the 
organization’s goals will otherwise persist..  This statement explains why after Deng 
Xiaoping returned to power in 1976; the reforms were subsequently initiated soon 
after.  Unequivocally, there is little chance tof implement reform in China without 
the acquiescence or support of the CCP.  Therefore, as many scholars argue (Shirk 
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1989,1993 ;Oi 1999 ;Woo 1999) the economic reforms in China are actually the 
result of political deadlock and compromises within the CCP between conservatives 
and liberals, and a general lack of consensus in society rather than arising from any 
particular theory of reform.  In this regard, I argue that reforms in China have been 
artificially constructed with provisional political purposes in mind.   
 
As noted, the Chinese economic reform process was initiated from the least 
conflictual position instead of the most imperative one.  Furthermore, the entrenched 
ideological constraints confine many non-economic features of the economic 
operation because economic reform is more than simply institutional change but also 
the changes in people, including human behaviours, customs, and values.  Looking 
back, the reform process essentially reflects the demand-and-supply of institutional 
changes in contemporary China whether it appears to be absurd or rational.  Actually, 
the evolution of ownership rights in transitional China may be one of the best 
indicators for evaluating the demand-and-supply of institutional changes because 
there were few pre-existing beneficiaries of wealth accumulation.  As Barzel (2000) 
mentions, individuals will increase output only if provided with rights, e.g. 
ownership, movement, and voting.  Dictators can guarantee them these rights by 
relinquishing part of their own (despotic) power.  In this respect, economic output 
grows in the aftermath of the exchange-of-interests between dictators and subjects, 
i.e. economic reforms.  Because not every subject can help dictators to maintain their 
legitimacy, the exchange-of-interest is unfairly distributed and has to benefit specific 
interested people (groups) implicitly.  This unfair distribution and treatment are 
mainly presented in the form of unequal access to social opportunities, e.g. medical 
care, education, and housing policy, instead of seemingly impartial economic 
opportunity.   
 
From the very outset, China’s administration assumed the economic reforms would 
be completed by the mid-90s according to the plans of three, five, and eight years 
(SAN WU BA GAI GE GUI HUA).  However, it has already taken 30 years since 
1978 and the reforms are still ongoing and will be so for the foreseeable future.  
Manifestly, it seems that reforms, supposedly based on a socialist economy, have not 
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completely espoused what the PRC administration expected.  Under such 
circumstances, China’s institutional arrangements could be merely made in 
accordance with the prevailing reality rather than the other way around.  As North 
mentions (1990), the prevailing reality is actually derived from previous habits, 
behaviours, formal and informal rules.  According to his argument, previous small 
events will lead one to a particular path (1990:94).  I therefore can be certain that the 
economic reforms in China will mainly serve the prevailing political condition 
instead of being efficiency-driven.       
 
Many core economic features in China were far more uncomplicated and 
unambiguous in the pre-reform era rather than the complex and abstract counterparts 
after the reforms, e.g. ownership rights and transaction costs (Ding 2000a).  To those 
state agents, who have been working since the pre-reform era, the straightforward 
ownership rights were institutionalized as habitual assumptions that they have 
acquired and take for granted (Commons 1931).  Therefore, I understand why the 
previously taken-for-granted habits, customs, and resulted-in formal and informal 
institutions persisting in society, have serious effects on the bureaucrats’ behaviours 
(see Note 14).   
 
Yet, I have learned that the relation between the bureaucrat and economic elites in 
China resembles the relationship of patron-client because state power can be bought, 
sold, and exchanged between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs (Pearson 1997:3;Wank 
1999:227).  Although economic elites become more structurally autonomous and 
ideologically hostile, it seems they hardly attempt to transfer this patron-client 
relation into strong pressure on politics.  On the contrary, these elites initiate a new 
pattern of clienteles closely tied to the state administration (Pearson 1997).  The 
pervasiveness of the patron-clientele in transitional China reveals the truth that 
business elites or, HNWIs, tend to maintain, first and foremost, a pragmatic 
commitment to putting business first as in other developing countries (Becker 
1983 ;Pearson 1997:101) and to rely on state agents to ease the constraints of th 
socialist market economy (Nee and Opper 2006a).   
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I have briefly discussed the economic reforms in relation to loose policy control, 
incomplete policies, innovative economic schemes, and the economic growth.  
Nevertheless, there is one important common thread that relates these issues to the 
economic reforms.  That is, most economic institutional arrangements have been 
subjectively imposed by state agents, not created spontaneously.  The emergence of 
HNWIs in China is certainly an epochal breakthrough for a previously proletarian 
country.  The implications of the emergence of HNWIs not only reflected in their 
different social status economically but also suggests that bureaucrats might give up 
future streams of revenue by accepting present gains (Rose-Ackerman 1999:118); 
therefore, entrepreneurs will become inter-dependent, inter-penetrated and share a 
new kind of addiction to the state’s resources (Solinger 1992:121).  Therefore, 
HNWIs in transitional China can efficaciously seize the profitable opportunities via 
the institutional holes (Yang 2004) and essentially dominate the new institutional 
arrangements because oligarchic political elites will empower and enrich the few 
(HNWIs) at the expense of the rest of the people (Huang 2008).   
 
Regarding the HNWIs’ pursuits of self-interest, there are negative impacts on 
Chinese society as a whole.  First, HNWIs and their political collaborators are from 
the highest strata of society and therefore, they run relatively few risks in terms of 
the pursuit of their interests even they are illegal.  Second, those initiatives followed 
by HNWIs or their relatives, whether they are illegal, unethical, or immoral, are for 
the purposes of enhancing the power, profitability, or influence of the organizations 
involved.  Third, if these pursuits are illegal, the punishments inflicted were lenient 
compared to those given to common criminals (Simon 2006:12).  In general, HNWIs 
not only possess great fortune and the ability to make decisions that affect the 
ordinary population, but they also exert a great deal of control over scarce social 
resources, e.g. prestige, opportunity to access better education, medical care, and 
wealth, etc.  In next section, I go on to examine the social circumstances in 
transitional China that give rise to the emergence of HNWIs. 
 
2.4 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AND ECONOMIC REFORMS IN CHINA 
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The consequence of China’s economic growth, as Simon (2006:28) contends, may 
have contributed to an elite deviance that is virtually out of control.  In China, 
administrative interventions have increased income disparity and social discontent in 
transitional China; however, the situation of widening income disparity between the 
rich and the poor not only arises in contemporary China but also exists in other 
capitalist societies founded on private ownership of property.  In this section, I will 
discuss the relationship between the economy and politics in transitional China and 
examine the uniqueness of this relationship, embodying the nature of China’s system 
that is neither Capitalistic nor Command.    
 
In general, what had changed in transitional socialist countries in the 1990s was not 
their economic difficulties, widespread cynicism, or corruption, but the institutional 
mechanisms that served to promote order in the past, but had now lost their capacity 
to do so (Walder 1994).  Likewise, institutional mechanisms in transitional China 
have to maintain the order derived from the old regime regardless of its chronic and 
manifest economic problems and political liabilities.  Therefore, the CCP has had to 
create new institutions to connect state and society, make up ideological deficiencies, 
and subsequently vacate some existing seats for newly appointed pro-reform elites 
into the Party.  Because the emergence of a new stratum in China is not just the new 
mercantile stratum that has grown rich along with reforms, but also of the subaltern 
that has not (Dutton 1998:3); therefore, any superficial measure from government  is 
unlikely to withstand the backlash of conflicts between long-standing ideologies and 
entrenched interests.  In this regard, the intense and incomplete market-oriented 
reforms in China are in the disguise of a socialist market economy but with the actual 
practices of political economic power within them, they will inevitably bog down 
and become difficult to turn around.  In other words, these reforms deepen and 
deflect the cultural, economic, and ideological contradictions along with its progress 
(Zhao 2008:339).  Likewise, the forces of unrestricted transfers of wealth and assets 
from public to private reinforce the hubris and privileges of new bureaupreneurs, 
entrepreneurs, and HNWIs in contemporary China (Kampfner 2009:5).   
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In fact, any economic system, whether Capitalism or Communism, is not monolithic 
and homogenous in its nature (Baumol et al. 2007:viii).  Therefore, China’s 
transition from planned economy to socialist market economy cannot be exempted 
from transformation.  The socialist market economy, which is prevailing in China 
and Vietnam (Vuong 2010:345), allows private properties as any Capitalist state does, 
but leaves them within the hands of few elites, who are resourceful and well 
connected as earlier mentioned.  It is said that the essence of a socialist market 
economy is the planned economy in the disguise of the market economy.  In 
authoritarian countries, ruling elites often have sought to legitimize themselves 
through their capacity to sustain economic growth.  However, once economic growth 
comes to an end or starts to decline, their legitimacies disappear and instabilities 
ensue, e.g. Suharto’s Indonesia in 1997.  Likewise, it seems that the side effects of 
partial reforms backfired on the Chinese government because the economic 
vicissitudes are unable to sustain legitimacy permanently, e.g. the social discontent 
incurred by illegal housing demolition (Wukan protest).   
 
Economic reforms in China, on the one hand, have proceeded at a pace exceeding 
political reforms (Goldstein 1995) and, on the other hand, release social power so 
that existing institutions cannot cope with the changes without equivalent political 
reforms.  In terms of reforms, the CCP essentially seeks the separation of politics 
from the economy (Zhang 1997).  Politically, China must remain socialist or, 
specifically, under the control of CCP; economically, China introduces the market 
economic mechanism that can be no different from any capitalist society.  The 
overtone is that the CCP expects economic growth that will persistently legitimate its 
claim to be the sole ruling party in China (Dickson 2004) and never needs to justify 
whether its decision about separation is appropriate or not.  Since a market needs not 
just any liberal regulation or private ownership but is also carried by adequate 
institutions (Kolodko 1999), the CCP needs institutions, as Barzel (2002:250) 
mentions, to sustain the economic growth, devise favourable ownership rights, and  
maintain tight control of China in order to retain the balance of power between 
protector and clients .   
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In China, economic growth occurred at top speed and satisfied people at all levels of 
the society with ease (see Fig 5 and 6) in the early stages of the reforms between 1979 
and 1985.  The income disparity between rural and urban areas had reduced to a 
record-low level.  However, the ensuing reforms, e.g. dual-track pricing, SOE 
privatization, pushed the inflation rate and income inequality to an all-time peak.  
Thus, most people began to suffer from social inequality from 1985 onwards as the 
many negative consequences of partial reforms became manifest, intensified, and 
more intractable, e.g. infringed resources, increasing inflation, plummeting real 
interest rates, dual-track pricing, and increasing income disparity between rural and 
urban areas (see Fig 6 and 7).  Under the circumstances, these bad results provided 
the backdrop for and inevitably gave rise to the 1989 Tiananmen protests.   
 
Although China’s reforms in and of themselves created noticeable economic growth, 
there are yet many structural weaknesses existing in the economy and politics.  
These structural defects have mainly been derived from the legacies of the party-
state regime, driving the reforms towards unanticipated and undesirable 
consequences.  Further they may not be reflected in the economic growth because 
the CCP changed the economic base of China’s socialism by introducing private 
economic activities as an essential supplement to the state-owned economy without 
corresponding political institutional arrangements (Chan et al. 2008:5).  That is to 
say, privatization in China does not principally improve industrial performance by 
increasing the role of market forces (Beesley 1997:27), but manipulates the 
combination of political and economic interests of social elites while pursuing their 
personal interests, and to some extent illicitly transfers public assets to private hands 
through a complex body of devices and techniques (Ding 2000a).  Therefore, the 
transition of ownership rights in China may resemble a cynical appropriation of 
other people’s property and rights because the economic benefits have never been 
fairly shared by the public but have been widening the gaps between different social 
strata (Luxemburg 1951:432). 
 
In China’s economic reforms, TVEs, which can be any rural enterprise legally owned 
by all inhabitants of town or village but actually controlled by local bureaucrats or 
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party cadres.  To a certain extent, there is no fundamental distinction between TVS 
and SOE in terms of legitimate property rights (Walder 1995c) because there is no 
specific owner for both economic entities.  Some people (Zhang 2003) argue the 
ownership of SOE in China is equivalent to the absentee owner (Veblen 1997 ;Levy 
1998); however, this argument is logically unacceptable because the status of SOE is 
infringed ownership rather than absentee owner.  Nevertheless, bureaucrats at town-
village level, who manipulate TVEs, often exploit those corresponding scarce 
resources that large SOEs left far behind.  Besides, these lower level agents, who 
were delegated administrative power by the state, were significantly uneven in terms 
of education, integrity, and vision (see appendix 4) and effectively controlled the 
TVEs and appointed or dismissed TVEs’ managers, or by delegating this power to 
another designated agency (Clarke et al. 2008:391).  
 
China was actually in an economically promising era (see Fig 5 - 6) while TVEs were 
roaring in 1978-1985, and opaque property rights prevailed.  During the same period, 
income disparity and social discontent had been eliminated to an unprecedented low 
level since the reforms first began (see Fig 5).  In this period, the rural income growth 
rate was explicitly superior to the urban counterpart during the same period (see Fig 
5).  However, China’s economic growth was accompanied by a variety of 
urbanization; that is, the more the cities are dominant, the less so is the agrarian land.  
The number of new cities in China has increased from 193 to 663 between 1979 and 
1999, and in the meantime, the registered urban population had increased from 18 
per cent in 1978 to 39 per cent in 2004 (State Statistics Bureau, 2000, 2003).  
Consequently, rural migrant workers increasingly move into urban areas owing to 
insufficient agrarian land.  Many scholars attribute the economic growth in part to 
the liberation of the rural migrant workforce after the collective agricultural 
productions of the People’s Communes were dismantled (Oi 1986,1989 ;Putterman 
1992 ;Shirk 1993 ;Weitzman and Xu 1994 ;Lin 1995 ;Naughton 1995 ;Yang 
1996a ;Xu 1997 ;Oi and Walder 1999 ;Wang 2004 ;Lin and Ho 2005).  In my 
opinion, the growing rural migrant workforce is due in larger part to fast urbanization.   
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In China, People’s Communes once played an important role before the reforms.  
They were efficiently utilized by the CCP to control and gather agricultural residuals, 
which was the only financial resource in pre-reform China because the agricultural 
residual is the only financial resource to support national structure plans prior to 
comprehensive industrialization (Gollin et al. 2002).  After the reforms were initiated 
without destroying the previous ownership rights and incurring overall social 
discontent in rural areas, the CCP agilely used collective-owned property rights, 
which remained tightly controlled by itself, to replace parts of private ownership 
rights and therefore lead to the truncation of ownership rights (Demsetz 1988:18-19).   
           
Regarding China’s transition, researchers should attend to the transitional role of 
bureaupreneurs in the institutional changes of China.  Because of the established 
decentralization, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs became reciprocal and symbiotic or, 
legitimizer and legitimizee.  For example, once bureaucrats and entrepreneurs 
merged into bureaupreneurs, they could exert a crucial influence with supports from 
local state agents and the likes to accumulate their primitive capitals with few 
economic and political limits (Adoratskiĭ and Torr 1942:231,533).  In many cases, 
bureaupreneurs re-arranged public assets, which are state assets or the like, under 
their control, and created new property forms that were to their own benefit and that 
of their peers (Stark 1996).  In this regard, they are good at exploiting and 
manipulating the institutional arrangements, which are frequently epitomized as 
provisional government policies (Yang 2002).  In the circumstances, bureaupreneurs 
are likely to legitimize their strategies and practices that are not clearly specified in 
existing institutional arrangements.  To them, the point is not whether institutions 
provide favourable incentives but whether opportunities for profit-making activities 
are actually implicit in the institutional structures.  It seems that bureaupreneurs are 
“as-if” rational (1994:653-657) because they act for sufficient reasons, which are 
their beliefs and desires in light of which the action appears to be appropriate (Elster 
2009:2).  Nevertheless, because a bureaupreneur is an entrepreneur with the capacity 
of a state agent, bureaupreneurs may be rational or act as-if they are rational.   
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However, the empirical support for rational-choice explanations of complex 
phenomena is weak (Elster 2007:26).  As mentioned earlier, ordinary people, state 
agents, bureaupreneurs, and HNWIs may not be rational although they may think 
themselves as-if they are (Friedman 1994:653-657).  In addition, Oliver Williamson 
(1996) argues that economic man to whom hyper-rationality is often attributed, 
indeed does not exist in the real world.  Therefore, even an individual is possibly 
rational, his or her rationality is limited by his ability to receive, store, retrieve, and 
process information to make knowledge or feelings understood by others 
(Williamson 1975).  In this respect, people will inevitably pursue maximization of 
self-interest with cognitive limitations and bounded rationality (ibid Williamson).  
For that reason, people may be in pursuit of maximization of self-interest (rational) 
without comprehending consciously and be influenced by the prevalent or 
established institutional environment.   
 
Before the economic reforms, state wealth was actually under the control of the CCP 
cadres and state agents.  Therefore, the state wealth could not be transformed into 
valuable assets or monetary value but ostensibly belonged to the people.  One must 
know that state wealth cannot be fairly converted into valuable assets or monetary 
value that previously belonged to the public, if there is no adequate institutional 
arrangement to guide the transition of property rights (De Soto 2000 ;Boyle 2003).  
As a general rule, wealth can only become a valuable asset with monetary value if 
they are carried by corresponding property rights.  In Note 15, I have explained the 
crux of all consequent maladies afflicting China’s reforms.  Following this, I will 
examine the reason(s) behind this and how it triggered events from the perspectives 
of ideological belief, property rights, rationality, organizational behaviour, resource 
dependence, and institutional change.   
 
In general, the CCP has discriminated against political reforms and in favour of 
economic ones since the beginning of the transition.  Surprisingly, the consequences 
of the partial reforms led China’s economy to a remarkable growth.  On the one hand, 
emerging HNWIs in China followed the footsteps of their counterparts in other 
Capitalist countries; on the other hand, the Communist political system, from all 
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aspects, remained technically intact and under tight controls in China.  Therefore, 
political elites can direct reforms along their preferred path and devise new 
ownership rights in favour of themselves and the like.  They agilely replace the 
important parts of private ownership rights with deliberately contrived ones, which 
are wholly manipulated by them, without dramatically changing previous ownership 
rights.  The consequence of this replacement soon results in the revised ownership 
rights becoming truncated (Demsetz 1988:18-19).  As a result, the manipulated 
reforms, which result in social discontent and income disparity, are no longer 
relevant to the ideological foundation of PRC but to an economic value after the 
fashion of Capitalism.  Therefore, I argue that China’s reforms are essentially 
reflected in the transitions of property rights.  
 
I have explained and discussed how the early transition of property rights and 
political interference in China (1978-1985) jeopardized subsequent economic 
reforms and made previously healthy economic growth becoming ephemeral.  In 
China, the blurred property rights (TVEs) startlingly improved the economic growth 
between 1978 and 1985 (see Fig 5) and led to people explicitly experiencing the 
promising economy at the same time.  Most of these TVEs, however, were in the 
guise of private firms (Nee 1992 ;Stark 1992a ;Peng and Heath 1996 ;Huang 
2008:xiv), which is obviously in conflict with the basic economic doctrines: 
ambiguous property rights impair economic growth (Furubotn and Pejovich 
1972 ;North and Thomas 1973b ;North 1987,1990).  They (basic economic rules) are 
provided for the protected realms of free action (property rights), voluntary 
cooperation between agents (contract law), and tort law, and protect internalization 
of external cost that should prohibit the government from awarding privileges to 
particular agents, who may distort markets and allow governments to build up 
networks for dependent clients (Bouckaert 2007).  Ironically, China retains economic 
growth for thirty consecutive years, whereas many of the existing economic 
institutions are in conflict with those general economic rules that are allegedly 
successful in other countries.  In this regard, I need to explore what the genuine but 
little known, feature lies in the transition to produce such economic growth in China.  
For example, do blurred property rights, which resemble institutional costs 
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(Williamson 1979) rather than institutional capital (Trebilcock 1995 ;Bresser and 
Millonig 2003a), actually improve economic growth or are there other factor(s) 
which we do not know about that offset the disadvantage of this institutional cost?  
In my opinion, although there are different patterns of institutional change in 
different countries, there always are some basic rules that commonly apply, not 
unlike those in basic mathematical operations of arithmetic.   
 
Now, I continue to scrutinize how institutional changes in China have arisen among 
different state agents (cadres) and have diffused into relevant interest groups.  In 
China, transitions do not explicitly point to the reform policies but implicitly and 
tentatively alter institutional arrangements (Bian and Logan 1996 ;Baum and 
Schevchenko 1999 ;Batjargal and Liu 2004).  Most reform policies, which will be 
applied to different testing points through different levels of state agent, have been 
proclaimed prior to any formal regulation.  As a result, these different policies 
benefit different agents in different domains, e.g. local and provincial government, 
light and heavy industry, SOEs and TVEs.  Therefore, these different agents 
inevitably engage in contests of benefit.  For instance, the establishment of SEZs 
(Special Economic Zones) in the early 1980s was not just any decree by Deng 
Xiaoping or other reformists but one that challenges the light industry department 
and heavy industry department, provincial governments and central government, and 
conservatives and pro-reformists (Shirk 1993 ;Nathan and Tsai 1995 ;Tsou 
1995 ;Shih 2004a ;Shih 2009).  In this regard, state agents can hardly fully follow 
diverse policies and long for a clear principle to guide their implementation of the 
reforms.  They have to, instead, choose the side, which will possibly maximize their 
individual benefits (Wank 1995 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Shirley 1999 ;Rozelle and 
Park 2000 ;Duckett 2001 ;Le 2004).   
 
Although China’s transition has been manifestly moving from a planned economy to 
market competition and from a traditional rural society to modern urban one, it has 
not fundamentally changed from socialism to real capitalism, which is based on the 
rule-of-law, clear property rights, and mature democracy (Wang 2004:10).  As 
described earlier, vague property rights and other inconsistent reforms are the likely 
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causal factors of the success of economic reforms.  This argument becomes 
contestable and sceptical because sustainable economic transition can hardly be 
sustained without simultaneous transitions in political, social, and cultural spheres.  
Rolland (2000:xviii) also argues that the large-scale institutional changes involved in 
transition are among the most complex economic and social processes.  In the 
meantime, those countries that had made progress in economic transition, had done 
so because they have been successful in reforming their political and social systems 
to create the institutions which support economic reform (Wang 2004:9).  However, 
the paradox is that nobody can be for sure how long the transition will continue or 
whether the countries engaged in this process will end up transformed into 
comprehensive capitalist economies (Bradshaw and Stenning 2000:121).  Therefore, 
it is indispensable and essential for me to comprehend the CCP and its organizational 
strategies and to distinguish the differences of transitions between China and other 
socialist societies in order to understand the processes of China’s transition and 
policy-making.   
 
Owing to the legacies of party-state regime and political interference, bureaupreneurs 
and HNWIs in China became severely dependent on these legacies in terms of 
wealth accumulation, e.g. to buy, sell, and develop land, mining and trading 
concessions, and so forth (Fligstein 1996b).  This is because the policy principles are, 
on the one hand, proclaimed by the central government but their implementation is, 
on the other hand, shaped by local financial conditions and the motivation of senior 
officials in different localities.  Nee (1989) once argued that state agents would 
eventually lose their controls on the market within the economy as the transition 
evolved
3
; however, the status quo is that the CCP remains the ruling party in China 
and this is based on its monopoly over legitimate political organization, impeding the 
emergence of competing organizations that could pose challenges (Dickson 2004).  
As a result, the degree of manipulation of existing political resources and state 
policies has not declined relative to the increasing market forces along with the 
economic reforms (Yang 2002).  Goldstein (1995) argues that the persistence of the 
party-state regime is due to its top leaders, e.g. Deng Xiaoping, persisting in tight 
                                                 
3 In Nee’s recent article, he recognizes that his previous argument is no longer appropriate and needs 
to be revised (Nee and Cao 2005).  
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adherence to the communist regime and resisting any political reforms that would 
weaken incumbent controls, thus  averting the same failure as Gorbachev in the 
former Soviet Union.   
 
In terms of adherence to Communism, there are two main reasons why Goldstein’s 
statement is inadequate and may only account for a part of the grounds.  First, 
although Deng Xiaoping proposed the Four Cardinal Principles (Si Xian Gji Ben 
Yuan Ze) in 1979 (1983 vol 2:159) to uphold the socialist path and the leadership of 
the CCP, he then realized it was not suitable for economic reform without immediate 
political reform
4
.  Secondly, China was extremely different from the FSU and CEE 
in 1978 although they all were derived from the legacies of Leninist Communism.  
Some researchers (Qian and Xu 1993) metaphorically consider China’s reforms to 
override those of their counterparts in the FSU and CEE because China had low per 
capita income and less industrialization.  In 2004, China had been struggling for 
more than a decade to overtake what the FSU had in 1978 (Fig 4).  In general, there 
was very less space for the FSU to divert public attention by merely implementing 
economic reforms as China had done, owing to then high-income levels.  That is to 
say, China could exploit her advantage of lower labour costs by liberalizing the 
redundant work force from rural areas and subsequently becoming the world factory; 
consequently, reforms surely improved the living standards of the ordinary populace.  
As a result, China is able to implement partial reforms, which purely focus on 
economic activities and deliberately ignore those legal, political, or comprehensive 
restructuring that were ostensibly implemented in China successfully (Chen 2010:59-
62).  On the contrary, Russia had no choice but to employ the big-bang method that 
drastically reformed most institutions.   
 
As a consequence, most people in China have been passionate about economic 
institutional changes after the initiation of the reforms.  This attitude is particularly 
endemic among those higher hierarchies in China’s government and the CCP.  In fact, 
from the twentieth century onwards, economic changes, as Bradford De Long (1998) 
                                                 
4 Deng mentioned the economic reform should come together with political reform in the Politburo 
Standing Committee (June) and the talks with Nakasone Yasuhiro, the former Japanese prime minister, 
in November 1986. 
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argued, became the driving force behind other changes that had rarely been seen 
before.  The ability of social democracy to deliver constant economic growth 
together with a comparatively stable relative distribution of wealth has created 
influential consensus in favour of their current institutional setup; therefore, the pace 
of economic change has been so great as to shake the rest of history to its 
foundations.  This argument seems to be a plausible explanation as to why Chinese 
people are so complacent and at ease with the economic perspective solely.   
 
Nonetheless, it is impractical to judge history from the present perspective without 
considering the context of the past (see Note 16).  Although China was a traditional 
rural society before reforms, there were considerable industrial bases and a 
fundamental infrastructure that had been established by Mao during the notorious 
Great Leap Forward era (Meisner 1986:211), e.g. steel plants, state roads, and 
petroleum refineries.  These facilities essentially provided the vital foundation for the 
following economic reforms, which are manifest and remarkable.  However, I 
wonder who has benefited the most throughout the reforms.  Institutions are set up to 
reduce the uncertainty rather than increasing social efficiency, serving those people 
who are able to create or change institutions (North 1990), or prevent confiscation 
and use checks-and-balances to enhance the viability (Barzel 2000).  Therefore, 
people will try to retain these institutions created by them whether these institutions 
are useful, suboptimal, or even at the expense of the mass majority.   
 
Burns and Stalker (1961) argue that organizations attempt to develop ways of 
tackling any low controls in constrained situations (new entrants in open markets) 
and protect any controlled advantages in opportunity relations (guanxi) whether they 
are individuals, public organizations (SOEs, TVEs), private organizations (private 
firms), or third party organizations (court, policing forces).  As Fligstein (1996b) 
asserts  China’s entrepreneurship is an interpretation not a reflection of institutional 
changes and entrepreneurs tend to exploit institutional rules instead of simply 
following them.  Therefore, entrepreneurs, but not all of them, will try to take 
advantage of the institutional changes and vagueness of institutional arrangements to 
increase their chances of success and help to prolong the tenure of the political elites, 
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and may therefore deliver economic growth (Yang 2004).  Therefore, China’s 
bureaupreneurs and HNWIs, as individual and small organizations, will unavoidably 
have to find alternative resources (expansion of regulatory power) from those held by 
SOEs, local government, central government, and other public administrations for 
example, in order to retain their established privileged positions.  Therefore, a theory 
regarding resources may provide an appropriate framework for explaining the 
institutional circumstances under which major economic actors operate (Guthrie 
1997).  
 
It is indispensable for understanding the assumptions made by HNWIs that are taken 
as beliefs and natural rights, and as such taken for granted.  As Commons (1931:697) 
says, these assumptions are not inherent and established in advance through custom 
and practice by participants in the transactions. These habits and customs take for 
granted results in institutional changes and people heavily depend on them.  This 
specific phenomenon, whether it is known as path-dependent (North 1990:94) or 
positive feedback (Arthur 1994:112), is obvious in transitional China, and many 
HNWIs accumulated their primitive capital through the assistance of these legacies 
of the previous Communist hierarchies.  However, orders, regulations, and 
institutions hardly perpetuate themselves permanently in the real world.  When 
people try to alter existing institutions whether it is good or not, they tend to break 
the current institutional stability in order to make new and favourable institutional 
arrangements.  In the contrast, institutions may persist even when they serve no one’s 
interests (Akerlof 1976) and they may persist even though they are collectively 
suboptimal once established (Zucker 1986).  According to North (1990), institutions 
are set up to reduce uncertainty rather than increase social efficiency and to serve for 
those people who are able to create institutions.  He also mentions that institutions 
have a variety of regulations, which are made according to different procedures, 
ethics, and morality that constrain individual behaviours in terms of the pursuit of 
wealth and maximization of individual utility (advantage) (North 1981).  Therefore, 
conflicts of interest will inevitably arise along with the process of institutional 
change between different interested individuals and groups.  Consequently, the 
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constraints and opportunities encountered will have a direct relevance to the 
selection and outcome of their strategies and survival.  
 
Elster (2007:32,36) asserts that every academic argument should rest on a general 
law or mechanism that occurs frequently and in an easily recognizable causal pattern 
allowing us to explain, but not to predict the consequences; therefore, I need to 
unpack the mechanisms involved in creating and sustaining institutions.  By 
examining these mechanisms, I may perceive how the effects are produced and know 
who and why with regard to the institutional effects.   In fact, Williamson’s 
perspective (1975) of bounded rationality matches the contentions of other scholars 
(David 1986 ;Arthur 1988) that under specified conditions, e.g. time limits, it is 
difficult to consider the use of alternative approaches even if these would provide 
better solutions.  This argument is understood to arise from positive feedback.  
Arthur (1994:112) deems the conditions that  support  positive feedback are: (1) 
large set-up cost; (2) learning effects; (3) coordination effects; and (4) self-
reinforcing expectations.   
 
The process of institutional change in China, whether they are path-dependent or 
positive feedback, can be split into two major phases.  In the first phase, many 
suboptimal institutions were created or prototyped because of economic reforms 
severely limited by political forces.  Therefore, it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to change these suboptimal institutions in the subsequent phase owing to large set-up 
cost, learning effects, coordination effects, and self-reinforcing expectations (Arthur 
ibid).  Because most existing interest groups can neither afford nor are willing to pay 
substantial costs to develop alternative institutions; therefore, they are disinclined to 
consider alternatives because of the required investment in time and effort.  In 
addition, they believe the current situation will prevail into the future through 
collusion and exploitation.  Consequently, the institutional changes in the second 
phase are affected by the inertia from those suboptimal institutions and by following 
the established path.  As mentioned earlier, conflicts between interested individuals 
and groups will inevitably arise at different times, and therefore coercion may be 
employed by different interest groups in order to alter existing adverse institutions or 
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retain existing privileged institutions.  In China, Government (CCP) is the only 
organization that can legitimately exert coercion; therefore, conflicts of interest will 
arise between different factions/hierarchies within the CCP and their respective 
external interest groups that altogether are authorized to exert different public 
authority.  Thus, these outside individuals or groups, who can surreptitiously exert 
coercion to effect or influence institutional changes but also to derive benefit 
themselves, establishing reciprocal and symbiotic reliance on their associated 
political alliances in this specific institutional environment.      
 
In China, the incomprehensive, inconsistent and insufficient reforms, as Burt (1995: 
5) comments, constantly create structural holes, which continue to provide 
opportunities for bureaupreneurs and HNWIs and subsequently ensure on-going 
superb economic growth.  Therefore, the institutional changes in China have an 
element of the vicious circle because structural holes give rise to those social 
contradictions along with the institutional changes throughout the reforms.  
Consequently, agile bureaupreneurs and HNWIs accumulate wealth through this 
ambiguity, inconsistency and partiality.  Meanwhile, they obtain legitimacy and 
protection from those institutions, which are clear, consistent, prompt, and complete 
(Yang 2002).  These structural weaknesses are, to some extent, inherited from the 
socialist economy
5
 and eventually make China vulnerable to further reforms.  As 
Neil Fligstein’s (1996a) argued that  people live in murky worlds where it is never 
clear which actions will have what consequences but it is mandatory to construct 
accounts of the world that interpret the murkiness, motivate and determine courses 
of action, and justify the action decided upon.  The murkiness in China is explicitly 
embodied in the institutional environment.  For example, there were no firms but 
only factories before 1985 because the then economic nature was not allowed to 
                                                 
5 A socialist economy is distinguished from a capitalist economy mainly by the high degree of state 
control of the economic assets of the economy.  Under the institution of state ownership in a socialist 
economy, control of all assets is to be managed by people, since the “state” itself cannot manage 
anything.  A person managing an asset will, to the best of his or her knowledge, try to derive the most 
benefit from it at the minimum cost or sacrifice to himself, in (a) utilizing its service directly to 
benefit himself or herself or (b) allowing others to use its services (Chow 2007:347-349).  In the 
socialist China, the public sector was viewed as a personal fiefdom. The administration of state assets 
revealed a lack of differentiation between the “economic” and the “political” sphere and the absence 
of any clearly defined boundary between public and private property. Bureaucrats and state agents 
disposed of public sector resources as if they were their own (Rose-Ackerman 1999:116). 
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lower transaction costs or improve hierarchical management (Imai and Komia 
1994:396).  Consequently, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Councils (SASAC) were purposely established in 2003 in 
order to improve the economic benefits of state assets, but it became a misfit and 
deviated from its original mandated purpose.  This organization is essentially 
composed of different civil servants and represents the shareholders of these Chinese 
SOEs - the entire Chinese people.  On the one hand, it actually controls nearly all 
SOEs and public assets; on the other hand, this special institute is not subject to any 
jurisdiction not to the National People’s Congress (NPC) but only to those appointed 
by the State Council Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of 
China.  As a result, the murkiness in China is reflected in the inseparability between 
politics and economy.  Thereafter and in my opinion, this murkiness leads SOEs 
towards infringed ownership rather than absentee ownership (Zhang 1996).   
 
In China, the SOEs, whether before or after economic reforms, can enjoy all the 
privileges bestowed by the state, and their directors-in-office create many barriers to 
restrain private competitors.  Owing to the vague property rights, the directorship 
becomes the endowment granted by the CCP; therefore, these directors of SOEs de 
facto pursue their own interests by means of the scarce resources given to SOEs.  In 
this regard, these directors put SOEs and public assets at their own disposal and 
benefit from them at the expense of vast majority.  In general, China has been in 
transition from a planned economy to “socialist market economy” since the late 
1970s.  Under the premise of abiding by the party-state framework, the ideology, 
property rights, customs, individual behaviours, social structure have been in the 
process of altering as a result.  Because there is no clear blueprint for the transition 
in China, the direction of change is obviously not continuous or coherent; 
nonetheless, these changes are persistently confined by political constraint – the 
party-state regime.  Zhang and Ong (2008) argue that China’s governing strategy is 
to set citizens free to be entrepreneurs of the self, but this was made possible not by 
dismantling the socialist apparatus but rather by creating a space for people to 
exercise a multitude of private choices, but always within the political limits set by 
the socialist state. 
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Apart from the preceding structural weaknesses, the status quo in China is that many 
bureaucrats at different hierarchical levels continue to retain their coercive powers of 
the previous party-state regime but no longer take communism seriously (Lieberthal 
2004:315).  Therefore, reforms are always confined within the political framework, 
which, by all means, necessitates supporting the CCP and its legitimacy.   
 
2.5 THE RESEARCH PURPOSES AND LEADING QUESTIONS 
At the very outset, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in China were established to 
attract FDI and cutting-edge technologies from advanced countries soon after 1978 
and were expected to rectify the Communist Economy based on the framework of 
public owned property rights.  Subsequently, the mechanisms of free competition 
and market pricing were introduced to China in order to invigorate the then 
moribund economy. That said there were emerging problems, such as inflation, 
inequality, corruption, and discontented factions that continually challenged the 
reform process.  As a result, a command economy no longer exists in China and that 
also means it has failed to attain the goal of a socialist market economy successfully.  
Next, I will have an in-depth study of the research purpose and primary questions.    
 
Many compliments have been heaped on Deng Xiaoping to whose reforms the 
economic growth has been attributed (see section 2.1) (Fleisher 2006a ;Smith 
2006 ;Chow 2007 ;Donaldson 2007 ;Wong and Wei 2007).  Luckily, as Fei (1986) 
argued, the reform per se has not been eradicated but implicitly rooted in China ever 
since the Cultural Revolution.  Fei indicated that TVEs mushroomed under the 
economic circumstances of a less constrained and loosened-policy after 1976 
because of intense famine and economic recession.  Since this disaster was less 
easily or artificially resolved by the central government, the local governments, 
especially at the lower level, were compelled to introduce provisional reforms to 
restore the economy, notwithstanding any inconsistency and incoherence manifested 
in those reforms.  This kind of “institutional amphibiousness” (Ding 1994) is at the 
heart of the political logic of China’s economic reforms (Shirk 1993) and incurred 
subsequent income inequality (Zhou 2000).  Therefore, the bureaucratic system in 
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transitional China, as those counterparts in modern Western societies, has so much 
power vested in so few people, with so few rules, it cannot do better no matter how 
good the people at the top are (Cochrane and Zingales 2009).  Their argument 
appropriately describes the phenomenon of an imbalanced relationship between 
power and constraint in China.  Therefore, any bureaucratic systems across time and 
space tackle their problems likewise.   
 
Even though there is a strong interaction between institutional changes and economic 
reforms in China, the institutional legacies, which are actually derived from 
practicing Communism, continue to exert strong inertia on the party-state regime.  
This specific phenomenon in China can be referred to as the path dependence (North 
1990:94), which continues to, economically and politically, reinforce the privileges 
of existing elites.  As Bassanini and Dosi (2001:41,43,47) state history matters in 
terms of path-dependent regimes because what social actors do today is shaped by 
what they did yesterday.  This argument is commensurate with Bromley’s individual 
actions (2006:7): individuals act with the future clearly in mind.  Therefore, I argue 
that ongoing institutional changes in China are deliberately designed to create 
incentives for those elites, who have power over institutional arrangements, to secure 
their existing privileges and consequently form a business-political complex
6
.  This 
argument responds to North’s (1990) contention that institutions serve those people 
who are able to create or change institutions.   
 
There are different social and economic structures emerging in contemporary China 
after three decades of reforms, which are built on the “ruins” (Stark 1992b).  In other 
words, differing experiences withdrawing from socialism shape the possibilities of 
transformation in the subsequent stages.  Minsky (1986:293) argued that the Market 
Economy probably is the most beneficial economic institution as yet, but it rests upon 
relatively fragile political foundations.  This perspective is meaningful because 
markets cannot flourish without visible guidance from government setting up norms, 
                                                 
6 This term has been modified from the military-industry complex, which was mentioned by former 
US president Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Farewell Address to the Nation on January 17, 1961.  In 
this speech, Eisenhower reminds American to guard against the influence by collusion between 
government and businesspersons. 
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regulations, and institutions and assuring compliance to these rules.  That is to say, 
no trade can be implemented confidently and securely without government’s 
oversight.  However, in the market with public authority, there are continuous quests 
from capitalists and entrepreneurs for government protections from competitors to 
retain their existing privileges in accessing public resources with least cost. (Rajan 
and Zingales 2004:311).  In this regard, the market economy can be manipulated as 
well under the continuous pressure of existing interest groups.  Given that, China’s 
economic reforms as they shift from a planned economy to a socialist market 
economy will repeat, to some extent, the failure of previous market economies.  The 
importance of this research is to find out how far these failures resemble each other 
and how and why some people gain opportunities through the manipulation of 
institutional arrangements, assuming these institutional environment(s) can truly 
reflect the general situation.  As well, I hope to make a contribution through logical 
analysis and the elite interviews that will explain those incentives in transitional 
China that might be attributed to the institutional holes arising from inconsistent and 
incoherent institutional arrangements.  
 
Thus far, I have described the possible causes of reforms, the emergence of 
bureaupreneurs and HNWIs, and intricate political situations.  Consequently, I could 
formulate the questions that can help me to understand the truth of economic growth, 
institutional changes, reforms, and the emergence of HNWIs in China.  Because 
China’s economic growth has been largely debated and examined by various 
scholars (Shirk 1989 ;Huang 1994 ;Naughton 1995 ;Qian et al. 1995 ;Peng and 
Heath 1996 ;Oi and Walder 1999 ;Wei 2001 ;Yang 2005 ;Fleisher 2006b ;Bouckaert 
2007), it is redundant to discuss the subject further, instead my research focuses on 
the “why” and “how” process questions.  
 
1. What are the reasons and causes driving China to the path of reforms at this 
specific time?  When did China decide to take that path? and why?  Why and 
how did the path bring China to such a different situation from other 
communist states?   
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2. What is the relationship between reforms and institutional change in China? 
What is the scale of institutional change in China?  What makes institutional 
change? Through what path? And in which direction?  What is the framework  
supporting  institutional changes in China?  What are  the elements in  the 
framework?    
 
3. As one of those Leninist Communist countries, what is the fundamental 
difference of before-and-after reforms between China and her comrades, e.g. 
former Soviet Union, Central Eastern European countries?  What causes that 
difference? Convergence or divergence?  Any impact on ensuing reforms?    
 
4. Were there any ideological conflicts arising between a long established 
command economy and prevailing market competition in China while the 
reforms were being initially implemented, and why?  How does the CCP and 
Chinese Government resolve the conflict?  To what extent does the conflict 
compound or  ameliorate the situation for ordinary people, economic and 
political elites?  What are the consequences?  Any impact brought forth by 
that consequence?  How does the impact influence subsequent institutional 
changes? Why?     
 
5. Do institutional changes in China alter the definition of property rights and 
opportunity? How and why?  Will institutional changes alter the way in 
which personal benefit is pursued? How and why?  Will institutional changes 
make the interactions between individual and the collective? How and why?  
What is the impact and consequence thereof on the society and China as a 
whole? 
 
6. Who exactly are those HNWIs in China after the reforms?  Where, when, and 
how do they emerge?  What is the impact of their emergence on the society 
and the country as a whole?  What is the relationship between reforms, 
economic growth, and the emergence of HNWIs afterwards?  In terms of the 
emergence of HNWIs, what is the impact and the consequence thereof on the 
  
Page 55 of 484 
society and the country as a whole?  How do the consequences  affect the 
future of HNWIs in China? 
 
Through these questions, I analyse the actual reasons giving rise to the emergence of 
HNWIs and their relationship with institutional changes in China.  Since institutions 
define and specify opportunity sets or fields of action for the members of a going 
concern and represent collective restraint, liberation, and expansion of individual 
action, the benefits and costs to  individuals and groups shall, may, or may not fall on 
those parties seriously affected by institutions (Bromley 2006:31,41).  In this regard, 
institutions can be regarded as both a restraint on and liberation of individual and 
group action.  That is to say, any change in existing institutions will re-define and re-
shape the opportunity sets and the way people pursue them, and consequently affect 
the social status of and interaction between people, e.g. promotion, wealth, privilege, 
crony collusion, rent-seeking, and so forth.   
 
As Bromely (2006:7) argued, every single cause starts with an underlying reason.  
Through this reason, people can acquire sufficient and essential information 
corresponding to the manifestation of the reforms and related processes in order to 
understand both vital factors that caused China’s transition.  Consequently, this 
information can elucidate the process and consequences of institutional changes in 
China.  In this regard, it is convenient for people to understand why different people 
and going concerns (family, clan, firm, and nation-state) will choose dissimilar paths 
of reforms and therefore lead toward diversified consequences (Bromley ibid:32).  
After that, people could also interpret why China has chosen such a specific path of 
reforms via preceding studies.  Because any successful reform should be, to a large 
extent, accompanied by comprehensive institutional change, otherwise, reform can 
only be a non-substantive one (O'Brien 1990:3-8).  In this case, the researcher should 
not focus on either reforms or institutional change alone but try to acquire 
comprehensive knowledge of the relationship between them.   
 
China has been moulded by the legacies from Leninist Communism since 1949; the 
fundamental ideology and social structure were therefore related to the proletariat.  
In this regard, the seeds of egalitarianism, an intrinsic belief, were deeply rooted in 
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most individuals, going concerns, and the state (Fewsmith 1994 ;Lieberthal 
2004:249-251;Chow 2006).  After Mao’s death, serious famine, mass unemployment, 
and a skyrocketing deficit led the CCP to the verge of demise.  In order to alleviate 
these problems, the CCP began to lift the ban on private property and re-shape 
ownership rights gradually.  Yao (2009) argued that China has achieved its successes, 
to a great extent, by adopting the recommendations proposed by standard economic 
theory and that the government does not favor any section of the population but sets 
the long-term welfare of the whole society as its priority.  However, this kind of 
sycophantic assertion is not only very unconvincing but also departs from the truth.   
   
Reform in China is arguably, incontestably an epochal undertaking and gives the 
open-door signal to the rest of the world.  Inevitably, there are resulting opportunities 
and pressures in the wake of an open-door policy.  To respond to increasing pressure 
from the external world, the Chinese leadership does not have much choice but to 
import the structures of the market economy from without.  Zheng (2004:36-37) 
maintained that: 
 
The leadership has to borrow the form of Western states, even while 
loudly condemning such a practice and facing strong resistance from 
the conservatives and society.  The leadership has learned much from 
the West in its efforts to rebuild the state system economically and 
politically. The question is not whether the leadership is “importing” 
the Western form of the state, but why the leadership has “imported” 
Western products (different building blocks of the Western state) 
selectively, and how these “imported” parts have been strategically 
sought after and integrated into the existing state system. 
 
However, the context in China was different from those in the FSU and CEE while 
reforms were initiated (see Note 17).  As a result, the Chinese leadership is caught 
between the tensions generated by tradition strategies and integrative ones.  The 
integration of the market economy in China is essentially a selective and gradual 
process. However, this is not to say that the Chinese political leadership is erroneous 
  
Page 57 of 484 
in choosing a piecemeal pattern.  As Zheng (ibid:32-37) mentions that: 
 
Integration must be accompanied by innovation, which is in the interests 
of the leadership and society as well.  In other words, in integrating a 
market economy, China leaders have to meet various goals 
simultaneously, namely, coping with pressures resulting from 
globalization, meeting the interests of society, satisfying the interests of 
ruling elites, and ultimately transforming the state system.   
 
As a result, the institutional changes in China can be neither comprehensive nor 
insignificant.  To be exact, reform in China has been carried by the framework 
consisting of two conflicting elements, the Communist ideological tradition and the 
market economic reality, that leads to a compromised institutional environment.  In 
the meantime, China’s top leaders made their choices and recognized their incentives 
and rewards, hopes and expectations, and constraints by introducing selective 
elements of market economy.  That is to say, not only can elites profit from the 
process of integrating the market economy, but more importantly, by doing so, these 
elites will also be able to realize the form of the market economy that they perceive 
to be the basis of power and wealth.  In fact, the successful integration of the market 
economy depends on the strategies of the leaders and their choice of strategies in turn 
depends on their perceptions of globalization, the politics of identity, the political 
context of power relations among the elite, the political alignment between reformist 
leaders and conventional state social forces, and the way the existing system has 
been developed.   
 
Through the abovementioned leading questions, I could methodically examine and 
figure out the real supports, implicitly manifest, behind China’s economic growth 
that has relatively deep effects on the existing institutions and future changes.  Many 
scholars (Burns 1989 ;Lee 1992 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Lau et al. 2000 ;Duckett 
2001 ;Gallagher 2002 ;Zhang 2003 ;Lieberthal 2004) have argued that China’s 
economic development has its uniqueness, which is increasingly crystal-clear that 
what has primarily supported economic activities are Western types of economic 
  
Page 58 of 484 
institutions.  Because there are entrenched ideological contradictions between 
Communism and Capitalism, Capitalistic reform measures inevitably challenge the 
CCP to cleanse itself of rigidity and inadequacy.  Thus, it is the market economy of a 
“market economy with Chinese characteristics” instead of the Chinese characteristics 
to support the economic growth.  Nevertheless, China’s rapid economic growth has 
been driven by Capitalistic economic measures that were unlawfully pursued initially 
as a way of economic development after the Chinese leadership began to implement 
the reform and open-door policy in the late 1970s.  Therefore, Deng Xiaoping re-
endorsed these measures during his southern tour in early 1992.  From then onwards, 
reforms have brought about enormous changes to every aspect of economic and 
social life in China and created economic growth.  
 
In terms of politics and laws, China appears to have remained in its traditional 
Leninist form.  In fact, without changing the essence of previously unexpected or 
unlawful institutions, the CCP is able to transform them into legal and favourable 
ones, once these institutions become essential to sustain the legitimacy of the CCP’s 
regime.  For example, Deng Xiaoping (1993:373) argued, during his notable 
Southern tour in 1992, that the planned economy cannot be equated to socialism 
since capitalism also has plans; the market economy cannot be equated to capitalism 
since socialism also has markets; both plans and markets are economic instruments.  
In this regard, Deng could introduce the market economy to China without breaching 
the basic concepts of governing Communism.  As Zheng (2004:56) argued, the more 
successful  China’s economic reforms are, the greater the threats posed to the present 
political system will be.  Briefly, the diminution of central controls has released more 
power than the CCP anticipated and a power beyond their capacity to manage.  
Consequently, many divisions of government have failed to cope with those selective 
institutions.  Further, rapid development benefited the enterprising and the audacious, 
but also the greedy and the corrupt.  Accordingly, the atmosphere among the 
majority of ordinary people is for a stronger sense of direction, for greater checks on 
economic growth, and even nostalgia for those more certain and predictable 
characteristics of the old days.  Actually, the Chinese leadership has been attempting 
to avoid any upheaval being triggered off by the integration of the market economy 
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because any discontent might bring new political forces and shake the political 
legitimacy of the CCP that has existed since 1949.  After all, the ultimate goal of 
introducing the market economy is not to completely replace the existing 
institutional arrangements but to improve them, especially the political ones.   
 
To sum up, China’s HNWIs have come to prominence in such a contradictory 
situation and relate themselves more closely to politics than economy in order to 
sustain their privileges in the unstable milieu.  That is to say, China’s entrepreneurs 
realize where their privileges come from and they do not find the political 
mechanisms or state agents to be any problem, but an opportunity to access to scarce 
resources (Lawler 1992 ;Fligstein 1996b ;Fligstein 2001a ;Walder 2003).   
  
Page 60 of 484 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CRITICAL READING   
The contributions of the previous chapter pay particular attention to the transition of 
China, of its people and of those associated institutions.  I also indicated that the then 
political leaders were confronted with fundamental questions, e.g. whether to 
dismantle the core institutions of the communism; what new institutions to create; 
how to explain the new relationship between state; society and market; and in what 
timing and sequence?  Although economic reforms in China have been underway 
since 1978 in a way that brought extraordinary results to China’s economy, private 
property rights, however, became legitimate and were formally protected only thirty 
years later (issued in 2007).  For this reason, this frail foundation makes property 
rights in China truncated (Alchian and Demsetz 1973) and renders them no more 
than empty institutions (Windhoff-Héritier 1991), with nothing more than a paper 
agreement or empty shell remaining.  A stable basis for property rights reform is not 
only based on regulation but also on structural reforms (Adams et al. 2009).  Because 
there is no separation of powers and formal rules, which is directly linked to the 
CCP’s power (Weede 1990:5-6), structural reforms are least likely to arise in China.  
By this logic, China’s institutional changes are not only hinged on economic 
parameters but also on those societal, political and cultural ones.  
 
A convincing research argument should be justified through a critical literature 
review because research only becomes valid in relation to other people’s 
contributions (Jankowicz 2004), which is made up of published and currently 
progressing articles in the chosen research area.  Therefore, to highlight the limits 
within current knowledge and to locate the researcher’s focus in the wider context 
(Gill 1997) is one of the best approaches to improving research ideas, enhancing the 
researcher’s knowledge, and clearing up research questions.  Because a literature 
review is by no means comprehensive but highly selective and focused on centrally 
relevant issues (Armingeon and Careja 2008:48-50), a much more comprehensive 
literature review in the research topics could have been done, but that would then 
make the research purpose and the research quite unstructured.  For this reason, 
researchers set out research questions and carefully construct research designs, and 
this research is no exception.   
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As has been mentioned, China’s entrepreneurs get privileges and grab scarce 
resources through political mechanisms or state agents (Lawler 1992 ;Fligstein 
1996b ;Fligstein 2001a ;Walder 2003), e.g. exertion of political power requires 
resources gained endogenously or externally.  For that reason, institutional change 
theory hardly stands up to explaining China’s transitions; therefore, I need to 
commence a critical literature review from theoretical, legal and societal perspectives 
in order to give a solid premise to this research and ascertain which supplementary 
theoretical framework is required.  
 
3.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA 
In China, rule-of-law is used to support those pro-market policies after 1992 (Adams 
et al. 2009).  For this reason, the rule-of-law accompanied by marketization fills the 
ideological vacuum left by the fading of Maoism.  Also, China’s transition, rather 
than from a planned economy to market economy, is from a planned society to 
market society, in which every tangible product or intangible service, as Sandel 
(2006:10) argues, has a market price.  By this logic, the rationale of the rule-of-law 
in China supports economic modernisation and indicates that the rule-of-law serves 
to subsidise the elite’s interests more than ensuring equality before the law.  
Therefore, China’s institutional environment consists in mostly formal rules that are 
nothing but lip-service, or as Thoreau (2012b:3) argued, they are not most likely to 
be in the right nor the fairest, and in all cases cannot be based on justice.     
 
Nonetheless, people scarcely understand the real reasons that trigger these changes 
(see Note 21).  Mainstream perspectives in relation to China’s transition and the 
emergence of HNWIs are biased and mainly focus on corruption, cronyism, 
embezzlement and other negative social parameters (Oi 1985 ;Cheung 1986 ;Oi 
1986 ;Shirk 1993 ;Ding 2000a ;Asher and Newman 2002 ;Chen 2003a ;Chow 
2005 ;Shirk 2007), whereas the economic growth in China has been accelerating 
simultaneously (Glassman 1991 ;Oi 1992 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Fan 1996 ;Cannon 
2000 ;Batjargal and Liu 2004 ;Djankov et al. 2006 ;Chow 2007 ;Naughton 2010).  In 
China, the CCP has been the longstanding and only functioning ruling party since 
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1949 that treats people with almost identical characteristics in extremely different 
ways.  For example, the Great Purge (Su Fan) campaign in 1955 was implemented in 
a way that severely discriminated against entrepreneurs in rural areas as well as rich 
peasants, and claimed the entrepreneurship process as a spontaneous force of 
capitalism.  In 1922, the CCP oddly advocated preferential treatment at the 
fourteenth National Congress for countryside entrepreneurs and supported efforts to 
mobilise them to the full in order to establish technical-service organizations and to 
allow any rural economic organization to recruit them into their workforce.  The 
discrimination and preferential treatment then and now is actually not exceptional 
and can be often seen in the various institutional dimensions.  In other words, the 
CCP regulatively constructs legitimate structures for entrepreneurs that both the CCP 
and entrepreneurs have never experienced since 1949.  Normatively, the CCP has 
oddly prescribed the goal of the pursuit of wealth as appropriate though this was 
disdained in the proletarian society.  Cognitively, the CCP intentionally creates a 
social atmosphere in which people no longer recognise the pursuit of wealth as 
unethical and one that should be banned or eradicated.  Taken together, after the 
reforms initiated in 1978, people gradually deemed that the pursuit of wealth was a 
taken-for-granted assumption. 
 
After 1978, the CCP swiftly responded to environmental pressures by altering their 
mandated goals in order to survive and increase their legitimacy no matter whether 
these practices would reduce organizational efficiency or otherwise increase costs 
relative to benefits (Meyer and Rowan 1977) (see Note 22).  From my perspective, 
state agents are the real forces for changing mandated goals and need transaction 
objects that all entail distribution and re-distribution of resources and wealth.  
Because there is no separation of political powers and the legal system, which is 
directly linked to the CCP’s legitimacy (Weede 1990:5-6), any change of law will 
change the CCP’s power accordingly.  In this case, powerful people have to devise 
both political and economic rules to execute transactions within the pre-determined 
and favourable framework of resource re-distribution in transitional China (see Fig 
15).   
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Except for the law, a flexible expediency – policy, which has the same legitimate 
function as the law has, is desperately demanded.   In China, policy not only 
determines who earn more profits during institutional changes but also decides who 
earns the most of it (Walder 1996); this is exclusively and deliberately made within 
the CCP and implemented by state agents in ways that are opaque and elusive to the 
mass majority.  Therefore, some scholars (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988:3) have 
argued that policy in China may be adopted for any of following reasons: (1) solving 
new policy problems pressing upon leaders; (2) keeping alive the ideological vision 
of its proponents; (3) rebuffing challenges from rivals; (4) rewarding its networks of 
loyalties; (5) as a feature of the structural dimensions of China’s bureaucracy.  For 
example, the CCP failed to keep its promise of delivering a proletarian paradise 
following the Great Leap Forward (GLF) and the Cultural Revolutions, which not 
only devastated the Chinese economy but also pressurised the then political leaders.  
Meantime people asserted that core institutions began to worsen dramatically 
(Lieberthal 1984 ;Child and Yuan 1996 ;Goldman and Macfarquhar 
2000:7,52;Gallagher 2002 ;Dittmer 2003 ;Lieberthal 2004:249-252;Chow 
2006 ;Huang 2007), and increasingly questioned if the core institutions would make 
a better life for them.  Therefore, the then political leaders issued several new 
policies, although in contradiction with the prevailing ideology but without shaking 
the foundations of the regime, to save the incapacitated economy of the time.  
Increasingly, as scholars argued (March and Olsen 1989:170-171), those self-
reflexive political actors adjusted policies in ways that were constrained by given 
institutional practices, rules, routines, and cognitive schema, and therefore made a set 
of new fundamental institutional transformations after 1978.  
 
In China, not only has policy frequently changed but also the purpose of reform, 
which represents the economic trends has rarely been predicted or remained 
consistent since 1978 (Woo 1999) (see table 5).  Some scholars (Pei 1999 ;Zhang 
2003 ;Bouckaert 2007) have indicated that there is neither a coherent process nor a 
deliberate blueprint for China’s reforms and any reform thereof is strongly 
experimental and tentative.  By mapping table 5 onto the political changes (see Fig 
16), however, I noted that the fundamental institutional arrangements between 1949 
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and 1989 had not dramatically changed.  So, which factor(s) indeed caused the 
dramatic changes after the 1990s?  Arguably, it is because the delayed normative and 
cognitive changes were occurring at full speed so as to catch up with the leading 
regulative changes and therefore, the three institutional dimensions (Scott 1995:Ch.3) 
were changing in different degrees.   
 
A set of institutional arrangements were implemented as the last resort after 1978 to 
reduce social discontent and save the political legitimacy of the day (Naughton 
1993 ;Woo 1999 ;Dittmer 2003) that ranged from full scale agricultural reforms to 
the dual-pricing systems between 1978 and 1989.  In contrast, the command 
economic ideology remains persistently rooted in people’s minds; therefore, 
normative and cognitive changes lagged far behind the pace of regulative changes 
that caused a gap, or institutional hole (Yang 2004).  Because political elites retain 
their privileged positions, which were derived from the pre-reform era (Csanadi 
1997:153), they distort normal economic development but also diminish the capacity 
for organic economic growth, and enabled the survival of economic elites in 
transitional China.  Consequently, those biased preferences resulted in hyperinflation, 
collusion, and huge income disparity in the late 1980s (see Fig 16).  Theoretically 
speaking, when those normative and cognitive changes accelerate and start to catch 
up with the regulative changes, protest (Tiananmen protest) will arise accordingly 
because elites and ordinary people started vying for those essential resources.  After 
1992 when Deng undertook his Southern Tour, those economic reforms were 
dramatically restored and pro-reformers were reinstated in power.   
 
According to Scott (1995:Ch.3), the regulative dimension first constrains and 
regularizes social actors’ behaviours, and consequently, the normative dimension 
dictates the goals of behaviour and the appropriate ways to pursue them.  Lastly, the 
cognitive dimension entails the culturally shaped, taken-for-granted assumptions 
about reality and the frames through which it is perceived, understood, and given 
meaning.  By observing how many of these dimensions of institutional change over a 
given period of time (time frame), the researcher can comprehend the pattern of 
institutional change (Campbell 2004:33-35;Walder 2004).  As already argued, the 
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lagging normative and cognitive changes were at full speed to catch up with the 
leading regulative changes after 1992 and these three institutional dimensions were 
changing to different degrees.  Nonetheless, political constraints remain, making 
certain dimensions resemble previous ones, e.g. the government persists in following 
the socialist road, steadily improving socialist institutions, developing socialist 
democracy, and improving the socialist legal system; thus, China’s transition is not 
on the revolutionary path except in the economic domain. 
 
Consequently, I also employ induced and imposed methods (Lin 1989) to examine 
these changes (see Table 4) and recognize that there is no significant quality of either 
evolutionary or revolutionary institutional changes manifest in China’s transition 
because of the frequent inconsistency of institutional arrangements and goals.  For 
that reason, I argue that China’s reform pattern conforms to the punctuated-evolution 
pattern that is more evolutionary than revolutionary in the sense that it is initially 
characterized by prolonged periods of either equilibrium or stability, or that 
evolution is interrupted unexpectedly by some calamity (Krasner 1984 ;Hay 
2001 ;Blyth 2002:Ch1;Campbell 2004:5).  This pattern first creates turmoil until a 
new set of institutional arrangements is established, that then remains in equilibrium 
or evolves slowly for another long period that corresponds to the characteristics of 
China’s transition.   
 
Two results are derived from previous study.  First, there are close associations 
between political changes and economic reforms in China that indicate major 
changes emerged once any vital political alteration arose (Weede 1990:4-5) (see Note 
23).  Second, reforms in China mainly start from the less-risky locus in order to 
maintain the stability of the CCP’s regime (Pei 1999,2006) that embodies the 
consequence of one-party autocracy (Weede 1990:1-2).  Taken together, I draw the 
conclusion that institutional changes in China intensely involve the exertion of 
political power.  Consequently, the previous discussion becomes the criteria for 
selecting appropriate literature and constructing my theoretical framework.   
 
3.2 MAIN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
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Scholars of institutional change theory try to analyze and explain social phenomenon 
in broader coverage; among them, Veblen (1898b) not only had the broadest 
coverage that consists of habits of thought, orthodoxy, and tradition, but also 
prompted the motivation to explore institutions among economists.  Veblen 
(1898b ;2001) also ridiculed the Conventional Economic assumption regarding 
individual behaviours that he considered  were actually governed by habits and 
conventions, being of an institutional character and varying as the institutional scene 
varies.  Because of incorporating many generalised parameters into their arguments, 
Veblen and his colleagues (Old Institutional Economics, OIE, or American 
Institutionalism) have been criticized as being the least detailed.  Coase (1984), 
among those criticisms, indicated that American Institutionalism was anti-theoretical 
and should wait for a theory of fire.  Nonetheless, Coase’s criticism on OIE appears 
biased and overstated (Rutherford 1994:9).  In fact, OIE was not as lacking in a 
theoretical premise as Coase’s criticism implies (Hodgson 1998).  For example, 
Veblen connected the individual to the working rules of going concerns that is 
embodied in the essence of cumulative causation (1898b) because the choices made 
today are embedded in the actions of yesterday’s volitional agents (Bromley 
2006:25).  North (1990:94,112) also said that: 
  
The consequence of small events and chance circumstances can 
determine solutions that, once they prevail, lead one to a particular 
path...comes from the increasing returns mechanisms that reinforce 
the direction once on a given path.  
 
In my view, if causation is not cumulative, yesterday’s small events will have fewer 
effects on today’s decision because of its weak influence.  On the other hand, if there 
is no causation, the accumulation of yesterday’s small events will have no effect on 
today’s decision.  For this reason, I argue that North’s (1990:22) “path dependence” 
is not only similar to but also closely corresponds with Veblen’s “cumulative 
causation”. 
 
After OIE, Hayek employed the concept of ‘spontaneous order’ to generalize from 
the institutions made by human beings that originated from the study of the free 
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market economy exclusively.  Hayek (1945) referred to the transition from market 
economy to planned economy as an ‘irrational product’, which remains manifest and 
relentless in many Communist countries up to this day.  Therefore, Hayek’s 
evolutionary framework is inadequate to cover broader institutional changes because 
of a narrowed vision and strong ideological belief.  Coincidently, Veblen (1898a), 
Hayek (1945), and Zhang (2003) have developed similar arguments that institutional 
changes should be spontaneous, endogenous, and unwitting, instead of artificial and 
deliberate.  They indicate that every individual and organization should participate in 
the social game from their respective interest point without any pre-arrangement or 
constraint so that everyone will unsurprisingly attain beneficial or, at least, 
consensual institution(s) consequently.  However, if this scenario does exist, there 
should be no more conflicts between different social classes because conflicts 
between different social classes have never been ceased.  According to my research, 
the truth of institutional changes in China only corresponds little to the spontaneous 
order in Hayek’s argument; instead, these changes consist of imposed and induced 
institutional changes (Lin 1989). 
 
Following OIE and the evolutionary school, institutions were referred to as 
encapsulating the rules of the game in a society or the artificially devised constraints 
that shape human interactions and reduce uncertainty by providing dependable 
frameworks for economic exchange (North 1990:6,33). North seemed to be trying to 
provide the predictability for individual behaviour. He had negative views on the 
individual purpose-oriented institutional changes because that individual purpose 
would normally hinder the emergence of efficient institutional arrangements and the 
benefits would not be fairly distributed to everyone but to specific individuals or 
groups (North and Thomas 1970:7).  Thus, North and Veblen have similar 
perceptions because Veblen (1899) also deemed that institutional changes hardly 
ever changed in favour of the mass majority.  North (1970:7) assumed that 
institutional change was driven by economic efficiency instead of the purpose(s) of 
policy makers, and  that institutions would and should undoubtedly move forward in 
the efficient direction although the truth manifests otherwise.  By this logic, North 
(1990:6) intentionally mentioned that institutions are dependable but not necessarily 
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efficient even though they can reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure 
for human interactions.  
 
Because institutions are man-made, dependable but not necessarily efficient 
structures for reducing uncertainty (North 1990:6),  institutions are powerful external 
forces to channel and regulate conflict ensuring social stability (Campbell 2004:1).  
In my argument, those forces causing institutional change are not endogenous and 
therefore should be considered together with those essential resources gained 
externally.  Nevertheless, institutional change scholars pay most attention to 
organisations and environments with scarcely any clarification of environmental 
determinism, strategic choice, and the connection between external constraints and 
internal dynamics (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:xiii).  Therefore, a resource 
dependence framework may enhance our understanding of those parameters driving 
the institutional changes because it is more concerned with power and interests in 
terms of organisations and environments (Di Maggio 1988:9,13).  By this logic, 
organizations should be incorporated into the discussion because they are embedded 
within networks of inter-dependencies and social relationships (Granovetter 1985) 
and then need resources, both tangible (utilities, financial) and intangible (human 
capital, social relationships) to ensure their survival.  Those intangible resources are 
more likely to create a competitive advantage because they are often rare and 
socially complex, making them difficult to imitate (Black and Boal 1994 ;Rao 1994).  
Resources are therefore significant to the survival of organisations because no 
organisation can be completely self-contained and has to depend on others 
temporarily or permanently for essential resources (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 
2003:2); thus, those resources obtained externally will render organizations 
reciprocally and indirectly dependant on those external sources.   
 
Because organizations depend heavily on those external sources, the environmental 
pressure is most likely to make organisations change mandated goals to ensure their 
survival.  March (1996) argued that organizations sought to act appropriately vis-à-
vis their environments rather than instrumentally vis-à-vis their mandated goals.  
Selznick (1949:125,259) also asserted that organizations are neither always rational 
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nor act independently because the real goals of agents or authorities, in many 
circumstances, deviate from the mandated purposes.  By this logic, the underlying 
reasons possibly derive from a mimetic process, normative process, or coercive 
process (Di Maggio and Powell 1983).  In terms of the deviation from mandated 
goals, the rational choice school adopts the all-purpose concept of maximization of 
interests to explain it However, social actors may not have enough time to get 
information and a clear sense which goals will maximize individual interests when 
uncertainty occurs (Williamson 1975).  Thus, I embrace the concept of Clemens and 
Cook (Clemens and Cook 1999) that the normative and cognitive scripts may 
constrain actors’ behaviours and enable their actions by providing them with 
guidance.  Nonetheless, the environmental pressure may paradoxically result in 
confronting institutional changes if it involves open struggle over the very core of the 
institutional status quo (March and Olsen 1989:170-171).  For example, institutional 
change was firstly initiated in China in 1976 during the severe draught; therefore, 
peasants and local cadres together signed the consent to death disclaimer (Sheng-Si-
Zhuang) (Lin 1988) to initiate primitive household responsibility (Da Bao Gan) that 
actually conflicted with the then core institutional status quo, e.g. egalitarian 
ideology, public ownership, etc.  This change actually resulted in the subsequent 
fundamental economic reforms in 1978. 
 
In every society, organizations vary in essential resources and the capabilities 
derived from these resources, which are valuable, unique and difficult to imitate, and 
that can provide the basis for organizations’ competitive advantages (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993 ;Peteraf 1993).  Therefore, the key factor for organisations’ 
survival (individual, firms, and state authorities) is their ability to acquire and retain 
these essential resources (Uhlenbruck et al. 2003).  Consequently, they try to make 
environments small-scale and become subject to new and different constraints as the 
pattern of inter-dependence alters.  Because not every essential resource can be 
produced indigenously, organizations relying on essential resources will endeavour 
to, by all means, acquire them or replace them with substitute ones gained externally.  
It should be noted that institutional constraints, which are often derived from 
previous legacies, would constrain organisations’ abilities to find substitute resources 
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to replace the original, essential one.  In this sense, dependence eventually eliminates 
the endogenous competitiveness of most organizations and makes them become 
heavily resource-dependent, whereas external institutional changes try to influence 
the environment.    
 
In China the legacy of the previous planned economy sporadically restrained 
subsequent institutional changes (Guthrie 2002:25-26), e.g. restrictions over private 
property rights.  On the other hand, the Household Responsibility System (Da Bao 
Gan or Bao Chan Dao Hu), the emergence of TVEs, shareholding and corporatized 
systems, and other newly introduced institutions borrowed from the market economy 
became adaptive to the circumstances in order to sustain the regime.  In this regard, 
resource dependence therefore has a significant foothold in this specific institutional 
environment because there always are some individuals, who can exploit their formal 
relations with ruling political elites with control over resource re-distribution and 
affecting institutional changes.   
 
So far, the real drive behind institutional change in China remains uncertain from the 
institutional change perspective.  In fact, neither North nor other scholars can 
adequately clarify why and how institutional change should arise.  Nevertheless, 
North (1990:73) did mention that entrepreneurs engage in purposive activity and in 
that role are the agents of, and shape the direction of, institutional change.  Since the 
purposive activity will alter the institutional structure and not be essentially and 
socially productive, this purposive activity therefore resembles the incentive for 
institutional change.  That is, institutions, on the one hand, have humanly devised 
constraints (North 1990:6,33) and will largely affect subsequent institutional changes.  
On the other hand, institutions, as Aoki (2001:41) argued, define the incentives for 
agents, who can affect or make institutional changes.  For that reason, individual 
purpose will not only be constrained by existing institution(s) but also affect 
subsequent institutional changes; therefore, whether a new institutional arrangement 
will be efficient or not depends mostly upon individuals or specifically, the agents, 
who can seriously have an effect upon or make institutional change.  
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Economic interests are most likely the incentives that steer institutional changes 
(Bromley 1989) and institutions, which actually define economic interests
7
, may fill 
the gap in North’s contention.  Bromley (2006:40-41) asserted that individual 
purposes involve designs and changes in the institution:   
 
Institutional change is motivated and acted upon with the future 
clearly in mind.  Existing institutions are not explained by the 
choices and actions of those living at this moment…the values and 
priorities and commitments of the past are projected into the 
present in the form of the prevailing institutions under which we 
live. 
 
In Bromley’s argument, institutions come before economic interests and individuals 
exist earlier than institutions because institutions are humanly devised.  I illustrate 
this concept (see Fig 8) in order to make explicit the relationship between these 
parameters.  With this concept, I argue that visions for better societies in the future 
are used to assess the efficiency of new institution.  
 
Because institutional arrangements and policy-making made by elites are often not 
the most favourable to the majority (Veblen 1899 ;North and Thomas 1970:7), the 
policy or arrangement may not be the most efficacious or beneficial in the least (see 
Note 19).  In my opinion, the major restraint confining China’s reforms to the 
economic domain is the determination to continue the legitimacy of the CCP regime.  
In China, the context of exclusive politics and predatory practices actually render the 
CCP a self-serving, ruling dictator rather than a proletarian party, which the CCP 
strongly proclaimed in the pre-reform era (Sun 2004:9).  For example, property 
rights, governance structures, conceptions of control, and rules are actually built on 
the legacy of a planned economy and become a vital factor in shaping economic 
transition (Guthrie 2002:25-26) in many different aspects.  Guthrie indicated that 
                                                 
7 Throughout the social sciences, structure (institution) tends to be conceptualized as patterns of incentives 
outside actors’ heads, and culture as attitudes, values, and beliefs inside actors’ heads.  From an actor’s point of 
view, structure is a situation (or part of it) and culture is a set of attitudes (or some of them) that an individual 
brings to the situation.  Structure in this sense is thought to impose the exogenous discipline of means-end 
rationality on the actors, while culture is the source of values that are not determined by structure and are in this 
sense non- (or pre-) rational.  That is, given certain ends, the actor is constrained in the choice of means by 
structurally defined positive and negative incentives (Nathan and Tsai 1995) 
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new institutions are built on the previous legacies that closely correspond to North’s 
path dependence (1990:94,112).  Nonetheless, the lock-in often has effects following 
path dependence and makes new institutions difficult to reverse (North ibid:94) or 
with a very high reversal cost (Levi 1997).  The farther along a path of developing a 
set of practices (institutions) an organization, a society, or a state is, the more 
difficult it becomes to shift to alternative paths (Hollingsworth 2006:424).  By this 
logic, the inter-dependence between path dependence and lock-in may make China’s 
further reforms vulnerable whilst trying to alter the present institutional environment.  
To conclude, institutional change theory hardly explains the dynamic relationship 
between organizations and external essential resources or specifically: how 
organizations acquire essential resources for themselves during institutional changes.  
Consequently, a novel theoretical perspective on institutional change is put forward 
followed by the elucidation of the specific case of China’s transition that embraces 
and secures the exertion of external power and change of property rights.  
 
3.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE THEORY 
I have elaborated on the history of China’s transition in chapter two, on China’s 
institutional environment, and on the emergence of HNWIs in previous sections.  In 
China, making intimate institutional environments for the market economy seems a 
paramount goal of the CCP; however, this goal is not the only one as the CCP seeks 
to justify and sustain its rule (Hu 2012a:96).  Therefore, politics in China is, on the 
one hand, a driver of reforms and, on the other hand, an impediment by restricting 
further reforms.  This particular institutional environment suggests embracing the 
concept of resource dependence whilst commencing institutional analysis on China’s 
transition.  In this section, I will have an extensive literature review in relation to the 
institution, its change and the cause and reason for this change before incorporating 
resource dependence theory into my theoretical concept. 
 
What is an institution?  What are the causes and consequences of institutional change?  
To put it briefly, institutions are the foundation of social life (Campbell 2004:1) in 
every society.  Without consistent institutions, society will become problematic and 
chaotic because the abrupt dwindling of old institutions causes confusion for people, 
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e.g. the FSU and CEE.  Hence, institutions guide and mediate conflicts and 
consequently assure stability for the society, and become external forces that assist 
people to determine how to make sense of their world and act in it (Campbell 
2004:1).  By this logic, institutional change may re-define the sets of opportunity, re-
distribute scarce resources, re-allocate social wealth and re-position people’s social 
status.  
 
Institutional change theory, actually, not only relates to the economy but also 
pertains intensely to sociology (Powell and Dimaggio 1991) and politics (Olson 
1971).  However, scholars from different institutional change schools8 often lay the 
emphasis on specific levels of institutional change confined to the economic domain.  
For instance, Justin Lin (1989) indicates that the main parameter for driving 
institutional change is the economy.  In other words, Lin regarded profitable 
opportunities in the economic domain as causing institutional changes that results in 
people spontaneously choosing the new institutional arrangements in their own 
interests and arguably, he views the purpose of institutional changes as solely 
economically oriented.  Lin’s perspective is not exceptional and has often been seen 
in many institutional change schools (Alchian 1965a ;Barzel 1989 ;North 
1990 ;Williamson 2000) that are inclined to constrain institutional change within 
economic domain.   
 
Because society and its relationship between variables changes, the primary function 
of academic research is therefore to continually move theory forward.  Therefore, 
any theoretical perspective focusing on specified problems may also narrow the field 
of the researcher’s vision (Minsky 1986:109), e.g. some significant questions 
become meaningless through different theoretical perspective and some questions 
essentially noteworthy to research are ignored.  Therefore, a theoretical economic-
oriented perspective is inadequate to explain China’s transition.  For example, 
Conventional Economic theory takes institutions and associated evolution for granted 
and hardly studies how the force – institution, affects pricing change, e.g. Marshall 
                                                 
8  This kind of perspective can be largely seen in most schools of Institutional change theory, e.g. NIE, 
evolutionary theoretical framework of institutional change (Hayek 1978), and OIE (Veblen 1898b,1904).   
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argued that economic analysis could only be undertaken if historical and institutional 
features were taken as base-line values (Foster 1993) in order to simplify the analysis.  
Nonetheless, Lin (1989) criticized those Conventional Economic analyses because 
they presume well-defined property rights, perfect information, and frictionless 
transactions.  
 
Institutional economics, as Hunt (1992:317-322) argued, became a stream of 
economic thought after Veblen.  Other than his holism argument mentioned 
previously, Veblen (1898b) ridiculed the Conventional Economics’ assertion of the 
existence of institutions without any explanation of the emergence of institutional 
change that is otherwise inadequate for analysing economic issues, especially 
economic institutions (Hodgson 1993a:50-77).  In Veblen’s (1899) opinion, 
institutions are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive process 
which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and aptitudes; 
they are at the same time special methods of life and of human relations, and are 
therefore in their turn efficient factors of selection.  Therefore, Veblen (1898b) 
deemed institutions as unserviceable ceremonial factors, and the evolution and social 
progress as a technique with instrumental features that continually overwhelm 
institutions.  Veblen (1899) considered that institutions might be seen as a way of 
thinking about some relations and actions, and is (1914:52) a widespread existing 
mind-set among human beings.  In brief, an institution is the accumulation of history 
and an adaptive product of past that can seldom cope with current requirements 
(Veblen 1899).  
 
There are many groups that benefit from existing institutions and have been regarded 
as absentee owners (Veblen 1904), e.g. kings, clergy, knights, or merchants, etc.: 
they hardly do any productive work but symbolic work to maintain and enforce 
existing institutions.  After institutional changes, Veblen (1899) deemed that people 
have to be adaptive to the new institutions through new processes.  Subsequently, the 
new means of living will be redistributed and the consequences of re-distribution 
hardly ever occur in favour of the collective.  Veblen (1899:127) then went on to 
distinguish institutions and economic structure into two classes: institutions of 
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acquisition (pecuniary) or of production (industrial).  The former categories have to 
do with business and serve either individual or non-individual economic interests 
whereas the latter are concerned with industry.  Therefore, the latter class is not often 
recognized as an institution.  In my opinion, these institutions can be defined as 
favouring those absentee owners rather than the rest.  The former institutions are 
made by or for those absentee owners and therefore have effects upon those for non-
absentee owners.  Commons (1934:xxi,679), after Veblen, emphasized the 
importance of actions of transaction, property rights, and organizations, and 
(1931 ;1934:679) defined the social relations in capitalism as the relations of 
transaction.  Because there are many interest groups in a society, there always will be 
many conflicts of interest.  Therefore, it is essential to set up institutions to establish 
the regulation of actions and harmonise all parties within the transaction (Commons 
1934).  He deemed that scarce resources cause conflicts of interest among 
organizational members.  These conflicts therefore induce institutional changes in 
order to eliminate the conflicts.   
 
In my view, Veblen (1898b) took a prejudiced view of institutions regarding them as 
unserviceable ceremonial factors.  He chose to ignore that institutions are the 
foundation of social life that guide and mediate conflicts and consequently assure 
stability for society.  Furthermore, Veblen (1904) asserted that institutions were 
made by or for those absentee owners, who hardly do any productive work but only 
symbolic work in order to maintain and enforce existing institutions.  In my opinion, 
Veblen implicitly indicated that institutional changes can be manipulated and 
therefore distort the re-distribution of social resources to benefit minor people.  
However, Veblen overstressed a holism that hardly links individuals with society, 
and inappropriately regarded the individual as the passive recipient of institutional 
change because the main body of economic activity is individual.  Commons only 
defined social relations in capitalism and ignored those in other economic systems, 
e.g. the command economy, socialist market economy, and mainly focused on how 
to eliminate the conflicts rather than why scarce resources cause conflicts so that he 
might possibly understand the relationship between scarce resource and institutional 
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changes.  Thus, OIE’s argument is not sufficient to explain institutional changes in 
China.   
 
Besides OIE, there are scholars in the new version of institutional analysis (NIE), e.g. 
Coase, North, Williamson and other followers in the Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (Campbell 2004:8-12).  The New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
mainly modifies the Conventional Economics presumption of institutions, such as 
cost-profit analysis, game-theoretic approach (North 1990:15,18-19) but keeps the 
legacy of Conventional Economics – the economic individual.  Apart from that, 
many NIE scholars examine institutions in the pattern of decentralized research, e.g. 
property rights (Alchian 1965b,1965a ;Alchian and Demsetz 1972); agency of the 
internal organization (Jensen and Meckling 1976 ;Jensen 1994); and transaction costs 
(Cheung 1969,1970 ;Williamson 1980 ;1981,1986,1988).  Nonetheless, they (except 
North) mainly take the market economic institutions as given and then focus on 
specific types of organization and the formation and change of corresponding 
institutions.  
 
As argued, not every individual is rational and will always pursue maximization.  
Commons (1936) argued that an individual is not an economic man, who is assumed 
to have sufficient knowledge of the relevant aspects of his environment that are 
unrealistic in the real world because of the exorbitant costs and time.  Likewise, 
Williamson (1996) argues that the economic man to whom hyper-rationality is often 
attributed, does not exist in the real world.  He (Williamson 1975) asserts that an 
individual is possibly rational, his or her rationality is limited by the ability to receive, 
store, retrieve, and process information and to convey knowledge or feelings 
understood by others.  In this sense, people are within a bounded rationality that puts 
limits upon the ability of human beings to adapt optimally or satisfactorily to 
complex environments in the pursuit of maximization of self-interest but with 
cognitive limitations (Williamson 1975).  Therefore, the concept of maximizing 
personal interest is inadequate for application to the China’s transition and the 
emergence of HNWIs. 
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North (1973b ;1981,1990) indicated that institutional changes for human beings 
within a general theoretical framework are supported by and interrelated with three 
basic parameters: property rights, state, and ideology.  In contrast to holism, many 
NIE scholars (Commons 1931 ;Williamson 1986 ;North 1990 ;Jensen 1994 ;Lin 
2005) asserted that individual rationality does not essentially imply collective 
rationality because it is in the interest of each individual to seek the most favourable 
result for him or the maximization of self-interest.  Therefore, conflicts between 
different personal interests and transaction costs of institutional restructuring will 
arise (Pejovich 2003).  Likewise, new formal rules often begin with the process of a 
legal culture (Sunstein 1992-1993:918) that has solid judicial protection of individual 
rights indicating that the primary mechanism of control is coercion (Di Maggio and 
Powell 1983).  These new rules therefore create behavioural incentives that are not in 
tune with prevailing informal rules and, in turn, increase the transaction costs of 
enforcing new formal rules.  In this regard, ideology becomes a practical tool for 
reducing the transaction costs and providing services for new institutional 
arrangements.   
 
Regarding transaction costs, North and Wallis (1988) considered that in the long run 
transaction costs will decline while economic growth increases.  Coase (1937), 
Williamson (1985:15,211), Wallis and North (1986) all asserted that the criteria for 
selecting appropriate proxies and the tendency of institutional change is to reduce 
transaction costs.  It seems that transaction costs can explain any economic situation 
whatsoever.  However, transaction costs differ as a consequence of differing physical 
attributes of inputs and outputs of differing institutional arrangements, and of 
differing sets of stipulations that require varying efforts in enforcement and 
negotiation (Cheung 1969). The transaction cost is therefore inconsistent and 
unpredictable in transitional countries due in part to varying institutional 
arrangements.  In brief, when changes in formal rules are in accord with the 
prevailing informal rules, the incentives they create will tend to reduce transaction 
costs and free up some resources for the production of wealth.  In other words, when 
new formal rules conflict with the prevailing informal rules, the incentives they 
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create will raise transaction costs and reduce the production of wealth in the society 
(Pejovich 2003).   
 
There has never been any formal rule (law) in China that has been an expression of 
popular will; in contrast, it has been shaped by different understandings of the 
relationship between state and society (Weede 1990:1).  In this sense, an efficient 
ideology, which is adaptable enough to secure the loyalty of new groups and the 
counterpart of older groups (North 1981), is arguably the best way to administer this 
country.  For example, the CCP exploits ideological propagandas to maintain 
efficiently the state’s legitimacy by giving limited and selective autonomy to 
entrepreneurs in order to retain economic growth and reassure conservatives’ 
discontent.  
 
Likewise, there are theoretical gaps in the New Institutionalism.  For example, Coase 
(1974,1984,1988) ignored income distribution but laid stress solely on the impact of 
legal rights arrangements on efficiency.  He asserted that income (or wealth) 
distribution is the middle link of institutional change and therefore neglects the 
relationship between rights and income distribution as well as the impact of income 
distribution on resource allocation.  Coase (1960) assumed that there is no impact on 
demand and allocation of resources while legal rights could have an effect on income 
distribution.  He disregarded the income effect arranged by legal rights.  As a result, 
Coase ignored the conditions of wealth accumulation in institutional change.  In 
other words, Coase focused on the institutional arrangement and its impact on 
efficiency; therefore, he barely considered the negative effect of resource allocation 
on wealth distribution owing to his own presumptions.  On the other hand, Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) paid more attention solely to the effects of property rights on 
resource allocation instead of on income distribution.  In China, property rights are 
defined and implemented by the CCP and therefore become truncated; only the CCP 
and associated individuals can successfully transform resources to wealth regardless 
of property rights.  Davis and North in their institutional changes study (1970) deem 
positive gain itself as the reason for institutional arrangements but do not lay 
emphasis on the distribution of positive gain that will have effects on consequent 
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changing institutional arrangements or not. 
 
State or government, as any organisation, cannot implement any policy per se, and 
has therefore to entrust this specific function to agents, the bureaucrats or officials in 
different hierarchies (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  By this logic, I need to discuss 
Organisational Institutionalism.  These agents, bureaucrats and officials in any 
organisation are individuals, who are prone to maximize self-interest as much as 
possible (Buchanan and Tullock 1962 ;Mueller 1976 ;Tullock et al. 2000) even 
under constraints and encountering limitations (Friedman and Friedman 
1980 ;Williamson 1985).  In other words, these state agents may try to pursue the 
maximization of self-interest with cognitive limitation and bounded rationality 
because they are human beings as well (Williamson 1975 ;Simon 1991 ;Anderson et 
al. 1998).  Government, as argued, is intrinsically unable to remove imperfections, 
which exist in any economic system between individuals and firms, that have to be 
corrected by individuals, who are free to adapt themselves to changing conditions of 
demand and supply (Tullock et al. 2000:xi).  Therefore, government, in all respects, 
is often inefficient in making premature policy interventions that are unduly 
prolonged (Tullock et al. ibid:xi), to cure social problems but in fact only benefit 
interest groups at the expense of the mass majority.  This argument exactly explains 
China’s economic reforms, the essence of which is the political survival of the ruling 
elites that act as the rent protection in critical economic sectors (Pei 2006:96).  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), two prominent organisational institutionalists, assert 
that by choosing diverse common rules, dissimilar political institutions will create 
different social wealth distribution.  This statement exactly explains why some 
people exploit their relationship with reigning elites to effect institutional change that 
makes favourable resource distribution, consequently becoming HNWIs in China.   
 
Economists regard human beings as primarily concerned with their own interest 
whereas political science assumes political actors are mainly concerned with the 
public interest; thus, economists amended this bifurcated view of human behaviour 
and applied the analytical framework of economics to political science (Tullock et al. 
2000:5).  In my opinion, these economic and political actors correspond to the same 
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kind of people but in different sectors who engage in economic activities and in 
politics; therefore, their behaviours have equal motivation in both sectors.  Olson 
(1971,1993) puts the emphasis on the collective activities and individual activity that 
can be more appropriate for explaining the situation in transitional China.  Olson 
(1971:33-34) indicates that members of small groups can be more effective than their 
counterparts in large groups because of the free-riders phenomenon (Olson ibid:33) 
and have a more substantial portion of collective goods than in large groups, without 
relying on coercion.  Olson’s contention appropriately explains how small interest 
groups (elites) in transitional China need no coerciveness and spontaneously 
perpetuate the survival of the ruling regime because of their collective benefit.  This 
assertion justifies my presumption that collective benefits produce a symbiotic 
relationship between the ruling elites and economic elites (HNWIs).       
 
Some scholars (Romer 1990 ;Nee 1991 ;Dewatripont and Roland 1992 ;Yang 2004) 
regard China’s transition as one of gradual and partial reforms, which are considered 
as organic reforms.  For example, Zhang (2003) asserted that spontaneous 
institutional changes in China are regarded as evolutionary reforms on several counts: 
(1) there is no artificial and consistent target in China’s reforms; (2) these reforms 
are step-by-step and from-easy-to-difficult; (3) many reforms in China are not top-to-
bottom or instructional.  Presumably, the uniqueness of partial reforms in transitional 
China is in response to Hayek’s Evolutionary perspective (1998:293-294) that 
institutional change cannot be consciously and rationally man-made to order.  In 
contrast, the entire process of gradualist reforms in transitional China might be less 
artificial but that key-links within them are largely distorted by political or social 
elites, who play vital roles in many crucial reforms in the decentralized power 
structure (Nee 1991 ;Solnick 1996 ;Stark 1996 ;Yang 1996b ;Walder 2003,2004).  In 
other words, these misguided changes of key-links have significant impacts on the 
direction and tendency of institutional changes.  Therefore, to generalize China’s 
economic reforms by employing the Evolutionary framework is, in my view, a 
blinkered approach (Royston 2004), i.e. using a closed system to model an inherently 
open social world .  
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In my opinion, no single school within institutional change theory can explain 
China’s transition and elites’ behaviours adequately without synthesising with other 
theories.  For example, Zhang (1996,2003) considered that institutional change in 
transitional China is spontaneous and not man-made. However, he neglected many 
key-links that were critically disturbed and influenced by vested interest groups, e.g. 
Special Economic Zones, Contract Responsibility, Dual-Pricing System, etc.  Some 
other scholars (Woo 1999 ;Lieberthal 2004:118-130;Shirk 2007:45;Shih et al. 
2010:66) regarded these synthetic key-links as embodying the confrontation between 
conservative and pro-reform in China.  Some scholars (Chen et al. 1992) note that 
three points should be emphasized with regard to institutional change in China.  First, 
it is critical to realize that many of these reforms are enabling reforms.  Second, 
many reforms have followed a “fait accompli” pattern.  Third, many reforms remain 
unsanctioned.  That is to say, central government authorizes local initiatives but does 
not promise the achievement of their intended effect, sanctioning important reforms 
only after they had become widespread.  Therefore, such authorization and consent 
are deliberately triggered because central government is unable to envisage the 
results.    
 
Because of these considerable debates in relation to institutional change, Scott’s 
(1995:Ch.3) three major institutional paradigms – the rational choice, organizational, 
and historical paradigm, may further facilitate this research.  The efficacy of these 
paradigms is obvious from a wide range of fields, e.g. the account of cultural 
organization (Di Maggio 1991:267-292); the account of economic organization or 
modern corporations (Williamson 1985 ;Fligstein 1990); the account of property 
rights (Barzel 1989); the account of economies and states (North 1990); and the 
account of economic policy (Hall 1986).  These diverse approaches are underpinned 
by differing rationales and consideration that reflect the diversity of institutional 
change theory.  The point is, however, not to focus upon their different approaches 
but their distinctive dimensions.  If I apply North’s argument to China’s transitions, 
the emphasis will fall on the constraints on human behaviour at the expense of 
considering the logic of procedure, ethics, and morality, let alone the pursuit of 
personal benefit.  Therefore, it is appropriate to consider institutions as the outcome 
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of struggle and negotiation (Campbell 2004:1) that reflect the resources and powers 
of those who made them and affect the distribution of resources and powers in a 
society that clearly displays the status quo of contemporary China.  
 
Regarding the three major paradigms of institutional analysis, there are extensive and 
contentious debates about which is the best approach in terms of analysis (Di Maggio 
1991:1-40;Thelen and Steinmo 1992:28;Kiser and Hechter 1998).  To avoid being 
limited to any one of these paradigms, a synthesized approach is proposed that can 
complement and reconcile these paradigms leading to a more comprehensive 
approach to institutional analysis.  First, I will examine institutional change through 
these three different paradigms.  Second, the cause and reason of institutional change 
must be identified.  Third, a distinction must be made between ideas and interests in 
terms of institutional change.  Consequently, I perceive the all-purpose assertion of 
maximized utility or self-interest from rational choice institutionalists, which does 
not offer a reason but rather a rationalization because utility or interest in itself is not 
a driver of institutional changes.  
 
Some scholars (Rutherford 1994:Ch.3;Langlois 2001) mentioned that these micro-
level individual actions give rise to institutions motivated by maximization of 
personal utility, based on the logic of maximizing benefits relative to costs.  From 
this perspective, institutions are built to advance actors’ self-interests.  Therefore, 
rational choice institutionalism, as Rutherford (1994:4) argues, is oriented toward the 
more abstract, formal, individualistic, and evolutionary.  However, actors will create 
institutions to maximize their interests that may not come about owing to uncertainty 
and time.  When uncertainty arises, an actor may not have enough time to collect 
sufficient information to make clear goals and maximize individual interests.  
Consequently, the normative and cognitive scripts not only constrain actors’ 
behaviours but also effectively enable their actions by providing actors with 
guidance (Clemens and Cook 1999).   
 
Unlike rational choice institutionalists, many organizational institutionalists, e.g. 
Scott and Meyer (1994) and Thomas et al. (1987), produce empirical studies in 
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which behaviours and formal structures of organizations are defined by their 
institutional environments.  They consider that organizations will seek legitimacy 
from their environments to ensure their survival even when they deviate from 
mandated objectives.  Some organizational institutionalists (except Selznick, who 
focuses solely on individual organization) extend their theoretical coverage to all 
organizations that share a common environment.  These organizations, which are in 
the same institutional environment, tend to adopt similar structures and practices and 
reproduce themselves over time (Jepperson and Meyer 1991:145).  Therefore, the 
phenomenon is distinct from rational choice institutionalism, which states that actors 
will instrumentally maximize their benefits relative to costs, because organizations 
try to conform to their environments.  From the perception of organizational 
institutionalism, actors not only respond to normative pressure in their environments 
but also stress cognition, that depends on taken-for-granted scripts, habits, and 
routines.  Through these normative and cognitive scripts, actors therefore interpret 
their institutional environment (Scott 1995:Ch.2).   
 
In fact, the intention of individuals plays a vital role in creating new institutional 
arrangements in China.  However, I need to unpack the reasons why people want to 
influence institutions.  As rational choice institutionalists argue, the individual desire 
to perpetuate institutions is favourable to the retention of self-interest.  Nonetheless, 
it may not be attainable or only at exorbitant cost.  Therefore, from one country to 
another, institutions will ultimately change and follow different patterns, which can 
be evolutionary, gradual, punctuated equilibrium, or other formats
9
 (Veblen 
1898b ;Hayek 1978 ;North 1990), within a given period.  Because institutions reflect 
the distribution of power and resources, those individuals, who have the rights to 
distribute resources and power at their disposal, can distort any originally benevolent 
institution.  
 
                                                 
9 There are diverse arguments from various scholars (Veblen 1898b ;Zhang 2003) that state decent institutional 
change can only be an endogenously evolutionary process instead of the artificial, or “spontaneous order” and 
instead of “deliberate design” (Hayek 1978).  However, on the one hand, we cannot yet confirm that institutional 
changes in China are spontaneous or deliberate.  On the other hand, we cannot make sure any suitable 
institutional change is completely evolutionary or spontaneous.   
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In China, the status quo resembles that of a market economy system, which is 
implemented and translated on clear and disjointed political restraints.  In contrast, 
partial reforms in this country continue to re-define the institutional parameters, 
which were set by the previous command economy and the enduring CCP.  Thus, 
any institutional innovation in China may put an end to persistent institutional 
parameters, perpetuated by existing interest groups.  In other words, former 
institutional parameters cannot cope with the pace of emerging economic reforms, 
and market efficiencies will be reduced and generate speculative opportunities or 
institutional holes (Yang 2004).  Many institutional legacies in China continue to be 
derived from the practice of previous socialism whereby the influence of the party-
state exerts a strong inertia in the period of transition.  This specific phenomenon 
resembles the path dependence idea (North 1990:94) and continues to strengthen the 
privileges of China’s elites
10
.  Therefore, strong and privileged interest groups and 
commercialized local governments will endeavour to hamper equal distribution of 
the benefits of economic growth throughout society, thereby rendering futile the 
CCP's strategy of trading economic growth for people's consent to its absolute rule 
(Yao 2010).   
 
Under this odd circumstance, many good or refined institutional innovations, which 
can benefit most people, are deliberately blocked or postponed in China if these 
constructive improvements make it more difficult for privileged groups to continue 
to access their economic benefits, e.g. the first Land-Use Right (LUR) was auctioned 
in Shenzhen in 1987 but the nationwide auction was not enforced until 2004.  The 
reasons for deferring the nationwide LUR have mainly arisen in two dimensions 
(Foldvary 1998 ;Lau et al. 2000 ;Ding 2003).  First, after decentralization, local 
government has to raise a sufficient budget to afford the local infrastructures and 
boost local GDP growth; thus, opaque land transfer can be a significant economic 
resource to assist ailing finances.  Second, obscure land transfer can, to a large extent, 
help local bureaucrats to acquire an extra budget in their private coffers and that 
                                                 
10 History matters in terms of path-dependence because what actors do today is shaped by what they did 
yesterday (Bassanini and Dosi 2001:41,43,47).  Institutionalists refer to path-dependence as a process by which 
contingent events or decisions result in the establishment of institutions that persist over long periods of time and 
constrain actors’ options (North 1990:93-95;Powell 1991:192)  
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turns into corruption and embezzlement subsequently, or embezzlement of state 
assets in disguise (Lang et al. 1995).   
 
Up to now, I have examined the pros and cons of different institutional change 
schools that reveal a high level of indifference to dependence on external essential 
resources.  In my view, Veblen and Commons ignore that privileged individuals, or 
the leisure class (Veblen 1899), are not passive recipients of institutions and they will 
exploit external resources to effect institutional changes, which may consequently 
benefit themselves and cause conflict with the entire society.  Coase deems that legal 
rights, e.g. property rights, could solve the issue of income distribution; however, 
those agents enforcing legal rights are highly likely to be affected while their 
essential external resources are exploited by privileged individuals.  Davis and North 
(1970) argue that people seek positive gain, which should bring in more opportunity 
to the entire society, and consequently change current institutional arrangements in 
order to increase self-interest.  However, they hardly refer to the truth that people 
possess asymmetric negotiating power, which will make new institutional 
arrangement biased towards those people who can capitalize on external resources.  
In my view, institutional changes consist in the changes of and transfer of various 
rights, which can alter or create the rules of the game within society.  Furthermore, 
there always are some people exerting external resources (power) to change or affect 
current institutional arrangements in order to increase their personal positive gain: 
environmental constraints really affect internal organizational dynamics (Pfeffer and 
Salancik [1978] 2003:xix).  By this logic, the dependence on and exploitation of 
external resources play integral roles within institutional change.  Therefore, to 
integrate resource dependence theory into institutional change theory is meaningful 
and essential to my research.   
 
3.2.2 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
Institutional changes have been occurring fitfully since the late 1970s in transitional 
China as a last resort to the then hesitating leaders.  Those rural reforms initiated in 
the early 80s provided a baffling success to the then Chinese government and 
sustainability to the then political leaders.  Consequently, those ruling elites applied 
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those quasi-rural reforms to urban areas.  However, those reforms hardly attained 
similar results as their rural reforms predecessors.  Meanwhile, exertions from 
HNWIs over state wealth and social resources were simultaneously afoot. While 
institutions were varied in urban areas, they were exploited to halt any effort to 
transform the oligarchic-exclusive market into a liberal-inclusive market, in order to 
remain prosperous in the competition-oriented market.  This particular phenomenon 
is in line with Tolbert’s (1985) assertion that a stable flow of scarce resources from 
external sources determines the survival of individuals or organizations.  This stable 
flow of resources, however, may soon be exhausted since resources are finite, and 
widespread requests in any institutional environment shared by isomorphic 
constituents in the same organizational field (Di Maggio and Powell 1983 ;Polit et al. 
2001) results in costly and scarce resources (Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer 
1992 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003).  In this circumstance, constituents have to 
innovate to acquire alternative essential resources (Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer and 
Salancik [1978] 2003) thus avoiding costly scarce resources and thereby changing 
the current settings of the standard.  By that logic, the resource dependence theory 
could provide an adequate theoretical premise for explaining the institutional 
circumstances under which major economic actors operate (Guthrie 1997 ;Sherer and 
Lee 2002).  
 
Resource dependence theory suggests that no matter how self-sufficient in resources 
organizations are, how well institutional arrangements organizations are made, and 
how much authoritative power organizations possess, they will depend on other 
individuals or organisations for certain essential resources they themselves need, 
temporarily or permanently (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:2).  In other words, 
any resource obtained externally creates dependency on the external source of 
essential resources.  Any individual or subunit of an organization that is best able to 
cope with critical organisational uncertainties, will come to have relatively more 
power inside organisations (Perrow 1970) and exploit that power to ensure their 
existing privileges.  In this sense, social actors will always vie for scarce resources to 
achieve their goals and make themselves competitive within the same standard 
(organisation, society, state).  Therefore, that competition for scarce resources are 
  
Page 87 of 484 
likely to be the cause of institutional change (Sherer and Lee 2002), or resource 
dependence, from my perspective, will have serious effects upon consequent 
institutional changes and vice versa.       
 
Because organizations always rely on others to acquire essential resources, 
organizations may therefore, try to reduce their dependence on external resources 
and search for the means to assure the acquisition of those resources that are 
significant in relation to the survival of those individuals or organizations.  Therefore, 
they attempt to capture alternative resources and may consequently depart from the 
standard, which is shared by the constituents of the organizational field making the 
essential resource more scarce and costly (Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer 1992 ;Pfeffer 
and Salancik [1978] 2003).  In this regard, only those organizations that have the 
legitimacy to vary from the standard, or alternatively, are prestigious or sufficiently 
high status, are enabled to be different (Rogers 1983:288).  These organizations, as 
Sherer and Lee (2002) argue, are able to develop and disseminate technical rationales 
for their innovations because they have the legitimacy to differ, and create legitimacy 
for those who follow (Tolbert and Zucker 1983).   
 
Different organizations have been vying with each other for similar essential 
resources in the same institutional environment that can be marked as a best practice 
conferring legitimacy on organizations (Meyer and Rowan 1977 ;Di Maggio and 
Powell 1983 ;Tolbert and Zucker 1983 ;Leblebici et al. 1991).  In China, after the 
1990s, the most significant institutional changes were effected or imposed by these 
economic or political elites and most Chinese people had no right to participate in the 
process of making new institutions.  Therefore, most ordinary people in China 
become passive recipients of new institutions.  The aforementioned statement 
corresponds to the proposition of Pfeffer and Salancik ([1978] 2003:114) that 
organizations will try to expand control over vital resources through vertical 
integration, and attain dominance, consequently increasing power in order to reduce 
the uncertainty generated from the competition of vying for external essential 
resources and finally diversifying the dependence on others.  Arguably, legitimacy 
and the origin of the scarce resource are vital parameters driving institutional 
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changes in response to the standard (institutional environment) (Sherer and Lee 
2002).   
      
Except for tangible and intangible resources, the source of these essential resources 
can be endogenous and exogenous occurring in response to change (Leblebici et al. 
1991).  The endogenous resources can be secured within the organization and the 
exogenous ones can be acquired externally; nonetheless, both resources eventually 
become scarce and costly because they are finite and in large demand in the same 
institutional environment.  Although organizations may have internal access to 
endogenous resources, the increasing demands on them in response to the standard 
required will be rapidly exhausted.  Therefore, this exhaustion will also lead 
organizations to seek external resources and those exogenous scarce resources will 
likewise have results.  In the circumstances, organizations seek more autonomy 
(legitimacy) to adopt alternative resources, which are less costly and available to 
them, to avoid facing the resource scarcity.   
 
Those alternative resources may not be in response to the criteria of existing 
standards and may tend to change existing institutional settings, permitting 
organizations to get more power through the alternative resources and over the 
constraints from existing the standard.  Therefore, organizations, which have the 
autonomy to legitimize the alternative resources and new institutional settings, can 
depart from previously accepted standards and consequently accomplish the 
institutional change process.  However, there are many organizations in the same 
institutional field (a standard) trying to adopt their alternative resources, which are 
exclusively cheaper and available to them while the previous resource has become 
scarce and costly.  In Fig 9, the available and cheaper alternative resource to 
organization A may not have the same effects on organization B.  Thus, organization 
B will also try to make its alternative resource, which is exclusively cheaper and 
available to organization B, become legitimized.  In this regard, the autonomy and 
power of organization A may become a constraint on organization B because there 
should be only one standard in the organizational field (institutional environment).  
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As argued, organizations not only vie for scarce resources but also the legitimacy of 
their exclusive alternative resource.   
 
The aforementioned argument vindicates the argument that institutional change 
theory barely elucidates institutional changes comprehensively without incorporating 
the resource dependence explanation.  Additionally, the resource dependence 
perspective describes how organizations vie for resources in a standard context in 
order to become more competitive.  In my view, if organizations cannot acquire 
sufficient resources to become competitive in this way, they will try to reduce the 
uncertainty confronting the institutional field by seeking autonomy to employ 
alternative resources and consequently get sufficient power to legitimize the process.  
The process of seeking-autonomy manifest in contemporary China is that people 
manipulate political power to retain their existing privileges.  
 
As argued, organizations need legitimacy to adopt alternative resources to replace 
existing scarce and costly resources, and therefore legitimacy becomes a force for 
constraining change and pressurizing organizations to act alike and organizations at 
the margin are likely to innovate first (Di Maggio and Powell 1983 ;Leblebici et al. 
1991).  Tolbert and Zucker (1983) argue that early adopters of alternative resources 
provide the legitimacy for these resources and other organizations are then under 
pressure to adopt it; however, they are unable to explain in what ways early adopters 
of the alternative resources are able to be different.  If organizations are at the margin 
that means they are much less competitive in the standard context, and this being the 
case, they may be the most eager ones to innovate but with relatively poor autonomy 
to legitimize their alternative resources.  Therefore, they should be the ones least 
successful at innovating, let alone legitimizing the alternative resources unless 
through other intense processes, i.e. revolution.  Therefore, those parameters, which 
can successfully connect legitimacy with early adopters who employ alternative 
resources, need to be established. 
 
In terms of those missing parameters, the concept of privilege may throw some light 
on this matter (Rogers 1983:115).  Rogers mentions that early adopters with high 
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prestige will possess the legitimacy to try innovations and employ alternative 
resources that have not yet been legitimized.  In other words, those individuals or 
organizations use their prestige or status to achieve success in creating and 
disseminating new technical rationales.  For example, many reform policies in China 
were actually conducted by elites before they were approved or after they were 
sanctioned to cease by the higher authority, e.g. the prohibition of public housing 
allocation was initiated in 1998, but many privileged state institutes (bank, military) 
continued to allocate public housing to high-ranking staff until 2000.  This example 
explains how an organization with prestige is the one best placed initially to facilitate 
change.  Therefore, those people, who are at the margin, may legally use alternative 
resources by connecting with those prestigious people with the result that power 
imbalance and mutual dependence will be derived from this connection.     
 
Nonetheless, Pfeffer and Salnick ([1978] 2003:38) do not specifically describe power 
imbalance and mutual dependence.  In my view, the notion of power and dependence 
can be traced back to Emerson’s (1962) classic volume on power-dependence 
relations.  Emerson indicates that the power capability of A over B is the inverse of 
B’s dependence on A in a simple context where there are only two of them in the 
organizational field.  He conveys, nonetheless, an unprecedented concept that power 
is not an attribute of any social actor but a property of social relationships and that 
there should be an object for that power.  If we say that a HNWI in China has power, 
for example, it is not a complete description unless we say this specific HNWI has 
power over ordinary people, bureaucrats in the low-hierarchical level, or other less 
powerful economic entities.  Moreover, power is not an attribute of HNWI but a 
property of a specific social relationship.  Once the object is a high-rank state agent, 
HNWI is no longer powerful but is subservient to the high-rank state agents.    
 
From Emerson’s argument, I therefore derive two concepts that A’s dependence on 
B is dependent upon (1) A’s need for resources that B can provide and (2) the 
availability of alternative resources to A.  Therefore, it implies the power capability 
of A and B should be considered simultaneously, and two distinct dimensions of 
power, power imbalance and mutual dependence, are derived from the dyadic 
  
Page 91 of 484 
approach to resource dependence (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005).  Power imbalance 
indicates the difference in the power of each social actor over the other.  This can be 
defined as the difference between two actors’ dependencies, or the ratio of the more 
powerful one to the lesser actor (Lawler and Yoon 1996).  
 
Because the process of role-playing is dynamic, therefore, those varying 
determinants have decisive effects on social transition.  I have applied the power-
dependence relations, which vary along with reforms, from Emerson’s volume (1962) 
to the scenario in transitional China (see Fig 14).  Before economic reforms were 
initiated, the role performance of the bureaucrat was simple owing to its rudimentary 
attributes and a smaller number of demands.  In society at that time, they only 
needed to perform the tasks assigned by the higher hierarchical authority owing to 
the planned economy system.  Apart from that, there was very little economic 
incentive to attract bureaucrats let alone any embezzlement or infringement of state 
assets.  Therefore, bureaucrats at the same hierarchical level had very low levels of 
dependence on each other because none of these bureaucrats could change the 
demand-and-supply of critical resource in the economic system at that time (see 
Configuration 1 of table 2).            
 
In the early reform era, bureaucrats in China were not acquainted with the newly 
introduced market economy system; therefore, they had to learn it from people 
familiar with market operations.  Some bureaucrats had therefore grasped the 
institutional holes (Yang 2004) due in part to the partial reforms, which introduced 
ownership rights, even though truncated(Alchian and Demsetz 1973), and therefore 
became the bureaupreneurs (Bouckaert 2007).  However, they remained insecure and 
had to rely on political power to secure legitimacy for their social status, and recently 
accrued wealth.  Therefore, the power imbalance between these bureaupreneurs and 
bureaucrats increased as well as the higher mutual dependence between them (see 
Configuration 2 of table 2). 
 
Following those initial reforms, some bureaupreneurs became HNWIs owing to an 
enhanced acquaintance with the profit-oriented economic system and accrued 
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substantial wealth along with the economic reforms.  Meanwhile, ownership rights 
have been legitimately defined; however, those associated ideologies, enforcement 
mechanisms, legal systems, and financial systems remained behind the pace of the 
newly defined property rights.  In this regard, structural and institutional gaps 
(institutional holes) remain between these parameters (see Fig 10), and deliberately 
exploited by those powerful vested interests (HNWIs and associated political elites).  
These institutional gaps provide interest groups with large opportunities to access 
wealth and privileges. However, these gaps, lacking in regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive institutional supports, make for vested interests, wealth and 
privilege in an unstable situation.  Thus, HNWIs have more dependence on 
bureaucrats than bureaupreneurs and therefore cause a higher power imbalance in 
addition to a deeper mutual dependence (see Configuration 3 of table 2).      
 
I have explained that organizations need to acquire resources from other 
organizations in order to survive in an organizational field (Tolbert and Zucker 
1983 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:2-3), with two subsequent scenarios.  First, 
some organizations will become more influential in the environment because other 
organizations rely on them in order to acquire essential resources.  According to a 
previous illustration (see Fig 9), the power imbalance between them is at a high level 
as is mutual dependence.  In this regard, these influential organizations become the 
external controls for those vulnerable counterparts and consequently affect the 
internal power arrangements of these less powerful organizations.  The second 
scenario is a derivative of the first scenario that less powerful organizations will 
accordingly try to be more autonomous in order to get rid of the external controls 
exerted by those powerful organizations.  In the circumstances, less powerful 
organizations may try to acquire and legitimize the alternative resources that are 
available and less costly to them.  The second scenario essentially corresponds to the 
previously mentioned dynamic process (Fig 9).  
   
I therefore perceive three notions that: first, power actually resides in the other’s 
dependency; second, the availability of alternative resources refers to the low 
transaction costs to the vulnerable organization; and third, the constraints from 
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powerful organizations impede vulnerable organizations in acquiring alternative 
resources.  The first notion is self-explanatory.  The second notion is hidden and has 
been implicitly argued.  If vulnerable organizations have alternative resources that 
are associated with low transaction costs, the vulnerable organizations’ dependence 
upon the powerful organizations will be accordingly reduced.  For example, many 
people in China have had to pay very high prices for private housing from 1991 
onwards (see Fig 11).  For example, if a public affordable housing project is 
reasonably priced, in sufficient supply, practically designed, and in a comparable 
location in comparison with private housing projects, ordinary people will 
consequently reduce their dependence upon private housing and pay less to acquire it.  
In this regard, private housing developers will have less power over the ordinary 
people owing to available and inexpensive alternative resources.  This will result in 
the third notion that powerful organizations will try to sabotage the supply of 
alternative resources or delegitimize the alternative resources in order to prevent the 
vulnerable counterparts acquiring them.  For example, China’s private housing 
developers deliberately restrict the budget of, postpone the development of, or even 
cancel projects of public affordable housing by means of manipulation, lobbying or 
bribery (Lee 1988 ;Walder 1992 ;Wu 2001 ;Zhang and Fang 2003 ;Quigley and 
Rosenthal 2004 ;Chan et al. 2006 ;Doling 2006 ;Quan 2006 ;2007) to keep their 
excessive profit.   
 
Following previous discussions, I assert, unfalteringly, that resource dependence 
theory provides the premise for a wide range of actions that organizations take in 
response to the changing institutional environment.  The aforesaid first and second 
scenarios, indeed, correspond to the ‘power use’ operations and ‘power 
restructuring’ operations (Casciaro and Piskorski 2005) respectively.  The ‘power 
use’ indicates that power imbalance facilitates the influence of powerful actors over 
power-disadvantaged actors and allows the former to extract a higher share of 
exchange surplus from the latter.  That is to say, powerful actors have external 
control over less powerful ones (Pfeffer and Leong 1977 ;Burt 1980 ;Provan et al. 
1980).  The ‘power restructuring’ operations, which can be unilateral or bilateral, 
aim to change the power-dependence structure within an environment (Casciaro and 
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Piskorski 2005).  The unilateral power restructuring operations correspond to the 
aforementioned second scenario that tries to reduce the demand for the given 
resource and cultivate the alternative ones.  Nevertheless, unilateral restructuring 
operations claim that organizations are allowed to change their dependencies without 
involving the other party.  This situation may only happen if the organizations that 
want to change are the powerful ones.  If vulnerable organizations try to change their 
dependencies on the powerful organizations, they will face constraints from the other 
party that are the powerful organizations.  This will lead the situation towards the 
third notion that powerful organizations will try to sabotage the supply of alternative 
resources or delegitimize the alternative resources in order to prevent the vulnerable 
counterparts acquiring them. 
 
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) propose bilateral power restructuring operations as 
supplementary to unilateral restructuring operations and deem that organizations will 
often have to engage in bilateral restructuring of dependencies.  However, the two-
scenario pattern does not explain the relationship between power and dependence 
comprehensively.  I therefore develop another scenario, realized power, in chapter 6 
(see Fig 23) that corresponds to the previously mentioned third notion or bilateral 
restructuring operations.  
 
From the preceding discussion, I argue that the major contents of the resource 
dependence theory consist of the following substance.  First, organizations try to 
pursue more resources to protect their interests and reduce or avoid those given 
impacts from the institutional environment that arise because of the uncertainty and 
scarcity of essential resources.  Second, the sustainable competitiveness of 
organizations is derived from good management and accumulation of scarce 
resources.  Third, as Pfeffer and Salancik ([1978] 2003:xiii) argue, the emphasis on 
power as opposed to economic efficiency distinguishes resource dependence from 
transaction cost theory (Williamson 1975), which focuses more on the inter-
organizational relationship amongst actors- namely buyers, sellers, and competitors.  
Lastly, because those valuable and scarce resources are finite, those organizations, 
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which can acquire more of these resources, will have more autonomy and will 
influence other organizations lacking in the scarce resource.   
 
No organization is self-sufficient and has to exchange resources with the 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:2).  Therefore, resource dependence 
theory stresses organizational power and deems that an organization as a political 
actor that will attempt to obtain advantages from government agents either through 
direct monetary support, protecting their market from foreign or domestic 
competition, or from competition from substitute goods and services (Pfeffer and 
Salancik ibid:213-214).  Apart from external representation, resource dependence 
theory also considers internal factors of organization.  It deems that people who can 
best cope with critical organizational uncertainties, including how to acquire scarce 
resources, come to have relatively more power inside the organization (Perrow 
1970 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003:xix,6).  These people consequently exploit 
power to ensure that their perspective in their best interests prevails, and that they 
become more important than other members do in the same organization.  This 
argument should be virtually extended to the relationship between different 
organizations and the organizational field (the standard).  
 
Based on the aforesaid examinations, I affirm that the organizational environment is 
not a substantial object rather it is created through a series of interactions (choices, 
comprehension, and participation) between participants, organizations and 
institutions that vary from one organization to another.  In this sense, organizations 
may change, manipulate or control other organizations to obtain essential resources 
in order to keep themselves independent and competitive.  In other words, 
organizations may try to control or change organizational environmental factors, e.g. 
legitimacy establishment or participation in political activity, to ensure their 
competitiveness in the organizational field.  In conclusion, I argue that resource 
dependence theory consists of three layers of meaning: first, organizations and their 
surroundings are inter-dependent; second, organizations can also adjust their 
dependencies on the current environment through acquiring alternative resources 
instead of following the existing institutional environment; third, the existing 
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institutional environment should not be regarded as the unchangeable and objective 
truth (see Fig 14).  Next, I will examine the main parameters in resource dependence 
theory and institutional change theory and their relationship to China’s transition.   
 
3.3 MAIN PARAMETERS  
In section 2.4, I have espoused the idea that institutional changes in China are clearly 
connected to the transition in property rights, which is devised in a way that 
maintains the legitimacy of the CCP and sustainability of the ruling elites.  Therefore, 
to discuss these parameters will enhance the researcher’s knowledge regarding this 
specific institutional environment, e.g. property rights (Demsetz 1964,1967 ;Cheung 
1968 ;Williamson 1980 ;North 1994 ;Barzel 2000), transaction costs (Cheung 
1969 ;Williamson 1979 ;Williamson 1981 ;North 1987 ;Lin 1989 ;North 1991), path 
dependence (North 1994 ;Stark 1994 ;March 1996 ;Knight and North 1997) and 
associates.  Nevertheless, there is one parameter that has been overlooked, namely 
legitimacy, which is not only concurrently significant in both institutional change 
theory and resource dependence theory but is also a nexus between these two 
theories.  As Scott (1991:169) mentioned, legitimacy explains and justifies the social 
order that makes institutional arrangements subjectively.  Parsons (1995) also argued 
that legitimacy was a significant concept for understanding organisations and their 
relationships regarding the social environment.  As argued, vying for external 
essential resources may be the cause of institutional change.  However, without 
legitimacy, people can hardly legitimately exploit external essential resources to 
retain their existing privileges because the constituents have consumed society’s 
resources and will be evaluated according to the usefulness and legitimacy of their 
activities (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003).  In the circumstances, to understand 
how an individual or organization obtains legitimacy during institutional change 
becomes an essential task.               
 
Following legitimacy, I turn the focus to rationality, which should be explained in 
terms of the limitations of human abilities and of the surroundings in which they live.  
A fundamental controversial argument in Conventional Economics is that human 
beings are rational.  In my view, a human being may not be egoistic but can only be 
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altruistic to the extent that the returns on his or her altruism outweigh the costs of 
being altruistic.  Rational persons, on the other hand, will not repeat the same fault if 
the perceived benefits from amending the mistake outweigh the costs (Downs 1957).  
However, individual rationality is bounded by the ability to receive, store, retrieve, 
and process information in order to make knowledge or feelings understood by 
others (Williamson 1975).  Consequently, transaction costs will arise in the face of 
other opportunists or specifically, free riders.  Maximization of individual usefulness, 
in this sense, will not be guaranteed in this complex environment.  The other reason 
for the failure to achieve maximization is that obtaining all information is costly and 
technically not always possible.   
 
Nonetheless, economic growth cannot exist without market regulations derived from 
and supported by institutions that are a series of rules, a process of tenacity, have 
criterion of morality and ethics that are set up to constrain individual behaviours in 
terms of the pursuit of the maximization of wealth and individual utility (North 
1981).  North (1990) gave the definition of institution as the “rules of the game”, 
both formal rules (constitution, law, government decrees) and informal constraints 
(norms, conventions, and codes of conduct) that provide the structure for human 
interaction.  He also argued that the institution is set up to minimize transaction costs 
and to facilitate market exchange within the state.  Because state is as an instrument 
for achieving collective action (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) or defined as a team of 
people seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means (Downs 1957), 
with the result that people can hardly ensure that every new institutional arrangement 
will be made to benefit most people instead of maximizing individual (government 
official) interests. 
 
Until now, legitimacy, transaction costs and rationality that make up institutions have 
been examined and they will unavoidably be transformed along with external 
institutional changes.  However, different tendencies exist concurrently within the 
same parameters that is both old (well established) and modified (newly initiated) 
intrinsic qualities.  Institutional changes may therefore replace habitual nature with a 
new one; therefore, institutional change can be characterised by competition between 
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the old and new characteristics of the parameters.  In transitional China, reform is 
difficult to implement because of previous socialist constraints, e.g. political and 
cultural together with the protection from previous socialist legacies. Thus, there is 
superficial institutional change that may not be intrinsic change or improve the 
nature of the parameter.  In this regard, only some apparent institutional changes can 
emerge in transitional China.  Therefore, I argue that HNWIs could largely rely on 
and intensify these habitual parameters favourable to the retention of their wealth and 
privileges rather than improving their competitiveness outside the structure of social 
constraints that might alter the social sphere.   
 
There are certain parameters and phenomena mentioned in most schools of both 
theories (see table 3); therefore, they need to be mostly examined if they correspond 
to the coding of interviews.  In table 3, I have noted that path dependence appears in 
different schools of institutionalism.  Apart from that, dependency is also another 
vital parameter in resource dependence theory.  Some other parameters are present in 
resource dependence theory and different schools of institutional change theory, i.e. 
legitimacy, scarcity, power, and property rights. Subsequently, I will contemplate the 
meanings of and the relationship between these parameters in following paragraphs.     
 
Path dependence is essentially a process consisting of many parameters that is 
widely cited among different schools of institutional change theory.  Therefore, some 
institutionalists consider that path dependence is based on feedback, increasing 
returns, and choice within institutional constraints (Alt and Shepsle 1990:1-8;North 
1990:94;Nee 1998:1-16) or maintain that once people are on a particular institutional 
path they tend to stick to it rather than jump onto another one (North 1990 ;Arthur 
1994).  In fact, path dependence is not only a vital process in institutional change 
theory but also relates to many parameters within resource dependence theory.  
Powell (1991:191) contends that path dependence is a process starting from power 
exercise, inter-dependency, taken-for-granted assumptions, and becomes path-
dependent.  In this process, path dependence not only simply is a process but also 
relates to power, dependency, and normative and cognitive ideas and vice versa, 
during its evolution.  As a result, once path dependence is embedded, powerful 
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people will be enthusiastically committed to ensuring its survival (Stinchcombe 
1968:107).      
 
Enlightened by Powell’s notion, I consider that path dependence may result in 
isomorphic organizations.  That is, once a particular practice is deeply rooted in an 
organizational field, changes in any one aspect require change in many other 
elements (Thompson 1967:145).  Therefore, altering institutional rules involves high 
switching costs and many political, financial, and cognitive considerations opposed 
to such changes (Stinchcombe 1968).  For that reason, many organizations in the 
same organizational field will resemble each other and become isomorphic.  Because 
they are isomorphic, it is difficult for them to become more competitive in the same 
organizational field.  These isomorphic organizations consequently have to vie for 
essential resources, which will make them become more competitive.  As has been 
argued, there are many essential resources shared by constituents (isomorphic 
organizations) of the organizational field, and consequently the resources become 
scarce and costly (Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer 1992 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 
2003).  Consequently, organizations may try to innovate with the aim of acquiring 
alternative resources (Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003) that 
avoid the costly scarce resources and therefore change the current settings of the 
standard (see Fig 9).    
 
Based on the perspective of resource dependence theory, prestigious social actors 
normally have the legitimacy to try innovations and employ alternative resources that 
have not yet been legitimized (Rogers 1983:115).  That is to say, in the development 
process of path dependence, power-exercise can legitimize the alternative options 
and lock them into the organizational field.  These lock-in options are mandated by 
their environment to ensure organizational survival because external agents, who are 
legitimized to a coercion, supply these locked-in options (Powell 1991:190).  
Consequently, these options become taken-for-granted assumptions and ultimately 
reach the status of the development process of path dependence.  The obvious 
question is how people effectively and economically maintain existing institutions 
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without fear of them being changed.  In addition, if they have been changed, to what 
extent are there constraints between alternative options and existing institutions? 
 
The power-exercise is either the starting point of a path dependence process or the 
diverging point of a new process: individuals or organizations search for alternative 
options or continue enhancing existing path dependence processes that start from 
here.  For example, if essential resources become scarce and costly, organizations 
may seek alternative resources to make them competitive.  In this regard, only 
powerful individuals or organizations with prestige will have the legitimacy to try 
innovations and employ alternative resources that have not yet been legitimized 
(Rogers 1983:115).  However, the speed with which a switch to alternative options 
can be made, depends on how scarce the essential resource is; on how influential the 
power exercised is; on how deeply rooted the taken-for-granted assumptions are; on 
how competitively individuals or organizations vie for resources in the same 
institutional environment; on how strongly constrained the employment of 
alternative resources is; and on how expensive the switching cost is.  All those 
factors interlock with each other tightly in the development process displayed in 
figure 14.  In the left cycle of this figure, the introduction of private property rights 
triggers a power-exercise because individuals and organizations may maximize their 
interests legitimately.  For example, Chinese peasants, after the economic reforms, 
were privately rewarded for their hard work that used to be allocated and distributed 
collectively.  Arguably, with the incentive and support of newly introduced private 
property rights, powerful people may legitimately maximize their utilities without 
additional effort; therefore, institutional changes in China consist of legitimacy, 
power (prestige), and property rights. 
 
Before moving forward, it is worth recalling that the essential condition of the 
market economy is that of private property rights, which not only allows and 
enforces each individual’s right to own private property but also respects the rule-of-
law broadly by facilitating and enforcing private contracts, by preventing deliberate 
coercion, and by inhibiting arbitrary taxation (Rajan and Zingales 2004:129-130) and 
should be thoroughly respected.  The essence of private property rights, de facto, 
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conflicts with the basic ideological ideas of the CCP that are open-ended 
interpretations of normative and cognitive institutions embodied in communal 
ownership, the proletariat, and the end of waged labour and private property 
(Lagasse 2008).  Because the essence of property rights is a form of monopoly 
giving the owner of an asset the exclusive right to use the asset and exclude others 
from its use (Rajan and Zingales 2004:131), the indispensable element in ensuring 
the security of private property rights may not be completely abided by in China 
even though private property rights are allegedly promulgated.  
 
By that logic, property rights may be the dividing line between the command 
economy system and the market competition system, as it maximizes motivation for 
self-interest, and causes inequality of wealth redistribution in transitional countries.  
Property rights, as Nellis (1999:v) mentioned, can only be feasible under well-
functioning legal and administrative institutions and vice versa.  In a society without 
well-defined property rights, ordinary people cannot identify who owns what, 
resources cannot be turned into valuable assets, descriptions of assets are not 
standardized and cannot be easily compared, and the rules that govern property vary 
from one place to another (De Soto 2000:11). It is because of the exclusivity and 
alienability of private property rights reflecting the market value and privileges of 
ownership (Cheung 1970 ;North 1990:28;Barzel 1997:21) that these rights are 
particularly sensitive to reflecting scarce resources.   
 
In my view, private property rights may not be either the cause or reason but the 
trigger for the embezzlement and infringement of public assets.  This embezzlement 
or infringement may occur because of ill-conceived attempts to maximize the 
monetary value of production violating the most cherished and precious property 
rights (Block 1977).  However, what is the cause of these ill-conceived attempts?  
For example, flipping a switch or lighting a candle is the cause of making a room 
brighter.  The reason is that people tend to make themselves more comfortable in a 
brighter place.  However, before deciding how to make the room brighter, actors 
must make a preliminary decision concerning the quantity of resources she or he is 
prepared to invest in looking for the brightness.  In terms of the expected cost and 
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benefits, as Elster (2009:27) argued, a lot of optimal investment depends on the 
actor’s preferences and beliefs.  If an actor cannot afford the electricity bill, she or he 
has to stay in a dim room with candle lighting.  In the worst-case scenario, the actor 
may have to stay in a darkened room because she or he can afford neither the 
electricity bill nor candle-light.  Likewise, it is very important to develop a multi-
faceted understanding of the constituent elements that compose private property 
rights in order to understand the process of the pursuit of their personal utility.   
 
With regard to reason, actors are acting with the future clearly in mind rather than the 
present.  Or, people are moved by the realization that if they do not act now, the 
future will be worse than the present (Campbell 2004:7).  If property rights are not 
only the watershed between the command economic system and market competition 
system but also the trigger for inequality of wealth redistribution in transitional 
countries, they may have polarized different consequences.  What exactly do 
property rights consist of?  Hernando de Soto (2000:42-53) has developed a unique 
outlook regarding the constituents of property rights that are: first, fixing the 
economic potential assets; second, integrating dispersed information into one system;  
third, making people accountable; fourth, making assets into tradable commodities; 
fifth, networking people, and sixth, transaction protection.  Before economic reforms, 
there were public assets with different economic potential values that could be 
transformed into active capital with adequate institutional arrangements, namely 
property rights and market jurisdiction.  As de Soto (ibid:42) argued, people can 
separate out the resource from its restrictive context and concentrate on its potential 
value by transposing the physical assets into artificial representatives, such as 
contracts, deeds, securities, titles etc.  These artificial representatives (institutional 
arrangements), unlike the physical asset, can be falsified, manipulated, and infringed 
by those people who have control over the production of the representative article.  
Once they are institutionalized, they have a direct and profound effect upon the 
remaining constituents of property rights.  Under these circumstances, such physical 
assets will be allocated and distributed legitimately but unfairly, especially in 
transitional countries.  Therefore, the legitimization of property rights in transitional 
China becomes the trigger for inequitable wealth allocation and distribution.  
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Consequently, ownership, transaction, and legitimacy of properties, which are 
allegedly unfair, will be unwaveringly defended through the widespread connections 
of powerful people.  Therefore, the false move (the emergence of property rights) in 
the first place will result in undesirable and unforeseen consequences along with the 
path dependence process.   
 
After step A in figure 14, the process of path dependence becomes complex.  The 
existence of bilateral dependencies in the organizational field are formed as mutual 
dependencies (Bacharach and Lawler 1981).  Apart from that, different individuals 
and organizations have various dependencies upon each other; therefore, power 
imbalance and mutual dependence are interrelated to a complicated extent.   
Following step A, step B not only consists of interdependence but also of the 
outcome of power struggles at different hierarchical levels.  At this stage, the 
institutional environment remains unstable and power struggles emerge sporadically 
until the shaped normative and cognitive constraints emerge restraining social actors’ 
behaviours in terms of the pursuit of their interests.  In step C, the taken-for-granted 
assumptions or normative and cognitive constraints have been shaped and therefore 
restrain the behaviours of actors in the same organizational field.  In the 
circumstances, actors become isomorphic to be rewarded for being similar to other 
actors in the organizational field.  This makes it easier to conduct exchanges, to 
attract support, to maintain legitimacy, and to be eligible to make profits (Di Maggio 
and Powell 1983).  Following this step, most of these taken-for-granted assumptions 
are established, supported, and promulgated by those powerful individuals and 
organizations that benefit from these prevailing conventions.  Thus, social elites may 
be both the architects and products of the formal rules and informal expectations they 
have helped to develop (Powell 1991:191).  At this moment, the path dependence 
process is nearly accomplished and those established institutional arrangements 
further enhance the power-exercise that helps the development of this process.           
 
Because some organizations are unable to acquire sufficient resources to become 
competitive in the organizational field because of costs, time, and formal and 
informal constraints, they try to seek autonomy by employing alternative resources, 
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and consequently obtain sufficient power to legitimize the process.  Therefore, 
prestigious organizations will have the legitimacy to try to innovate and employ 
alternative resources that have not as yet been legitimized (Rogers 1983:115).  These 
prestigious organizations therefore develop alternative path dependent processes as 
seen in the cycle on the right in the above figure.  For example, the establishment of 
SEZ in the early 1980s was not simply decreed by Deng Xiaoping or other reformists 
but arose from competition between light industry and heavy industry departments, 
provincial government and central government, and conservatives and pro-reformists 
(Shirk 1993 ;Nathan and Tsai 1995 ;Tsou 1995 ;Shih 2004a ;Shih 2009).  In the early 
1980s, Deng was trying to introduce large-scale economic reforms but Chen Yun and 
other conservatives, who represented the then interest groups such as powerful party 
cadres and heavy industry, opposed Deng’s radical idea given that it would be time 
and resource heavy in budget, land, and power.  Therefore, utilizing his remaining 
influence, Deng started introducing SEZs in distant offshore areas, e.g. 
Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shantou, and Hainan.  Under the circumstances, Deng’s new 
reforms could only be implemented in these SEZs and light industry before they 
came to prevail nationwide.  Nevertheless, Deng’s reform programs have eventually 
surpassed the previously prevailing conservative policies and are now broadly 
accepted in China.   
 
Representing these different parameters, figure 14 illustrates the relationship between 
resource dependence theory and institutional change theory embodied in the 
following process (see Fig 14).  In phase one (initiation of institutional change), state 
agents try to maximize their personal interests and the state gives up its economic 
goals in favor of political ones.  As an important function of political power as is 
allocating economic resources, they need external resources to keep themselves in 
power (phase two).  Because of the complex interdependence between HNWIs and 
government agents, their relationship shifts from hierarchical allocation to reciprocal 
dependence (phase three).  Then, this shift turns institutional change and resource 
dependence into an inter-dependent cycle. 
 
The consequence of de-institutionalization is the collapse of old institutions which 
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made up the previous hierarchy that social actors used to access power and resources 
(Hsu 2007:5) (see Note 20).  However, any de-institutionalization may signal the re-
emergence of re-institutionalization.  In turn, new institutions of hierarchy emerge 
and produce new inequality in transitional China.  A social hierarchy comprises three 
types of institutions (Grusky 2001:3): the first determines the worth of various forms 
of capital; the second determines the allocation of valued forms of capital across 
occupations and positions; and the third links individuals to different positions that 
generate unequal access to valued forms of capital.  Arguably, there is an internal 
consumption (Fagen 1969) between old and new institutions which consist of 
different hierarchies in the transitional process.  This internal consumption will 
consequently change those valued forms of capital consisting of economic capital 
(Remenyi et al.), social capital (Guanxi), and human capital (educational credentials 
and formal knowledge) which can be exchanged at different exchange rates from one 
society to another depending on the local institutions (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1992:99).  In transitional China, political capital persists in importance (Walder 
1995b); it  can be converted into sums of money (economic capital) at a preferential 
exchange rate.  For example, political elites who control the rights of resource re-
allocation and re-distribution in transitional China can have public assets at their 
disposal without equivalent cost, e.g. dual-track pricing, opaque LUR acquisition, etc.  
As these valued forms of capital are essential resources, elites compete with each 
other in order to reach a dominant position within their surroundings and retain their 
existing privileges and wealth.  
 
3.4 CONCLUSION  
Institutions are man-made, dependable but not necessarily efficient structures that 
guide and mediate conflicts and therefore reduce uncertainty.  By this logic, 
institutions become external forces assisting people to determine how to make sense 
of their world and act within it; therefore, any change of institution may re-define the 
sets of opportunity, re-distribute the scarce resources, re-allocate social wealth and 
re-position people’s social status.  Reforms have been under way in China since the 
late 70s that not only sustain the outstanding economic growth but also justify the 
legitimacy of the CCP.  Because these reforms are mainly embodied in the economic 
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domain especially those property rights transition, China therefore is in the process 
of re-organising, re-distributing and re-allocating its resources and wealth, and 
consequently subsidises the interests of the emerging entrepreneurial class.  
Accordingly, the legitimization of these newly introduced property rights 
accompanying those partial institutional changes create a new social class: HNWIs.   
 
Most theoretical institutional change perspectives cannot fully explain China’s 
institutional changes, which manifest a high level of exertion of external power to 
affect or alter institutions.  In contrast, only few of them implicitly indicate that the 
exploitation of external resources may cause institutional changes, e.g. Commons 
and North; however, they continue not to engage in any research that furthers study 
in relation to this manipulation.  Additionally, most theoretical institutional 
perspectives engage in the discussion in relation to market economic systems rather 
than the particular socialist market economy.  For these theoretical resource 
dependence perspectives hardly engage in the discussion of the causes and reasons, 
that trigger institutional changes from an economic perspective.  Together these 
themes indicate the original contribution of this research in incorporating the 
resource dependence concept into institutional analysis with respect to China’s 
transition and the emergence of HNWIs.  Nonetheless, to understand China’s 
transition is not an easy task for most researchers.  This chapter not only enhances 
my understanding in relation to these themes but also justifies the synthesis of two 
different theories that helps me to ascertain my research questions, research method, 
and data collection.  Next, I will have a discussion with respect to the theory and 
reality of China’s transition. 
 
  
Page 107 of 484 
4. THEORY AND REALITY OF CHINA’S TRANSITION 
Following the literature review, I have identified that institutional changes in China 
had become the core of those hasty economic and social transitions since 1978.  
From a theoretical perspective, the rule-of-law (Hoff and Stiglitz 2005) constrains 
state power (Nee 1989 ;Mcfaul 1995 ;Barzel 2002) and comprehensive property 
rights (Demsetz 1967 ;Barzel 2000) form the premise of decent economic growth.  
However, none of these elements can be completely located in China, which has 
manifested outstanding economic growth for thirty years.  Thus, there is a 
discrepancy between the theoretical propositions and the reality existing in China.     
 
In 1949, the CCP emerged as a Stalin-style political party, pledged to eradicate the 
bourgeoisie and provide the proletariat with wellbeing.  Nonetheless, Deng Xiaoping, 
in 1985, strongly advocated that some areas and some people should get rich first, 
leading and helping other regions and people to gradually achieve common 
prosperity; nonetheless, this idea has never yet been realized.  In contrast, this 
ideological transformation has brought about unforeseen results, e.g. fast economic 
growth and huge social disparity, mounting sovereign-wealth and a dwindling 
middle-class, and increasing GDP index and mounting housing costs.  Therefore, 
these consequences accompanied by those devised formal rules make China’s 
institutional environment peculiar and incomprehensible.   
 
This chapter is an extensive study not only complementing the literature review that 
proves no single conventional theoretical perspective can explain those peculiar and 
incomprehensible institutional changes in China that are comprehensible only 
through a synthesized theoretical viewpoint, but also explaining how ideas can 
evolve into formal rules that have effects on further reforms in China.  The result will 
inform the research methods, data collection, and research questions.  
 
4.1 IDEAS AND LEGAL CORRELATES 
How and why entrepreneurs’ ideas can be developed into formal rules in transitional 
China.  In this section, the evolution of formal rules will be scrutinized exhaustively.  
There are four different types of ideas and their varying effects on decision-making 
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and institutional change: paradigms; public sentiments; programs; and frames.  
Additionally, there are two types of ideas and associated effects: (1) ideas can be 
underlying and implicit in the assumptions embedded in the background of decision-
making debates, (2) ideas can be either cognitive or normative consisting of values, 
attitudes, and identities (Campbell 2004:93-94).  In the first scenario, ideas are either 
institutions in the sense generally intended by organizational institutionalists or 
theories located in the foreground of these debates, where they are explicitly 
articulated by decision-making elites.  In the second scenario, cognitive ideas are 
outcome-oriented, but normative ideas are not.  I therefore illustrate these four types 
of ideas in table 6 (see Note 24) and indicate that the frames are normative concepts 
located in the foreground of decision-making debates, enabling elites to legitimize 
their programs and institutional changes (Campbell 2004:98).  However, one must 
know that frames can be manipulated and used to block institutional change or to 
facilitate it.  For example, after 1949 the CCP had shut down private businesses and 
subsequently confiscated their assets in line with proletarian ideological beliefs.  
These beliefs that prohibit capitalists and the free market economy privileging the 
few to concretize their property rights, and resulting in relative poverty in the large 
under-capitalized sector incapable of leveraging their own assets (Marx [1906] 
1990:880), were essentially trying to eradicate private businesses.  After the 
economic reforms, there were contradicting results for same decision makers and the 
same programme identity through different normative frames (see table 6), and 
private companies (capitalists) therefore were recognized as the engine of China’s 
economy and highly welcomed by CCP, and they shared seats with long-standing 
Communists cadres after 2001.   
 
I have illustrated two first-level concepts in the foreground: programs and frames.  
They are underlined by those second-level concepts: paradigms and public 
sentiments, in the background.  As such, these second-level concepts are constraints 
that limit the range of options for decision makers while they are trying to tackle 
their political, economic, and organizational problems.  In this regard, decision 
makers may test, try, and revise their first-order concepts to fit into the existing 
constraints imposed by dominant paradigms and public sentiment.  Thus, decision 
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makers may ignore the evidence of a poor fit with their cognitive assumptions (Jones 
1999), interpreting the evidence differently and consequently making different 
choices (Knight and North 1997).  For example, in the early days of reforms, the 
CCP and governments at different hierarchical levels within China ignored the 
emergence of mushrooming private businesses and remained proletarian-oriented in 
terms of their cognitive assumptions.  Therefore, in order to survive, private 
businesses operated under the guise of the “red cap”
11
 in different areas and 
industries, e.g. collective enterprises, towns-and-villages enterprises (TVEs), joint-
venture enterprises, etc.  To this extent, the dividing line between what is public and 
what is private in transitional China is often still impossible to detect (Mcgregor 
2010:197,203).  Consequently, public assets could be embezzled by state agents 
without any difficulty under the circumstances of vague property rights.  That is to 
say, institutions can sent both positive and negative signals concerning individual 
behaviours that restrain some individual, groups, or class of individuals on the one 
hand, but on the other, they can liberate other individuals, groups, and class of 
individuals (Bromley 2006:46).  Apart from that, markets cannot exist without an 
underlying the institutional structure that indicates ownership; what is a cost; and 
who must pay whom in certain situations (Bromley ibid:46).                    
 
Denzau and North (1994,2000:35) argue that ideologies are the shared framework of 
mental models that groups of individuals possess, and that these provide both an 
interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment 
should be structured.  Following this logic, ideologies in part provide both 
interpretation and prescription for market institutions that define ownership, 
transaction costs, and transaction rules.  The essence of legal relations (Hohfeld 
1913,1917) among individuals in society that are characterised as a right-duty, 
privilege-no right, power-liability, and immunity-no power (see table 7) may be 
distorted in transitional China because of the pervasive proletarian ideology and 
dictatorship.  This research has mentioned the ‘Legal Correlates’ that are the essence 
of legal relations among individuals in a society.  However, those social elites, who 
                                                 
11 Red cap means that private enterprises are de facto run by private individuals but de jure are owned 
by collective or semi-public bodies.  Sometimes, private owners even registered their companies 
under SOEs in order to get protection.  
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derive political control from the pre-reformed era, enjoy privilege, right, immunity, 
and power corresponding to the right, privilege, power, and immunity of government 
(see table 8).  Under these circumstances, they enjoy privilege and immunity but shift 
their duty and liability to the ordinary populace (see Fig 18).     
 
The newly introduced property rights realized the economic value of properties in 
those ex-Communist countries.  Without these innovative property rights, most 
essential resources were actually valueless in Communist society.  As for property 
rights, it means that owners of property can rely on the authorities to protect their 
claim to the benefit stream – her or his property (Alchian 1965a ;Demsetz 
1966,1967 ;Bromley 2006:56).  In contrast, property rights, which are allegedly 
proclaimed in transitional China after the reforms, remain the privilege of some elites 
in a society but not essentially available to all members of the society.  In this regard, 
the embodiment of this particular legal correlate pertains to privilege and no right 
can be perceived between those elites and ordinary people.  That is to say, property 
rights become the privilege of some elites.  Therefore, elites may undertake action 
that will be detrimental to ordinary people but need hold no particular concern for 
their interests in the face of such interference.  For example, in transitional China, 
some economic and political elites together, directly or indirectly, deliberately exert 
state coercive power to expropriate rural land and demolish existing urban housing 
with no corresponding equitable compensation (Li 1997 ;Zhang 1997 ;Ding 2003).       
 
To sum up, an application of new ideas can promote institutional change, but once 
new ideas become institutionalized, their implementation capacities tend to become 
constrained in path-dependent ways as long as institutions remain stable themselves.  
In Communist countries, as Lenin ([1918] 1992:26) describes, there is “as much 
centralization as possible” at the top of the system, allowing self-appointed 
professional revolutionaries to dictate downwards to a working class considered 
incapable of rising above their day-to-day struggles. In this way, the ideological 
beliefs at the top of the system will shape paradigmatic and public sentiments.  In 
this regard, these paradigm and public sentiments constrain the frames and 
programmes of these Communist countries and consequently define the nature of 
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policy-making.  Without serious change in the institutional environment that will 
undermine political stability, there will be less possibility for rectifying existing 
institutions in communist countries.  In addition, the normal legal correlates may be 
different in Communist countries in which property rights cannot be disinterestedly 
maintained and protected because those inveterate ideological beliefs will influence 
the interpretation of those rights.  Therefore, these distorted legal correlates only 
favour those people, who have privileges and immunity to shift their responsibility 
and liability to other people, even though reforms are allegedly made.  For that 
reason, any reform program will be implemented in the circumstances given by 
political elites in a communist country.  Thus, reform becomes a mechanism for 
helping political elites achieve their goals, such as securing political legitimacy, 
stabilizing the political situation, and overcoming political dissidents.    
 
4.2 THE EMERGENCE OF HNWIS 
Previously, those ideas, which have been developed into institutions, were fully 
scrutinized.  In transitional China, these new institutions, which have been 
constrained by paradigm and sentiment that were actually shaped by ideological 
belief, are the legacy of ex-reformed China and compromise the truncated property 
rights, opaque legal system, and party-state regime.  By this logic, legal correlates 
are inevitably distorted in a China that only favours those people with privileges and 
immunity to shift their responsibility and liability to the mass majority.  For that 
reason, HNWIs emerge, of course, as a consequence in China within a short period. 
   
In China, the early HNWIs had one common characteristic- that is, either being able 
to control resource re-allocation or having access to political protection from their 
parents, relatives, or close friends.  However, there remains insufficient knowledge 
behind the emergence of HNWIs.  Rational institutionalist may argue that the pursuit 
of maximization of individual utility and wealth plays a crucial role in terms of the 
HNWIs’ emergence and this is just how it should be (North 1981,1990:45).  This 
argument, however, is a generalization rather than a comprehensive reason 
explaining their emergence in China (Campbell 2004:13-17).  Thus, it is necessary to 
trace back to the early reforms in rural China since the late 1970s.   
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Before peasants were formally allowed to work in part for themselves, household 
responsibility (Da Bao Gan) had been actually implemented for years in many rural 
areas (Chen 1981:100;Lin 1988).  In this sense, Deng Xiaoping could do nothing but 
legitimize the fait accompli rather than made any innovative arrangement or 
prohibited it.  This legitimization did get instant results in increased food production 
that also benefited urban areas.  From 1978 to 1988, the GNI (Gross National Income) 
per capita was increased from US$ 228 to US$ 370 and there was an average growth 
rate of 5.4% (see Fig 19).  The result of early rural reforms in China was successful 
because the then rural population made up 80% of the Chinese population. The 
success of household responsibility in rural areas also increased the demand for 
consumer goods and other products.  Therefore, the majority of the Chinese 
population began to prosper accordingly and the success of the reforms made them 
into a vested interest group.   
 
Consequently, reformists deemed this success as concrete evidence of effective 
economic reforms.  Therefore, Deng prompted reforms in urban areas and industrial 
sectors along similar lines.  From a Marxist perspective (Marx et al. 1991:283-293), 
peasants are referred to as labourers in the household responsibility, and farmland is 
referred to as the subject of labour (objects transformed by labour) (see Note 26).  
Correspondingly, factories are referred to the instrument of labour in the industrial 
sector.  Deng and pro-reformists tried to utilize these factors of production efficiently 
in urban areas.  Hence, the government adopted a similar schema to the countryside 
arranging to lease or contract the operation of industrial and commercial enterprises.  
In fact, whatever the leasing schema in urban areas or household responsibility in 
rural areas, China’s government de facto ignored those unfavourable property rights 
and retained control over the ownership of agricultural, commercial, and industrial 
properties that had been confiscated from previous land owners and business men in 
1956 (Wu 2002). 
 
In China, those leasing- or contracting-plans in urban areas are similar to their 
counterparts in the West that lessees keep what is earned or absorb losses after the 
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payment of a specified amount.  As for household responsibility in rural areas, 
lessees of the leasing schema can be individual, collective, corporate groups, party 
cadres, and bureaucrats as well.  Notably, there are distinctions between leasing- and 
contracting- arrangements.  The leasing arrangement often is used for small and 
nearly failing enterprises.  The contracting arrangement is otherwise employed for 
medium and barely sustainable SOEs.  Unlike the party cadres in the countryside, 
who can benefit from the re-allocation and re-distribution of land and other local 
enterprises, their counterparts in urban areas or industrial sectors gain relatively less 
profit.  Therefore, urban and industrial cadres adopted alternative approaches to 
accessing benefits through the negotiations of contracts with lessees, who were 
subordinates, colleagues, or superiors of those negotiators from government of all 
levels.  They (the negotiators) can agree to easy terms if there is any personal interest 
in exchange.  In many cases, the lessees can become wealthy in a short period 
through beneficial terms and consequently develop into early HNWIs (Goldman and 
Goldman 1988 ;Chen 2003a ;Dickson 2003 ;Batjargal and Liu 2004 ;Djankov et al. 
2006).   
 
Policy-making is a process of writing, re-writing, or changing current rules, 
regulations, and laws.  Occasionally, it is about confirming informal rules and 
practices as recognised and legitimate assumptions (Campbell 2004:24,92).  As some 
scholars (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:3) argue institutions constrain and refract politics 
but they are never the sole cause of outcomes (see Note 27).  In fact, China, with its 
regular political class struggle and socialist slogans, has been under normative 
political guidelines since 1949. For example, the harmonious society (He-Xie She-
Hui) movement is not only about fusion of different social classes but also means 
dictatorial rule of speech, thought, and behaviours (Yiyantang) (Fan 2006).  That is to 
say, a society, which is full of discontents, will become harmonious only under the 
strangulating regulations. 
                  
Up to now, I have explained that policy-making programmes in China, at first, will 
not directly make changes to institutional arrangement but play the role of a 
normative political guideline in China; in other words, there is a time lag between 
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initiation and enforcement.  During this regulative vacuum, people may behave as 
March and Olson (1989:160) contend that: 
 
Behaviours are driven by preferences and expectations about 
consequences, therefore, behaviour is wilful, reflecting an attempt to 
make outcomes fulfil subjective desires, to the extend possible…. a sane 
person is who is “in touch with reality” in the sense of maintaining 
consistency between behaviour and realistic expectations of its 
consequences.       
 
Although there is no appropriate regulatory guideline in transitional China, the legal 
rules remain effective.  Therefore, people will take the calculated approach (Chen 
1981) to prevent any unanticipated and undesirable consequence.  
 
Now, I am going to explore the distinctions between cause and reason for their 
emergence that is not as opaque as it previously was.  In my opinion, cause is 
relatively comprehensible and more straightforward than the reason.  As for cause, it 
indicates that officials at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy were able to 
infringe state properties at their discretion and in line with party interest owing to 
political and economic decentralization.  In the meantime, private property rights 
were increasingly granted to the people who were then motivated people to pursue 
private interests enthusiastically. However, the juxtaposition of the market and 
command economies left officials directionless and with the leeway to exploit the 
incomplete reforms.  Consequently, owing to the institutional loopholes incurred by 
incremental and partial reforms, bureaucrats are able to pursue private profits.  
Nevertheless, property rights and ownership matters in the transition can only be 
feasible under well-functioning legal and administrative institutions, and vice versa 
(Nellis 1999:v).  Before economic reforms and with the exception of very few people 
in the highest bureaucratic hierarchical positions, most people in China were equally 
deprived and only had bleak private properties at their own disposal.  In other words, 
when private property rights were legitimately granted to people in China, they 
needed real private properties rather than the previous insecure counterparts at their 
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disposal.  Under the circumstances, people needed substitutes to be transferred to 
them through the newly introduced mechanism – private ownership.  Inductively 
speaking, the new private properties at their disposal during the early reforms were 
definitely not the private properties they possessed before economic reforms.  
 
Many scholars (Ding 2000c,2000a ;Bai et al. 2006 ;Bromley and Yao 2006 ;Chow 
2007) consider that most of the collective-owned properties were de facto state-
owned before the economic reforms.  In addition, only state assets can be counted as 
valuable properties in the early stage of reforms.  Coincidentally, the legitimate novel 
mechanism of private ownership, can be employed to transfer properties from other 
formats to privately owned ones, and is therefore imperatively essential.  As for 
legitimacy, this mechanism can legitimize the acquisitions of state-owned properties.  
The privatization process can either be formal or informal, whereas the process may 
be forbidden or discouraged by central government (Ding 2000c).  By this logic, 
these consents, attributed to political decentralization in the pre-reform era, were 
given to those transfers of state assets forbidden or discouraged by local authorities 
from time to time (Ding 2000a).  On the one hand, state policies were actually 
becoming the instruments for legitimizing these controversial acquisitions of state 
properties through the deliberate distortion by authorities at different hierarchical 
levels; on the other hand, these policies helped people, who then controlled the state 
properties, to legalize their embezzlements.  However, since the regulatory rules 
remain ineffective in transitional China, those who have rights approving or 
governing the privatization process can legitimize their personal benefits through 
reliable channels such as their next of kin, cronies, subordinates, colleagues, and 
successors, and soon legitimately became the first generation of HNWIs in 
transitional China.                     
 
As for the reason that some people exploit the ‘given’ rights and consequently 
become HNWIs, it is relatively complicated.  Before the economic reforms and 
openness policy initiated in 1978, China was an enclosed society that had limited 
connections with international society.  Those institutional pillars (Scott 1995:45) 
were designed to support the legitimacy of the Maoist-Communist system.  After 
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Mao, Deng Xiaoping initially lacked regulatory legitimacy and was starved of 
endorsements from other senior party leaders and local cadres in order to overthrow 
political dissidents and launch his reform programme at the stage of the early 
reforms (Shirk 1993:23-25).  Owing to the political constraints and legacies of 
previous unpredictable social conflicts in China, the supporting measures of 
normative and cognitive pillars were not secure when reforms were initiated in late 
70s.  In fact, after the end of Cultural Revolution along with Mao’s death in 1976, 
the Chinese people lacked a normal cultural-cognitive environment, which could 
provide orientation and guidance to individuals while they constructed and dealt with 
the social reality of everyday life (Zucker 1977).  People in China, as Scott (1995:36-
38) mentioned, could and can only acknowledge the existence of the regulatory 
system without necessarily believing that the rules were fair or justified.  By this 
logic, they can scarcely define appropriate economic goals and choose proper ways 
to pursue economic improvement.   
 
Following the sequence of interminable significant social conflicts since 1950
12
, both 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars had collapsed, leaving only the regulative 
pillar, inappropriate to upholding the institutional environment at the outset of the 
reforms.  Even now, the normative and cognitive pillars have not been fully restored.  
For example, China’s companies have continued over the last decade to use 
prohibited ingredients in their products e.g. the melamine in baby milk powder, toxic 
soy sauce, remade waste cooking oil, lime flour, to name but a few.  Whilst not 
saying that these prohibited products are only manufactured in China, which has the 
largest foreign currency reserve and is the second largest economy in the world, such 
illegal occurrences should not happen.  By Scott’s (2008:51) logic, I argue that there 
is instrumentality (regulatory logic) but limited appropriateness (normative logic) 
and orthodoxy (cultural-cognitive logic) in transitional China after the economic 
reforms.  Thus, lacking in appropriateness and orthodoxy, people cannot define their 
goals and ways appropriately in terms of maximizing individual interests.  
                                                 
12 There were incessant large-scale social conflicts from early 1950, e.g. the Campaign to Suppress 
Counterrevolutionaries (zhenfan) in 1950; the Anti-Rightist Movement (Fan Youpai Yundong) in 
1957; the Great Leap Forward (Dayuejin) in 1958; the Socialist Education Movement (Siqing 
Yundong) in 1962; the most notorious Cultural Revolution in 1966.  In three decades, these irrational 
social conflicts led to the death of tens of millions of Chinese people.  
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Meanwhile, lacking in orthodoxy, people have lost the orientation and guidance to 
achieve appropriateness.  I therefore assert that maximizing private utility could 
hardly be the reason for approaching private economic benefit.   
 
Because of the continuing destruction of commonly held beliefs and shared logic of 
actions, people will largely pursue the instrumental aspects of newly introduced 
regulatory rules.  For example, after the market economy was gradually introduced 
into China after the Cultural Revolution, people have consistently pursued personal 
interest.  Owing to the absence of appropriate transformation mechanisms for 
appropriateness and orthodoxy between the command economy and market economy, 
the maximization of personal utility becomes the most vital purpose within the newly 
introduced economic system.  Thus, the maximization of personal utility determines 
the corresponding appropriateness and orthodoxy, not the other way around.  For this 
reason, people’s only concern is about guilt or innocence rather than shame/honour 
and certainty/confusion regarding their activities of pursuit of wealth (Scott ibid:51).  
 
After the reforms, ‘getting-rich-quick’ was advocated by the then supreme leader and 
became the overriding regulatory purpose in transitional China (Liu et al. 
2001:34,83,89;Walter and Howie 2001:2).  It indicates that expedience has replaced 
social obligation and was established in this transitional society.  By aggregating all 
these scenarios, it is not difficult to comprehend why people maximize individual 
utility at all costs if they can hedge their bets in a legally sanctioned manner in 
transitional China.  In the light of previous analyses, it can be claimed that the reason 
behind the emergence of HNWIs in transitional China turns on the absence of 
normative and cultural-cognitive pillars, on the regulatory pillar governing the 
institutional environment and providing the orientation and guidance for people.  
However, owing to the legacy of political constraints, the regulatory pillar is biased 
towards and implemented by those individuals with powers.  Consequently, the 
biased regulatory pillar leads to an institutional environment that deviates from the 
norms.   
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In China, the CCP prioritises economic growth rather than other reforms in order to 
restore the devastated country to normality after the chronic ravages of social 
conflicts.  Because of the destruction of normative and cultural-cognitive pillars 
during the previous social struggles in China, pro-reformists distorted the entire 
institutional environment through obstinate and exclusive focusing on economic 
restoration.  Soon, only the regulative pillar can support the institutional environment, 
which is without suitability and orthodoxy.  In my opinion, when Deng’s regime 
started to introduce a market economy to replace the previous command economy 
system, it concurrently brought in the objective of ‘getting-rich’, which becomes the 
sole economic propaganda and the prominent regulatory purpose of government and 
people follow in its wake because of the missing normative and cultural-cognitive 
logics.  Once the episode becomes pervasive in society and people regard it as given 
or habitus
13
, they will neglect normal binding expectations and constitutive schema 
only if their behaviours fulfil the requirement of regulative rules.  From my 
perspective, previous accounts dilute the reasons why HNWIs emerged in China 
after the economic reforms.  In next section, I will explain which political 
environment incubates these HNWIs in China.  
 
4.3 POLITICS AND MARKETS IN TRANSITIONAL CHINA 
As noted in the preceding section, regulatory logic replaces both normative and 
cultural-cognitive pillars of the institutional environment in transitional China.  
Consequently, people designing regulatory rules will set up binding expectations and 
constitutive schemas.  In other words, people in power will control the coercive, 
normative, and mimetic mechanisms; therefore, the mass majority will regard these 
elites’ expediencies as social obligations and shared understandings in China’s 
society.  For this reason, the institutional environment in China is sustained merely 
by the regulatory pillar that is solely controlled by powerful people or elites.  I 
therefore argue that China’s institutional environment is exclusively regulated by 
social elites, and their thoughts and behaviours are deemed as the norm in the society.   
 
                                                 
13 Habitus refers to the existence of a system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past 
experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions (Bourdieu 1977:82). 
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By regulating this specific institutional environment in China, elites often maximize 
their individual utility through these rules, which is in the guise of formal rules, laws, 
and informal codes (North 1990:4;Scott 2008:52-53).  Because of the uniqueness of 
China’s institutional environment, arbitrating agents, party cadres, and political elites 
are often the same persons.  Therefore, state authority, the coercive power 
legitimated by a normative framework that should be undertaken by a neutral third 
party, is frequently influenced by the individual utility of these third party agents, 
party cadres, and political elites because of the duplication of roles (Skocpol 1985:3-
37;North 1990:54,64).  By the power-dependence logic, political elites can therefore 
trade power for their benefits with other elites, and vice versa (Emerson 1962) (see 
Note 28).   
 
Because consolidated political restraints are derived from the Communist legacy in 
China causing the market economic system to malfunction, people with power to 
allocate and distribute resources will have greater privilege in accessing economic 
benefits than do others.  By this logic, politics deeply intersects with economy in the 
unparalleled arrangement that is the market economic system with socialist 
characteristics, i.e. the Socialist Market Economy.  Following its implementation, 
this system has supplemented the centrally planned economy in PRC and contributed 
in part to the high growth rates in GDP during the past decades.  
 
This section does not particularly focus on any specific institutional environment in 
China that promotes or inhibits this environment, but on detecting how entrepreneurs 
handle the subtle political-business relationship in this complicated atmosphere to 
retain their privileges consistently (see Note 29).  By this logic, to have a 
comprehensive understanding of entrepreneurs’ thoughts and experiences are surely 
required.  Because these thoughts and experiences can unlikely to be acquired 
comprehensively through any literature source, a direct discussion with these 
entrepreneurs will be the best approach.  In this regard, I had several interviews with 
entrepreneurs in order to collect adequate information.  According to these 
interviews (Appendices 1-8), a businessperson is unlikely to get sufficient resources 
(both economic and political) to grow rapidly if they try to become politically 
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insulated.  Thus, when people discuss the political-business relationship, the main 
issue should not be how far away from politics but how close to politics they can get 
without being pigeon-holed as a briber.  From this perspective, the recipe for 
handling this subtle situation successfully is to get close to authorities without 
intimate friendship with certain bureaucrats, or doing so implicitly.  In other words, 
they have to rule out any possibility of consideration with particular state agents.   
 
In this research, I translate this subtle relationship through the GDP and its 
underlying constituents.  Regarding the GDP index, to develop economies for local 
governments and departments, state agents desperately need enormous support from 
these economic elites.  Further these demands change as the benefits given to these 
economic elites vary according to the changes in the macro-economic environment 
occasionally.  For example, from the end of 2008, businesspersons paid lower LUR 
(Land-Use right) prices because governments were trying to revitalize the economy 
that had been affected by the Western Credit Crunch.  Alternatively, they could get 
bank loans without difficulty at the end of 2009 as the government tried to raise 
domestic demands in order to improve the economy by retaining 8% annual growth 
rate of GDP.  To most state agents, economic development is equivalent to excellent 
political performance and a consequent avenue to promotion.  The political 
promotion often leads to two outcomes: (1) it means more controls over social 
resources, (2) it means that state agents can acquire more economic benefits in return.  
In other words, in the system of centralization and pursuit of high GDP growth rate, 
there is plenty of room for legitimate rent seeking in China.     
 
In China, the introduction of private ownership rights was arguably the most 
significant cause triggering the emergence of HNWIs because of the exclusivity and 
alienability of private property rights reflecting the market value and privileges of 
ownership (Cheung 1970 ;North 1990:28;Barzel 1997:21).  These rights are 
particularly manifest and reflected in scarce resources.  Under many circumstances, 
institutional changes arising from previous institutional arrangements can no longer 
adapt to the re-distribution and re-allocation of scarce resources.  Therefore, I split 
up the process of resource distribution into four stages (see Fig 20).  First, the 
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motivation for institutional change is to pursue those scarce, essential resources.  If 
resources are not scarce, people do not need to define property rights and everybody 
can have endless supplies of the resource.  Because these essential resources are 
scarce, people who hold the scarce resource can therefore define the property rights 
and retain these essential resources.  Other people who tend to acquire these scarce 
resources have to obey the given rights.  Ultimately, people need new institutions 
(institutional changes) to acquire these essential resources or alternatives.   
 
Second, as scholars (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003) argued, each organization’s 
power is based on the other’s dependence on them, not their own dependence on the 
other.  By this logic, the greater the scarcity of the resource, the more the dependence 
on it will be.  Whoever owns these scarce resources will have more power than 
others will have.  Thus, owners of scarce resources have the most rights to increase 
or reduce the corresponding transaction cost; this will eventually have effects on 
relevant institutional changes.  Thirdly, there are different demands for scarce 
resources in different periods; therefore, the scarcity of resource will vary 
accordingly.  In other words, people who are able to effect institutional change vary 
from time to time.  At the last stage, owners, who hold diverse essential resources 
from time to time, will become differently entrenched interest groups and construct 
different privileged levels and institutions in transitional society.  The distribution 
process in China, however, is different from the figure 21.  The market economic 
system was re-introduced in China in the late 70s because of then devastated 
economy and struggling of political power.  However, the re-introduced market 
system was deliberately devised by political elites and different from other mature 
market economies in advanced countries, e.g. Japan, U.K., and USA (see Note 30).       
    
Some scholars (Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) have argued that indigenous 
ownership rights cannot be incubated in an artificially made market.  In other words, 
private owners in China never have full rights to make the desired allocation at their 
own will.  The most useful ways of assessing the ownership right, as Demsetz 
(1988:21) argues, is arguably by examining two fundamental components: 
alienability and exclusivity.  Alienability refers to the right to re-assign ownership to 
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someone else.  It includes the right to offer for sale at any price.  As for exclusivity, 
it refers to the right to determine who may use a scarce resource and including the 
right of the owner to determine whom else may use a resource.  
 
Furthermore, because ownership is more valuable in some circumstances than in 
others, there are extra benefits to be gained by enforcing private ownership of scarce 
resources (Demsetz ibid:23).  Therefore, people will endeavour to pursue the 
exclusivity and alienability of any scarce resource whether it is in the command 
economy or market economy.  However, it seems that comprehensive exclusivity and 
alienability do not exist in China completely.  For example, governments can 
confiscate people’s properties without equitable compensation in a way that seriously 
contradicts the essence of alienability and exclusivity.  Thus, people in China, on the 
one hand, try to secure private property rights at all costs.  On the other hand, 
government can deliberately infringe such alienability and exclusivity.  For that 
reason, searching for more political protection to secure existing property becomes 
significant to people in China. 
 
As noted previously, to have private ownership rights is tempting in any economic 
system, and invariably induces people to possess the exclusivity and alienability of 
scarce resources.  Once the values or prices of scarce resources are relatively buoyant, 
the intention to pursue exclusivity and alienability will become stronger.  Even in a 
society with public ownership, people still try to implement exclusivity and 
alienability in a way, which is extremely different from those in a completely private 
ownership market, let alone the society with vague private ownership rights.  For 
example, in a society with vague and weak ownership rights, exclusivity can be 
obtained through de facto use of the scarce resources.  In other words, people 
consider the right of use as temporary ownership in that society.  As for alienability, 
by using political power, powerful people can alienate ownership rights from specific 
people or groups.  For example, in China, some people, who have actual use of public 
resources, can manipulate the political power to transfer these public scarce resources 
to themselves, relatives, cronies, and other such, e.g. privatization.   
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According to my interviews, there are some features in common among my 
interviewees.  First, they are disgusted at a return to having the meagre lives that they 
had previously.  Second, they regard that whatever they have today was bestowed on 
them by the state and the CCP, whether the processes are consented to or not.  Finally, 
the state and the CCP deem the processes are acceptable and confer legitimacy on 
their existing privileges and wealth.  They recognize and perceive that many of the 
acts, policies, and laws, which were promulgated by government and the CCP, are 
irrational and undesirable; nevertheless, irrational and undesirable regulations have 
not only arisen in China but in nearly every country and society.  They therefore are 
not interested in the rationality and desirability of those regulations.  As long as they 
fully obey and follow the decisions made by government and the CCP, they are fully 
convinced that they will be protected by the authorities and continue to retain our 
privileges and wealth. 
 
In China, the CCP as a governing body stipulated in the PRC's constitution that its 
position is that of supreme political authority and its power is realized through its 
control of all state apparatuses and of the legislative process
14
.  As many of my 
interviewees mentioned, from the Beijing Central Government to any small town 
house in Uighur, or from a conglomerate like the CNPC (China National Petroleum 
Corporation) to a trivial TVE, there always is a party cadre within any individual 
economic entity.  In fact, within all SOEs, the party secretary de facto manages the 
enterprise together with top-ranked managers, or sometimes they themselves are 
these managers.  Moreover, every decision ranging from daily administration to 
business development within SOEs has to be approved and recognized by its party 
secretary.  In the best scenario, the general managers or chairpersons themselves are 
the party secretaries that mean they obtain the trust from the higher hierarchy in the 
CCP and will have great chance of promotion.  Under this profound political 
penetration, it is easy for the CCP to influence and regulate any activity at any 
hierarchical level before and after reforms in China.   
                                                 
14 Under the leadership of the CCP and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought, the 
Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people s democratic dictatorship and follow the 
socialist road, steadily improve socialist institutions, develop socialist democracy, improve the socialist legal 
system and work hard and self-reliantly to modernize industry, agriculture, national defence and science and 
technology step by step to turn China into a socialist country with a high level of culture and democracy (the 
preamble of the Constitution of the PRC, adopted on 4th of December, 1984).  
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Because the party-state polity remains unchanged, bureaucrats continue to have 
effective controls over resource allocations and distributions, and the newly 
emerging private property rights are of course under the control of state agents.  
Owing to the previous political decentralization, local state agents therefore 
implement these mechanisms without restraint and at their own discretion.  By this 
logic, many economic elites trying to emerge from this contradiction continue to 
have vague relations with political elites in order to retain their privileges of wealth 
accumulation.  In this sense, the power-for-money cluster actually impedes the 
control from central government to local authorities.   
 
By comprehending the relationship between the CCP and markets, I try to explore 
further the interactions of specific perspectives on the institutional environment in 
China. Markets cannot be sustained without the visible hand of government setting 
up norms, regulations, and assuring conformity to these rules (Minsky 1986:293) 
whether it is communist or capitalist.  Therefore, ownership rights should not be 
assumed to be without constraint at all (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972) because it is 
exclusive.  Without the visible hand, exclusive ownership can hardly be successfully 
implemented in any society.  Thus, when we mention the exclusive benefits from 
ownership, we have to understand why state or authority enforces property rights 
because it involves the effectiveness of the protection provided by state (Alchian 
1965b:243).   
 
In my opinion, the state will not provide the protection of ownership without cost.  
Therefore, ownership rights, which are entangled with the state from the very 
beginning, are not exclusive and independent at all.  People acquire the protection of 
the state through paying taxes because government is the only organization that can 
exert ‘violence’ legally (North and Weingast 1989 ;North 1990:33,49).  The 
relationship between the state and ownership is therefore not different from any 
agreement or contract (Cooter and Ulen 2007:80).  In transitional China, a property 
or resource that is state-owned or private-owned is often tangled.  Because property 
rights are a bundle of rights, ownership rights in China are truncated and emerge as 
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part of the property rights taken by state.  I therefore perceive that property rights in 
China, on the one hand, can only be successfully implemented with the protection 
provided by state; on the other hand, the intervention of the state may inevitably lead 
to the truncation of ownership.  In transitional China, this contradiction is palpable 
because of the distortion in private ownership.  Therefore, this conflict results in the 
North’s Paradox (North 1981:25).  In North’s proposition, he deems that efficient 
arrangements of ownership play the key role in economic growth (North and Thomas 
1973a).  However, North also finds that efficient arrangements are only one potential 
consequence among many possibilities rather than the absolute one (North 
1981:25,1990).  He (North 1981:25) therefore raises the paradox that the state, on the 
one hand, tries to maximize its rent; on the other, it tries to reduce the transactional 
cost in order to maximize the social productivity.  Because of this conflict, many but 
not all, economies are unable to retain continuous economic growth.  
 
Habermas (1989:14-26) argued that a bourgeois public sphere can coordinate 
different private authorities and represents civil society as monitoring, governing, 
constraining, and resisting any activity from the state that will encroach on society.  
Therefore, a public domain is a counterbalancing mechanism between civil society 
and the state.  Nonetheless, Habermas’s logic cannot explain the distinction between 
France in 18
th
 century and England in 17
th
 century in terms of economy.  For 
example, both civil societies were mature enough in these two countries in order to 
reach compromises; however, there were more conflicts in France than England.  In 
my opinion, a civil society is necessary but not sufficient to arrive at a compromise 
between the state and civil society.  Only the collective actions from newly emerging 
ownership rights and their owners are strong enough to force the state and its agents 
to protect these emerging rights and owners in order to retain their own benefits.  In 
other words, the compromise cannot be reached at once.  On the contrary, the state 
and civil society have to repeatedly proceed with institutional negotiation to make 
final political decisions (Mann 1984).  
 
Taken together, I therefore argue that the counterbalance can merely be attained 
through dialogue, negotiation, and transaction between state and civil society.  In 
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China, ownership has always been defined and conferred by state and its agents, 
therefore, the effects of truncated ownership rights (Demsetz 1988:18-19) are 
manifest in the implementation of private property rights because many ingredients 
of the private property rights have already been assigned to the state in the first place.  
Therefore, any further dialogue, negotiation, and transaction are not necessary at all.  
For example, many housing demolitions and expropriation of farmland caused by the 
notorious infringement acts have occurred in China after the reforms (Walker and 
Hin 1994 ;Zhu 1994 ;Chan 1999 ;Wu 2001 ;Ding 2003 ;Ren 2003 ;Zhu 2005), which 
is a consequence of the effect of the truncation of ownership and deliberate neglect 
by state.   
 
After the establishment of the PRC, only SOEs and very few marginal self-employed 
businesses (Ge-ti-hu) existed in urban areas and the numerous People’s communes 
prevailing in rural areas.  These communes are not like their counterparts in other 
countries, e.g. New Zealand, Canada, Israel, and the USA (Staatz 1987:87-107).  In 
contrast, they are based on state-owned organizations required to follow all kinds of 
instructions given by the state with regard to cultivation, purchase and sale, 
transaction, and immigration.  The state therefore became the sole decision-maker, 
ruler, and beneficiary of this specific collective-owned economy (Zhou 1995).  
Under the circumstances, the state is no longer acting to protect and arbitrate in the 
ownership matters but to control the ownership.  Interestingly, whilst the CCP 
controls property rights in the name of nation (Quanmin), they not only wipe out 
traditional ownership, but also eliminate ownership in general terms.  Because the 
CCP controls all national economies, the most vital and exclusive institutional 
arrangements therefore become redundant.  In addition, after wiping out the 
exclusivity of ownership, the trade of scarce resources (alienability) consequently 
becomes needless.  In other words, the CCP eliminates the exclusivity and allows 
free access to the use of certain types of resources in the disguise of nationally 
owned resources.  Thus, the CCP becomes the only owner of scarce resources but an 
entrenched interest group making all institutional arrangements in transitional China 
(see Fig 20). 
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To sum up, incomplete property rights have been artificially created and deliberately 
taken over by some state agents and party cadres, so that any further dialogue, 
negotiation, and transaction between government and civil society becomes pointless 
ultimately.  In this regard, the invasive acts from government consequently give rise 
to truncated property rights and state agents can accordingly control most resources 
in the guise of a national economy (see Note 31).  In the next chapter, I will tackle the 
difference between theory and reality of China’s institutional changes and move 
towards some theoretical answers.   
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The previous chapter indicated that any single theoretical concept is unable to  
translate China’s institutional changes adequately without synthesising 
complementary theory.  In other words, neither a pure economic perspective nor 
institutional change theory can comprehensively explain the institutional changes in 
China.  In this chapter, I have expounded how people’s thoughts can be developed 
into favourable institutions and making them well off in a relatively short period 
after China’s economic reforms.  Therefore, I assert that China’s institutional 
changes follow a compromised pattern because the reformists require support from 
leading social actors to sustain their political legitimacy; consequently, these 
reformists give benefit to those actors in exchange for their support.  In short, those 
newly granted private property rights in China not only are manipulated by elites but 
also become a legitimate mechanism legally, converting public or disadvantaged 
people’s assets into powerful elites because of a lack of corresponding institutional 
arrangements.   
 
In chapters three and four, I have learned that there are various parameters actually 
affecting economic returns (see Note 32).  The economy definitely is a significant 
factor affecting the trend of institutional change in transitional China.  Additionally, 
social aspects, peer pressure, family influence, formal rules, ideological beliefs, and 
political constraints altogether have effects on the trend of institutional changes as 
well.  Although Campbell (2004:157) mentions that prevailing beliefs legitimize 
particular social practices, and that these practices consequently provide a 
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justification for particular institutional arrangements suited to those beliefs and 
practices; however, this argument is inadequate to explain institutional changes in 
China.  In many cases, prevailing beliefs in China do not legitimize the social 
practices.  As has been argued, the normative and cognitive pace could not catch up 
with the regulative one after the reforms initiated in 1978.  In other words, reforms in 
China are inconsistent with the then prevailing ideological beliefs.  
 
This chapter argues that the crux of the matter is how and why the government/CCP 
regulate prevailing beliefs to suit for intended social practices.  Reform in 
transitional China initially was at a slow pace but most people supported it because 
Deng and other reformists tried to protect everyone’s interests (Shirk 1993:130).  
However, after introducing newly devised private property rights, the established 
popularity of the reforms started to weaken, e.g. dual-track pricing, MBO of SOEs, 
and unclear transition of LUR.  In this regard, the newly introduced private property 
rights may well explain why reforms started to diverge from the original beliefs that 
increased the living standards and wealth of the vast majority in China.  In table 9, I 
have displayed the gap between the theory and reality of institutional change in 
China that is captured, and thereby sets out the context for the key focus of this 
research.  Thus, the gap is the threading of the research question between the theory 
and reality of institutional changes in China.  In the next chapter, I will apply the 
results of these two chapters to the research methods, which are used to conduct and 
implement this research.   
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5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH METHOD 
Research methodology, in general, refers to the theory of how research should be 
undertaken, and consists of, but is not limited to, the following concepts: (1) a 
collection of theories, concepts or ideas; (2) comparative studies of different 
approaches; and (3) critiques of the individual methods (Webster 1967).  By this 
logic, methodology is the philosophical logic behind research methods, and the scope 
is wider than that of the research methods, which constitute a part of the research 
methodology.  In other words, methodology refers to more than a simple set of 
methods; rather, it refers to the rationale and the philosophical assumptions that 
underlie a particular study.  There is a significant distinction existing between 
research methodology and research method: the former is the science and philosophy 
behind all research, whereas the latter is a way of conducting and implementing 
specific research (Adams et al. 2009:25).  In other words, research methodology is a 
way to systematically solve research problems, and a method or techniques that is 
supported by a clear grasp of methodological approaches (Kothari 2006:8).  By 
adopting appropriate methodology, researchers will know in what way knowledge 
and answers to research questions can be created and then they are in a position to 
understand what might be wrong. 
     
Few will disagree with the view of Wodak (2001:64) that effective research does not 
necessarily need to be based upon a grand theory such as those of Bourdieu, Marx, 
and Weber. However, good research always needs conceptual tools capable of 
interpreting abstract philosophical theories, concepts, and ideas to make them 
relevant and manageable (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000:foreword).  Research 
collects facts or information with a clear purpose, then re-assembles and re-orders 
these facts or information through purposeful interpretation (Walliman 2001:9); 
therefore, it is more than just reading a few books, articles, talking to a few people or 
asking them a few questions (Saunders et al. 2003:2).  In this chapter, I will 
thoroughly set out my understanding of the various methodologies, and provide a 
critique of their strengths and weaknesses as well as their applicability to my study.  
 
5.1 RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
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This research particularly lays emphasis on the inter-relationship between 
institutional change and the emergence of HNWIs in transitional China; therefore, it 
is arguably social science oriented.  In the context of social science research, there 
mainly are three kinds of methodology (Saunders et al. 2003:83): Positivism, 
Realism, and Interpretivism.  Positivism implies that from the end product of 
research generalizations, similar to those produced by the physical and natural 
scientists, can be made (Remenyi et al. 1998:102-104).  Because HNWIs in China 
vary with the changing political environment, therefore, the inter-relationship 
between them is unlikely to produce any law-like generalization.  For this reason, 
Positivism is not suitable for my research, which attempts to unpack the dynamic 
process of institutional changes in relation to the emergence of HNWIs in China.  As 
for Realism, it is based on the belief that an existing reality is independent of human 
thoughts and beliefs, and implies that social forces and processes will affect people 
without their necessarily being aware of the existence of such influences on their 
interpretations and behaviours (Saunders et al. 2003:84-85).  Therefore, there exists 
an apparent paradox in the methodology of Realism.  On the one hand, Realism does 
not recognize people as the objects to be studied in the style of natural science.  On 
the other hand, it identifies the importance of understanding people’s socially 
constructed interpretations and meanings, or subjective reality, within the context of 
seeking to comprehend broader social forces, structures, or processes that influence 
and perhaps constrain the nature of people’s views and behaviours (Saunders et al. 
2003:85).   
 
Whilst Positivism tries to reduce the complexity of our world to law-like 
generalizations and Realism does not recognize human beings as research objects, 
Interpretivism, which advocates every situation is unique to a particular set of 
circumstances and individuals, may offset the generalization of Positivism and the 
ignorance to human beings in Realism.  Generalisability within Interpretivism may 
be less valued than within Positivism because the circumstances of today may not 
apply in three weeks’ time.  Interpretivism tries to discover the details of the unique 
social situation in order to understand the reality or perhaps a reality working behind 
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the situation that is also related to the concept of constructionism, or social 
constructionism (Remenyi et al. 1998:35).  Saunders et al. (2003:84) indicated that: 
 
Social constructionism regards reality as being socially constructed 
and, in turn, people may place many different interpretations on the 
situations in which they find themselves… different interpretations are 
likely to affect their actions and the nature of their social interaction 
with others… people not only interact with their environment, they 
also seek to make sense of it through their interpretation of events and 
the meanings they draw from… their own actions may be seen? As 
being meaningful in the context of these socially constructed 
interpretations and meanings… interpretivists to seek understand the 
subjective reality of those that they study in order to be able to make 
sense of and understand their motives, actions and intentions…              
 
In other words, for example, powerful elites in China not only subjectively perceive 
knowledge from their own contexts but also use that perceived knowledge to affect 
their behaviours and those of ordinary people; consequently, the nature of the entire 
society will be permeated by it.  In this regard, these elites only make sense of their 
behaviours through their own understandings of the specific context, and therefore 
deliberately promote their knowledge and realize it in the form of policy.  Therefore, 
I may only have an insightful perspective on this research from people’s direct lived 
experience instead of abstract generalization.  In other words, I only can capture the 
core of meaning and contradictions through people’s (HNWIs) experiences (Denzin 
1978) that can be neither reduced to a law-like generalization nor be irrelevant to 
human discourse and activity.  As argued, human discourse and action, which is seen 
as text or a collection of symbols expressing layers of meaning, can scarcely be 
analyzed by the methods of natural and physical sciences (Dilthey [1911] 1977:141). 
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In my opinion, nearly each methodology is equally important but some of them are 
better at conducting specific research because of different research questions to be 
answered.  As indicated, I can capture the core of meaning and contradictions 
involved in people’s experiences.  By this logic, the qualitative approach is arguably 
more suitable to my research rather than a quantitative one.  In next section, I will 
introduce two major processes for analysing qualitative research (Saunders et al. 
2003:388): the deductive and inductive approaches.  In the deductive approach, 
researchers use existing theories to shape their approach, which they apply to 
qualitative research processes and to aspects of data analysis.  In the inductive 
approach, the researcher collects data and develops theory as the result of data 
analysis or data collection and analysis, followed by theory development.  
 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
As indicated in last section, there are two major approaches, the deductive and the 
inductive, for researchers to analyze qualitative data.  According to Saunders and 
other scholars (Saunders et al. 2003:88-89), if researchers try to adopt the deductive 
approach to analyse this specific research, they should:  
 
1. Start with the proposition or arguments that reforms in China are likely to be 
compromised along with institutional changes. 
2. Decide to research a population within which I would have expected to find 
evidence of compromise in the behaviours of HNWIs in transitional China. 
3. Distribute a questionnaire (questionnaires) or interview(s) to a large sample 
of HNWIs in order to establish the extent of compromise (either actually 
experienced or witness). 
4. Be particularly careful about how I defined compromise, institutional change, 
and HNWIs. 
5. Standardize the compromised responses to the institutional changes from 
HNWIs in transitional China. 
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1. It may be strongly biased in presuming the institutional change pattern in 
China is compromised without further data collection, interviews, and 
personal experiences, and therefore distract from the intended research 
objective. 
2. Because of biased assumptions, this research may not be able to gather 
adequate data, information, and evidence of compromised institutional 
changes in China. 
3. It is not feasible to collect a large sample of HNWIs because they are a rare 
breed and essentially inaccessible to most people. 
4. Because HNWIs are human beings and the institutional environment in China 
is unique, it is not adequate to generalize HNWIs’ responses to institutional 
changes or to have a predictable result.  
 
Alternatively, if I embrace an inductive approach, I only need to interview few 
HNWIs, who had been subjected to the compromised institutional changes in China.  
Because this research is interested in HNWIs’ feelings about what they have 
experienced, how they coped with the problems they encountered, and their 
perspectives on the likely causes and reasons of the compromised institutional 
changes in China, it seems more feasible to conduct this specific research 
productively through an inductive approach.  However, researchers should be aware  
that both deductive and inductive approaches can generate valuable data at different 
stages and each is better adapted to different things.  Therefore, neither of them 
should be considered as better than the other one. 
 
I have argued that any insightful perspective on this particular research can be 
acquired only through people’s direct lived experience instead of abstract 
generalization.  For this reason, an interview may be the best way to conduct this 
particular research because people’s actual experiences provide constructive advice 
and valuable insights into how researchers can successfully gain access to and further 
understandings of complex social phenomena (Hirsch 1995:72-80).  In China 
HNWIs and other leading social actors among different communities together 
comprise those elites, who are difficult for researchers to study because their 
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accessibility is constrained by their status and rigorous time schedule (Hertz and 
Imber 1995:1).  Hertz and Imber (1995) have a thorough discussion about how useful 
information is given, and how valuable data can be collected by researchers through 
elite interviews, so that researchers can realise their study and write about their 
subjects.  For this reason, I will adopt elite interviews method in this research as I am 
fortunate by virtue of my previous work experience and personal contacts to be able 
to access top-level executives in order to gain rare and first-hand data.   
 
In my opinion, different research approaches can be deployed on a mixed method 
basis to benefit research in different ways.  In other words, it is advantageous to 
employ multi-methods in one research because (1) different methods can be used at 
different stages in the research; and (2) it enables triangulation to have effect.  For 
example, in-depth interviews of elites are about getting comprehensive perspectives 
on many important issues of institutional change relevant to my objectives.  Apart 
from the in-depth interviews, this research will adopt different data collection 
methods in order to confirm that (1) the data are telling the researchers what they 
think respondents are reporting; and (2) test the validity of the conclusion of this 
research (triangulation).  By this logic, a better way of conducting this research is to 
adopt a multi-methods strategy (qualitative-quantitative-qualitative) (Tashakkori and 
Teddlie 1998a:23).  Nonetheless, there is no easy way to answer this question 
because each method has its unique strengths and weaknesses (Smith 1975:89,309) 
and the result of research will inevitably be subject to ‘method effect’ (Cote and 
Buckley 1987).  Therefore, it makes sense to employ multiple research methods to 
neutralise the method effects.  As a result, if researchers have clear research purposes 
in mind, they should be able to adopt appropriate methods to conduct research at 
different stages.   
 
5.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS, ARGUMENTS, AND RESEARCH METHODS 
In this section, I am going to discuss my research questions, research hypothesis 
(argument) and research method.  Research question differs from research hypothesis 
or arguments (Miles and Huberman 1994b:75;Maxwell 2005:53), the former refers 
to what researchers want to know and the latter are researchers’ tentative answers to 
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the former.  The hypothesis or argument, which is grounded in collected data, 
personal experiences and the interviews conducted, is generally formulated after 
beginning a study.  In a previous chapter, I have formulated my research questions 
and arguments in table 10.  These arguments are inductively developed during a 
study (or series of studies) and in constant interaction with the collected data from 
that study and therefore become grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 2009).  They 
are unlike existing theories in qualitative research that are developed conceptually 
and then simply tested against empirical data, or those in quantitative research that 
are prior ideas and can be tested against statistical data.   
    
In table 10, I have set out generalizing questions vis-à-vis a broad population 
(HNWIs) and then have selected a small group (HNWIs interviewees) from them in 
order to answer these questions.  Therefore, I need to justify my sampling strategy 
for generating the specified data collected and the relationships between these data, 
or statistical conclusion validity (Cook and Campbell 1979:41), for the population 
sampled in this particular research (see section 5.4.3).  Those research questions are 
about understanding both the meaning of China’s institutional changes and activities 
for the HNWIs involved in these changes and the influence of the social context on 
these changes and activities.  Therefore, these questions probe what actually 
happened in terms of observable behaviours or China’s institutional changes 
(descriptive questions), and the meaning of these things to those HNWIs: their 
thoughts, feelings, and intentions (interpretive questions), why these things happened, 
and how they can be explained (theoretical questions).  These descriptive, 
interpretative and theoretical questions include most of the types of research 
questions that qualitative research develops (Maxwell 1992).  In this research, I not 
only measure but also interpret the phenomena in China that closely correspond to 
the characteristics of a qualitative study (Sayre 2001:7;Maxwell 2005:59). 
   
The table 10 indicates that the research subjects are the institutional changes, HNWIs, 
and the context of China’s reforms.  In addition, there are other sub-objectives in this 
research, e.g. private property rights, resources dependence, allocation-and-
reallocation and distribution-and-redistribution of resources and power.  As Kumar 
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(2005:45) mentioned, once the research questions have been determined, the 
remaining steps will fall into place, i.e. the type of study design, the type of sampling 
strategy, the research instruments and the type of analysis.  Thus, research question is 
a signpost that helps the researcher to identify the right route.  The focus of my 
research questions is on understanding, explaining, exploring, discovering and 
clarifying situations, feelings, perceptions, attitudes, values, beliefs and experiences 
of HNWIs in China.  By this logic, I argue that a qualitative approach is most 
appropriate because it provides immense flexibility to my research.   
 
Before any further clarification of methodology, I would like to discuss the research 
purpose and consequently collect and interpret data systematically. The purpose is 
about understanding the role-transition of leading social actors, institutional changes 
in China, and their inter-relationship after economic reforms.  In other words, the 
researcher should examine his or her research from the perspective of its application 
and differentiate one from another, and therefore group it into different categories: 
the pure (basic) research or the applied one (Kumar 2005:9).  In table 11, I display 
the main distinctions between the previous two categories.  From the table 11, I 
perceive the contents of chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation corresponding closely to 
the purpose of the applied research.  As argued (2005:9), most social sciences 
research is applied-oriented.  Likewise, this particular research, which sets out to 
understand the complex phenomena of institutional change in China, is applied social 
research.   In this regard, the ‘applied’ approach can present a suitable template for 
this particular research.  Next, I will discuss the method and methodology for this 
particular research and consequently explain why qualitative research was adopted in 
this research. 
 
5.4 COMMON RESEARCH APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Many scholars (Davis and North 1970 ;Lin 1989 ;North and Weingast 1989 ;North 
1990 ;Mcfaul 1995 ;North 1998 ;Clemens and Cook 1999 ;Lin 2001 ;Zhang 
2003 ;Campbell 2004 ;Nee and Cao 2005) lay emphasis on qualitative research 
methods to conduct their research regarding institutional changes.  As argued, I will 
take the same approach as they do.  Yet, some scholars consider that qualitative 
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research is limited in scientific relevance.  For example, Kerlinger (1979:270) argued 
that scientists are not, and cannot be, concerned with the individual case and have to 
seek laws, systematic relations, explanations of phenomena, whose results are always 
statistical.  Calder (1977) contends that quantitative research seeks scientific 
explanation, which can be referred to as the scientific approach.  These arguments, as 
Kvale (1996:67) argued, may be ontological and regard that everything exists in 
number or the social world is basically a mathematically universe.   
 
Nonetheless, both qualitative and quantitative research methods, in my opinion, are 
seen as instruments of different research designs and are equally important, but their 
utility depends on their capacity to bear on the research questions asked.  As 
suggested by Webster’s (1967), qualitative analysis is designed to discover the 
components of a substance but quantitative analysis is designed to identify the 
numerical amounts of the components of a substance.  This research aims to unpack 
the components of institutions and their functions and inter-relations within the 
specific institutional environment.  Through this unpacking, I can analyze the 
existing social phenomena in transitional China.  The data collection and data 
analysis in this research feature both qualitative and quantitative methods.  
Consequently, the tables, graphics, and results require qualitative interpretations.  
Apart from that, this research will adopt qualitative interviews of elites, which is a 
sensitive and powerful method for capturing the experiences and lived meanings of 
their daily lives; therefore, interviewees are able to convey their situations from their 
own perspectives and words.  At last, I intend to employ China’s housing market to 
exemplify the research argument that is unique within other comparable studies 
because the attributes of housing market embody the transition of property rights in 
China.  
     
5.4.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  
As argued, some scholars (Calder 1977 ;Kerlinger 1979:270) have discounted 
qualitative research because they regarded scientists as being concerned less with 
individual cases than the search for ‘theoretical laws’, systematic relations, 
explanations of phenomena that carry statistical significances.  Maxwell (1998:69) 
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was critical of some people regarding research designs as (1) fixed or standard 
arrangements of research conditions and methods that have their own coherence and 
logic, as possible answers to the question; and (2) of the logical progression of stages 
or tasks, from problem formulation to the generation of conclusions or theory, that 
are necessary in planning or carrying out a study.  On the one hand, these contentions 
are ontological and deem that everything exists in numbers or that the social world is 
basically a mathematically universe (Kvale 1996:67).  On the other hand, they do not 
represent the logic and process of qualitative research (Maxwell 1998:70).  Therefore, 
how can the logic and process of qualitative research be understood?  Briefly 
speaking, qualitative analysis is designed to identify the components of a substance, 
and quantitative analysis is designed to identify the amounts of the components of a 
substance.  From this perspective, qualitative and quantitative approaches are both 
research tools and equally important, but their utility depends on their capacity to 
bear on the research questions asked.  In other words, if the researcher wants to 
utilize qualitative research, the research questions in his or her research should be 
answerable through qualitative research.  
 
This research is purposive and sets out to unpack the components of institutions, how 
they function within the specific institutional environment, and analyze the existing 
social phenomena in transitional China. As has been argued, many scholars conduct 
institutional change research through qualitative research methods.  For example, 
Barzel (1989) mentioned the way people organize the use of resources in order to 
maximize the value of their economic rights over these resources.  Lin (1989) draws 
on progress in the economics of information, property rights, transaction costs, 
induced innovations, and the theory of the state to analyze the functions and choices 
of social institutions, and to consider the mechanism of institutional change.  North 
(1990) attempts to describe the origin of political and economic institutions in order 
to build a better understanding of how institutions work, change, and either promote 
or prevent economic growth.  The reason these research studies can be deemed to be 
qualitative in their design rests on their essentially interpretive and naturalistic 
approach to their subject matter and to the study of phenomena in their natural 
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settings.  Further, they attempt to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of 
the meanings that people bring to them.   
    
Because institutional changes are dynamic and varying over time, researchers have to 
develop and modify their theories, elaborate and refocus their questions, and collect 
and analyze their data constantly and simultaneously.  As a result, this research, as 
Grady and Wallston (1988:10) argue, also needs a flexible, non-sequential approach 
to investigate institutional changes and connected phenomena in contemporary China.  
Next, I will borrow Chenail’s (1992) scenarios to explain why qualitative research 
method is the suitable one for my research. 
 
5.4.2 WHY QUALITATIVE RESEARCH  
I already introduced the qualitative research method and explained how people apply 
it to the study of institutional change.  In this section, I borrow five scenarios from 
Chenail (1992), which can be used to justify the choice of qualitative research 
methods.  Furthermore, I also demonstrate the extent to which each scenario is 
applicable to my research.  
 
Scenario One 
Much of qualitative research is dominated by the research traditions of education, 
sociology, and anthropology.  Researchers from these fields favour such methods as 
ethnography, participant observation, and naturalistic inquiry (Atkinson and 
Hammersley 1994 ;Riley and Love 2000:248-261).  Apart from these popular 
methods, qualitative research can also include methods from fields like 
communication (e.g. discourse analysis or conversation analysis (Antaki 2008)), 
literature (e.g. narratology (Bal 1990) or figurative language analysis (Pollio and 




Much of qualitative research is essentially practised from a scientific viewpoint.  It is 
legitimized by its juxtaposition with quantitative approaches (i.e., qualitative 
research as pre-quantitative, qualitative research as post-quantitative, or qualitative 
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and quantitative research in triangulation configurations (Ambert et al. 1995)) and it 
is undertaken with similar goals in mind as quantitative approaches (e.g. to predict, 
to confirm, etc.).  There also are various qualitative research methods, which do not 
embrace a scientific way of knowing and doing.  For example, artistic or literary 
qualitative research is based upon an artist's way of practicing and knowledge 
production (Brenda 2011).  Another type of this research is clinical qualitative 
research, which constructs its investigations by examining clinicians' methods and 
applying those ways of knowing in research inquiries (e.g. the use of circular 
questioning in data collection and analysis). 
 
Scenario Three 
Knowledge is produced from the practice of research, qualitative or quantitative, and 
is usually placed above awareness derived from the practice of practitioners as in the 
case of educators reflecting on their teaching or therapists re-searching their work in 
the clinic. Chenail (1992) states that researchers can take their place along side other 
practitioners and engage in dialogue towards the creation of a community of 
knowing and not knowing. 
 
Scenario Four 
As Sandelowski (1995) argues that aesthetics in qualitative research results in  
researchers attempting to approximate a known, well-practised, and established form 
or tradition in their research project at hand (e.g., "In this study, the researcher 
employed a grounded theory approach.") or improvise on a well-known approach 
(e.g., "The ethnographic interview was modified in the following ways...").  Other 
qualitative researchers feel that the particularities of each research project are so 
unique that they require a distinctive method for every study.  They may identify 
research tradition(s) that inspired their method for a specific project, but they will 
also allow each study to have its own project-specific method, which emerges from 
the special characteristics of the project. 
 
Scenario Five 
The qualitative researcher has a habit of focusing on what is familiar and central to 
the study at hand. That which was known through literature reviews and previous 
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observations before the study was commenced, becomes central in the unfolding 
process of the research.  In addition, phenomena observed as occurring the most 
during the study garners the lion's share of the spotlight.  What may be missed 
through this style of inquiry is an opportunity for investigators to know what they 
might not have known before the study.  Space and time have to be allowed in 
research to create room for such discoveries.  In addition, the margins of a project 
often provide some of the most interesting and informative patterns for investigators 
if they include a curiosity for the ‘exceptions’ in their work and a tendency for 
adopting explanations that might turn out to be premature. 
 
Among these five major scenarios of qualitative research, scenarios two and five 
correspond most closely to this particular research.  In scenario two, qualitative and 
quantitative research can be juxtaposed and complement each other in the conduct of 
the research.  The way to apply qualitative approaches to this research is different 
from many institutional change studies that simply take descriptive evidence to 
conduct their qualitative research without the verification of further concrete specific 
evidences.  For example, both Veblen and North argued that path dependence has 
serious effects on institutional changes.  Veblen (1899) deemed that an existing 
institution is an adaptive product of the past and can seldom cope with current 
requirements.  North (1990) mentioned that prevailing reality is actually derived 
from previous habits, behaviours, formal and informal rules, and previous small 
events may lead reform to particular path.  Nonetheless, they both conduct their 
research without empirical evidence to justify their arguments.  
 
Although I have embraced various theories and descriptive evidence in my research 
to explain the institutional changes in China, they still cannot satisfactorily explain 
phenomena of institutional changes in China.  Seen only from a third party’s point of 
view, these theories and descriptive evidence of institutional change lack adequate 
persuasiveness and validity to justify my propositions.  As argued, I adopt a 
qualitative approach to interviewing elite groups that constitutes a sensitive and 
powerful method for capturing the experiences and lived meanings of their daily 
lives, and therefore can let interviewees convey their situation from their own 
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perspectives and in their own words.  On top of that, interviews allow me to 
understand my subjects by probing those elites who have comprehensive knowledge 
of institutional changes in China.  Therefore, I can obtain useful information and 
valuable data through interviewing those elites (Hertz and Imber 1995), who know 
the reforms comprehensively because of years of profound engagement with the 
development of institutional changes in China.  However, elites are difficult for 
ordinary researchers to study because elites’ accessibility is constrained by their 
status and rigorous time schedule (Hertz and Imber ibid:1).  Because of my direct 
and indirect very strong relationships with these elites built whilst I was the 
managing director of a German company in China between 2000 and 2005, I am able 
to access these elites and gain their trust with relative ease.  In this regard, I can get 
adequate and useful first-hand data from them.  
 
In addition to those adopted approaches and elite interviews, I have also collected a 
variety of statistical data vis-à-vis economic growth, income distribution and 
disparity, and from the housing index to justify these qualitative data (elites’ 
interviews) and theories, and vice versa.  Many scholars (Becker 1958,1970 ;Murray 
1996) have adopted a similar method, known as Quasi-Statistics, to conduct their 
research.  For this reason, the data collection and data analysis in this research will 
be interactive between both qualitative and quantitative methods.  Consequently, the 
tables, graphics, and result require qualitative interpretations.  Without this 
complementary process, the statistical data will become a collection of meaningless 
numbers and the qualitative data will become nonsensical prattle.  Lastly, this 
research draws on China’s housing market data to justify these research arguments, 
which to a large extent distinguishes this research from that of others on a similar 
topic.   
 
In scenario five, although literature reviews and previous observations have occupied 
significant attention, it is essential that researchers pay attention to what might not 
have been known prior to their studies.  Apart from that, space and time have to be 
taken into consideration in research to create room for such discoveries.  Without 
considering these exceptions, research may become outdated and of no use at all.  
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For example, although China, the CEE and FSU all derived legacies from Leninism, 
it is simplistic to assume analogous reforms within them that will lead to erroneous 
assumptions about the consequences: these countries may eventually resemble each 
other after reforms.       
 
I have borrowed Chenail’s (1992) five scenarios to show why qualitative research is 
applicable to this research; nonetheless, the qualitative approach may be not the only 
method to be applied to this research.  As argued, the rationale for applying a 
qualitative approach to this research rests upon by the research questions, and the 
path to finding answers to these research questions constitutes the research 
methodology (Kumar 2005:18).  In other words, research questions decide the 
research path that researchers should take.  By this logic, I need to demonstrate when 
to use qualitative research, and the strengths and weaknesses of this particular 
approach.  Because the purpose of this research is to unpack the transitional roles of 
leading social actors in China’s transition after the late 1970s, therefore, it will 
inevitably involve human experience, which is allegedly subjective and not without 
suspicion.  In other words, the purpose of this particular research closely corresponds 
to the paradigm of qualitative research that is a tool employed in understanding and 
describing the world of human experience (Myers 2000).  Myers also regards one of 
the strengths of qualitative research as the depth in which examinations are 
conducted and explanations are written, resulting in sufficient detail for audiences to 
grasp the peculiarities of the particular situation, phenomenon, context, etc. 
 
Because the emphasis of qualitative research is to comprehend and explain 
perceptions, beliefs and experiences of people, it lacks the clarity of quantitative 
research; thus, the study design of qualitative research is more often non-linear and 
non-sequential in its operationalization because it (the study design) mainly entails 
the selection of people from whom the information is explored and gathered.  As a 
result, the distinction between study design and data collection methods is far less 
clear in qualitative research because qualitative research is more flexible and 
emergent in nature and evolving (Kumar 2005:104).  In this regard, there are various 
weaknesses in qualitative research: it is less specific and precise, and does not have 
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same structure and depth as quantitative research.  Nevertheless, there is an overlap 
between study design and methods of data collection in qualitative research.  For 
example, in-depth interviewing, which will be applied to this research, is both a 
research design and a method of data collection (Kumar ibid:104).  Because 
qualitative research heavily involves human beings, who are unique and dynamic, 
and therefore, any replication of qualitative study design becomes less feasible.  
Finally and importantly, because of the flexibility and lack of control, it is more 
difficult to check for researcher bias in quantitative research.   
 
I have discussed the major weaknesses of qualitative research; nonetheless, there are 
strengths that could offset these weaknesses in terms of my research.  For example, 
qualitative research is more appropriate for exploring variation and diversity in any 
aspect of social life because it is more appropriate for studying values, beliefs, 
perceptions, and meanings to interpret processes, events, structures, and emerging 
relationships logically, e.g. researching old issues, examining new solutions, using 
new ways-of-working and new terminologies.  All these features closely correspond 
to this particular research.  The ultimate purpose of qualitative research is to offer a 
perspective on a situation and provide well-written research reports that reflect the 
researcher's ability to illustrate or describe the corresponding phenomena (Myers 
2000).   
 
As argued, there are strengths offsetting the weakness of qualitative research.  For 
example, the richness and depth of explorations and descriptions is the strength of 
qualitative research.  Thus, qualitative research is arguably the best way to help me 
to approach my research purpose.  As indicated, qualitative research has long been 
criticized for lacking in standardized research tools owing to its multiple research 
methods and procedures that are both flexible and evolving.  In this regard, this 
research may need specific data (primary) and statistics (secondary) to verify the 
research arguments.  By this logic, a qualitative-quantitative-qualitative approach 
may be an appropriate strategy because this composite approach is able to test the 
validity and reliability of qualitative research even without standardized and 
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structured methods and procedures that are the bases for testing validity and 
reliability in quantitative research.   
 
Some scholars (Guba and Lincoln 1994:114) use alternative ways to judge the value 
of inquiry in qualitative research by setting out the criteria of trustworthiness and 
authenticity, which parallel validity and reliability in quantitative research.  Scholars 
deem that trustworthiness is determined by four indicators, credibility (internal 
validity), transferability (external validity), dependability (reliability), and 
confirmability (objectivity), that too reflect validity and reliability in qualitative 
research (Guba and Lincoln 1994:114;Trochim and Donnelly 2007:149).  In my 
integrated method, I therefore start with qualitative methods to ascertain the spread 
of diversity, using quantitative methods to measure the spread, and then going back 
to qualitative methods to interpret the observed patterns.  In the next section, I will 
examine the method and steps of data collection of this research.     
 
5.4.3 Steps of Qualitative Research 
I have set out most of the major features of qualitative research, which arguably is 
the appropriate method for this particular research, and is a diverse, rich, but 
sometimes self-contradictory inquiry.  Meta-analyses of qualitative research methods 
and philosophies are quite common in the field and serve as a good introduction to 
this diversification of approach.  Following on, I will introduce five essential 
sequences, which are borrowed from Maxwell (1998:73-91), of qualitative research 
and each of them deals with a different set of issues that are essential to the 
coherence of my research.   
 
Step 1 Purposes: Why am I doing in this research?  
There must be a clear sense of purpose in every research; otherwise, it will be 
inclined to lose its focus.  The term purpose indicates motive, desire, goal, or 
anything that researchers hope to accomplish through their researches.  In all aspects, 
research purpose is the most fundamental to all researchers because it guides 
researchers’ designs and ensures their research is worth doing.  In this research, there 
are four major purposes, which correspond to a qualitative approach.  First, to 
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understand the meaning of the events, situations, and actions that HNWIs are 
involved with and how their understandings influence their behaviours.  Therefore, 
this design is known as the interpretive approach to social science (Rainbow and 
Sullivan 1987:398).  Second, it sets out to understand the particular context within 
which HNWIs act and the influence of this context on their actions.  Third, it will 
develop the causal explanation for HNWIs’ actions and the particular context.  Lastly, 
it will generate a result that is comprehensible and credible to the respondents and 
others (Bolster 1983).  Nevertheless, researchers have to restrict the impact of their 
personal motivations for conducting their research, to avoid arriving at invalid 
conclusions. 
 
Step 2 Conceptual Context: What do I think is going on? 
The conceptual context is the system of concepts, assumptions, expectations, beliefs, 
and theories that supports and informs my research (Maxwell 1998:77).  The 
conceptual context not only explains the main things, which are the factors, concepts, 
or variables, to be studied in the research, but also presumes the relationships 
between those things (Miles and Huberman 1994a:18).  Therefore, the conceptual 
context formulates what I think is going on with the phenomena I am studying, 
which is a tentative theory that provides me with a model of why the world is the 
way it is (Strauss 1995 ).  In fact, the conceptual context is more than a conceptual 
framework but is about what I think is happening and why that gives new insights 
and broadens the understanding of the phenomenon.   
 
Because researchers cannot always find specific phenomena from previous 
literatures or studies, the conceptual context is often artificially constructed.  In other 
words, it incorporates sections adopted from somewhere else; however, the entire 
structure and overall consistency are not something that exists ready-made but are 
built by the researcher to work effectively with his/her research (Becker 2007:141).  
Becker indicates that there are four main sources: the experiential knowledge, the 
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1. Experiential Knowledge 
For most researchers, personal background often affects their research and its impact 
should be eliminated from research designs (Johnson 1997).  However, in my view, 
personal background should be treated as valuable component in the research design 
(Berg and Smith 1988 ;Jansen and Peshkin 1992:681-725) because it can provide a 
major source of insights, hypotheses, and validity checks (Grady and Wallston 
1988:41).  However, it is not to say that any personal background or experiential 
knowledge can be indiscriminately employed in research.  On the contrary, Reason 
(1988:12) sets up the criterion, which is called critical subjectivity, that should be 
imposed on personal assumptions about the research.  From Reason’s perspective, 
critical subjectivity is a quality of awareness in which researchers do not suppress 
primary experience nor allow themselves to be overwhelmed by it, but rather use it 
to raise consciousness and as part of the inquiry process.  Thus, if researchers can use 
personal background and experience appropriately, they may gain more support for 
their research.           
 
2. Existing Theory and Research 
This particular source can be found in published or unpublished works, papers, 
dissertations, and conference presentations (Locke et al. 2007:48-49); however, there 
are both advantages and risks in employing existing theory in qualitative research.  A 
practical existing theory is always helpful to researchers to organise and analyze their 
collected data, and to fit seemingly unconnected or irrelevant information into their 
interpretation of research findings.  Nonetheless, existing literature and assumptions 
embedded in it can also distort the ways researchers frame their research because the 
ideological hegemony in existing literature makes it difficult for researchers to see 
other phenomenon in ways that are different from those are prevalent in the literature 
(Sallach 1974 ;Becker 2007:149).  By this logic, existing literature may deform 
research and lead researchers to focus on the dominant questions in the literature and 
therefore ignore the most interesting implications and possibilities of their research 
(Becker 2007 ibid:146,149).  As scholars (Mills 1959 ;Becker 2007:149) argued, the 
researcher should use the literatures, and not the other way around.  According to the 
foregoing explanation, I therefore synthesize these two sources of the conceptual 
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context together and consequently form a valid conceptual framework for my 
research design. 
 
3. Pilot and exploratory study 
A pilot study, or so-called feasibility study, is often used in two different ways in 
social science research studies that are small scale versions or trial runs, done in 
preparation for the major study (Polit et al. 2001:467).  A pilot study is designed to 
test logics and gather information before a larger study, to improve the quality and 
efficiency of the larger study.  A pilot study can reveal deficiencies in the design of a 
proposed experiment or procedure and these can then be addressed before time and 
resources are consumed on large-scale studies.  Although pilot studies are a crucial 
element of a good study design, conducting a pilot study does not, however, 
guarantee success in the main study, but it does increase the likelihood.  Nevertheless, 
the pilot study fulfils a range of important functions and provides valuable insights 
for other researchers.   
 
Pilot studies can be based on quantitative or qualitative methods and large-scale 
studies might employ a number of pilot studies before the main survey is conducted.  
Thus researchers may start with qualitative data collection and analysis on a 
relatively unexplored topic (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998b:47) by using the results 
of in-depth interviews to establish the issues to be analyzed in a large-scale 
study.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a pilot study alone can provide adequate data 
on variability for this research that explains the institutional changes and the changes 
of leading social actors in China.  To offset it, systematic literature reviews are 
adequate for enhancing the credibility of this research.  While I was working in 
China, I conducted several pilot studies such as studying the emergence of some 
HNWIs in China that together with experiential knowledge essentially built up the 
conceptual context of this research that China’s institutional changes are occurring 
under a compromised model.  
 
4. Thought experiment 
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Thought experiment often takes place when the method of variation is employed in 
entertaining imaginative suppositions.  They are used for diverse reasons in a variety 
of areas, including economics, history, mathematics, philosophy, and physics, e.g. 
veil of ignorance (Rawls 1971) or the prisoner’s dilemma.  Although Becker (2007) 
indicated thought experiment as a source of the conceptual context, the common goal 
of a thought experiment is to explore the potential consequences of the principle in 
question.  In other words, thought experiment may be of limited help for and unlikely 
to be relevant to my research, which focuses on the real world. 
 
Step 3 Research Questions: What do I want to understand? 
Research questions, which specifically represent what researchers want to know by 
conducting their research, are at the heart of the research design and directly connect 
to all other parts of the research design.  Therefore, research questions will have a 
strong influence on, and respond to, those parts and to the research design as a whole.  
Because of these features, research questions in qualitative research should not be 
established in detail before the purposes and conceptual context of research have 
been clarified rather than being assumed a priori. This is, however, not to say that 
qualitative research should not begin with questions in their research.  In fact, 
researchers frequently have substantial questions about the phenomena investigated 
based on their considerable experience and previous theoretical knowledge.  These 
initial questions will frame their studies, influence their research methods, and 
consequently become the basis for further focusing on and development of more 
specific questions (Maxwell 1998:81).  In this respect, researchers might not 
establish research questions specifically at the very beginning of qualitative research.         
 
Research questions primarily provide two main functions that are (1) to help the 
researcher to focus on the study and (2) to give guidance for conducting the research.  
The former function relates to the research purpose and conceptual context, the latter 
relates to the research method and validity.  By this logic, research questions can 
help researchers to know what site or informants to choose, which data to collect, 
and how to analyze these data (Miles and Huberman 1994a:22-25).  If researchers 
are premature in constructing their research questions, those immature questions may 
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lead researchers to neglect many important parts of theory or previous experience 
that are relevant to the researchers’ understandings of what is going on and to pay 
less attention to a wide range of collected data in their studies, which may reveal 
important and unanticipated phenomena and relationships.  Some researchers 
unconsciously import unexamined assumptions into, or impose an unsuitable 
conceptual framework on their research questions.  For example, if I put “Why do 
HNWIs affect institutional changes in China?” as the research question, it arguably 
assumes that HNWIs have an influence on China’s institutional changes.  This kind 
of assumption needs to be carefully examined and justified beforehand, and therefore, 
it might be better to put the question as a tentative sub-question to broader a question.  
For example, the preceding question can be changed to “What is the relationship 
between HNWIs and institutional changes in China?”  Apart from inaccurate 
assumptions, research questions should take what researchers want to accomplish 
and what is already known into account in order to avoid positioning themselves for 
already available answers, or irrelevant questions to research purposes.  More 
succinctly, there is no value in posing any unanswerable or already existing question.   
 
Finally, there are three main issues applied to social research when framing research 
questions.  First, it is more appropriate for researchers to formulate their questions 
specifically when their purposes relate to understanding some particular programmes, 
situations, phenomena, and behaviours.  Secondly, unlike basic or quantitative 
research, questions in applied qualitative social research should be stated in terms of 
inferred behaviours, beliefs, and causal influences (realist) rather than in terms of 
information that can only be directly observed or reported from respondents 
(instrumentalist or positivist) (Norris 1983 ;Maxwell 1992).  For instrumentalists and 
positivists, they often formulate questions in terms of observed or measurable data 
rather than inferential ones, which cannot be defined as data for these people 
(Maxwell 2005:70-74).  For example, they would reject a question such as, “How do 
HNWIs affect institutional changes in China?” and replace it with a question like 
“How are HNWIs observed to affect institutional changes in China?”  On the other 
hand, realists (Cook and Campbell 1979:21,28-29;Maxwell 1992 ;Campbell 
1998:xviii) assume research in terms of feelings, beliefs, intentions, previous 
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behaviour, and effects can be framed as useful data for their studies.  Realists treat 
these data as imperfect facts about studied phenomena that can be used to develop 
and test ideas in terms of their research.          
 
In this research, I prefer to adopt realist research questions and systematically and 
vigorously consider them as validity threats.  However, I deem these threats not to be 
as serious as instrumentalists do and positivists indicate.  As Tukey (1962:13) argued, 
to adopt inference data that may provide appropriate answers to right questions rather 
than merely employing observed and measurable data that can only provide exact 
answers to irrelevant questions to my study.  Finally and importantly, I focus my 
research questions on process questions rather than variance questions because the 
nature of my research is qualitative-based.  Process questions centre on how and why 
things happen rather than whether there is a particular difference or relationship or 
how much it is explained by other variables (variance questions) (Maxwell 1998:84).  
It is risky to frame research questions focusing on differences and their explanation 
in qualitative research because these inappropriately framed questions may lead 
researchers to consider findings in variance terms, identify variables that explain 
observed differences, and consequently overlook the real power of qualitative 
research, which is often better at showing how things happen.   
 
What are the questions then that qualitative research should focus on?  They are (1) 
questions about the importance of events and activities to the people involved in 
them and (2) questions about the influence of the physical and social context on these 
events and activities because these kinds of questions involve situation-specific 
phenomena and engage an open-ended, inductive approach.  As has been argued, 
formulating research questions is one of the most import parts in a research design. 
Therefore, the researcher not only pays attention to the question itself but also to the 
relationship with all the other parts of the research design.  By this logic, good 
research questions can serve the research purpose, imply conceptual context, select 
appropriate methods, and tackle validity threats.  
 
Step 4. Methods: What will I actually do? 
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There is no universal instruction manual for qualitative research.  Although 
qualitative researchers try to adhere in their research methods to methodological 
rules as much as possible, the value and feasibility of their research cannot be 
assured because the research relies heavily upon the specific setting and phenomena 
of what researchers are studying with consequences for the research method. 
(Maxwell 1998:85).  I already have described how unstructured approaches are 
favoured in qualitative research because they allow researchers to focus on particular 
phenomena and are useful for understanding the processes that lead to specific 
outcomes (Huberman and Miles 1988).  However, this is not to say that every 
qualitative researcher should utilise an unstructured approach in their research.  Even 
though an unstructured approach is useful for exploring ‘exotic’ cultures, 
understudied facts, or complex social phenomena, it is risky for inexperienced 
qualitative researchers to adopt this approach to understanding the above issues 
within a familiar culture or subculture (Miles and Huberman 1994a:17).   
 
The choice of a structured or unstructured approach is not concerned with the extent 
to which researchers frame their studies, but with the ways in which researchers do 
so and why.  In other words, both approaches can help researchers to reach similar 
goals.  For example, researchers can adopt unstructured and open approaches to data 
collection, but use these data for a confirmatory test of explicit hypotheses based on 
a prior theory (Festinger et al. 1956:17).  Alternatively, researchers also can adopt a 
highly structured approach (ethnoscience or cognitive anthropology) to data 
collection but interpret these data in a inductive manner and with very few pre-
established categories (Werner and Schoepfle 1987a:100,261,1987b:73,94,121).  At 
the point of inception, researchers may have tentative plans for some characteristics 
of their studies in detail but leave open the possibility of revision to take account of 
emergent insights, new sampling plans, different data, and different analytic 
strategies.  Following on, I will elucidate my own research approach/design. 
 
1. The relationship between research and what researcher study 
The relationships between researchers and their respondents are complex and 
changeable; this will have an influence on the researchers and implications for other 
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parts of their research designs.  The changing relationships between participants not 
only profoundly affects the mentality of the researcher, but also influences whom the 
researcher will be able to interview, the opportunities for observation of social life, 
the quality of their collected data, the questions the researcher is able to answer, and 
researcher’s ability to test the conclusions.  Therefore, it is essential to think about 
the relationships researchers want to have with those participants whom they study, 
and what researchers need to do in order to establish such relationships.  These 
relationships should be considered as part of research design rather than external 
forces although they are not completely under the researchers’ control and cannot be 
defined precisely in advance.  
 
2. Sampling: where, when, who, and what 
Researchers are faced with a sampling decision once they have any choice about 
when and where to observe, whom to interview and be observed, or what data 
sources to focus on.  In qualitative research, most sampling is purposeful (Patton 
1990:169) in that particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for 
their important information that cannot be derived from other sources.  There are 
mainly four functions of purposeful sampling.  First, it can be used to achieve 
representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals, or selected activities.  To 
systematically select a small number of samples for typicality and relative 
homogeneity can adequately represent the average members of the observed 
population than accidentally or randomly select substantial samples.  In my research, 
the sampling strategy largely resembles Patton’s (1990) approach.  Second, it can 
capture the heterogeneity in the population that ensures the research results can 
represent the whole range of variation, rather than only the typical members or some 
division of this range.  Third, a purposefully selected sample can be used to examine 
the research while researchers have subsequently developed theories.  Last, it can be 
used to make particular comparisons to reveal the reasons for differences between 
settings or individuals. 
 
There were two rounds of interviews held separately in my research. I had been 
acquainted for years with most of the interviewees in the first round interview.  
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Those remaining few elites were introduced through either other elite interviewees or 
friends.  The atmosphere in the first round interview was enthusiastic and pleasant.  I 
therefore got an abundance of useful and hard-to-extract information from those 
interviewees.  However, because of the cordial atmosphere, there was very less 
challenge to my questions from those interviewees in the first round.  Additionally, 
the heterogeneity in the population may not have encompassed and represented the 
whole range of variation.  I therefore arranged the second round interviews with 
participants who were not well acquainted with me.  Nevertheless, because of my 
extensive experience in dealing with elites, the second round interview atmosphere 
was warm and I got some necessary challenges from them to my questions.  I have 
displayed the detailed information from those interviewees in table 5.1. 
 
No. Name Age Gender Pre-reform Status Current Industry Generation 
1 Mr. G 35-40 Male Non-cadre Electronic Post-reform 
2 Mr. H. Over 40 Male Non-cadre Food Manufacturing Post-reform 
3 
Mr. Q 55-60 
Male 
Former bureaupreneur 
and Senior Cadre 
Manufacturing Pre-reform 
4 
Mr. N. 55-60 
Male 
Current bureaupreneur 
and Senior cadre 
Manufacturing Pre-reform 
5 Ms. W. Over 60 Female Senior cadre Housing Pre-reform 
6 Ms. Z. 55-60 Female Non-cadre Housing Pre-reform 
7 Mr. R Over 60 Male Non-cadre Mining Pre-reform 
8 
Mr. Z. 55-60 
Male 
Former bureaupreneur 
and Senior cadre 
Mining Pre-reform 
Table 5.1 Interviewee Sample 
 
According to this table, half of the interviewees participated in my interview because 
of aspirations.  For the remaining interviewees, they participated in the interview at 
the request of friends initially.  However, after explaining my intentions to them, 
they became enthusiastic and highly interactive as soon as the interviews were 
initiated because they never had any chance to confide their beliefs, concepts, and 
experiences to other people without fear of being arrested.  These interviews 
successfully brought abundant constructive and unheard-of information to this 
research.      
   
3. Data collection: how does the researcher gather information that will be 
adopted in the research 
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There are mainly two designs in selecting and adopting data collection methods: the 
relationship between research questions and data collection methods, and the 
triangulation of different methods.  It is unlikely that research questions can be 
converted into practical research methods; the latter are the tools for answering, 
rather than transforming the former.  The selection of research methods depends not 
only upon the research questions, but also on the actual situation and what will work 
most effectively in that situation for the provision of essential data.  For example, the 
researcher may convert the research questions into interview questions if the 
interviewing method is selected.  However, the point is not whether the interview 
questions derive from research questions, but whether the interview questions can 
provide the necessary data to answer the research questions.  In other words, 
interview questions or observational strategies are not a mechanical translation of 
research questions, but are focused, context-specific and diverse questions to define 
what the researcher seeks to comprehend in conducting the study.   
 
As argued, I will adopt an elite interview approach entailing interview questions to 
collect primary data for this research.  As indicated, interview questions should not 
be mechanically translated into research questions, but rather extracting necessary 
information to respond research questions.  Before conducting the interviews, I 
categorized my research questions according to essential characteristics e.g. cultural, 
economic, and political.  Secondly, I used combinations of these questions during the 
interviews, e.g. cultural-political, economic-cultural, or political-economic, etc.  In 
this way, my interviewees would be less likely to feel bored or alerted to my 
objectives while responding my questions.  Thirdly, there is no specific question 
such as “how do you assess” or “how do you judge”.  Instead of that, I employed an 
unstructured interview method, which is a conversation, a statement to grasp the 
point of view of people’s conversation (Malinowski 2002), but with purpose 
(Bergess 1989:107) to induce my interviewees to tell me the essential information.  
My interviews often began with ‘telling- the-story’ of the interviewees’ experiences.  
Within these conversations, we often exchanged opinions vis-à-vis specific events or 
persons.  However, it should be noted that in the second stage of the interview, these 
conversations always the encompassed research questions without directly indicating 
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them to my interviewees.  This kind of method can dispel their doubts about the 
interview and, in turn, get a closer relationship between interviewees and myself.  
 
4. Data analysis: what researchers deal with the collected data in order to 
comprehend their studies 
Analysis is not separate from, but is a part of research design.  Researchers should 
decide how their analyses should be conducted, to what extent their decisions will 
influence and be affected by the rest of the research design.  There is a common 
problem in qualitative research that researchers often pile up unanalyzed data and 
transcripts, making final analyses difficult and disappointing.  Thus, researchers 
should start analyzing their interview data or observations as soon as possible and 
continually analyze other data as long as they are working on the research.  This 
process will allow the researchers to focus their interviews and observations 
increasingly, and to decide how to test the emerging inferences.   
 
There are two strategies about qualitative analysis: categorizing (Coffey and 
Atkinson 1996:108) and contextualizing strategy (Dey 1993:120-136).  Categorizing 
strategy is coding, which intends to fracturing the data and re-arranging it into 
different categories that facilitate comparison between things in the same category 
and between categories (Strauss 1987:29).  These categories can be derived from (1) 
existing theory, (2) inductively generated during grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 2009:5), or (3) drawn from the categories of what people studied (Williams 
1974).  The categorizing strategy enables researchers to develop a general 
understanding of what is going on, to generate themes and theoretical concepts, and 
to organize and retrieve data to test and support these general ideas (Dey 
1993:129,132).  Nevertheless, fracturing collected data may lead researchers to 
neglect some contextual relationships, which rely upon contiguity rather than 
similarity (Maxwell and Miller 1988) among those data, and therefore create analytic 
blinders that prevent the researcher from seeing alternative ways of understanding 
his or her data, and eventually may be fragmented into constituent themes (Atkinson 
1992:458-459).  In this regard, contextualizing strategies are developed in part to 
resolve those problems in the categorizing strategy (Atkinson 1992).  These 
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contextualizing strategies attempt to interpret those collected data in context 
(interview or other textual material) and adopt a variety of methods for recognizing 
the relationships among the different constituents of the text, rather than fracture the 
text into separate elements and re-sorting it into new categories.  These strategies 
have something in common in that they seek relationships connecting statements and 
events, which are within a particular context, into a coherent entirety (Atkinson 
1992:460).   
 
Nevertheless, researchers have to distinguish categorizing strategies from 
contextualizing ones in order to employ them appropriately.  If a research question is 
exploring how events in a specific context are connected, this question cannot be 
answered by a categorizing analysis (coding) exclusively (Agar 1993:181-194).  On 
the other hand, if a research question is asking about similarities and differences 
across settings or individuals (comparison), it cannot be answered by a 
contextualizing strategy.  The analysis strategies have to be compatible with the 
questions the researchers are asking.  There are many computer programs available 
for analyzing qualitative data, however, most of them are devised primarily for 
categorizing analyses and may distort researchers’ contextualising strategies into 
categorizing ones.  Apart from this, if a less experienced researcher relies on 
computer programs too much, he or she may fail to answer the key questions of 
study.  For this reason, I do not intend to utilize such computer programs to analyze 
my textual data because of  unfamiliarity and inapplicability.                                
 
Step 5 Validity: How might I be wrong? 
There are various validity threats in qualitative research.  Unlike quantitative 
researchers who can control and design expected and unexpected validity threats in 
advance, qualitative researchers have to try to rule out most validity threats after the 
research has begun, and use evidence collected during their research to make 
alternative hypotheses implausible (Maxwell 1998:91).  Qualitative researchers need 
to develop the skill of recognising the specific threat in any question and the way that 
particular threat can be excluded.  There are two main types of validity threats, 
researcher bias and reactivity, which are often raised in relation to qualitative studies.  
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From Webster’s Dictionary (1967), bias represents a leaning of the mind, or 
propensity or prepossession toward an object or view, which cannot not leave the 
mind impartial.  Apparently, bias is a prejudice or a predetermined conclusion, and 
researcher bias may distort the collection and analysis of data because of the 
researcher’s values, preconception, and ideologies.  Because every researcher has an 
individual identity, therefore, he or she has a different background, such as education, 
family, culture, experience, etc.  Thus, it is not possible to eliminate their biases or to 
standardize researchers to achieve reliability.  Instead of that, people should try to 
comprehend how a particular researcher’s values influence the conduct and 
conclusions of the study.  As for reactivity, it is not likely to control or eliminate the 
actual influence of the researcher, but to understand it and to utilize it productively 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007:101).   
 
As argued, I adopted an interview approach to collect primary data; thus, personal 
bias may have negative effects on an interview because the interviewer and the 
interview situation have a powerful and inescapable influence on the interviewees 
and data collected (Briggs 1997:41-42).  Therefore, interviewers should realize how 
they influence what the interviewees say, and how they affect the validity of  the 
inferences interviewers can draw from the interviews (Fletcher 1990).  Regarding 
validity threats, there are many strategies for tackling it and thereby increasing the 
credibility of a study in qualitative research.  Many of them do not verify conclusions, 
but test the validity of conclusions and the existence of potential threats to those 
conclusions (Campbell 1988:vii,xvii).  Nevertheless, the emphasis of these strategies 
of validity testing is on searching for evidence that either challenges the conclusion 
or makes the potential threat implausible.  In Table 11, I have displayed different 
strategies that can be employed to test validity.   
 
As argued, the centrality of these research steps is research questions.  These steps 
form a distinctive model whereby each step closely relates to each other through 
research questions (see Fig 21).  Herein, this model merely intends to emphasize the 
central role of research questions, rather than neglecting the relationships between 
methods and purposes or validity and conceptual context, etc.  The vertical line of 
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this model- purpose, questions, and conceptual context, should be one integrated unit.  
The research questions ought to have a clear relationship to the purposes of my 
research and should be informed by what is already known about the subjects I am 
studying and any theoretical tools that can be applied to my questions.  Apart from 
that, the purposes should be directed by both existing theory and knowledge and the 
questions I actually can answer: my choices of relevant theory and knowledge 
depend upon the purposes and questions.  On the other hand, the horizontal line- 
validity, research questions, and research methods, should be another integrated unit.  
The methods I adopt ought to facilitate those answers to my research questions and 
handle possible validity threats to these answers.  These questions consequently need 
to be framed to take into account of the feasibility of the methods and the 
significance of particular validity threats.  The plausibility and relevance of particular 
validity threats, on the other hand, depend upon the questions and methods I have 
chosen.  Therefore, the research questions are the hub of this model, connecting the 
other four steps into a coherent entirety, as well as responding to the other four steps.           
 
At last, the value of qualitative research is in the development of a theory that can be 
extended to other cases (Becker 1991 ;Yin 2009:38) that is recognized as 
transferability rather than generalisability in qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln 
1994:191-216).  Nevertheless, qualitative research design needs to pay attention to 
the connections among the different parts of the design.  Following the above 
discussions, I therefore developed my own research approach to create a coherent 
qualitative research design and the components needed (see Table 12).  In this table, I 
give an in-depth explanation of my research approach, which is distinct from the 
general ones.  In the following explanation, I will illustrate the data collection 
methods and their applicability to this particular study in next section. 
 
5.5 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
There are many data collection methods used in qualitative and quantitative research 
distinguished by restrictions imposed on flexibility, structure, sequential order, depth, 
and freedom.  These restrictions, however, are more favourable for quantitative 
research than qualitative.  As Kumar (2005:138) suggests, there are some premises 
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that may help researchers to determine the classification of a data collection methods 
into qualitative or quantitative categories (see Table 13).  For example, if I try to 
collect data through interviews and consequently record these data in a descriptive or 
narrative format, this kind of research becomes a qualitative one.  On the contrary, it 
becomes quantitative research if I record data in response to categories or that are 
quantified in numbers.   
 
Whether qualitative or quantitative research, there are mainly two sources of data 
that can be collected: primary and secondary data.   The distinction between these 
two sources depends upon whether the data is first-hand or second-hand.  For 
primary source data, there are three ways to collect them, observation (participant 
and non-participant), interviewing (in-depth and interactive), and written 
questionnaires (open-end and closed questions).  For secondary data collection, this 
normally indicates information available to the public, e.g. census, government 
publications, earlier research, statistical data (see Table 14).  The choice of these 
methods depends on the research purpose, available sources of data, and researcher’s 
skills.  For example, even if a research method is appropriate for achieving the 
research objective, it sometimes cannot be employed because of other constraints e.g. 
lack of available resources or sufficient research skills, etc.  Nevertheless, no matter 
which method of collecting primary data is used, the researcher needs to know the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the population studied, such as the educational 
level, age structure, socioeconomic status, and ethnic background.  In addition to that, 
respondents need to comprehend the purpose and relevance of the research.  In Table 
15, I have illustrated those major methods from the perspective of their applicability.  
 
In this research, I use interviews instead of observations (see Table 16) because 
observation only gives a sense of context but not an understanding of how people 
think and feel (Sayre 2001:134).  Therefore, observations can only let the researcher 
see the present actions and contexts of respondents, which is not suitable for this 
particular study.  As for questionnaires and interviewing, they both are suitable for a 
qualitative research in terms of collecting primary information from respondents and 
therefore can sharpen research.  Nevertheless, there are three major shortcomings in 
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questionnaires that impede comprehensive data collection.  First, respondents may be 
reluctant to give me their spontaneous responses via a questionnaire approach.  They 
may instead give their answers selectively that will consequently mislead this 
particular research.  Secondly, respondents may be influenced by the responses to 
other questions.  Thus, I may not be able to get an unbiased response.  Thirdly, 
respondents may consult other people while they are answering the questionnaire or 
ask other people to finish the questionnaire on their behalf.  Therefore, I may get the 
responses actually answered or adapted by people other than the respondents.  
Finally, I cannot either observe or explain to the respondents directly while they are 
answering the questionnaire.  On the contrary, I may comprehend and acquire 
accurate answers through observation and explanation in interviewing.  In this regard, 
interviewing may help me to acquire essential and precise information for this 
research by comparison with a questionnaire.   
 
I have suggested that the interview is the most suitable method for collecting primary 
sources of data for my research.  Individuals, academic institutes, or governments 
have already collected considerable data (secondary data) that is essential to other 
ongoing research on similar topics.  In this regard, researchers merely need to extract 
the required information from those data for their own research.  Because secondary 
data (see Table 13) can be used in both qualitative and quantitative research, 
researchers can extract descriptive and narrative information in qualitative research, 
or take categorical and numerical information in quantitative research.  Because the 
validity of secondary information may vary from one source to another, researchers 
should recognize some problems, such as availability, format, and quality, no matter 
which category of information researchers are going to use from secondary sources.  
For example, data obtained from the government publications is likely to be more 
valid and reliable than that obtained from magazines, personal records, etc.  In 
addition to that, information obtained from government statistics, census, and 
publications has more rigour because of less personal bias.  In this regard, the 
priority of secondary information in my research should be (1) government 
publications (statistics, census, written record); (2) earlier academic research 
(journals, conference papers); and (3) magazine and personal records.  Apart from 
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that, secondary information can be used as a tool to verify or correct those first data 
collected through interviews, observations, or questionnaires.   
 
5.5.1 COLLECTING INTERVIEWING DATA 
Collecting interview data is not simply a matter of recording some descriptive or 
narrative information and transferring them to text, or grabbing a recorder, going out 
and find some interviewees, and questioning them deliberately.  Rather, interview 
data collection will restrict interpretation of the research outcomes if there is no 
coherent data collection and management procedure (Kammen and Stouthamer-
Loeber 1997:375-376).  I will employ the unstructured interview for this research 
because of the nature of qualitative research (Kvale 1996:13). Consequently, I will 
have complete freedom in terms of the wording I use and the way I explain questions 
to those respondents.  Apart from this, I can formulate questions and raise issues 
depending upon what occurs to me in the context of the discussion. 
 
At this point, a paradox emerges that researchers, on the one hand, have complete 
freedom in terms of the wording they use and the ways they explain questions to 
their interviewees; on the other hand, only constant and careful data collection can 
bring forth high-quality research results.  That is to say, although researchers have 
the freedom to use wording, raise issues, and formulate questions in unstructured 
interviews, these interviews indeed involve themes such as the trustworthiness of 
researchers’ work (Kvale 2002:310).  Thus, all the questions asked in interviews 
have to surround the research themes, and the researchers must continually check all 
information obtained from interviews.  In Table 17, I have displayed the 
prerequisites that should be noticed before collecting data from my elite respondents.  
 
Because flexibility, freedom, and spontaneity in contents and structure underpin and 
interact in all kinds of unstructured interviews (Kumar 2005:160) such as in-depth 
interviewing, focus group interviewing, and narrative and oral histories, I have 
therefore, had to select the specific type of unstructured interview that can 
appropriately collect relevant data from my interviews.  In this research, I will use in-
depth interviews that help me to understand those respondents (elites) and their 
  
Page 163 of 484 
perspectives on daily life, experiences, or situations as expressed in their own words 
through face-to-face encounters (Neuendorf 2002:77).  As already mentioned, 
whether economic or political elites, they have been either connected with or 
involved in institutional changes in China, and therefore, I can access valuable 
information through interviewing them.  Apart from this, these elites will only share 
exclusive information with people once they feel confident and safe.  In this regard, 
focus group interviewing will not be an option for data collection in my research.  In 
the light of the understanding and confidence between those elites and myself, I can 
however generate access to in-depth and constructive information during individual 
interviews.   
 
My data collection approach is different from other scholars (Kvale 1996 ;Sayre 
2001) because of my perception and the particularity of this research.  For example, 
contrary to Kvale’s argument (1996:191-193), I put categorization prior to 
condensation because any potential term (category) may be eliminated during the 
condensation process.  After transcribing those interviews, I should carefully 
examine the most repeated terms or themes vis-à-vis literatures, objectives, and sub-
objectives to indicate all the potential categories, e.g. institutional changes, property 
rights, reforms and openness, economic growth, SOE privatization, acquisitions and 
mergers, banking loans, land reforms, housing policy, imbalanced development, 
unequal re-allocation and re-distribution of resources, HNWIs, rich-hatred, 
harmonious society, etc.  Consequently, I can proceed with condensation based on 
these categories extracting from the interview transcripts.  At this stage, I should 
condense the interview texts without eliminating those category terms.  Following 
the condensation, I can sort out the condensation according to established categories.  
After previous steps (transcribing, categorizing, condensation, sorting), I therefore 
can go on with interpretation, which is the most important part within the entire data 
collection process.   
 
Interview interpretation is beyond a structuring of the manifest meanings of texts to 
less speculative interpretations of texts (Kvale 1996:193), and entails re-
contextualization of those condensed texts.  During the categorization process, 
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interview texts have been de-contextualized.  This is not to say that these categories 
have been isolated from the context.  Instead, if I consider the broader context, some 
categories may become relatively less important.  Therefore, I may only refer to 
those comparatively vital categories and neglect those less important ones during 
categorization.  For example, I can neglect inter-party democracy and rotation, which 
too have significant impacts on institutional changes, while I am focusing on the 
political constraints in China.   
 
Nevertheless, interpretation goes beyond what has been directly said by interviewees 
that may be absent in interview texts.  With different conceptual frameworks, the 
same verbal or nonverbal statement, e.g. word, sentence, gesture, and even a sigh, 
can lead to different interpretations by different researchers (Scheflen 1978).  These 
different conceptual frameworks, to some extent, resemble a bias or propensity 
toward an object or view that compromises impartiality. (Webster 1967).  As 
Scheflen (1978) argued, different conceptual frameworks will lead interpretation to 
an entirely different result.  For example, some interpreters focused on the 
interviewee in isolation, some brought up the preceding context and the relationship 
between interviewer and a third party, some included the succeeding context and 
other relationships, and some followed from a closer focus on the interpersonal 
interaction (Scheflen 1978), and all these interpretations were gathered from the 
same interviewee.  Nevertheless, these interpretations are convincing from their own 
perspectives, and strategically practical at some point.  In other words, interpretation 
is trying to interpret what a person directly says and a text manifestly expresses, into 
something that is directly said, which is a hidden intention (Kvale 1996:203).  To 
prevent personal conceptual frameworks becoming biased vis-à-vis interpretation, I 
shall therefore employ abundant statistical evidence regarding this particular study 
that can present objective facts to either verify or correct my interpretations 
concerning those interviews.       
 
As previously mentioned, data collection in unstructured interviews, on the one hand, 
are not simply recording some descriptive or narrative information and transferring 
them to text, or grabbing a recorder and going out to find some interviewees and 
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question them deliberately; on the other, they cannot be collected through a set of 
predetermined questions.  Instead of that, researchers should raise issues around 
different areas of inquiry with an interview guide.  The interview guide not only is a 
loose list of issues that researchers want to discuss with respondents, but also ensures 
desired coverage of the areas of enquiry and comparability of information across 
interviewees.   
 
5.5.2 COLLECTING DATA FROM SECONDARY SOURCE 
Previously, I have argued that scholars, semi-government and government institutes 
occasionally collect and produce some essential data, evidence, or information from 
which I only need extract the required parts (see Table 13).  The reliability ranking of 
secondary source is (1) government or semi-government publications, (2) earlier 
research, (3) personal records, and (4) mass media.  All of these have been discussed 
in section 5.4 and it is redundant to repeat them here.  Note that I should focus on the 
availability, format, and quality of secondary source data and adopt them as the 
above ranking mentioned.   
 
5.6 DATA PROCESSING 
I have already discussed the ways of collecting data through different sources and 
their prerequisites.  Next, I will discuss the ways researchers plan to communicate 
their findings that will determine the processing and analyzing of the data collected.  
There are three major ways that researchers can express their findings in qualitative 
research: (1) to develop a narrative to describe situation, episode, event, or instance, 
(2) to identify the main themes that emerge from field notes or transcriptions of in-
depth interviews and writing about them, quoting extensively in verbatim format, 
and (3) in addition (2), to quantify the main themes in order to provide their 
prevalence and thus significance (Kumar 2005:277).  In this research, I will adopt the 
third approach that closely corresponds to my research purpose.   
 
Content analysis is about to capturing the essence, e.g. what is the perfume, the flavour, 
and the nature of the phenomenon (Mayring 2000).  Researchers often conduct content 
analysis (Neuendorf 2002:10) analysing the contents of interviews to recognize the 
  
Page 166 of 484 
main themes that emerge from the responses given by respondents.  As researchers go 
further along the research paradigm spectrum, from quantitative to qualitative 
assumptions, then they tend to immerse themselves experientially in the holistic nature 
of the phenomenon.  In content analysis, there is immersion in text, and researchers 
can use a variety of approaches for analysis.  It may be that via deep, personal reading 
and thinking about textual data, a researcher can develop an accurate conceptualization 
and understanding.  However, it may also be that using more structured, analytical 
techniques, involving sorting, categorizing, naming themes, and counting, is required.  
As always, the specific method will depend on the nature of the situation, the 
personality and expertise of the researcher, and the financial and political context.  I 
therefore set out the description and application of data analyzing process in the Table 
17, and will explain in the following paragraph why I conducted this four-step process 
in this particular research and how I processed them. 
 
Qualitative research generates a large amount of data from multiple sources that can 
help researchers to explore their perceptions, experiences, feelings, and beliefs about 
people; therefore, systematic organizing of the data is important to prevent 
researchers from becoming overwhelmed by the piles of data and to prevent 
researchers from losing sight of their original research purposes and questions.  In 
my research, much of the descriptive data is obtained from those elite interviewees, 
who participated in my research for confirmation, congruence, validation, and 
approval.  Therefore, those elites may be the best persons to decide whether the 
research results have been able to reflect their opinions and feelings appropriately.  
In this regard, advance preparation assists in handling large amounts of data in a 
documented and systematic fashion: categorizing, coding, sorting, and retrieving (the 
four-step process).   
 
As most data in qualitative research are descriptive and the research purpose is to 
explore perceptions, experiences, feelings, and beliefs of people, the major strength 
of the qualitative approach is the depth to which explorations are conducted and 
descriptions are written, usually resulting in sufficient detail for readers to grasp the 
idiosyncrasies of the context (Dhar 2008).  The above-mentioned purposes of 
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qualitative research are applied to explore the role-transition of leading social actors 
and the relations between them and institutional changes in China.  Therefore, I 
expect the four-step data analyzing process can help my readers to grasp the 
idiosyncrasies of China’s institutional changes.  The application of the four-step 
process, which is shown in the Table 18, will enhance and sharpen my argument.  
Next, I will explain the data analyzing process of my research.  
 
5.6.1 DATA ANALYZING 
In qualitative research, researchers often inspect raw data using as many 
interpretations as possible to find linkages between the research objects and the 
results vis-à-vis the original research questions.  Throughout the evaluation and 
analysis process, researchers should remain open to new opportunities and insights.  
In this regard, the qualitative research approach with its use of multiple data 
collection methods and analysis techniques provides researchers with opportunities 
to triangulate data in order to strengthen the research findings and conclusions.  In 
this section, I will explain how I rely on the technique to come up with (1) 
developing my own theory or (2) finding some suggestions from the scattered 
qualitative literature. 
  
In the interview approach, data analysis will come about through listening to 
repeated playing of the recorder and by cutting and pasting selections from some 
pages of transcripts.  These are exhausting tasks and became more overwhelming 
than I had originally anticipated at the beginning of those interviews.  At the 
beginning, it seemed that I could be confident of having analyzed those responses 
sufficiently or having worked out the main structure and meanings.  Therefore, I 
occasionally wanted to withdraw from my hard won studies because of exhaustion, 
and consequently, I did not succeed in absorbing and processing the original richness 
of the interview stories in a methodological and justifiable way.  By acknowledging 
the efforts of several scholars (Tesch 1990 ;Miles and Huberman 1994b ;Wolcott 
1994 ;Silverman 2006), I have found several qualitative analysis methods that 
classify the interview into: categorization, condensation, sorting, interpretation, and 
ad hoc.  Some of these approaches indeed helped me to analyze data more efficiently 
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than in my initial efforts which were interpretative and ad hoc.  Within these 
approaches, the results of condensation and interpretation are mainly in a descriptive 
format.  As for categorization, its form can be either in numbers or in descriptive 
form that can be applied to both statistical analysis and qualitative study.  As for the 
ad hoc approach, it is eclectic and can be descriptive as well as in numbers.   
 
In the categorization step, interviews are coded into categories to denote the strength 
of a specific phenomenon (Kvale 2002:192).  As mentioned in section 5.4.1, I will 
not assign any code to a theme but from its descriptive nature.  Condensation entails 
a synopsis of the responses expressed by interviewees, or the main sense of what is 
said and rephrased in a succinct format (Kvale 2002:192).  In fact, data with rigor 
and discipline expressed in terms of ordinary language can be highly useful without 
transforming them into quantitative formats if researchers deal with data 
systematically (Giorgi 1975:95-96).  Now, I will split interpretation into two parts: 
narrative and interpretation.  With respect to narrative, it focuses on the stories told 
during interviews, and consequently works out their structures and plots.  Most 
respondents told their stories during interviews.  In this regard, I may create a 
coherent story out of the many incidents reported throughout the interviews that did 
not tell stories.  There remains one important issue regarding narrative that I have to 
identify the main themes and classify their responses within the vernacular to prevent 
any incorrect theme-identification and response-classification.  Narrative may 
sometimes rephrase interviews in brief format, however, I need to develop the 
potentialities of the interviews into elaborate texts and therefore get more descriptive 
notes than in the original interviews. 
 
Apart from that, Interpretation entails the subjective consciousness of the qualitative 
researcher, who must go beyond the manifest meanings of interviews to the 
speculative interpretations of them (Kvale 2002:193).  As mentioned, researchers 
will therefore re-contextualize the descriptive statements given by respondents 
within broader frames of reference.  That is to say that interpretation can be a turning 
point within interview research because it may guide researchers to the factual result, 
or mislead them to a preconceived conception.  In this regard, the quality of 
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interview questions, reliability of interviewee, and skill of interviewer are imperative 
for the researcher to conduct high-quality interview research.  In terms of the ad hoc 
approach, it literally represents a special approach, which is eclectic, various, and can 
be in words, in numbers, in figures, and in their combination as well.        
 
Nevertheless, no matter whichever approach is adopted in my research, the premise 
is to read the statements from my interviewees thoroughly with the least 
preconception and to thematize their statements from my own perspective.  In order 
to elaborate this particular analyzing process, I have extractd a process from Giorgi 
(1975) that may help me to analyze the research process thoroughly (see Fig 22). 
 
Before any further discussion and exemplifying my analysis approach, I need to 
further explore the role of interpretation within the research interview.  An interview 
is a conversation between two persons about a theme of mutual interest; therefore, 
the interview is a specific form of human interaction in which knowledge evolves 
through a conversation (Kvale 1996:125).  Apart from that, in interview research, the 
transformation from spoken language to written text was depicted as a translation 
and interpretation; therefore, analysis has actually permeated an entire interview 
inquiry rather than at an isolated stage.  Besides, interpretation also continues during 
verification and reporting in a research interview.  Nonetheless, there remains a 
common question with respect to the interview interpretation that different 
researchers find different meanings in the same interview.  This query to 
interpretation, as Kvale (1996:210) mentioned, involves the demand for objectivity 
that a statement has only one correct and objective meaning, and the task of 
interpretation is to find this one and only true meaning.  However, the fact is that 
interpreters’ preconceptions may be often integrated into the research questions and 
therefore result in different meanings in the same interview.  In this regard, the 
researchers’ purposes may play the major role in interview. 
 
In this research, I am about to find out how institutional changes could affect the role 
of leading social actors in China.  Because interpretation in an interview involves a 
related distinction, therefore, the purposes of this particular interview research can be 
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either (1) comprehending interviewees’ understandings of China’s institutional 
changes or (2) developing, through the interviewees’ descriptions, a broader 
understanding of how institutional changes affect the interviewees and the like in 
China.  These two different purposes may therefore bring forth different research 
questions to the same interviewees in the same interview and get different results and 
meanings.  In scenario one, I may get a result that merely reflects an individual and 
subjective perspective on institutional changes in China.  Therefore, I may interpret 
the institutional changes in China from a macro perspective as scenario two does.  In 
this regard, the interpretation acquired from scenario one may not be applicable to 
this particular research because of the micro perspective.   
 
Another issue in interpretation is that the researcher analyzes the statement from the 
interview on (1) a manifest level, or (2) the latent meanings, which are not explicitly 
conscious.  If my purpose is to get the latter one, I must be very careful to avoid 
being misguided by any preconception because I may only notice the evidence that 
supports my own preconceptions, selectively interpret and report statements 
justifying my own conclusions, and consequently overlook any counterevidence.  
Therefore, different interpretations seem subjective that may in part be because the 
research questions asked are not clearly stated and without specifications.  In order to 
prevent any being wrongly interpreted, an explication of the perspective and 
specification of the research question should be posed at interview.  In this regard, 
different interpretations of the same interview will contribute to the richness and 
strength of interview research.  I have already illustrated the data collection and data 
processing, which includes data processing procedure and data analyzing. In the 
following section I will discuss the limits on generalisation  
 
5.7 LIMITS ON GENERALISATION 
A generalisation is an approximate quantitative measure of the numbers of objects 
belonging to some class or a statement about certain common properties of objects 
(Sayer 1984:100).  For example, “80% of HNWIs in China exploit their access to 
resources in order to retain their existing assets and privileges”, or “most HNWIs in 
China become rich because of a distorted and unfair housing policy”.  These 
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examples may suggest a necessary relation; however, most interpretations remain 
sceptical about the causal relationship. 
 
Because of the dissertation topic, many people persistently asked me questions, such 
as “what do these HNWIs have in common?”; “what are the distinguishing 
characteristics of HNWIs in China?”; “how many of these HNWIs have these 
characteristics?”, etc.  That is, once those people hit upon something, they simply 
pose analogous questions that primarily seek out relations with previous persons or 
situations.  Those questions were mostly derived from some rough predictions that 
may be either simple descriptive summaries of a given situation or extrapolations.  
The central theme of generalisation in social science is that human behaviour will be 
successful although there is hardly a piece of evidence to justify it, whether 
deterministic or probabilistic (Sayer 1984:100).  Many positivists in social science 
try to produce laws of human behaviour that could be generalized universally (Kvale 
1996:232); however, a contrasting fact is that every situation is unique and each 
phenomenon has its own intrinsic structure and logic.  In other words, to search for 
generalisation in this research is improper and unattainable. 
 
I have explained that HNWIs in China have changed from time to time and the 
institutional environment varies along with those shifting economic and political 
situations as well.  Likewise, today’s HNWIs are different from those in earlier years.  
Not only are their educational backgrounds, social status, and the explicit ways of 
becoming rich different, but also their beliefs and behaviours have changed 
dramatically.  Nonetheless, one thing that is immutable is the intrinsic quality of 
accessing wealth.  Most HNWIs in China need political power unceasingly to keep 
their wealth; otherwise, they are highly likely to lose everything, e.g. Yang, Rong 
(2001 3
rd
 richest, fled to USA), Hwang, Guang-Yu (2008 ranked 1
st
 richest, 
incarcerated), Zhang, Rong-Kun (2005 ranked 16
th
 richest, incarcerated), Zhou, Zen-
Yi (2002 ranked 11
th
 richest, incarcerated), etc.  They were imprisoned not only 
because of economic crimes but also because of the loss of their political protections.  
For example, the arrests of Hwang, Guang-Yu and Chen, Shaoji (former chairman of 
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CPPCC Guangdong province) and the arrests of Zhou, Zen-Yi and Chen, Liangyu 
(former Shanghai CCP secretary) are closely related.   
 
Nevertheless, generalisations may be misleading in the context of de-historicization 
because people regard some properties allegedly as common to society(s), which can 
be the same or different, at different times and try to give a transhistorical, 
pancultural character to phenomena, which are essentially historically specific and 
culture-bound (Kay 1979:55;Menzies 1982:127-129;Sayer 1984:91).  Therefore, to 
generalize about the relations between HNWIs and institutional changes in China is 
unrealistic.  However, owing to the unchanged political polity, China remains a 
country with a one-party dictatorship since 1949.  Although there have been many 
changes within the CCP, e.g. establishing a rotation system, intra-party democracy, 
but the CCP still masters all major resources, whether they are cultural, economic, or 
political.  In this regard, people who can access these resources will have more 
chances of becoming wealthy in this particular society.  Therefore, it is likely that I 
may generalize about relations between HNWIs and institutional changes in China as 
a constant and unchanging aspect of the environment.   
 
The more a social object is internally related to other objects, the less likely is it to be 
invariant across time and space (Sayer 1984:92).  Therefore, it is important to 
scrutinize this immutable nature and its relationship with other objects.  As 
mentioned, unchanged political constraints are a coercive measure to force ordinary 
people to conform to decrees, which were promulgated by local or central authorities, 
whether illegitimate or counter-constitutional, e.g. Changes in Urban and Rural 
Construction Land (issued by Minister of Land and Resources in 2008).  These kind 
of coercive measures often restrain people from legally accessing public resources.  
In this regard, to access public resources becomes the manifestation of people’s 
privileged social status and good political and commercial relations.  Consequently, 
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This intrinsic quality of accessing wealth arguably relies upon political institutions 
that make this unaffected intrinsic quality a contingent fact, which has to be 
determined by means other than generalisation (Sayer 1984:92), rather than a 
necessary fact.  In this regard, generalisation may not be applicable to that intrinsic 
quality.  However, if the political institutions are practically necessary facts in China, 
I will be able to generalize this intrinsic quality of accessing wealth in accordance 
with the rule of necessary fact.  In this regard, this research becomes meaningful and 
necessary.  However, I have to be aware of the fallacy of composition (Elster 
1978:97-99); namely, that what is possible for an individual must be possible for all 
individuals simultaneously.  For example, a HNWI has accessed wealth because of 
exploiting his or her power to access public resources owing to institutional holes 
(Yang 2004); therefore, all HNWIs can get rich by the same means.  This 
extrapolation or common-sense thinking essentially underestimates the 
interdependence of positions.  Likewise, I cannot infer that each HNWI will get rich 
by exploiting his or her control of access to public resources because most HNWIs 
do so.  This downward inference of one kind of strength; another would be the 
instance of the fallacy of division.  In fact, many HNWIs in China become wealthy 
because of intelligence and industriousness.   
 
In addition to the fallacies of composition and division, I would like to mention the 
ecological fallacy (Elster 1978:99), which is the inference from a correlation at the 
community level to a similar correlation at the individual level.  In Elster’s example, 
a high proportion of Ethnic groups in a community goes together with high crime 
rates; that we conclude that Ethnic groups commit more crimes than whites that is 
invalid because it may be due to people of ethnic origin being more victims of crimes.  
In this respect, I may not be able to say that HNWIs commit more collusion than 
other people do because HNWIs in China’s business world goes together with more 
collusion.  The above discourse actually corresponds with my interviews that many 
economic elites did not want to collude with bureaucrats but were forced to do so.  In 
my opinion, all the above fallacies make similar mistakes that they make inferences 
inappropriately and subjectively.  Consequently, I note several limits on 
generalisation in the Table 19.   
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The value of generalisations depends upon the qualitative nature of the objects to 
which they refer.  They only, at most, allow indirect reference and change, and 
require causal analysis, e.g. what enables or leads to doing it.  In my opinion, 
generalisations can only complement and enhance but never replace orthodox 
qualitative research methods.  Next, I will discuss the ethics issue concerning this 
particular research.   
 
5.8 ETHICAL ISSUES 
Ethical means conforming to accepted standards of conduct (Webster 1967) or in 
accordance with the principles of conduct that are considered correct, especially 
those of a given professional group (Collins 1979).  Within this definition, several 
keywords “accepted standards of, or principles of, conduct” and “considered correct” 
raise subsequent questions: (1) what are these accepted standards or principles of 
conduct, (2) who determines them, and (3) in whose judgment must they be 
considered correct.  More queries arise following the above questions that (1) are 
there any universal principles of conduct that can be applied to all professions? (2) 
do these principles vary with time?; and (3) what happens when a professional does 
not abide by these principles? (Kumar 2005:242).  In this particular research, the 
aforementioned questions become the determinants of ethical issues. 
 
Society is continuously changing according to the needs and expectations of that 
society; therefore, the ethical codes governing society also need to change.  In other 
words, what has been considered ethical in the past may not be ethical at present or 
in the future.  Therefore, any practice whether ethical or not, is made because of the 
principles of conduct prevalent at the time.  Because the principles of conduct vary 
from profession to profession, there is no such ethical code that can be universally 
applied across all professions.  In this regard, each profession has its own ethical 
codes.  In social science research, any derivate of a moral quandary is the basis of 
ethical conduct and certain behaviours in this research are considered to be unethical, 
e.g. breaching confidentiality, using information improperly, and bias introduction, 
etc. (Kumar 2005:242).   
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Ethics is debatable and contestable because it is concerned with how people ought to 
behave and suggests how social and individual behaviour can be improved; therefore, 
it is the conflict of values, interests, sentiments, and choices between principles, 
decisions, and choices (Preston 2007:16).  In other words, ethics can only be 
interpreted rather than followed because it seldom provides definite answers to the 
normative choices to be made during a research process (Kvale 1996:110).  Without 
deeper examination and accurate definition, it is difficult to perceive how important 
ethics will be to my research and the extent of the consequences if I do not comply 
with them.  Therefore, how I resolve these ethical issues depends on myself, and the 
conditions under which I am working.  Honesty, fairness, knowledge, and experience, 
which constitute the integrity of every researcher, are always the decisive factors 
(Kvale 1996:117).  Next, I will discuss ethical issues at different stages of the 
research and relations between these issues and participants in my research. 
 
There is an ethical protocol, which illustrates some questions at the various stages of 
interview study shown in Table 19.  This protocol can be very useful for me to 
prepare the outline of my research design because this protocol can make me bear 
these ethical and moral issues in mind while making research design and normative 
decisions.  In my opinion, Table 19 can be reduced to three essential subjects: 
informed consent, confidentiality, and consequences.  Informed consent entails 
informing the research respondents about the overall purpose of the particular 
research and any possible risks as well.  In my research, I have informed all my 
interviewees before interviewing that they are free to withdraw at any time and all 
informed consent directly received from them rather than their spouses, parents, and 
superiors.  In this regard, my interviewees will normally not feel any pressure to 
participate and voluntarily partake in the interviews.  Because the informed consents 
were obtained directly from participants without reluctance, therefore, the 
information given by them during interviews is abundant and useful most of the time.  
Some scholars (Lincoln 1990:286) want to replace informed consent by a dialogue 
format and assert that this may shape the final research result. However, this 
innovative format does not seems practical in my research because those respondents 
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in my interviewees scarcely felt comfortable without any prior disclosure of my 
interview purposes.              
 
Confidentiality in this research is enormously important, possibly more so than with 
other subjects because of the peculiar institutional environment in China.  Since 
many people in China continue to be subjected to unfair and illegitimate convictions 
because of truth telling, e.g. AI Weiwei, RAN Yunfei, etc., securing the 
confidentiality of the identities of my interviewees and private data is imperative and 
became the first priority in my research.  Because these interviews entail a large 
number of investigations of institutional changes, especially those of dual-tracking 
pricing, SOE privatization, land auction, the data obtained from these interviews may 
jeopardize the existing interests and privileges of some incumbents, and 
consequently bring serious problems to my interviewees and their families if they are 
identified.  Although some of my interviewees are even keen to identify themselves 
to the public because of their discontents against those incumbents, I continue 
however to keep the identities of all my respondents in confidence in order to avert 
any potential risk to all respondents of my research.   
 
Nevertheless, other researchers may claim that they are not able to reproduce the 
findings or have intersubjective control from my research because of the unknown 
identity of respondents (Smith 1990).  Thus, I have detailed descriptions about the 
criteria for selection of respondents in this research, e.g. they were previous SOE 
managers and party cadres and are owners of private companies or high-ranked 
managers of an SOE, their wealth positions, etc.  In other words, researchers who are 
interested in my research may identify their own qualified respondents to conduct 
similar research to check the results of my research, and correct, verify, or extend it 
consequently.  Finally, I am going to discuss the last subject of ethical issues, 
consequences.  For every interview study, it is the researcher’s responsibility to 
inform respondents regarding the potential harms and expected benefits of 
participating in their studies.  The purpose of doing so is to reflect on those possible 
consequences for both the respondents participating in the research and the people 
they represent.   
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Now, I am going to discuss ethical issues vis-à-vis different stakeholders of research.  
In general, there are three major stakeholders in research, the research participants or 
subjects, the researcher, and the sponsor organization (Kumar 2005:243).  In this 
research, there is no sponsor organization; therefore, I will only discuss ethical issues 
from the perspectives of participants and myself.  Participants in social science 
research are those who provide information to help researcher to gain understanding 
of a phenomenon, situation, or issue.  There are several things concerning ethical 
issues and participants that researchers need to notice (see Table 19).  In the light of 
this table, I have illustrated several ethical issues that should be noted concerning the 
research participants, and have displayed those issues that are related to the 
researcher pertaining to ethics in Table 21. 
 
In my opinion, researchers need to consider ethical issues not only from their own 
perspectives but also from those participants of their research.  Apart from that, 
ethical issues change from one stage to another in the same research.  Next, I shall 
try to arrive at a conclusion of my study of methodology. 
 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
This research employs the qualitative approach, which tries to understand 
phenomena in context-specific settings (Golafshani 2003) and produces findings not 
arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification (Strauss 
and Corbin 1990:17).  It also gathers information of HNWIs’ behaviours and actions 
and the structures and processes of institutional changes in China.  Consequently, I 
have encountered several questions such as how their behaviours and actions are 
understood, how those changes are explained, etc.  Scholars often respond to these 
questions by incorporating some theories into accounts of these issues, and 
theorization (conceptual framing) therefore becomes the value-added element of 
qualitative research (Llewelyn 2003).  However, I need to know what composes this 
theorization.  Is it better and essential for me to employ any grand theory to provide 
comprehensive explanations of HWNIs’ behaviours and actions, and structures and 
processes of institutional changes in China?  In my opinion, any grand theory has to 
be brought down to a level where it becomes relevant and manageable in a 
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qualitative methodological context (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000:foreword); 
therefore, these grand theories may lose part of their essence.  By this logic, it may 
be better for me to clarify conceptual tools and to build new ones by following the 
criteria of utility. 
 
Arguably, it may be time consuming or even time wasting to create new theories if I 
could apply available theories to this research with certain alterations and 
supplements.  From my perspective, theory is not restricted to “an order set of 
assertions about a generic behaviour or structure assumed to hold throughout a 
significantly broad range of specific instances (Sutherland 1975:9)”, or not only 
having an unfamiliar and esoteric character in relation to lay vocabularies, but rather 
a diverse and multifaceted understanding (Sayer 2000:146).  Apart from that, I 
should not ignore the contextualization of behaviours and structures (Llewelyn 2003) 
because theory can scarcely be equally successful in every context and this applies 
equally to its constituent elements (Sayer 1984:73).  That is to say, people should not 
try to expect any theory to effectively explain similar action, behaviour, events, or 
relationships in different contexts.  Thus, even though I try to apply any obtainable 
theory to this research, it is less likely to be fully applicable without any change to 
the original one.  Therefore, I integrate institutional change theories with resource 
dependence theories because the initial contexts of both theories differ from the 
context in China, and, in turn, appropriately apply this new combination to my 
research (see Fig 9). 
 
Theories reflect the contestation of meaning and significance in social and 
organizational life (Sayer 1992:83), and significance differs across cultural, 
economic, and political contexts.  In contrast, meaning is concerned with how an 
event is connected into an episode or how social actors are related in an 
organizational structure (Polkinghorne 1988:6) and is relatively stable.  Significance 
varies due to interaction effect and unintended consequences: a relatively trivial and 
not very meaningful event may assume huge significance within a particular context 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000:58-59).  For example, the Arab Spring would not 
have happened without advanced technology of communication, people’s 
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intelligence, and desire of freedom varying with the times.  Likewise, it is unlikely to 
take place in China because of the different cultural, economic, and political context.  
Even the Tiananmen Square protest may not happen again in China for the same 
reasons.   
 
Nevertheless, in preference to any theory, people need theorizing or conceptual 
framing in order to decide what to do or think next.  Thus, researchers have to 
describe the theorizing process more explicitly, operate it more self-consciously and 
decouple it from validation more deliberately in order to improve the theorizing 
process and, in turn, ameliorate theory (Weick 1989).  As mentioned, the theorizing 
process is not restricted only to one orthodox type, but rather to a diverse and 
multifaceted understanding: (1) metaphor, (2) differentiation, (3) conceptualization, 
(4) theorizing settings, and (5) theorizing structures (Llewelyn 2003).  According to 
Llewelyn (2003), theory has been restricted to the higher levels (four and five).  
Those lower levels (one, two, and three) that are essential to understanding and 
explaining action, agency, emergence and change have not been considered as 
theories.  The lack of theorizing at lower levels has led to an inappropriate use of 
higher levels of theories to understand and explain action, agency, emergence, and 
change.   
 
In this research, I only focus on the lower three levels of theorization, metaphor, 
differentiation, and conceptualization.  For example, metaphor in China is frequently 
adopted by ordinary people towards state leaders because of the implicit culture of 
expressing feelings or cautioning directly.  Therefore, metaphor is an alternative and 
effective method for people to express inside feelings and thoughts.   For example, 
my interviewees often say that they do not need to expose their underpants to others 
because people already knew what it is.  Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun once said 
that a good cat, whether black or white, could always catch mice, or cross the river 
by feeling the stones respectively.  In China, people often can hear and see this kind 
of metaphor everywhere.  The underpants, cat, and feeling the stones mentioned 
above are metaphors that essentially represent the implicit and pragmatic essence of 
China’s reforms.  In the light of a pragmatic perspective, I therefore comprehend 
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why many reforms merely change within political restraint because most bureaucrats 
deal with changes sensibly and practically.  Additionally, via re-working 
relationships with resource dependence theory, the adaptation of the institutional 
change theory effectively corresponds to the context of China after the late 1970s 
 
Truth is not objective but rather subject to a conceptual system in social science 
(Lakoff and Johnson 1981:159); therefore, the so-called truth is a concept of 
practical adequacy (Bhaskar 1998:142).  Put differently, truth is not universal and 
may vary with different conceptual systems.  For example, the truth of China’s 
housing pricing is poles apart owing to different conceptual systems.  From the 
perspectives of my interviewees (HNWIs), housing prices will continue to rise 
because of the shortage of land, expanding urbanization, the growth of wages, and 
increasing immigrant labourers.  For them, buying a house is as simple as poor 
people buying a cabbage.  In the HNWIs’ conceptual system, they mostly think 
about the up-side potential of the house instead of the excessive price now.  For them, 
the perceived truth is that the housing price will always rise.  However, ordinary 
people think the housing prices should and will stop increasing because of the 
decline in real wages, oversupply of housing, the upsurge of social justice and 
grievances.  For them, buying a cabbage is sometimes as difficult as buying a house 
because of inflation.  In their conceptual system, they mostly think about the 
affordability and interest rates instead of the up-side potential of housing.  For those 
ordinary people, the truth is that house prices are already too high and will tumble 
eventually.   
 
Thus, what is the truth of housing prices in government?  Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
has consecutively issued a series of injunctions aimed at restraining the rising cost of 
housing since late 2009.  However, the Minister of Land and Planning Division, Mr. 
Dong, claimed that the problem of land shortage was extreme in the Council of 
National Land Supply Report on 7
th
 of April, 2011, and his declaration consequently 
insinuates that the rising price of housing is valid.  As for provincial or local 
governments, they seriously rely on the land use fees to sustain local financial 
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expenditures and thus expect and promote the skyrocketing housing prices.  
Therefore, the truth of housing prices in China varies with different conceptual 
systems of rich people, poor people, central and local governments, let alone the 
institutional changes in the economic system. 
 
Following the above discussion, I comprehend that entire institutional changes vary 
with different conceptual systems in China.  Therefore, in terms of institutional 
changes, behaviours and beliefs of leading social actors, and their relations in China, 
any observation, which is theory-laden (Hanson 1958:19), can reach different 
conclusions via different theories.  As Hanson (1958:6-7) says, people, not their eyes, 
see; there is more to seeing that meets the eyeball.  In this regard, people, whether 
they live in China or abroad, can see the same things happening in China, the 
disparity in their accounts arise from the interpretations they put on these things.  In 
other words, people without adequate cultural background and plentiful personal 
experience, even if they live in China and have rich academic foundations, whether 
Western, Chinese, capitalist, or socialist, have limited appropriate interpretations of 
institutional changes in China.  
 
Now, I am able to sort out the theorizing process of this research.  Insofar as it can be 
ascertained, observation, which is not seeing an object without any perception, is 
pre-theorized.  In other words, people may only understand something through 
particular ways of seeing.  They need their own conceptual systems to breed their 
specific perceptions and theorizing or conceptual framing to decide what to think 
next, and, in turn, ameliorate their theories.  Therefore, social scientists should not 
begin at any grand theory, but at the conceptual framing work.  Finally, the same 
social object appears differently through different theories.  From the above 
description, the most important constituent within this process is, arguably, the 
theorization that essentially consists of more than one orthodox academic method.  In 
next chapter, I will use the synthesized conceptual framework and research methods 
to analyze the collected data.   
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6. DATA INTERPRETATION 
The approach for conducting data analysis in this research is through interpreting the 
raw data collected, and then finding associations between research objects and 
research questions.  This approach is in order to make sense of what people have said, 
put together what is said in one place with what is said in another place, and integrate 
what different people have said.  In section 5.6.1, I have indicated the technique for 
classifying interview data, which are quotations from my interviewees (see table 5.1) 
that cannot be replaced.  In this research, I have consistently embraced the concept of 
property rights in order to re-conceptualize the reform process in China for two 
reasons: (1) the evolution of property rights embodies the institutional changes 
taking place in China and (2) property rights are inseparable from control (power) or 
the support of the state.  Next, I will justify the appropriateness of the above 
rationales through reference to the synthesis of institutional change and resource 
dependence theories (see Fig 9).  
 
6.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Before further commencing any analysis, it is necessary to briefly re-introduce the 
conceptual framework for this research.  In China, people did not have private 
properties and associated property rights before the economic reforms; therefore, it is 
least likely that China’s HNWIs possess their wealth by way of creatio ex nihilo but 
through corporatization or privatization of previous state or public properties.  The 
process of corporatization or privatization per se is essential for revitalizing state 
wealth if it is initiated with fairness and transparency.  In China, however, the rules 
of the game relating to these processes were usually ambiguous in terms of the 
transaction prices and scope that actually embody the integration of the theories of 
property rights (Barzel 1989 ;Barzel 2000), power process (Lawler 1992), and 
resource dependence (Pfeffer 1992 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003) according to 
my research arguments (see Fig 23).  In this figure, the role of the social elites, the 
function and scope of property rights, the value of public and private assets, and the 
extent of reliance on political power are dissimilar from one stage to another.  There 
are two critical points, 1980 and 1990, in the process of power changes which were 
embodied in many important economic indexes such as the GINI index and GDP 
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growth. (See Fig 5).  The GINI index or income disparity, for example, started to 
decline in 1980 because of the successful rural economic reforms.  On the contrary, 
after 1990, not only did the GINI index and income disparity start to increase but 
also HNWIs started to mushroom in China.  The conceptual framework for this 
research is manifested in the aforementioned evolution process. 
 
6.2 CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE REFORM CONTEXT, CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK, AND INTERVIEWS 
I have introduced the conceptual framework anew in last section.  In my opinion, 
China’s institutional changes amount to alternative economic predatory activities 
under the guise of economic reforms that transit public resources into the hands of a 
few.  For this reason, it is essential to re-examine the reform context and comprehend 
the connection between this context and the conceptual framework, and then 
embodying them in my interviews. 
 
China’s institutional changes, in my view, consist of four main historical strands.  
The first one is the planned economy and class struggle that brought the state 
economy to the brink of collapse in the first thirty years (1949-1979).  The second is 
the restraint of free movement of labor forces being confined within rural area.  The 
third is the globalization that provides huge economic opportunities for China.  The 
fourth is that much of the workforce was accustomed to a low-wage system derived 
from the previous planned economy at the beginning of economic reforms.  By 
weaving these four strands into a whole, I therefore can explain why rapid economic 
growth in China happened after the economic reforms. In the economic globalization 
era, China’s surplus labour force that was used to getting relatively low wages, was 
suddenly unleashed from rural areas to offshore cities, effectively sustaining the 
competitiveness and growth of labour-intense industries in China.  However, such 
competitiveness and growth can hardly be sustainable through low wages in an era of 
rising consciousness of rights resulting in increasing discontent.  Therefore, so long 
as sustainable economic growth supports the legitimacy of the CCP, prolonging 
economic growth will be the highest priority for the survival of the CCP.  By this 
logic, state interventions, which are an effectual operating mechanism in China for 
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the sake of immediate interest and derived from the contradiction and dislocation of 
the state’s role, are highly likely to be counter-competitive and ultimately eradicate 
market competition.  In other words, to intervene in any social activity to maintain 
sustainable economic growth is the indispensable means for upholding the CCP’s 
legitimacy.  
 
In rural areas, the CCP obtained a preliminary success after the economic reforms 
were initiated; therefore, the CCP continued to transplant the rural reforms into urban 
areas after 1985.  However, urban areas required far more sophisticated reforms than 
the rural areas.  Thus, the results of urban reforms were not as initially expected and 
led to endless modifications without sufficient supporting measures and consistency.  
As argued, reforms in China are different from time to time; therefore, I split modern 
China’s chronology into five timeframes in Table 23, each of which presents 
different characteristics and consequences.  Through this table, I perceive a 
noticeable fact that the CCP has long been accustomed to dominating the allocations 
and possessions of all social resources since its establishment.  Although the CCP 
supports and continues economic reforms to maintain persistent economic growth,  
these deliberate reforms result in unexpected consequences and call on additional 
reforms to remedy these deficiencies.  
 
Institutional changes in China embody the process whereby the market economic 
system replaces the planned economic system.  The forms of allocation and 
ownership of resources in China, however, are antithetic in these two economic 
systems.  In Note 33, I have comprehensively discussed this peculiar relationship 
between the transition of property rights, economic reforms, and the emergence of 
HNWIs in China.  As no one can reverse and scrutinize the process of China’s 
institutional changes anew, to interview HNWIs, who have greater understanding 
regarding the exploitation of public and state resources to access massive wealth, 
becomes the most appropriate way to rebuild the process and reconstruct the scene.  
By this logic, my interviews with these HNWIs should highly relate to who they 
were before the reforms, how they became rich after the reforms, and what they are 
doing and thinking now.   
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6.3 INTERVIEW APPROACH AND CHANGES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS  
In China, the changes in property rights did epitomize the reforms since 1978. Basic 
property rights in China have long been withheld by state authorities; thus, state 
agents are able to exploit their power to pursue their own interests in such a peculiar 
institutional environment.  By this logic, a decent state agent in China, being 
authorized with so much power (exploitation license, tax evasion, construction 
permit, bank loans, favourable policies) without much corresponding restraints, 
could be lured into altering his/her mandated purposes because power is always 
accompanied by a rent-raising capacity inevitably sought by opportunists.  For 
example, entrepreneurs (bribers) who can make one million Yuan profit may have to 
pay half of the profit over to state agents in order to get the permits to start their 
projects.  Therefore, these entrepreneurs will lose half of their anticipated profit, 
which will be transferred to those state agents and result in an eccentric income re-
distribution.   
 
For those state agents and bribers, bribery may be a Pareto Improvement that harms 
none of them but helps both parties (Zhang 1998) – the power to consent is not worth 
much in the agent’s hands but is valuable in the briber’s hands.  However, there is a 
loss for society as a whole because other developers may make more profit from the 
same project than the briber and therefore contribute more to society through 
taxation.  In other words, not only is the utility maximization of a scarce resource not 
attained but also minor people make a profit, which is the external cost spilling over 
the entire society, and at the expense of the vast majority.  Nevertheless, China’s 
entrepreneurs have long been restrained within such a confined environment after the 
economic reforms (see Note 34).  Because regulations have a self-expansionary 
feature that eventually may eradicate market competition (see Note 35), those 
deteriorated regulations and excessive concentration of power together eventually 
form a symbiotic relationship. 
 
The consequences of China’s reforms, as some scholars (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988:3) argued, are “negotiations, bargaining, and the seeking of consensus among 
affected bureaucracies.”  Thus, there may be no direct relationship in China between 
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problem and solution, and a policy outcome may not reflect the problem that 
previously prompted the decision-making process (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988:4;Saich 2001:212).  For that reason, any policy in China may be deployed for 
either of the following reasons: (1) to solve new policy problems pressing upon 
leaders; (2) to keep alive the ideological vision of its proponents; (3) to rebuff 
challenges from rivals; (4) to reward its networks of loyalties; (5) reflecting a 
structural dimension of China’s bureaucracy (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988:3).  
The previous debates essentially reflect the policies adopted in China’s reforms, and 
provide the source of categories for my analysis.  The evolution of the policies 
displayed in figure 6.1 was sloganeered at different stages that resulted in sequential 
consequences justifying my conceptual framework: institutional change theory alone, 
without introducing a resource dependence parameter, can explain China’s transition.  
This concept will be adopted to justify my interview questions, guide categorizing 
and coding, and explain how to apply them into the data interpretation. 
 
 
6.4 CATEGORIZING AND CODING OF TRANSCRIPTS 
I have argued that interviewing HNWIs is essential to this research from both the 
literature and practical perspectives, and have mentioned that data processing 
consists of four steps: categorizing, coding, sorting, and retrieving (see Table 18).  As 
for categorizing, I have identified the main themes from the pilot interview with 




Figure 6.1 Policy and consequences at different stages of China’s reforms 
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became his own company after the economic reforms.  In other words, his 
representativeness is significant.  In this particular interview, there are many terms 
(see Table 24) essentially corresponding to my presupposition – institutional changes 
in China are highly related to and constrained by politics.  As mentioned, I will use 
appropriate wordings (themes) to categorize the transcript into suitable themes.  This 
process is not straightforward and interpretation requires considerable care.  For 
example, interviewee 3 always referred to re-distribution as distribution because it is 
his first time to benefit from the wealth distribution.  However, for those people who 
used to own enterprises, factories, or farmland before 1949, these distributions 
initiated after 1978 were actual re-distributions after confiscation of their properties 
in favour of the populace in 1950s.   
 
At this moment, I shift my focus to four main features of property rights: alienability, 
control rights, ownership rights, and tenure.  For ownership rights and control rights, 
the former refers to the power to appropriate income accruing to the means of 
production and to dispose of it; the latter refers to the power to make production and 
exchange decisions.  In China, the CCP intensifies its control rights and, in turn, 
deliberately devises ownership rights to decide tenure and to restrain alienability.  As 
for tenure and alienability in China, they are rarely coherent and are restrained by 
inconsistent policies.  As the sixth interviewee indicated, many farmlands and urban 
dwellings are expropriated by different hierarchies of authority with disproportionate 
or no compensation.  By this logic, people who seize control rights of property in 
China actually take hold of ownership rights, tenure, and alienability and therefore 
access wealth (see Fig 24).  Thus, the CCP, on the one hand, gives the ownership 
rights of public properties to designated individuals by way of gratuitous alienation 
(Quilliam 1970) or private deals; on the other hand, they limit tenure and restrain the 
alienability of all properties.  The seventh interviewee also mentioned that the 
entitlement of ownership in China is useless because government can take away 
people’s ownership anytime by means of any high-sounding excuse.  Therefore, 
legal authority in China can have significant control or influence over property 
without the ownership that essentially embodies the previous process.   
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One question remains: why was the third interviewee unwilling to use the term “re-
distribution”?  From my viewpoint, if there is a wealth re-distribution then there 
should have been wealth distribution in earlier times; therefore, the transition from 
the distribution to the re-distribution should be examined and compensated for.  For 
example, his company was a COE, which was arguably owned by the villagers but 
essentially controlled by the CCP.  However, villagers never had a penny from their 
own company that they should been able to appropriate income accruing to the COE.  
The truth is that interviewee 3 unwaveringly deemed the transition to be merely 
between him and the state rather than the villagers.  There are two reasons for 
upholding his insistence.  First, the CCP did transfer the previous COE into a co-
operative system (gu-fen-zhi) instead of private ownership (privatization) at the 
outset of economic reforms
15
.  Second, the COE was insolvent according to its 
accounting book at the time of transition.  According to my interviews, many 
managers of former SOEs, in due course, became legitimate owners of these newly 
established corporations after the economic reforms because these managers might 
‘cook the books’ to legally acquire public assets at least cost.  This newly introduced 
co-operative system, which ostensibly was to promote efficiency, essentially 
removed the full-employment burden from the state and, in turn, transferred public 
assets to specific individuals to achieve the purpose of wealth re-distribution (see Fig 
25).   
 
Except for the terms of distribution and re-distribution, many terms’ definitions are 
confused and ambiguous as well.  For example, the term “state” sometimes refers to 
the political leader (yibashou or lingdao), central or local government or the CCP.  
The terms “lay-off” and “dismissal” came into being during the process of 
privatisation, the term “private owner” sometimes indicates the nouveau riche, and 
this specific reform process is known as Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics 
(see green dotted line in Fig 26).  In Fig 26, I unpack the relationship between the blue 
parts representing the operations within market economy and the red parts 
                                                 
15 His company was first transferred from COE (Collective-Owned Enterprise) to a shareholding corporation in 
which the government retained minor shares in 1992.  In 1995, he purchased all the government shares at an 
unspecified price.   
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representing operations in pre-reform China.  The purple dotted line indicates the 
privatization in China after the economic reforms. 
 
In this research, interview data is often inconsistent within different respondents’ 
experiences, perceptions and explanations of events.  For this reason, categories can 
hardly be accommodated within pre-existing categories because of the rationale and 
justification for using a qualitative approach.  By this logic, categories should be 
guided by the research purpose through the research questions and objectives.  In 
other words, researchers with different purposes and objectives may be able to derive 
different categories from the same data (Dey 1993:105).  Thus, categorizing entails a 
process of abstracting, a tool bringing greater clarity and precision in making 
comparisons, from within the enormous amount of detail and complexity of the 
collected data.  There are two fundamental aspects of categorizing that are (1) 
implicitly meaningful in relation to the data and are (2) explicitly meaningful in 
relation to other categories (Dey 1993:96-97).  Next, I will discuss how to abstract 
interview data. 
 
6.5 INTERVIEW ABSTRACTING 
Interview abstracting consists of examining the natural meaning units with regard to 
the research purposes.  The main purposes of this research are to unpack the question 
“what on earth are the institutional changes in China?” and “what are the relations 
between these changes and emergence of HNWIs?”  Consequently, I developed 
central themes that dominate those natural meaning units.  The central themes of the 
natural meaning units were addressed regarding such questions as, “what does this 
statement tell me about the institutional changes in China and the relationship with 
emergence of HNWI?”  I then display the interviewing abstracting of interviewee 3 
in table 6.1, and those details of all interviews in Appendix 1-8.  Finally, the central 
theme of the entire interview set was tied together into essential descriptions and 
developed corresponding key terms (see Table 24).  Subsequently, I will match these 
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Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. I have experienced the transition from planned 
economy to market economy and regard the reform 
and openness as the second regime of China, and the 
country would otherwise fall behind without them.  
If people look back, they can comprehend that 
reform is necessary and both Deng’s path and 
insistence are right.  Seclusion will only lead the 
country to death, just like the Qing dynasty.   
 
2. There once were serious debates in higher level, 
however, theory and practice are extremely different 
in terms of reform and openness.  When the 
municipal party secretary initiated the reforms, he 
had to get approval from someone among the central 
leadership.  This is a matter of principle because the 
CCP attaches great importance to principle.   
 
3. As every movement in China, they initially put 
forward a slogan of “not seeking ownership, but 
seeking whereabouts” that local authorities did not 
want to own the SOEs but had to keep them located 
there.  Therefore, the corporate tax still can be levied 
by local authorities and contribute to local 
prosperity.   
 
4. In my opinion, the main purpose of reform and 
openness is to change people’s perspectives, 
especially those of the CCP cadres.  Once this 
perspective is altered, the improvement and growth 
of  the economy will only be a matter of time.  For 
example, there are many people like me who became 
rich overnight after the reforms.   
 
5. Of course there are many political leaders who are 
jealous, but this is the result of the reforms.  As 
always, the CCP initiates every movement with a 
typical model, so does reform.  In our province, 
unlike a universal model in other areas, the CCP put 
forward the “one policy for one plant”, which is a 
scientific approach and actually activated the then 
doomed economy.   
 
6. The status quo of the then SOEs was generally one 
of deficit.  If you deduct that negative equity, these 
SOEs had nothing at all and no one else could get a 
penny back.  Thus, banks had to hang their bad debts 
on their accounts until these SOEs, or the 
restructuring enterprises, made profits.   
 
7. As for the redundant labourers, the new enterprises 
had to lay off them within an approved range, e.g. 
5% per annum in my company.  Those local 
authorities also worried in case we laid off all 
labourers and sold the properties, e.g. land, 
buildings, machinery.   
 










2. Reforms were not consistent and have 









3. Sloganeering is vital in China and 







4. Reforms were mainly used to change 
the mentalities of the party cadres.  





5. Political leaders did envy the success 
of HNWIs.  There is no single model 
for reform in China.  It varies from one 






6. Before the reforms, most SOEs were 
insolvent and relied heavily on the 
assistance of state banks; all debts can 




7. The restructuring enterprise has to deal 
with the issue of redundant labourers 
because the CCP repudiates its 
commitments to those labourers.   
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Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
8. Not all transitions, however, were successful.  Some 
political leaders had serious conflicts of interest with 
plant managers; therefore, they were frequently 
replaced and resulted in poor efficiency.  In general, 
unlike those heavy industries in Northeast provinces, 
all SOEs including collective-owned enterprises and 
TVEs were gone in one year once the direction of 
reforms was made in our province.   
 
9. Nowadays, from the central government to local 
villages, they all are economy-oriented instead of 
class struggle oriented.  In my opinion, China is 
definitely a market economy or a quasi-capitalist 
country.  However, the path of the reforms is not as 
smooth as it is now.  Between 1989 and 1992, I was 
worried about the direction and path of reform.  
However, I do believe that the development has to go 
on and cannot stop.   
 
10. In China, the slogans associated with any 
development  is very important and has to be loud 
and clear to let the populace understand.  Deng then 
proposed “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics” 
and “development is the absolute principle” that 
were apparent to all indicating the direction without 
a shadow of a doubt.   
 
11. For those Western capitalist countries that have spent 
three hundred years to reach existing economic 
positions.  We only spent three decades to juxtapose 
with them.  This is the advantage of backwardness 
and we should take advantage of it.   
 
12. In China, some people advocate the multi-party 
competitive democratic system that will bring this 
country to a dead end.  For example, unemployment 
benefits and pension systems in the Western 
countries make their countries uncompetitive and 
none of the political parties can change the status 
quo.   
 
13. I would say most of China’s people agree with the 
existing political system and are of the opinion that 
the multi-party system would destroy what we have 
now.  This existing model actually plays the role that 
guides China on the right track.  We have our own 
flexibility, e.g. one policy for one plant, which is 
very successful; therefore, it is unnecessary for us to 
adopt wholesale westernization in our reform.                                                                       
 
8. Some restructuring SOEs wound up in 
failure because of state intervention.  
Except the heavy industrial SOEs that 
could not be transferred owing to large 
debt, most SOEs or the likes were 
restructured once direction of the 
reform had been decided.    
 
 
9. China almost is a capitalist country 
now unlike 1989-1992.  Nevertheless, 








10. Sloganeering is vital to promote any 







11. The tempo of China’s transition is 
swift and desirable exceeding what 
Western countries did hundreds years 
ago and is s a consequence of 
advantage from its ‘backwardness’.  
 
 
12. China should not accept all Western 
institutions because some of them are 





13. China should adhere to the existing 
road, which has led us to the current 
success, and ignore inapplicable 
Western models. 
 
Table 6.1 Interview Abstracting of Interviewee #3 
 
6.6 GENERATING CATEGORIES 
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I have inferred a set of key terms (see Table 24) from interview data that provide a 
resource for generating categories.  Although generating categories is not as vague as 
it was at the outset, I continue to face a dilemma:  should I develop them in a more 
detailed way (Strauss 1987) or in a holistic approach (Jones 1985:56)?  The former 
method will generate detailed categories and therefore enhance efficiency, but at the 
expense of reliability and flexibility.  The latter one, on the contrary, ensures 
flexibility, but at a high price in terms of efficiency.  So far, l am not convinced that 
the distinctions between the data were sufficient to form a detailed category set that 
may have precluded particular lines of development and even prejudiced subsequent 
analysis.  For this reason, I will adopt broad categories (Becker and Geer 1982) to 
develop a more flexible approach drawing some broad preliminary distinctions 
within the data.  In my opinion, policy issues could potentially be used to identify the 
key terms for use in collecting data and the developed as categories because the 
CCP’s regime is characterized by a rule-by-policy (Yang 2000:66).  Therefore, 
interpreting those policies adopted in China’s reforms may provide a reliable source 
of categories for analysis because the preceding flexible approach fits well with 
policy-oriented research.  In Fig 25, I have displayed different policies sloganeered 
in China at different stages that resulted in sequential consequences, which will be 
adopted as a broad category set for this research at the outset.       
 
To justify my arguments and to fill the gap between the broad category set and key 
terms regarding the in-vivo concepts of interviewees, I borrowed Flick’s (2002:183) 
ideas to list my interview questions in following tables.   
 
Question 1: What is it about here?  Which phenomenon is mentioned? 
#1 interviewee 
China is prosperous after reforms.  Small-medium enterprises have to 
follow existing regulations, which benefit specific companies.  
Institutional changes in China are flexible and often without prior 
preparations.   
#2 interviewee 
China’s economy is booming.  The protections of property rights are not 
fully implemented and merely favour large and international companies.  
Position and quality of laws have been improved in the business 
environment only. 
#3 interviewee 
Reforms are generally used to change the mentalities of bureaucrats 
and are imperative to China’s economic growth, but not always 
consistent and vary from one place to another.  After the reforms, China 
is a quasi-capitalist country and ought to adhere to its existing mode in 
terms of development. 
#4 interviewee Reforms, in general, release the potential power from SOEs.  After the 
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Question 1: What is it about here?  Which phenomenon is mentioned? 
reforms, SOEs were not improved if they continued to retain their 
previous ideologies and management style.  SOE’s performance was 
improved because of enhanced management instead of corporation 
restructuring.  The worst burdens of SOEs were redundant labourers 
and bad debts. 
#5 interviewee 
Many previous state servants initiated their private businesses either by 
starting-up a new company or by acquiring previous SOEs or affiliates.   
These former bureaucrats keep close relations with incumbent state 
agents in order to facilitate business operations.  China has a market 
economy and everybody has the right to become rich. 
#6 interviewee 
Reforms were literally initiated after 1992.  Better education and higher 
living standards do not enhance the performance of bureaucrats 
because of entrenched ideologies.  Regulations are selectively 
implemented that result in social discontent.  
#7 interviewee 
Some people became rich through restructuring SOEs; however, the 
restructuring was a move backward that led to deprivation of their 
ownership rights.  The implementation of property rights protection is 
inefficient. 
#8 interviewee 
Some people became rich through SOEs restructuring.  People, who do 
not comply with regulations, should be excluded from industry.  
Table 25 
 
Question 2: Which persons, actors are involved?  Which roles do they play?  
How do they interact? 
#1 interviewee 
State agents, skilled people, and opportunists are involved.  State 
agents are in the dominant position and assist those conglomerates and 
vested interests through administrative power.   
#2 interviewee 
State agents, businesspersons, and opportunists are involved.  
Businesspersons can be in the dominant positions except for those 
agents.  State agents help their friends and relatives through selective 
implementation of laws.   
#3 interviewee 
State agents and their former colleagues are involved.  Incumbent 
bureaucrats are in dominant positions.  Incumbent state agents may not 
always assist their former colleagues.   
#4 interviewee 
State agents are involved.  Incumbent higher-ranked bureaucrats are in 
dominant positions.  Inferior state agents mostly have to follow the 
instructions given by superior state agents.    
#5 interviewee 
State agents and their former colleagues are involved.  Incumbent 
bureaucrats are in dominant positions.  Bureaupreneurs or the like can 
adopt financial incentives in exchange for valuable information from 
their former colleagues who remain incumbent.   
#6 interviewee 
State agents and opportunists are involved.  Incumbent bureaucrats are 
in dominant positions.  It is not easy for state agents to comprehensively 
restrain these opportunists because of institutional holes.   
#7 interviewee 
State agents, their former colleagues and opportunists are involved.  
Incumbent bureaucrats and their former colleagues are in the dominant 
positions.  Former bureaucrats will always get assistance from their 
incumbent colleagues.  Opportunists eventually have to give way to 
incumbent state agents and bureaupreneurs. 
#8 interviewee 
State agents, their former colleagues and opportunists are involved.  
Incumbent bureaucrats and their former colleagues are in dominant 
positions.  State agents can work together with large conglomerates to 
regulate business operations.   
Table 26 
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Question 3: Which aspects of the phenomenon are mentioned (or not)? 
#1 interviewee 
Interviewee did mention how certain institutions can benefit his 
company but not how they can jeopardize other companies.  He also 
ignored the damages derived from those inconsistent but flexible 
institutions.  
#2 interviewee 
Interviewee overemphasized the domestic market and economic power 
of China but ignored how inequality and discontent can make the 
market economy go into doom and gloom.  He did mention the quality 
and implementation of laws are enhanced in the business environment, 
however, he did not mention how they are in other environments, e.g. 
people’s well being.  In addition, he did mention that China pays  
attention to her international image but not to the domestic one.      
#3 interviewee 
Interviewee is relatively fair in terms of institutional changes in China in 
comparison with others.  He did not mention how to cope with this if the 
existing mode in China changed. 
#4 interviewee 
Interviewee mentioned that management is most important to the 
performance of SOEs instead of the corporate structure.  However, he 
ignored that an insolvent SOE can remain operational because of this 
unique corporate structure.  He also mentioned that redundant 
labourers and bad debts pull down SOEs.  However, he did not mention 
that cheap labour and unpaid debts kept the regime intact. 
#5 interviewee 
Interviewee did mention that he was one of those people who became 
rich first because of relationships with incumbent bureaucrats and 
information asymmetry.  She did not mention how these abused 
relationships and asymmetric information distort the wealth distribution 
and may result in a potential uprising.   
#6 interviewee 
Interviewee is relatively fair in comparison with others.  She considered 
that reforms were literally initiated after Deng’s Southern trip in 1992.  In 
this regard, she neglected the success of the reforms in rural areas that 
resulted in subsequent reforms in urban areas.      
#7 interviewee 
Interviewee did mention the vagueness of property rights in China.  He 
also mentioned that the government could withdraw given property 
rights at any moment without the support of persuasive evidence and 
concrete regulations.  However, these complaints could not exculpate 
his wrongdoing of initiating his existing company; he did not mention 
this at all.         
#8 interviewee 
Interviewee did mention the immediacy of acquiring and merging with 
his industry in a high-sounding tone.  However, he did not say any word 
about the previous collusion with incumbent bureaucrats that helped 
him to start up his business.  In addition, he mentioned a lot about the 
advantages of consolidation in his industry, however, he did not mention 
that the mandatory consolidation is essentially against the principle of 
the deified market economy.   
Table 27 
     
Question 4: How long?  Where?  Time, course and location  
#1 interviewee 
Interviewee did mention his experience in Guangzhou province since 
2004.  He considered that reforms, in general, have been put on the 
right path (benefit domestic manufacturing industry). 
#2 interviewee 
Interviewee did mention his experience nationwide since 1994.  He 
indicated that reforms have become image-considerations-oriented. 
#3 interviewee 
Interviewee said that that the reforms were initiated froom the early 80s 
and specifically in Zhejiang province (especially not in the Northeast 
provinces).  Reforms are mostly on track.    
#4 interviewee Interviewee traced reforms in Shanghai back to 1986.  He considered 
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Question 4: How long?  Where?  Time, course and location  
that reforms in Shanghai have been carried out warily. 
#5 interviewee 
Interviewee mentioned her experience in Wuhan since 1985.  She 
considered that reforms have been absolutely put on the right path.  
#6 interviewee 
Interviewee considered reforms were literally initiated after 1992.  She 
deemed that reforms have been distorted and deteriorated since 2005. 
#7 interviewee 
Interviewee mentioned his experience in Jiangxi province before 1979.  
He considered that reforms moved forwards and backwards frequently 
and deviated from Deng’s original plan. 
#8 interviewee 
Interviewee mentioned his experience in Jiangxi province after 1987.  
He considered that reforms have been literally put on the accurate path. 
Table 28 
 
Question 5: How strong? Aspects of intensity  
#1 interviewee 
Reforms are lacking in prior preparation and adopt a trial-and-error 
mode.  The initial intensity of reform was low before reaching a 
consensus.  After the consensus was formed, the intensity became very 
strong. 
#2 interviewee 
Reforms vary from one scenario to another.  The intensity can be either 
strong or low and that is subject to the objectives.   
#3 interviewee 
The intensity of reforms was low without the consent of higher-ranked 
political leader.     
#4 interviewee 
The intensity of reforms was subject to the determination of actors and 
higher-ranked bureaucrats. 
#5 interviewee The intensity of reforms was subject to its implementation. 
#6 interviewee 
The intensity of reforms was varied and subject to the bureaucrats and 
vested interest groups. 
#7 interviewee 
The intensity of reforms was unpredictable and subject to the 
government agents and large companies. 
#8 interviewee 




Question 6: What for initially?  With what intention, to which goal?  
#1 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to make China prosperous 
and the purpose was to exceed Western advanced countries. 
#2 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to improve people’s living 
standards and make China an international superpower in all aspects. 
#3 interviewee 
Interviewee regarded the intentions were to prevent China falling apart 
and keep in line with international norms and consequently juxtapose 
with Western advanced countries.  
#4 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to solve chronic domestic 
economic problems and to get rid of the heavy burden of redundant 
labour and bad debts.   
#5 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to make people rich, and 
eventually build up a market economy society.  
#6 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to remove collective-owned 
enterprises, and eventually become a rule-of-law country. 
#7 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to restructure ownership rights 
and return the controls of property rights to the populace.   
#8 interviewee 
Interviewee considered the intention was to restructure ownership rights 
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Question 7: By which?  Means, tactics and strategies for reaching the goal  
#1 interviewee 
The CCP adopted the means of crossing the river by feeling stones, 
which resembles trial and error, to deal with reforms.  They might waste 
some time and money because of error; however, they would never 
carry out any reform in an overwhelming manner.       
#2 interviewee 
Government adopted flexible but inconsistent means of dealing with 
reforms.  The prime directive of the means is protecting the political 
interests of the CCP. 
#3 interviewee 
Before the death of Deng Xiaoping, no matter how flexible or 
inconsistent the reforms were, they eventually moved forward to the 
goal of opening up.  After Deng’s era, reforms remained very flexible 
and inconsistent because of the conflict in the political centre.  They 
sometimes would have a plausibly consistent policy when those political 
leaders reached a tentative compromise; however, they eventually 
would change again because of the imbalance of interests. 
#4 interviewee 
To reap without sowing or paying the least cost is the guiding principle 
of the reforms.  Therefore, they always hedge (change) once they 
encounter any problem attracting a high cost.  They always deal with 
the reform with the least cost, rather than the most urgent one.   
#5 interviewee 
The CCP adopted all possible means to make some people rich first, so 
that they could then be the role model for other people and helpful for 
improving economic growth as well.  Therefore, all policies and means 
were based on personal interests.  
#6 interviewee 
The beginning of the reforms was by all means to adjust the mentality of 
the bureaucracy in order to pursue higher efficiency that included 
benefiting certain groups of people.   
#7 interviewee 
The CCP initially fulfilled the commitment of handing state properties to 
the people through property rights restructuring.   
#8 interviewee 
The CCP kept its promise to restructure state properties and allocate 
them to the right people to improve economic growth through the 
maximization of the utilities of those properties.   
Table 31 
 
These questions related to four major aspects: frequency (never or seldom), extent 
(less or large), intensity (weak or strong), and duration (short or long).  From the 
extractions, I show the answers from interviewees’ perspectives that may fill the gap 
between this broad category set and key terms.  In figure 6.2, I develop a concept 
that consists of preceding questions and a paradigm model to test and re-define 
categories.  In this figure, the vertical line clarifies the relations between a 
phenomenon, its cause and consequences, its context and the strategies of those who 
are involved.  As for the four horizontal dimensions, they are extracted from Table 
25 - 35 to match the vertical axial.  For example, to make some people rich first is 
the causal condition of the unjust wealth distribution (phenomenon).  The context in 
this figure has been rephrased in section 6.2.  In general, the political centre 
ultimately compromises with the local bureaucrats in exchange for their political 
support because of the established decentralization system.  Therefore, many 
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strategies of exchange-of-benefits were developed, e.g. dual-tracking pricing system, 
official profiteering.  Consequently, these strategies resulted in many bureaupreneurs 
who became HNWIs and many serious social malcontents. 
 
Figure 6.2 New Concept of Testing and Re-defining Categories, concept borrowed from 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990:99;Flick 2002:183) 
 
Those key terms (Table 24) have been refined based on the main categories (Fig 26) 
in the light of preceding concepts (vertical line in Fig 27).  Some of those key terms 
have been eliminated because they are inclusive of other terms.  Hence, I have a 
preliminary category set shown in Fig 26.  In the next phase, these preliminary 
category sets will be developed based on the four horizontal dimensions (see Fig 6.2).  
In Table 26, I have a preliminary analysis regarding the evolution of the relationships 
between those six category sets (see Fig 28) and four dimensions: frequency, 
intensity, extent, and duration (see Fig 6.2).  From this analysis, a pattern emerges: 
frequency and intensity of most reform activities have become less frequent and 
weaker than they were, though reforms remain ongoing.  However, their extent has 










Never Seldom Frequency 
Low Strong Intensity 
Less Large Extent 
Short Long Duration 
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corresponds to my contention (see Fig 14) that most previously taken-for-granted 
assumptions have been established and supported, and therefore promulgated by 
those powerful individuals, who benefit from these prevailing conventions.  In other 
words, these social elites, as Powell (1991:191) argued, are both architects and end 
products of the formal rules and informal constraints they have developed.  On the 
other hand, the reform objectives had been changed over time (see table 1).  After 
1992, the CCP set the tone of the reform objectives in the voice of “the Socialist 
Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics”; hence, reform activities moved 
forward vertically and their extent has been raised to a higher level.  Consequently, 
competition for scare and valuable resources escalated, some individuals were no 
longer able to acquire sufficient resources to keep their existing privileges and 
competitiveness in society.  These individuals will therefore try to seek alternative 
resources to retain their power (see Fig 9).   
 
Based on the preceding concept (see Fig 24), I continue the refining process by 
applying the parameters of both institutional change and resource dependence 
theories (see Fig 13).  These parameters, however, were extracted from institutional 
change or resource dependent theories created by commentators on developed 
societies.  Thus, they may be, as Chang (2006:70) mentioned, too demanding or out 
of line with the social norms or cultural values of developing countries.  In this 
regard, I may need to modify them to fit this research.  In Table 26, I not only set out 
the affiliations among those key terms (see Table 24), parameters (see Fig 13), and 
main category sets (see Fig 25), but also eliminate those duplicate categories, e.g. 
collusion, trial-and-error, extortion bribes, peasant labour, etc.  However, many of 
these terms are related, and should be re-organized in an alternative category list 
displayed in Fig 26.  In Fig 26, I have associated these categories with corresponding 
phases in China’s reforms that produce a distinct result for further analysis.  For 
example, those categories associated with the phase of reform and openness can be 
further shown as an evolutionary process (see Fig 28).  Therefore, I comprehend the 
relationships between, and constraints of, these categories, and subsequently make 
these categories as succinct as possible by grouping those with equivalent or similar 
meanings.  Because beliefs and behaviours were not tightly coupled, people re-
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asserted their self-interest, which ultimately undermined institutional stability and 
gave rise to institutional changes subsequently.  Consequently, some resulting 
interactions between beliefs and behaviours will change in the social context.  Thus, 
it was possible to continue the categorization at a higher-level refinement and 
conceive the core category.         
 
The main reason for making use of the property rights approach to re-conceptualize 
the reform process in China is the introduction of private property rights.  This 
introduction causes distinct purposes, pursuits, and causalities of the same issues 
existing before and after economic reforms, e.g. wealth distribution, competition of 
political power, ideological conflict, etc. The first de-institutionalization process of 
the conventional planned economy largely improved the agricultural output after the 
introduction of basic private property rights to China in 1979.  The second and the 
most explicit one began subsequent to Deng’s Southern trip in 1992 when he firmly 
persisted in a reforming and opening-up policy, and soon prompted the emergence of 
a large number of private enterprises and their owners (see Fig 26).  The second one, 
however, caused widespread social discontent relating to income disparity and 
conspicuous consumption.  As consistently argued, public wealth was more or less 
evenly distributed to ordinary people in China before economic reforms; thus, there 
was no specific economically advantaged group that could have an effect on the 
CCP’s regime.  After the economic reforms, the distribution of public resources was 
increasingly concentrated in the hands of few people (HNWIs).  Indisputably, these 
people upheld the prevailing system that was legitimated by the government, to 
prevent their existing privileges from turning to dust (see red line in Fig 31).  
 
According to my research, introducing partial private property rights to China not 
only resulted in de-institutionalization processes but also changed people’s beliefs 
and behaviours.  At the centre of this research is the compromise between legitimacy, 
power, distribution mechanisms, and resources that elaborate the transformation 
from public resources to individual wealth in China after the economic reforms (see 
Fig 31).  Most derivative sub-categories actually encompass the centre, which has 
been presented in Fig 32.  Although power plays a crucial role in China’s reform, its 
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pursuit and purpose, however, vary with the appearance of private property rights 
and corresponding ideology.  Hence, I argue that private property rights are the core 
category, which when developed to their fullest features and dimensions, links to 
virtually all other categories. 
 
I have already displayed refined categories from previous analyses to develop a 
comprehensive category list.  However, it is most likely to be amended if I encounter 
any data that does not fit within the existing list because residual categories for data 
cannot be readily assigned at this moment.  As a result, to retain the flexibility and 
avoid premature judgements for the sake of efficiency, I adopted overarching 
categories that are neither mutually inclusive nor duplicated because the process of 
assigning categories might lead to modifying whatever categories are employed at 
the outset.  In the light of the preceding elucidation, the overarching categories of 
this research are compromises of formal rules, ideology, legitimacy, mutual 
dependence, normative and cognitive ideas, path dependence, power, private 
property rights, rationality, resource, and transaction costs.  Next, I will transfer 
original data bits to corresponding overarching categories.       
 
6.7 ASSIGNING CATEGORIES 
In this section, I will assign the corresponding overarching category to original data 
bits that mainly entails copying and filing, and is not simply a one-on-one process.  
For this reason, I assign more than one category to the same bits of data.  
Subsequently, I use the format to categorize data along with the sequence of 
interviews (see Table 34).  In this research, I have analyzed China’s reforms from two 
aspects: (1) a social reform from a traditional, rural, agricultural, and semi-closed 
society to a modern, urbanised, and open society, and (2) an economic reform from a 
highly centralised planned economy system to a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics, which integrates a market competition system into a 
command economic system.  I also categorized data regarding formal constraints 
according to the sequence of interviews.  These categorized data includes not only 
those constraints resulting from formal rules but also from the phenomena derived 
from those rules (see appendix 9-1).         
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In appendix 9-1, I inspect all the databits that have been assigned to the category 
“formal constraints”.  Arguably, this list is bold and has its drawbacks.  There is a 
clear risk of misunderstanding or misinterpretation; therefore, re-examining databits 
is essential.  In other words, a splitting that refines categories by subcategorizing data 
is essential.  In appendix 9-2, some formal constraints were derived from different 
hierarchies of government or the CCP; others were those inflicted by interviewees on 
each other or their peers.  Thus, I can distinguish between these formal constraints by 
differentiating between “formal constraints on HNWIs” and “formal constraints on 
ordinary people”.  I use the former to refer to any formal constraint experienced by 
HNWIs or the likes, or to formal constraints inflicted by government, HNWIs, or the 
likes upon ordinary people.  In addition, I try to reverse the process, and start with 
some ideas about the category “formal constraints”.  There may be several different 
distinctions, which occur to me in relation to this category.  Therefore, I distinguish 
them between economic and political formal constraints.  Consequently, I derive 
different levels of sub-classification from the subcategory “formal constraints” 
shown in Fig 33.  In this figure, the category “formal constraints” has been 
subcategorized into three different layers of subcategory (see appendix 10-1) 
according to the constrained object, constraining method, and the nature of the 
constraint.  
 
Except for formal constraints, ideology is another crucial category that weighs much 
in this research.  As Sunstein (1992-1993:918) argued, new formal rules begin with 
the process of a legal culture with solid judicial protection of individual rights that 
embodies the introduction of private property rights in China.  These new formal 
rules (private property rights) often create behavioural incentives (free to pursue 
private wealth) that are not in tune with prevailing informal rules (proletarian 
ideology) and will in turn increase the transaction costs of enforcing new formal 
rules.  The most important institutional arrangement for reducing the transaction 
costs of providing the services of other institutional arrangements is ideology (Lin 
1989:9).  According to this research, ideology carries more weight in the normative 
and cultural-cognitive dimension rather than in the regulative dimension of the 
  
Page 202 of 484 
institutions.  An efficient ideology must also be sufficiently adaptable to secure the 
loyalty of new groups and its counterpart in previous groups as well (North 1981).  
According to North’s perspective, propaganda is the best way to create ideological 
loyalty in people.  In other words, the stronger the ideology the participants possess, 
the higher the price they will pay for change.   
 
From North’s perception (1981:49), there are three major features of ideology: (1) 
providing the ruler with an economizing and simple means of enhancing their 
decision-making by making people accept the status quo, (2) intertwining of moral 
and ethical judgements about the perceived fairness, and (3) developing a new set of 
rationalizations that better fit with people’s experiences because of the inconsistency 
of their previous ideologies.  In China, the CCP was successful in imposing 
proletarian ideology on the people from 1949 onward.  After the economic reforms, 
the CCP exploited propaganda to justify the means of wealth distribution to change 
the perceived fairness of the previous ideology.  By this logic, the inconsistency of 
proletarian ideology incurs a new set of rationalizations defying the status quo 
because of huge differences in ideology between different social classes.  I therefore 
distinguish ideology into different levels of subcategories in light of political, 
economic, and cultural aspects (see Fig 34) and therefore derive six subcategories 
from the category “ideology” (see appendix 10-2).  Though I have not taken the 
analysis further in this chapter, the result of appendix 10-2 indicates that imposed 
ideologies outweigh the inherited ones because ruling elites can manipulate formal 
and informal institutions to change or modify inherited ideology.  
 
Next, I will scrutinize those databits relating to legitimacy, understood as social 
acceptability and credibility (Scott et al. 2000:237).  To keep hold of such social 
acceptability and credibility, organizations and bureaucrats may not always act 
independently and rationally, and may respond to hierarchical pressures by altering 
initially mandated goals in order to survive (Selznick 1949).  Legitimacy, from 
Scott’s perspective (2008:59-60), is a condition reflecting perceived consonance with 
normative supports or alignment with cultural-cognitive frameworks that is not 
solely defined by what is legal or illegal.  Therefore, a legitimate purpose will not 
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necessarily ensure resource allocation, nor will resource allocation necessarily ensure 
legitimacy.  Legitimacy in China is not only a condition but also a resource, and can 
be extracted from the institutional environment (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).  Thus, 
the CCP can tactfully manipulate legitimacy by establishing the ideological 
foundation for sustaining those three institutional pillars: regulative, normative, and 
cultural-cognitive (Scott et al. 2000:50).   
 
Nonetheless, legitimacy is the outcome of the process of legitimation, which is a 
unilateral process that only inferior individuals or organizations need to justify to 
peer or superordinate systems its right to exist and continue to import, export, and 
transform resources and power (Thompson 1967:11;Maurer 1971:361).  Therefore, 
legitimacy embodies the equilibrium between social values and the norms of 
acceptable behaviours in institutional frameworks of which an individual is a part.  
Any actual or potential disequilibrium, which is in the form of legal, economic, or 
other social sanctions, may jeopardize the legitimacy of the individual.  In Fig 33, 
legitimacy has been subcategorized into four different layers according to the 
perspective of the three institutional pillars, regulative, normative, and cultural-
cognitive.  Later, I derived five subcategories, rule (law, sanction), appropriateness, 
certifications (accreditation), prevalence, and isomorphism, from legitimacy (see 
appendix 10-3).   
 
Any legal regime, supported by the political system of authority, actually underpins 
property rights: an affiliated structure but embedded in the economic order, as the 
order cannot exist without the political system and its derivatives.  In authoritarian 
countries, however, only very few people can participate in the decision-making 
process, and these few people can impose consequent external costs on ordinary 
outsiders (populace) and retain welfare for themselves (Buchanan and Stubblebine 
1962).  By this logic, the more resources these few people gain, the more external 
costs will be imposed on the populace.  In summary, to sustain property rights, which 
are unambiguous, secure and freely alienable, and ensure that any transaction and 
choice-of-interests based on this can be protected, is a major function for any 
authority (Rapaczynski 1996).   
  
Page 204 of 484 
 
Following legitimacy, there remain certain unexamined main categories: property 
rights, resources and power, and transaction costs.  Previously, I have explained the 
reform process, reform model, and private property rights in China in Fig 30, 34, and 
35 respectively.  From these illustrations, it seems that there are abundant inter-
relationships between these categories that can be integrated as a whole.  Therefore, 
it may not be necessary to assign databits to, or subcategorize, these categories.  I 
will explore the inter-relationships between these main categories in next section.  
 
6.8 RELATIONS BETWEEN CATEGORIES 
I have elucidated China’s reforms, which mainly are the transformation from a 
planned economy to a market economy.  Within this process, private property rights, 
which can swiftly give people access to wealth, have been introduced to China that 
are deliberately implemented without clear accompanying interpretation.  This 
process essentially represents the economic reform and explains the emergence of 
HNWIs in China.  Speaking briefly, the market economic system has been distorted 
in China owing to intervention from elites that results in a power-path-dependence 
process; the problems that arise are the result of state intervention and cannot be 
resolved by any existing instrument in the market economy but have to be resolved 
by the power of the higher hierarchy.  For this reason, power, as an instrument, is 
developed to manipulate ideology and formal rules, and is exploited by a few 
individuals and interest groups in order to intervene in the market to attain their 
individual goals.  As well, power can help them to retain their legitimacy for 
justifying their means.  From my perspective, deliberately distorted property rights in 
China become a legitimized framework that underpins the predatory behaviours of 
the elites.  Thus, power and resources are eventually used interchangeably in the 
pursuit of self-maximization (see Fig 36). 
 
The mainstream of China’s economic policies focus on efficiency, trends of reform, 
interests of private companies, and marketization but they neglect fairness, justice of 
process, interests of the populace, and democratization (Zhao 2008).  Nonetheless, 
no matter how wrong the government or individuals get some of the initial 
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entitlements, e.g. property rights, people will try to correct it by appropriate private 
agreements since they are free to contract (Coase 1960).  In China, however, these 
private agreements only further destroy the already distorted market with its tight 
political constraints, and eventually it ends up in a vicious spiral whereby the power-
path-dependence market already hampers the cultivation and perfection of regular 
market mechanisms.  Ultimately, this peculiar market, in my view, becomes nothing 
but a battlefield for political power struggles instead of market competition.   
 
Yet, I have explained the roles of formal constraint, ideology, and legitimacy in 
China’s reforms and assigned interview data bits to them, which bring forth various 
subcategories (see Fig 33, 37, and 38).  I also explicated the relationships between 
these main categories, which not only complement each other but also explain 
reforms in China (see Fig 36).  As argued, property rights underpin the distribution of 
wealth that is mainly subject to legitimacy and formal constraint.  In other words, 
without legitimacy and formal constraint, property rights cannot really exist in any 
institutional environment, or specifically, legitimacy per se is necessary but not 
sufficient to underpin the private property rights framework.  Because not every 
exchange in the market is identical with legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975), 
formal constraint becomes indispensable in complementing the insufficiency of 
legitimacy.  Note that any change in formal constraint could be delayed and must 
await a specific statutory enactment; thus, ideology can take over the role of formal 
constraint and complement legitimacy.   
 
As argued, economic reforms in China are identical with the transition of property 
rights and power-path-dependence.  Furthermore, power can, to some extent, be 
regarded as the combination of legitimacy and formal constraint that is developed to 
manipulate ideology in China’s reforms.  By this logic, formal constraint, ideology, 
and legitimacy will indispensably complement each other in China’s reforms as they 
make the transformation from a planned to a market economy.  These statements 
arguably justify that assigning interview databits to those three main categories, 
formal constraint, ideology and legitimacy, is necessary and sufficient.  Next, I will 
link those assigned databits to re-capture the essence of my interviews.    
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6.9 LINKING DATABITS       
I have refined the main categories to twenty-three subcategories (see Table 35).  In the 
refining process, the original interview data have been divided up into different 
segments and some information about relationships between these different parts of 
databits was lost.  To enhance the final analysis, I therefore recapture this lost 
information by linking these databits.   
          
To recapture the lost information, I have to recognize the formal and substantive 
relationships between subcategories.  Why and how do I differentiate between formal 
relations and substantive ones?  The formal relationship (association) is concerned 
with how things can be related to each other in terms of similarity and difference, e.g. 
understanding how far things do or do not share the same characteristics.  The 
substantive relationship (link) is concerned with how things interact, e.g. 
understanding how things are connected through interactions that need not be similar, 
and vice versa (Dey 1993:153).  For example, the government inflicted formal 
economic constraints on ordinary people that are biased towards some actors, e.g. 
SOEs, HNWIs.  On the other hand, “appropriateness” is regarded as a proper 
behaviour or thought in a norm-abiding society.  Despite the formal differences 
between “inflicting formal constraint” and “appropriateness”, there may be a 
substantive relationship between them.  Lacking in appropriateness, government can 
hardly inflict formal economic constraints on ordinary people, e.g. levy strictly high 
taxes on peasants or confiscate people’s assets without proper compensation.  
Correspondingly, appropriateness can facilitate the imposition of formal economic 
constraints on ordinary people.   
 
Substantive relationships are composed of internal (necessary) and external 
(contingent) relationships (Sayer 1992:88-89).  The internal or necessary relationship 
is in the sense that one necessarily presupposes another.  The external or contingent 
relationship is in the sense that one which may exist but need not to do so.  For 
example, the formal economic constraint imposed by government that is biased 
towards to SOEs and HNWIs.  Without appropriateness, this bias cannot prevail in 
society because ordinary people will claim their rights that may conflict with this 
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economic unfairness and result in social discontent.  In this sense, the relationship 
between formal constraint and appropriateness is external (contingent).  On the other 
hand, government may presuppose those formal economic constraints inflicted upon 
people are necessary even without appropriateness.  By this logic, the relationship 
between government and those economic constraints are internal (necessary).  In the 
next chapter, I will use triangulation to analyze the literature, interview databits and 
my research arguments, and consequently justify the final analyses.    
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7. ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
This chapter contains the final analysis based on all collected databits whether they 
are from interviews, personal experience or public organizations followed by the 
justification for my research arguments.  This process depends on the databits being 
analysed (how), the subject matter of the interview (what) and the purpose of the 
interview (why).  As argued, I utilize a qualitative approach that provides me with 
direct evidence of the dynamics occurring since the analysis of data into categories 
can capture the main elements of social activities through noting and documenting 
how these categories interconnect.  The interpretation of these interviews rested on 
the clarification of the topic and purpose of the interviews – an exploration of the 
institutional changes, power dependence, the emergence of HNWIs and their inter-
relationships in China’s reforms.  Thus, the research analysis actually permeates the 
entire process of the interviews and data collection and every stage provides both 
possibilities and constraints for later stages.  Next, I will set out the relationship 
between China’s reforms and my theoretical framework, including the theory itself 
and any insufficiency, or supplementary aspects, and a new argument adapted from 
institutional change theory.  Lastly, I will use this new argument to explain these 
phenomena in China’s reforms and exemplify it. 
 
7.1 REFORM CONTEXT AND THEORIES  
In section 2.1, 6.2 and Note 33, the reform context in China is explicated from 
different perspectives, especially that of post-reform.  These explanations indicate 
that the peculiar context in China has been embodied in the process of reassigning 
public wealth into the hands of a few under the guise of economic reforms, e.g. 
corporatization, privatization, MBO, etc.  Nonetheless, this section will account for 
why economic reforms have been exploited, chronically in China and in what 
context. 
 
It seems that the “Market Economy with Chinese characteristics” performs well in 
China; however, it is because of the “Market economy” rather than the “Chinese 
characteristics” (Economist 2011).  The “Chinese characteristics”, from a legal 
perspective, suggest that laws turn out to be an instrument that is used as the state 
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sees fit (Peerenboom 2002:8;Pan 2003).  The governing institutions in China 
between 1949 and 1978 were actually based on Mao’s ideologies (Lieberthal 
2004:120-123) and remained nearly unchanged from 1978 onwards from the 
viewpoint of power, rights and responsibility.  By this logic, institutional change in 
this kind of context could be cut across largely and predictably by external political 
power. 
 
Scholars (Denzau and North 1994,2000:35) argued that ideology only carries 
primarily  the weight of normative and cultural-cognitive dimensions rather than the 
regulative dimension of the institution; however, Mao’s ideologies not only replaced 
the normal normative and cultural-cognitive framework but also distorted the 
regulative structure.  Mao’s political ideology was that the state’s capacity to develop 
the economy not only depended on the will and skills of prominent leaders, but on 
the lower organizations and social institutions (Zhen 1999:29).  He therefore 
decentralized certain administrative powers to local bureaucrats in exchange for their 
support.  Not only this has been the political guideline for nearly every political 
movement in China even after his death, it also intensified and consolidated the 
power of local bureaucrats after the reforms.  This logic explains why local 
bureaucrats can control more resources by overtly agreeing with but covertly 
opposing central policies, leading to collusion between themselves and emerging 
economic elites.   
 
Together with the pursuit of economic growth, power decentralization in China 
results in a feeble regulative environment after the economic reforms.  As argued, the 
weak implementation of the regulative dimension is due in part to the absence of 
normative and cognitive dimensions, which resulted from previous social conflicts.  
By giving little autonomy to economic elites to uphold economic growth and putting 
conservative rivals at ease (Yang 1996b), these potentates continue after 1978 to 
exert influence over regulative dimensions to maintain the CCP’s legitimacy.  This 
two-fold strategy has been extremely successful and even rival conservatives 
defected to the pro-reform faction to get more scarce resources (Shih 2009:51).  
Therefore, resources and capabilities, which are conferred on elites gradually through 
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regulative institutions, are used interchangeably and refer to the tangible and 
intangible assets that both economic and political elites apply to develop and 
implement their strategies (Ray et al. 2004).  In other words, in China, the regulative 
framework alone can effectively facilitate elites getting out of any predicament.   
 
Mao and his comrades recognized that agricultural surpluses could become the 
accumulated capital on which the impoverished state could be industrialized (Gollin 
et al. 2002).  In order to accomplish this ambition, Mao initiated the People’s 
Commune movement between 1958 and 1960 by merging peasants’ properties into 
these communes that essentially truncated peasants’ ownership rights.  Therefore, the 
state mechanism demolished the protective boundary of private ownership rights, 
and subsequently infiltrated and controlled every organization in China.  In other 
words, the CCP could have its financial resources not only from agricultural taxation 
but also from these truncated rights applied to all available resources.  In appendix 
11, I have explained that how the CCP had confiscated rural lands from the original 
landowners and allocated it to peasants through the agrarian reforms of the early 
1950s and technically took them back from these peasants.  This appendix also 
shows how triple truncation of property rights was happening in China.  First, the 
CCP invaded these property rights and gradually destroyed these main institutional 
pillars following the order of cultural cognitive-normative-regulative.  Second, the 
CCP appropriated major parts of ownership rights at will; consequently, these parts 
of ownership rights were then adapted to suit the CCP’s interpretations.  Third, the 
CCP bestowed the newly artificially devised private ownership rights on those 
obedient people, who then become HNWIs.  Ultimately, the CCP not only oversees 
but also has permanent control of ownership rights of scarce resources (Chen et al. 
2008:39-46).   
 
The children of the ruling elites (Gaogan Zidi) in China arguably initiated the 
infringements of property rights and embezzlement of public assets. However, not 
only them or their like, can exploit power but also people in the wider sections of 
society, who can make close connections with these ruling elites, can manipulate the 
incomplete property rights as well.  The causes of these phenomena in China are the 
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absence of civil society and lack of dialogue between the ruling elites and the 
ordinary people (see section 4.7).  That is, a public domain, which is regarded as a 
counterbalancing mechanism between civil society and the state, has long been 
absent in China since 1949.  However, a civil society is not adequate for reaching a 
compromise between state and civil society, but the collective actions from newly 
emerging ownership rights and their owners are strong enough to force the state and 
state agents to protect these emerging rights and owners in order to retain their own 
benefits (Mann 1984).   
 
Nevertheless in China, counterbalancing can rarely be reached through dialogue, 
negotiation, and transactions between state and ordinary people because all 
ownership rights are defined and given by state agents.  Furthermore, local party 
cadres or state agents are often out of central control because of the legacy of 
decentralization.  Nevertheless, local and central party cadres or state agents will not 
interfere in mutual operations unless there is a serious incident such as the Wukan 
protest (see section 7.4).  In this context, once ruling elites change their minds, 
private ownership rights will become different and consequently have an impact on 
all the populace, including these economic elites. 
            
The aforementioned descriptions indicate that the chronic exploitation of the right to 
interpret and implement property rights has been deeply embedded in the CCP 
whether before or after the economic reforms.  From my perspective, the worst 
exploitation was the CCP’s re-introduction of private property rights, which have 
never been intrinsic but imposed through a series of purposive governmental actions, 
without any matching institutional restraint on their exaggerated political power.  
Thus, the ultimate purpose of this change remains to control all scarce resources 
whereas they are legally owned by private individuals.  In other words, the essence 
of institutional changes in China has never wavered and remains the control of scarce 
resources by means of political intervention; however, these changes in property 
rights have serious effects upon the ideology and behaviour of state agents.   
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The CCP attempts to supervise bureaucrats and cadres at different hierarchical levels 
and cannot save any of the costs involved in regulating these collective productions 
even though they eliminated the mechanism of residual claims before the economic 
reforms.  Because the right of residual claim in China was already taken by the CCP 
before the economic reforms, the only incentive available for these regulators was 
the promotion of official positions.  Once people were promoted to the core of the 
CCP, they could access the power to coerce, which could never be shared with any 
ordinary people outside the power centre (Stigler 1971).  In other words, political 
power, a scarce resource, had been used as the incentive for those bureaucrats in 
China before the economic reforms, and it then converts into economic benefits 
while private property rights were re-introduced to China. 
 
Before the economic reforms, the state was unable to provide any tangible economic 
return to or share residual claims with these low-echelon regulators; higher 
hierarchical bureaucrats could only sit by and watch these regulators infringe the 
existing trivial benefits of peasants, collectives and the state, e.g. extra staple food.  
Thus, the state mechanism can be sustained under such erratic circumstances because 
of the non-institutionalized residual claims providing the essential incentives to 
regulators (Zhou 2004:23). Without infinite state financial resources and a 
comprehensive capacity to supervise and regulate these regulators, there is otherwise 
no alternative method for replacing the existing governing mechanism.  By this logic, 
institutional changes before the economic reforms were not too different from those 
after the economic reforms in terms of the exploitation of political power excepting 
the change of property rights.   
 
The initiation of reforms in 1978 led to several explicit changes in the regulative 
dimension of institutions; however, the normative and cognitive dimensions neither 
closely followed the pace of regulative changes nor were present in the institutional 
environment.  Therefore, social actors’ behaviours remained guided by the normative 
and cognitive dimensions of a command economy, despite the regulative institutions 
of a market economy that were initially introduced to China.  For this reason, a gap 
that results in consequent institutional holes (Burt 1995:191;Walker et al. 
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1997 ;Yang 2004) (see Fig 10) emerges between the ruling and leading dimensions of 
institution.  Apart from that, the rewards that bureaucrats have received become 
relatively tangible because the CCP explicitly adapted to private property rights after 
1978.  Therefore, the mixture of tangible returns, chronic maladies, corrupt 
bureaucrats, and the re-introduction of private ownership rights after the economic 
reforms gave rise to the emergence of HNWIs.   
 
In China, the delayed normative and cognitive dimensions of institutions, e.g. 
proletarian ideology and egalitarianism, confront these introduced regulative 
dimensions, e.g. private property rights, in a society that is politically inhibited.  
Those normative and cognitive dimensions changed slowly because of enduring 
political constraints; therefore, the progress of reforms was unlikely to be as rapid as 
they were in the FSU and CEE.  Arguably
16
, there are two major factors, the political 
constraints and the pace of privatization, that differentiate transitions in China from 
other former socialist countries, and indeed have the strongest associations with the 
economic return and other consequences in China’s reforms.  On the one hand, the 
manifest distinction is that these political elites in China remain untouched and 
continue to effectively control the re-distribution of resources and hold political 
power accompanying the expansion of the market economy.  On the other hand, the 
pace of privatization in China is not as spontaneous as for their previous socialist 
comrades that had led to considerable changes.  Therefore, the CCP remains in effect 
in complete control over China, unlike CEE and FSU.  In other words, privatization 
in China remains in effective control of nearly all unaffected communist polities after 
reforms.  
 
I have already explained that lacking in any institutional dimension, whether they are 
regulative, normative or cognitive, will arguably impede and constrain consequent 
institutional changes.  In China, many entrepreneurs, who are responsible for 
recombining institutional elements in innovative ways (Schumpeter [1934] 
                                                 
16 There are many scholars have focused on this issue since early 1990s (Lampton 1992 ;Solinger 
1993 ;Fewsmith 1994 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Qian 1996 ;Oi and Walder 1999 ;Wank 1999 ;Chen 
2002 ;Shih 2004a ;Walder 2004 ;Nee and Cao 2005 ;Yang 2005 ;Chow 2006 ;Dobbin 
2006 ;Bouckaert 2007 ;Heilmann 2008 ;Tsai 2008). 
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1983:Ch.2), emerge after the economic reforms, e.g. political entrepreneur or 
business entrepreneur.  By this logic, it is essential to understand the role of the 
entrepreneur and why one institutional change is created instead of another.  
Nonetheless, very little attention has been paid to this topic except by very few 
scholars (Di Maggio 1988:3-21;Fligstein 1997,2001b).  In this research, I assess their 
roles within a set of social relationships and institutions rather than their individual 
qualities, e.g. charisma or talent.  By understanding their roles, it is then possible for 
me (1) to grasp how social relationships, institutions, and entrepreneurial skill 
interact; (2) to shed the most light on why one institutional arrangement is made 
rather than another; and (3) to understand why some institutional changes are more 
evolutionary while others are more revolutionary (Rao et al. 2000) (see Note 37). 
 
In Note 37, it is arguably obvious that when entrepreneurs’ social, organizational and 
institutional locations influence their capacity for creative innovation, they confront 
institutional and resource constraints that shape their capability to make their 
innovation acceptable and vice versa.  In addition, it is essential for entrepreneurs to 
realize their innovative institutions by accessing scarce resources. If these 
entrepreneurs fail to access the resources, their innovative ideas will either go wrong 
or will survive institutionally, regardless of how brilliant they are(Aldrich 1999:76).  
This argument is essentially compatible with my interviews of HNWIs: it is 
unrealistic for any businessperson in China to be successful without political 
protection.  For example, interviewee 8 (9 of appendix 8) indicated that 
entrepreneurs must have sufficient social, organizational, and institutional resources 
to make their innovative ideas stick.  He mentioned that they merged several small-
medium coalmines under the guise of the 2004 Provincial Restructuring of the Coal-
Mining industry.  He also mentioned that they had similar illegal mining problems as 
the small coalminers had, e.g. a multitude of coal-pits with the same permit, beyond-
boundary exploitation.  However, all his problems had been resolved by the 
consolidation of mining industry with the collaboration of the provincial government. 
 
In China, state properties have been largely transferred to private hands under the 
disguise of the economic reforms post 1978.  Many of my interviewees were located 
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in positions whereby they could legally and technically re-distribute resources
17
 and, 
in turn, were given significant opportunities for institutional improvisation, e.g. 
corporatizing or MBO, which is different from what KKR
18
 did to Nabisco or the 
likes.  In light of my interviewees’ comments, the prevailing way of China’s MBO is 
that they first cooked the books or underestimated the net value of their companies.  
Second, lacking in knowledge of the market economy in the early reforms era, they 
gradually shifted public property to collective property, which was compatible with 
the then regulative institutional environment, under the disguise of efficiency-
improvement.  Third, entrepreneurs legally and technically had effective controls 
over collective ownership, e.g. the Employee Welfare Association, and transferred 
most shares to themselves.  In other words, entrepreneurs in China, with assistance 
from the political potentates, unscrupulously acquire public wealth under the guise of 
economic reforms.     
 
Entrepreneurs in China also confront the normative and cognitive backlash from a 
society that opposed their methods of accumulating wealth.  Thus, they repeatedly 
use the regulative institutions to make up their normative and cognitive deficiencies.  
On the one hand, they often mobilize political power to make innovative regulations 
and suppress growing public indignation; on the other hand, they feel drained by the 
blackmailing from political actors.  For this reason, entrepreneurs have to shift their 
political protection from one place to another.  Lacking in mutual trust, this 
continuous shifting also raised the cost of the political protection and reduced the 
economic rent; therefore, it became a vicious spiral of institutional change and 
resource dependence (see Fig 15).  By this logic, the institutional changes in China 
correspond to a compromised model.     
 
The preceding descriptions justify that changes in any institutional pillars will 
produce constraints inhibiting entrepreneurs’ capacity to interpret innovative 
                                                 
17
 My interviewees were the directors or managers of different SOEs before privatization.  They had 
effective control over employment, administration, finance, and manufacturing before privatization.  
They have been CCP members for many years and have very good connections with local government 
officials and party cadres, who can cover for them should the need arise. 
18
 In 1976, Kohlberg, Kravis, and Roberts established the KKR and made a takeover of a subsidiary of 
Rockwell.  KKR made the acquisition together with the management team of the acquired company to 
realize the Managers-Buy-Out (MBO). 
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institutional arrangements.  With all due respect, these economic entrepreneurs, no 
matter how brilliant they or their innovations are, will eventually wind up failing if 
they do not retain political protection in transitional China.  For example, many 
previously ranked richest people in China were arrested after 2003, i.e. Hwang 
Guang-yu (2008 ranked 2nd), Zhang Rong-kun (2005 ranked 16th), Zhou Zen-yi 
(2002 ranked 11th), Zhu Guo-ping (2008 ranked 366th), Xie Guo-sheng (2007 
ranked 348th), to name but a few.  The cases of Hwang Guang-yu and Zhou Zen-yi 
are two clear examples that resulted from political power struggles (Dittmer 2003 ;Li 
2005).  The former was arguably implicated with Chen Sau-gee, the chair of the 
CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) of Guangdong 
province.  The latter could be perceived from a political view as implicated with 
Chen Liang-yu, the Shanghai municipal party secretary who had previously been 
loyal to the Shanghai political alliance
19
 rather than the so-called Hu-Wen coalition 
(Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao).  Politics aside, as Beesley (1997:26) argued, any new 
economic institutional arrangement reflects the prevailing political environment.  In 
other words, economic reforms are not simply the result of an efficiency-driven 
economic transformation but also reflect the status quo of political power.  By this 
logic, any innovative and regulative-abiding institution in China may not stick 
because political constraints can exploit normative and cognitive parameters to over-
ride the existing institution.   
 
To conclude, the main causes instigating a trade-off between conformity to external 
institutional pressure and exercising influence over external resources in China are 
decentralization and the introduction of private property rights.  Decentralization was 
mainly used to attack major political rivals, and consequently make the power-
dependent effect intense and deteriorated.  As for the introduction of private property 
rights, it ultimately adds precious market value to existing goods and services, and 
then pushes people to pursue the alienability and exclusivity of these goods and 
services.  On the one hand, the CCP had loosened formal constraints by changing 
proletarian ideology and introducing a market economy and consequently brought 
about certain institutional changes, e.g. the maximization of personal utility, conflicts 
                                                 
19 The alleged leader of the Shanghai alliance is previous President Jiang Zemin, who was the 
Shanghai municipal party secretary before the presidency. 
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of property rights, the pursuit of better economic benefits, etc.  On the other hand, 
the CCP had to mobilize political factions among different industries, provinces and 
administrative departments to support their reforms that entailed intense power 
dependence.   
 
Because power is used to help people pursue better economic interests, regulate 
conflicts of property rights and ensure social stability, the scarcity of power soon 
becomes manifest because too many individuals and organizations vie for it.  In this 
regard, those individuals and organizations will try to utilize alternative power, 
which is cheaper and exclusively available to them.  Because China is a rule-by-
policy regime, seriously influenced by political forces, different political factions 
interpret policy at their own discretion and consequently cause a disordered market. 
Under these circumstances, vying for the legitimacy of power not only protects 
existing privileges of economic elites but also keeps them competitive in this specific 
institutional environment.  This symbiotic relationship between economic elites and 
power resources therefore constrains China’s institutional changes in a compromised 
context.  
 
7.2 JUSTIFICATION       
Different scholars often interpret the same data in diverse ways.  For example, 
optimistic scholars may interpret everything they have seen in China from a 
permanently optimistic perspective, e.g. the social disparity and special network 
(guanxi) were regarded as a matter of course during China’s transformation (Chow 
2004:67-83).  Chow considered this disparity as a “one-step ahead” or trickle-down 
whereby some people would get rich first and have to be very rich in order to 
encourage others, although he subsequently assumed this might cause discontent 
amongst the general population.  The fact is, the disparities generated by the “one-
step ahead” approach becomes wider over the years (see Fig 37) and a trickle-down 
effect has never been attained because of political disjuncture.  Chow interpreted this 
disconcerting phenomenon simply from a theoretical economy aspect.   
 
In my interviews, many interviewees fell into the same error and firmly held egoistic 
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and specious arguments that everything, e.g. justice, legality, could be traded in 
China.  Yet, this misconception has resulted in awful consequences and has become 
a prevailing ideology that is termed the Thomas theorem (William Isaac Thomas and 
Thomas 1928:572) - if men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences, even this belief is invalid in terms of veridical reading.  As Kvale 
(1996:211) argued, interpreters’ presuppositions will enter into the question with 
which they interrogate text or data and these questions co-determine what meanings 
can be found in the text or data.  Therefore, in order to interpret the interview texts 
appropriately, researchers must comprehend which approach should be posed to the 
texts in the first place.  In Table 27, I adopt Kvale’s (1996:223) readings to enhance 
my interview analyses that are experiential, veridical, symptomatic and 
consequential.  These readings drew on different contexts of interpretation in which 
the validation of the answers involved different communities, such as the 
interviewees, the public, and the research community.   
 
In my interview databits, I adopt three main categories: formal constraints, 
legitimacy and ideology, that mainly cause the trade-off between institutional 
changes and resource dependence in China’s reforms.  In other words, any context 
relating to these three categories should be interpreted.  In appendix 9 and 10, I have 
condensed and sorted interview databits according to the aforementioned three 
categories in order to facilitate my research.  As argued in section 7.3, the seesaw 
between the introduction of private property rights and the decentralization has a 
serious effect on the trend of institutional changes because the consequences of these 
two parameters represent autonomy and reciprocity respectively.  As argued 
(Ricardo 1821:144), autonomy and reciprocity are two major elements in the 
business context.  In China, local state agents have more autonomy since 
decentralization and therefore can wield decisive effects on the re-allocation of 
scarce resources after the economic reforms.  However, ordinary people are only 
allowed to use those scarce resources to maximize personal utility within existing 
political constraints after the introduction of private property rights.  Because local 
agents can unilaterally affect or change existing political constraints after 
decentralization, the pursuit of interest is not reciprocal between individuals since the 
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political constraints only implicate those individuals without protections from local 
agents.  
 
My research arguments can be justified not only from the interviews but also are 
embodied in the recent Wukan protest.  This particular incident was triggered in 
September 2011 because the local CCP secretary, who was also the mayor in Wukan 
village, embezzled billions RMB by selling farmland, which is stipulated as 
collectively-owned in the Chinese Constitution, to real estate developers without 
properly compensating the residents of the village.  Moreover, security agents 
abducted five village representatives and took them into custody in early December 
2011.  After one representatives died whilst in custody in suspicious circumstances, 
this incident quickly escalated into a local uprising. Eventually, the deputy CCP 
secretary of Guangdong mediated in the dispute between peasants and local 
government.  The Wukan outbreak arguably exemplifies China’s economic reforms 
and the ways in which the CCP interprets and implements the property rights rather 
than any independent event.   
           
7.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND TRIANGULATION 
In table 10, I have displayed my research questions and arguments that represent not 
only the essence of, but also the purpose of this research.  Next, I will apply literature, 
interview data and my argument for answering these questions, and then justify my 
theoretical concept.    
 
Question 1: Aside from the economy, what is the main feature in China’s 
institutional changes? 
The presupposition for this question is relatively straightforward that institutional 
changes in China comprise the interactions between culture, economy and politics.  
After an extensive literature review and in-depth interviews, this argument remains 
appropriate because the essence of China’s institutional changes is embodied in the 
transition from a command economy to a market economy and the transition from 
controlling rights to property rights.  By this logic, institutional changes in China 
entail political power, legitimacy, economic opportunity, scarce resources, and social 
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status that spread into the cultural, economic, and political spheres.     
 
China, CEE and FSU, from a political perspective, all derived from the legacy of 
Marxism and Leninism, and should resemble each other in terms of institutional 
changes.  However, the essence of culture and of the economy in these countries is 
different, and therefore results in dissimilar institutional changes.  In the CEE and 
FSU, it was difficult to diversify people’s foci by simply implementing pure 
economic reforms owing to the then relatively high-income level and intensive 
urbanization in these countries (see Fig 4).  However, the CCP could utilize the 
relatively low labour-costs by liberalizing the redundant work force from rural areas, 
and then could make a success of the reforms if people focused only on the economic 
activities but deliberately ignored comprehensive (cultural, economic, and political) 
restructuring (Chen 2010:59-62).  Ultimately, the institutional changes in China are 
different from those in the CEE and FSU (Szelenyi 1989 ;Rona-Tas 1994 ;Oi 
1995 ;Walder 1995a ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Kornai 2000).  In other words, 
institutional changes in China, the CEE and FSU are similar to each other if those 
changes merely operated within the economy rather than the triad of culture, 
economy and politics.    
 
In my interviews, most participants have largely expressed their concerns or 
experiences in terms of the constraints inflicted and their effects on elites, 
governments, and ordinary people.  According to their experiences, most of these 
constraints relate to the economy and politics and often have decisive impacts on 
government agents (appendix 10-1).  For example, the fifth interviewee commented 
that they could freeze their competitor’s construction permit when she wanted to 
trade the on-hand package deals (3,  case reference 5, appendix 9-1).  By this logic, I 
understand, in the same city, why some people could easily get construction permits 
but some others did not.  In fact, many of these constraints are stopgap measures and 
not legitimized through any lawful ratification processes but merely through a 
provisional policy issued by local or department state agents.  In other words, the 
legitimacy of the constraint is often obtained through reciprocity and symbiosis 
between economic and political elites.  There is another explicit example in case 
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reference 8.  The eighth interviewee unscrupulously told us how he compelled other 
small coalminers to merge under the guise of consolidation issued by government (5-
7, case reference 8, appendix 9-1).  Apart from that, the eighth interviewee and his 
business alliances persuaded state agents to issue many favourable policies, e.g. 
small coalminers consolidation, that only privileged them and attacked others’ 
existing benefits (7, case reference 8, appendix 9-5).   
 
The main features of China’s reforms were embodied in culture, the economy and 
politics whether from the literature reviews or my interviews. Therefore, focusing on 
theoretical economic perspectives alone cannot comprehensively explain the 
exploitation of institutions in terms of the pursuit of economic interest.  On the other 
hand, neither can theoretical political perspectives explain the purpose of the 
exploitation of the institution in China’s reforms.  Moreover, neglecting the cultural 
essence in China’s reforms will also lead an analysis that resembles that of other 
former communist countries.  In other words, results failing to address any of these 
three spheres will not only be prejudiced and incomprehensive but also lead 
researchers in the wrong direction.   
 
Question 2: Which factors cause institutional change in China? 
The initial suggestion is that entrepreneurs recognized institutional changes might 
threaten to hinder access to scarce resources and then precipitate favourable 
institutional changes.  Following the extensive literature review and in-depth 
interviews, this suggestion may only be an ostensible cause rather than the essential 
factor because it did not elucidate why those changes might impede the elites’ access 
to wealth.  As argued, the main factors causing institutional changes in China are 
decentralization and the introduction of private property rights; the former one is not 
only intense but also reduces the power-dependent effect, and the latter ultimately 
adds precious market value to existing goods and services, consequently making 
people pursue the alienability and exclusivity of those goods and services.  Next, I 
explain why decentralization emerged and how institutional changes have been 
affected in China.  
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The reason that Mao had to manipulate decentralization to attract loyalty from 
different political factions, e.g. provincial, industrial, rural, and PLA (People's 
Liberation Army), to compete with his political rivals and achieve his political goals 
arose from various political crises confronting his power from the late 1950s that was 
particularly embodied in Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution.  For example, 
Liu Shaoqi, the former President, the General Secretary of CCP between 1959 and 
1969, and the major political rival of Mao, was unlawfully convicted by the Red 
Guards, who were provoked to assault Mao’s political rivals during the Cultural 
Revolution, and consequently died without mention in 1969.  This miserable example 
illustrates the notorious effect of decentralization in China: no scruples and no 
limitations.  This kind of brutal clash had been eliminated to the smallest extent after 
Deng’s reinstatement in 1976 because it was diluted by the newly granted personal 
economic benefit.   
 
Presumably, decentralization has largely been exploited to pursue personal interests.  
However, decentralization is a generalization rather than a comprehensive reason.  
The reason that political actors in China stopped these brutal clashes and then shifted 
to pursue economic interests remains unidentified.  According to my research, the 
roles of these leading social actors are profoundly associated with the varying 
institutional environments in transitional China.  Because the normative and 
cognitive institutional pillars were ruined previously (see section 4.5 and 4.6), the 
institutional environment in China therefore is merely maintained by the regulative 
framework.  Unlike the Communist ruling party in CEE and FSU, the CCP remained 
intact after the reforms.  Therefore, many regulative institutions, especially those 
political regulations established in Mao’s era, remained ineffective after the 
economic reforms.  By this logic, people who have the rights to control or change 
rules can provide dependable and efficient frameworks for the economic elites in 
order to realize their economic exchanges.   
   
I have explained why decentralization arose and how it shapes institutional changes 
in China.  Now, I am going to explain why the re-introduction of private property 
rights makes China’s institutional changes distinctive.  In a market economy, state 
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authority not only allows and enforces each individual’s right to own private 
property but also respects the rule-of-law broadly by facilitating and enforcing 
private contracts, preventing deliberate coercion, and inhibiting arbitrary taxation 
(Rajan and Zingales 2004:131).  However, these essences conflicted with the 
fundamental ideologies of the CCP before the reforms, e.g. communal ownership, 
proletarian, terminating waged labour, and private property (Lagasse 2008).  The 
spirit of property rights is to give the exclusive right to an owner of an asset to use 
and excluding others from its use (Rajan and Zingales 2004:131).  In  Article thirteen 
of the Chinese Constitution, the state has to protect those law-abiding citizens 
and their legal income, savings, houses, and other private property.  In China, 
however, the fact is unlikely to correspond with this stipulation.  Apart from that, 
some scholars (North and Weingast 1989) argued that the government will not 
expropriate its citizens if the countervailing power of parliament and the judiciary is 
constitutionally enhanced.  However, this argument may not be applied to China 
because the CCP still arbitrarily expropriates the populace, e.g. demolishing urban 
dwellings and confiscating rural farmlands without legitimate reasons and fair 
reimbursement, even though they remain intact in terms of the political structure and 
dominate the state authority after the economic reforms.  In other words, the status 
quo in China opposes not only North’s arguments but also the stipulation of the 
Chinese Constitution.  Therefore, the re-introduction of private property rights in 
China embodies a pretend and ineffective institutional change and becomes a device 
for assisting elites to lawfully grab public wealth.    
 
In China, decentralization and partial reforms together give extra power to those 
incumbent state agents, who were in power before the economic reforms.  In this 
regard, people who have the right to change institutions may become an object for  
rent-seekers because institutions can legally allocate the economic benefits and steer 
the consequent institutional changes (Bromley 2006).  Because people are allowed to 
pursue the maximization of utility after re-introducing private property rights, these 
state agents can consequently swap their rights for substantial economic benefits 
leading them to collude with the emerging economic elites.  Under the circumstances, 
state agents and economic elites become reciprocal and mutually dependent in terms 
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of retaining existing favourable institutions or making the institutional changes on 
the preferred track.  By this logic, it is unlikely that the Chinese government or the 
CCP, as many scholars argued (Lee 1989 ;Folsom and Gonzalez 1999 ;Quiggin 2002) 
would only restrict itself to the roles of providing law and order, and protecting 
property rights.   
 
Examining China’s institutional changes merely from the legitimacy of property 
rights perspective cannot fully explain the collusion, embezzlement, and the 
emergence of bureaupreneur-HNWIs.  For example, Coase (1974,1984,1988) 
analysed the impact of legal right arrangements on efficiency but ignored the wealth 
distributions.  In other words, he neglected the relations between rights and wealth 
distributions and the impact of wealth distributions on resource allocations.  Coase 
(1960) wrongly assumed that there was no impact on demand and resource allocation 
while legal rights could have an effect on wealth distribution.  By focusing on the 
institutional arrangement and its impact on efficiency, he ignored the effect of 
institutional change on wealth distribution.  Likewise, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
only pay attention to the effects of property rights on the allocation of resources  but 
ignored the distribution of wealth .  Davis and North (1970) deemed the positive gain 
as the reason for institutional arrangements in their institutional changes study and 
hardly put any emphasis on the distribution of that positive gain whether the 
distribution would have effects on consequent changing institutional arrangements or 
not.  
 
There are many examples in my interviews that correspond exactly to my argument.  
For instance, the fourth interviewee told me that local state agents have too much 
power to confiscate and demolish people’s properties without fair compensation and 
legitimate reasons.  What is worse is that state agents collude with developers to 
extort dwellings from ordinary people in the disguise of economic development.  In 
China, it is almost impossible for ordinary people to win lawsuits by suing such state 
agents and developers (10-12, case reference 6, appendix 9-1).  From the seventh 
interviewee, I learned that state agents have too much power to treat people without 
Guanxi (special relationships) unfairly, even though these people are wealthy 
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businesspersons.  He told me that state agents often exploit their right to 
discriminately interpret property rights and then jeopardize those businesspersons 
without adequate Guanxi (2-4, case reference 7, appendix 9-1).  The eighth 
interviewee mentioned that he was better informed because of decentralization and 
then he exploited this information to become affluent through the newly-introduced 
private property rights, and consequently was able to restrict his rivals and expand 
his own business successfully (2-4, case reference 8, appendix 9-1).  Therefore, 
following those interviews and the literature review, I understand that even though 
the re-introduced private property rights in China are legitimate and ostensibly 
efficient, these newly introduced rights continue to function inadequately and distort 
wealth distribution because these state agents, through decentralization, have 
overwhelming powers to interpret and implement these rights arbitrarily.  
 
Question 3: What effect does path dependence have on China’s institutional changes? 
At the outset, I assumed that path dependence was particularly manifest in the 
distribution of resources and power in transitional China.  Because the choices made 
contemporaneously were embedded in the actions of yesterday’s volitional agents 
(Bromley 2006:25), the results of the reforms we have today in China were 
determined by the past.  As argued, cumulative causation (Veblen 1898b) exactly 
corresponds to path dependence (North 1990:22) that the consequences of small 
events and chance circumstances can determine solutions that, once established, lead 
one to a particular path.  Those solutions consequently come from the increasing 
return mechanisms that reinforce the direction once on a given path (North 
1990:94,112).  If causation is not cumulative, the accumulation of yesterday’s small 
events will only have very little effect on the path of today’s decisions.  Thus, path 
dependence not only plays an important role in the institutional change process but 
also affects future wealth distribution because institutions heavily impact on 
economic benefit (Bromley 2006).  Likewise, the path dependence effect in China 
manifests itself in those political institutions, which are more evolutionary than 
revolutionary.  However, the economic institutions are relatively revolutionary rather 
than evolutionary.  Therefore, although economic reforms introduce significant 
institutions to China, these reforms cannot fairly allocate economic resources to 
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ordinary people because of the political restraints.  Therefore, following extensive 
literature reviews and interviews, this argument remains adequate.  
   
Because reform is not revolution, reformists have to respect existing interest groups 
no matter what their perspectives are and where the reform will be initiated, and 
China’s institutional changes are no exception (Zhang 2003).  Institutions 
presumably provide the mechanism that will affect laws and changes of property 
rights but do not completely replace legal challenges; the effect may be to re-allocate 
social wealth in a relatively short period and result in social discontent (Demsetz 
1967 ;Coase 1988 ;North 1990).  Thus, it is understandable that there will be 
intertwining of party-state and society in the financial elite’s network with the 
legacies derived from Marxist’s historical Materialism (Pearson 1997:33).  In this 
regard, the transition from command economy to market economy is a complicated 
mixture of continuity and change (Rose-Ackerman 2004:2) because, in former 
communist countries, new institutions are often built on the legacies of the planned 
economy, and become vital factors in shaping economic transition in many different 
aspects (Guthrie 2002:25-26), e.g. property rights, governance structures, 
conceptions of control, and rule.  This explains why path dependence has serious 
effects on China’s institutional changes.         
                
Following path dependence, lock-ins often have consequent effects once a solution is 
made and become either difficult to reverse (North 1990:94) or with very high 
reversal costs (Levi 1997).  The farther along a path of developing a set of practices 
(institutions) an organization, a society, or a state is, the more difficult it becomes to 
shift to alternative paths (Hollingsworth 2006:424).  Therefore, the reciprocity of 
path dependence and lock-in makes China vulenrable to further reforms that try to 
alter the present institutional environment.  The institutional legacy in China derived 
from the practice of socialism, will decide economic benefit that together with the 
influence of the party-state results in strong inertia during transition (Chen et al. 
1992 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Bromley and Yao 2006 ;Chow 2006).  The specific 
phenomenon therefore indicates that the path dependence effect continues to 
reinforce the privileges of existing economic and political elites in China.   
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It is expensive to create new institutions or change existing ones, therefore, 
institutions tend to generate positive feedback and support from constituents and 
institutional elites, who derive increasing financial returns and other benefits from 
them (Campbell 2004:13), once created.  Therefore, strong and privileged interest 
groups and commercialized local governments will try to hamper equal distribution 
of the benefits of economic growth throughout society, thereby rendering futile the 
CCP's strategy of trading economic growth for people's consent to its absolute rule 
(Yao 2010).  Nevertheless, institutionalists, somehow, are unwilling to indicate that 
institutions are mainly maintained through the exercise of power due in part to 
theoretical reasons rather than ignorance.  In fact, interventions made by social elites 
often play a critical role in creating institutions.  Powell (1991:191) contends that 
path dependence is a process starting from the exercise of power, interdependency, 
taken-for-granted assumptions, and then becoming path-dependent.  Therefore, path 
dependence not only is a process but also relates to power, dependency, and 
normative and cognitive ideas and vice versa, while it evolves.  In other words, 
different patterns of power exercise, interdependency, and normative and cognitive 
ideas will result in dissimilar path dependence.  As a result, once path dependence is 
embedded, powerful people will be enthusiastically committed to prolonging such 
power-exercise (Stinchcombe 1968:107).           
  
Thus, I argued that path dependence, as Powell (1991) asserted, results in isomorphic 
organizations in an institutional environment where they consequently vie for 
essential resources.  Once a particular practice is deeply rooted in an organizational 
field, change in any aspect requires change in many other elements (Thompson 
1967:145). Consequently, it is costly to alter institutional rules owing to high 
switching costs and significant political, financial, and cognitive considerations 
discourage making such changes (Stinchcombe 1968).  Under the circumstances, 
most organizations in the same organizational field (institutional environment) will 
arguably be similar to each other and become isomorphic ultimately.  Because they 
are isomorphic, it is difficult for them to become relatively competent in the same 
organizational field.  Therefore, these organizations have to vie for similar essential 
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resources making them more capable in the institutional environment.  In sum, 
essential resources are shared by constituents (isomorphic organizations) in the same 
organizational field and consequently result in scarcity of resources and higher costs 
(Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer 1992 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003).  Therefore, 
organizations try to innovate with the aim of acquiring alternative resources 
(Leblebici et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003) that avoid costly scarce 
resources and therefore change the current settings of the standard (see Fig 9). 
 
Following the development of path dependence, only powerful people with prestige 
have the legitimacy to innovate and employ alternative resources that have not been 
legitimized yet (Rogers 1983:115). Thus, power-exercise will legitimize the 
alternative options and lock them into the organizational field.  These alternative 
lock-in options will become mandated in their environment and ensure 
organizational survival because powerful people will support these alternative lock-
in options (Powell 1991:190).  Consequently, these options become taken-for-
granted assumptions and ultimately reach the goals of those powerful people.  Thus, 
the power-exercise is both the starting point of a path dependence process and the 
diverging point of a new process.  
 
In my interviews, nearly all participants agreed with my argument regarding the path 
dependence effect in China.  For example, the first interviewee told me that SMEs 
(Small-Medium-Enterprises) have been performing relatively efficiently following 
the economic reforms, but that the banks continue to behave as though they were still 
in a command economy being biased towards SOEs and conglomerates in terms of 
bank loans (3-5, case reference 1, appendix 9-2).  Likewise, the second interviewee 
informed me that state authority always acts arbitrarily as they did in the command 
economy era regardless of the severe competition in the market economic system 
(13-15, case reference 2, appendix 9-5).  The third and the eighth interviewees 
enlightened me that only the CCP is capable of implementing successful reforms in 
China (15, 18, case reference 3; 10, case reference 8, appendix 9-5).  That is, 
although the defining economic institutional changes have been underway since 1978, 
these HNWIs remain brainwashed and believe that the way to implement these 
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reforms still follows the previous path of the command economy.  In fact, the effect 
of ideological path-dependence is the worst and very difficult to eradicate. 
 
Arguably, path dependence alone cannot affect China’s institutional changes but 
merely provides the momentum to prolong previous arbitrary allocations and 
distributions in different formats.  Nonetheless, to switch pace to alternative 
resources depends upon how scarce the essential resource is; how influential the 
power exercised; how deeply rooted the taken-for-granted assumption; how 
aggressively individuals or organizations vie for resources in the same institutional 
environment; how strong the constraint to restrict the employment of alternative 
resources; and how expensive the switching cost is.  In sum, the introduction of 
private property rights essentially triggers power-exercise because individuals and 
organizations are allowed to maximize their utilities legitimately.  For example, after 
the economic reforms, Chinese peasants were rewarded privately for their hard work 
in ways that used to be allocated and distributed collectively.  This statement exactly 
corresponds to the suggestion of the third research question.   
 
Question 4: Why do certain people pursue individual utility and consequently 
become HNWIs in China?  How precisely do some people become HNWIs in China 
after the economic reforms and who are they? 
After very informative interviews with the elites and a broad literature review, I 
concluded that this particular question should be amongst the most problematic 
research questions because of its intricate and multi dimensioned character.  The 
initial conception was that the CCP has created unique private property rights 
through regulative mechanisms after the initiation of reforms; however, the newly 
given rights became distorted, and were then exploited to pursue the maximization of 
personal utility because of a lack of appropriate normative and cultural-cognitive 
mechanisms.  Regarding this deviation of institutional pillars, Scott (1995:45) also 
failed to explain why it happens and to what extent.  North (1981,1990:45) argued 
that the emergence of HNWIs can be attributed to the pursuit of the maximization of 
individual utility.  However, the social actor’s rationality is limited by the ability to 
receive, store, retrieve, and process information to make knowledge or feelings 
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understood by others (Williamson 1975).  Therefore, it is not feasible for social 
actors to maximize utility without cooperating with other people in the same 
institutional environment.  According to this research, the pursuit of maximization of 
personal utility, at the outset, is the means rather than the reason many of my HNWI 
interviewees, who were former SOEs’ managers, were literally forced to take over 
the then broken SOEs or establish a new company rather than embezzle from them.  
Thus, I argue that the market economy with Chinese characteristics, decentralization, 
and re-introduction of private property rights together answer this question.  
 
In most societies, power and essential resources are scarce and consequently bring 
forth economic interest for people who hold them. However, there may not be 
sustainable competitive advantage and constant scarcity in the economy as a whole 
(Kay 1993).  Therefore, to keep scarcity constant can simultaneously retain the 
existing privileges for such powerful people.  Therefore, the CCP tries to control the 
scarcity (variable) and keep their competitive advantages sustainable along with the 
reforms.  In transitional China, scarcity plays an important role that is embodied in 
decentralization and private property rights.  In addition, scarcity not only is highly 
related to marginality but also is exemplified in corresponding rent (Ricardo 
1821:53-75).  Thus, those people who have advantages that are more competitive 
will not only gain more economic interests but also have the power to make less 
resourceful people ineffective while holding essential scarce resources.  Therefore, 
only a market economy with Chinese characteristics, which is a milieu with 
controlled socioeconomic variables, can achieve the CCP’s political goals and boost 
an ailing economy.  In question two, I have argued that decentralization and re-
introducing private property rights are the main causes of China’s institutional 
changes.  The former gives extra power to local state agents; the latter allows agents 
to legally exchange their existing control rights with those economic elites for 
substantial economic benefits.  Therefore, state agents, on the one hand, can have 
more powers to exchange substantial economic interests; on the other hand, 
economic elites can continue pursuing the maximization of personal utility under the 
circumstances of power-for-money.  These special features can only co-exist in the 
market economy with Chinese characteristics.  
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Many scholars (Shirk 1993 ;Oi and Walder 1999 ;Steinfeld 2002 ;Tsai 2008) have 
argued that former SOEs managers, who later became HNWIs, should be condemned 
for pilfering public assets in the guise of efficiency-improvement.  Following my 
interviews, I realized that his argument is arbitrary and subjective, and wrongly 
implies that these HNWIs were infringing on public assets because many HNWIs 
were literally forced to take over the then broken SOEs.  Arguably, there is a 
prevailing problem in most societies: that is, how to allocate resources and wealth 
that depend upon the rights and power held by people.  These rights and power 
allocated through different administrative regulations, contracts, ideologies, laws, 
and social norms (North 1992 ;Scott and Meyer 1994) are mainly derived from either 
position or property no matter what the decisive factor of the allocation is.   
 
The position-based rights attach to certain hierarchic positions in the social structure 
and the property-based rights attach to property (tangible or intangible).  The former 
rights indicate that people have to approach certain positions of influence in order to 
get corresponding rights; the latter rights indicate that people should possess certain 
properties before having corresponding rights.  Thus, I argued that the emergence of 
HNWIs in China intrinsically corresponds to the transition from position-based rights 
to property-based rights.  The fundamental difference between these two rights is 
that the latter rights are better defined than the former ones because property-based 
rights are often clearly defined in, and protected by, laws and social norms.  On the 
contrary, position-based rights are loosely defined and non-exclusive, and are subject 
to frequent administrative changes.  In China, people holding position-based rights 
often abuse their discretionary power to change their rights and therefore create new 
subordinate positions to support them because rent seeking often pairs with position-
based rights.    
 
The second feature of position-based rights is that people cannot sell them in the 
market to exchange economic interests voluntarily and legally; therefore, they can 
only maximize position-based rights by exploiting these rights during their tenures.  
Unlike position-based rights where people are forced to transfer to others and cannot 
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receive any appropriate economic compensation from the new holders after tenure, 
people can generate long-term revenue streams through, or voluntarily transfer, 
property-based rights to others for adequate economic returns. The third feature of 
position-based rights is their limited availability due to the setting of hierarchic 
positions attached to control rights.  Thus, people will lose their positions and those 
attached rights when others gain these positions.  Instead, when a new position is 
created, the rights attached to other positions will be diluted.  On the contrary, 
property-based rights can be created indefinitely through production and innovation; 
for example, producing a new computer will not damage other people’s property 
rights.   
 
In any society with well-protected property rights, people can possess a new property 
either through direct production or through free-will exchange; thus people can 
exchange other valuables for the desirable property.  In my view, most competition 
for property-based rights occurs through creation whereas the competition for 
position-based rights is through re-allocation.  In China, public property rights, 
which could be regarded as absentee ownership (Zhang 1999, pp.143-162) or 
everybody’s ownership (Zhou 2000:176), remain controversial and therefore give 
scope for agents to embezzle and infringe upon public assets.  In fact, they are one 
side of the same coin because everybody (public) means nobody in China.  
Nevertheless, the difference is that property rights are position-based in the state-own 
economic system but property-based in the market economic system.   
 
Except for a period of stagnation between 1989 and 1992, economic growth in China 
has been remarkable since 1978 whereas property rights have remained vaguely 
defined and not well protected.  However, it should not be regarded as evidence that 
property rights are irrelevant to economic growth because most property rights are at 
a particular end of the continuum between clear and unclear.  Nevertheless, it seems 
that those vague property rights in China are on the right track towards clearly 
established ownership.  For example, the success of rural reforms between the 1970s 
and 1980s was derived from the household contracting system rather than the ailing 
public commune system.  Consequently, private ownership was granted legal status 
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in 1988, and the Constitution was ultimately amended to give legitimacy to private 
ownership in 2004.  These economic institutional changes essentially give rise to 
economic growth and the consequent emergence of HNWIs in China.   
 
Thus, apart from the market economy with Chinese characteristics, decentralization, 
and re-introducing private property rights, the re-allocation of entrepreneurial people 
from different professions when position-based rights are transferred to property-
based rights, plays the key role in terms of the emergence of HNWIs in China.  
These talented entrepreneurs choose to work with incremental returns, whether they 
were peasants, labourers, or bureaucrats.  Nonetheless, these entrepreneurs mainly 
worked in SOEs, public organizations, or government before the economic reforms 
because these are the only places that incremental returns were available.  After the 
economic reforms, the economic environment increasingly shifted from a planned 
economy to a market economy and transferred from position-based rights to 
property-based rights although they all were devised by the CCP to fit a different 
political atmosphere; consequently, entrepreneurs from different industries have been 
allowed and motivated to pursue the maximization of personal utility. Afterwards, 
these entrepreneurs chose to engage in private business to access more wealth by 
means of those emerging property-based rights.   
  
In a market economy, people are allowed to pursue the maximization of personal 
utility without restraint because they have comprehensive property-based rights.  
However, this kind of pursuit is not available to everyone in China because market 
access remains controlled by the CCP, and the pursuit of personal interest is 
therefore not on the same level as those people in advanced market economy 
countries.  In China, only selected people within certain bureaucratic constraints can 
exercise such rights after the economic reforms.  In other words, many distinguishing 
features of property-based rights such as clear definition, free exchange and 
unlimited amounts, remain under the control of the CCP.  For example, many urban 
dwellings with well-defined property rights have been expropriated by different 
hierarchical administrations through illegitimate directorial orders with inadequate 
compensation policies.  In rural areas, peasants remain forbidden to sell their 
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farmland because of the farmland protection policy; however, the usage right of the 
same farmland could be arbitrarily expropriated by government and then be 
auctioned on the market. 
   
In China, people are not free to initiate ordinary businesses without advance 
governmental approval even those outside the state strategic industries e.g. food, 
garment, trading, etc.  Therefore, trade-offs between entrepreneurs and bureaucrats to 
enhance mutual interests may prevail in this particular market economy with Chinese 
characteristics.  
     
As indicated, the majority of my interviewees, except the first and the second ones, 
had experienced the transition of the economic system.  Apart from that, these elite 
interviewees not only were re-allocated from different professions when position-
based rights transferred to property-based rights but also have various unspecified 
guanxi with incumbent bureaucrats.  I had a sudden epiphany when interviewing 
these HNWIs that essentially epitomised my research argument: entrepreneurial 
people from different professions whilst position-based rights are transferring to 
property-based rights, can become HNWIs in a politically restrained society where 
decentralized political actors re-introduce private property rights to a former planned 
economy.  For example, the third interviewee informed me that the re-introduction of 
private property rights into China resulted from difficulties in sustaining full 
employment and from an ailing financial situation (2, appendix 3); in my view, this 
constituted one way of opening the door to maximizing personal advantage. 
 
As indicated, most entrepreneurial people have special connections with incumbent 
administrators; for example, the fifth interviewee told me that his former and 
superior colleagues and him together established his company to buy-and-sell public 
housing (1-2, appendix 5).  From the sixth interviewee, I can justify my argument 
that decentralization makes local bureaucrats powerful.  These local bureaucrats can 
always exploit their power to manipulate institutions to maximize their utility no 
matter how institutions evolve (3, 5, case reference 6, appendix 9-1).  The main 
reason that these entrepreneurial people were allowed and motivated to pursue the 
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maximization of personal utility can be found mainly in the re-introduction of private 
property rights (1, appendix 6; 1, appendix 7; 2, appendix 8).  In my last interview, 
the eighth interviewee told me that by the tight-knit relationship with incumbent 
administrators, he feels free to pursue the maximization of personal utility without 
scruple (4-8, appendix 8).  In other words, entrepreneurs can, on the one hand, 
legally pursue the maximization of personal utility in the reformed economic 
environment; one the other hand, they exploit the relationship with incumbent 
administrators to restrict their competitors’ access to the market (37, 47, 50, 55, 56, 
appendix 9-2).   
 
In sum, the study and data support the original proposition in question five that the 
liberal economic policy is a means rather than a reason for making people pursue 
individual utility.  Due to the institutional disarray in China, it is readily open to 
individuals to pursue the maximization of personal utility especially when they have 
a chance to get close to the centre of re-allocation and re-distribution of resources or 
power.  This proposition arguably is the reason behind how and why some people 
become HNWIs in China.  Nevertheless, the original argument does explain why 
some people become HNWIs after the reforms instead of others.  In conclusion, I 
have justified that entrepreneurship was released from every occupation after the 
economic reforms; however, only those talented people knowing how to seize the 
opportunity were able to utilize relationships to pursue personal interests.        
 
Question 5: Why does compromised institutional change exist in China?  How does 
it help HNWIs in China, and vice versa? 
Previously, various significant issues regarding China’s institutional changes have 
been scrutinized in this research, e.g. the effect of path dependence on China’s 
institutional changes, the reasons behind the pursuit of individual utility leading to 
some individuals becoming HNWIs after the reforms, etc.  As indicated, the purpose 
of this research is to verify if there are trade-offs between conformity to external 
institutional pressure and the exercise of influence over external resources that 
embodies the compromised institutional changes.  In other words, this trade-off or 
compromised institutional change insulated China from the chaotic transformations 
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especially those resulting from the shock-therapy reforms emerging in FSU and CEE. 
The initial argument for this question is that entrepreneurship is increasingly granted 
to ordinary people in China after the reforms.  The party cadres and political elites 
were correspondingly permitted a greater degree of entrepreneurial freedom; 
meanwhile, prominent political leaders advocated that when the nation, city, 
community, and individuals gain more economic capital, social problems would be 
accordingly resolved and people might experience higher standards of living.  Under 
the circumstances, many social problems, e.g. biased distribution of public resources, 
profit-oriented behaviour, were glossed over and getting rich became the priority in 
China.  Therefore, economic elites want to trade their obedience for more scarce 
public resources derived from biased wealth re-distribution.  This vicious spiral 
ultimately provoked the compromised institutional changes emerging in China. 
 
Following extensive literature reviews, data collection, and interviews, I detected a 
flaw in my initial argument, which did not fully explain why the compromised 
institutional changes emerged in China.  Nevertheless, through this research, I can 
now explain how the compromised institutional changes benefit HNWIs.  
Compromise is, literally, a settlement by arbitration or by mutual consent, which is 
reached by concession on both sides, or is a reciprocal abatement of extreme 
demands or rights that result in an agreement.  Therefore, a compromised 
institutional change is a settlement, which is devised by major players at the cost of 
the rest of the people, to benefit key players through various abatements of demands 
or rights. The last research question sets out to reveal the participants and the 
operation of the compromised institutional change in China.  I have justified that the 
factors causing institutional changes in China are decentralization and re-introducing 
private property rights, which were essentially derived from cultural-political and 
economic-political spheres.  This statement corresponds to another argument that the 
main features of China’s reforms were embodied in cultural, economic, and political 
spheres.  Apart from these factors, the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive 
pillars (Scott 1995:45) designed to support legitimacy have been deliberately 
damaged by powerful figures in China during the incessant social conflicts since the 
1950s.  I amended Scott’s argument and explained why the regulative pillar is the 
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only one left to uphold the institutional environment of China.  By this logic, people 
in China can hardly expect to reach appropriate economic goals through proper ways 
of pursuing personal benefits.  Thus, they necessitate a normal cultural-cognitive 
environment to provide orientation and guidance for individuals as they contend with 
the social reality in everyday life (Zucker 1977).  In other words, people in China, as 
Scott (1995:36-38) mentioned, can only acknowledge the existence of the regulative 
systems without necessarily believing that the rules are fair or justified.   
 
By Scott’s (2008:51) logic, there is instrumentality (regulative logic) but few 
appropriateness (normative logic) and orthodoxy (cultural-cognitive logic) in China 
after the economic reforms.  In the absence of appropriateness and orthodoxy, people 
cannot define their approaches appropriately in terms of maximizing individual 
interests.  Lacking in orthodoxy, people lose the orientation and guidance that can 
lead to appropriateness.  Therefore, people in China intrinsically pursue the 
instrumentality of the newly introduced private property rights (formal rules) after 
the economic reforms because of the unceasing destruction of common beliefs and 
shared logic of actions.  For this reason, the maximization of personal utility 
determines the corresponding appropriateness and orthodoxy, not the other way 
around.  Therefore, people’s only concern is that the pursuit of wealth pivots on guilt 
or innocence rather than shame or honour and certainty or confusion (Scott ibid:51), 
and to-get-rich became the overriding regulative framework in China.   
 
Under the circumstances, expedience replaced social obligation and taken-for-
granted assumptions in this transitional society (Liu et al. 2001:34,83,89;Walter and 
Howie 2001:2).  Thus, it is comprehensible that some entrepreneurial people 
endeavour to maximize individual utility if they can hedge any legal sanctions.  
Consequently, the biased regulative pillar will make the institutional environment 
deviate from the norms and become the only support of the institutional environment, 
which is without appropriateness and orthodoxy.  Once such an event prevails in 
society and people regard it as taken-for-granted or habitus, they will ignore the 
normal binding expectations and constitutive schema only if their behaviours fulfil 
the requirement of preferred regulative rules.  As scholars (Sachs and Woo 1994: 
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preface) have argued, corroboration that power is created through institutions, which 
structure human organizations and relationships in most societies, simultaneously 
create power by giving individuals control over resources and social functions.  
Because these individuals control the rights to create formal rules, they will use any 
available instrument to legitimize their behaviours in terms of maximizing personal 
interests, whether economic or political. 
 
As argued, there is no straight relationship between problem and solution in China, 
and the policy outcome may not reflect the problem that previously caused the 
decisional process in transitional China (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988:4;Saich 
2001:212).  In conclusion, any adopted policy in China can arise for any of the 
following reasons: (1) to solve new policy problems pressing upon leaders; (2) to 
keep alive the ideological vision of its proponents; (3) to rebuff challenges from 
rivals; (4) to reward its networks of loyalties; (5) from the structural dimensions of 
China’s bureaucracy (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988:3).  According to the policy 
paradigm (Hall 1992:90-113,1993), not only have these instruments and settings 
frequently changed, but also the goal of reforms has been unpredictable and 
inconsistent since 1978 (Woo 1999) (see table 5).  In sum, lacking in the normative 
and cultural-cognitive pillars and thus distorting the institutional environment, these 
ideas and behaviours of people, the conflicts between the essence of the market 
economy and the basic ideologies of the CCP, formal rules in China are very likely 
to be devised to satisfy these social elites in their pursuit of maximization of personal 
utility.  The preceding statements not only explain why compromised institutional 
changes inevitably arise and persist in transitional China as distilled from the essence 
of my literature review, but also answer this specific research question.  Next, I will 
examine the interview data to verify my argument.   
 
In this research, I constantly argue that missing normative and cognitive pillars 
distorted China’s institutional environment; this is ubiquitously embodied in my 
interviews.  In the first interview, for example, the interviewee said that state banks 
fecklessly follow the superannuated regulations without confronting the status quo: 
expanding SMEs (5, appendix 5).  Likewise, the second interviewee informed me 
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that different hierarchical administrations set up a series of strict regulations, which 
fail to protect SMEs against illegal business activities, e.g. counterfeiting (4-5, 
appendix 2).  There are similar criticisms from other interviewees.  For example, the 
third interviewee told me that he had to deal with bureaucrats in different hierarchies 
to restructure the then ailing SOEs (7-8, appendix 3).  The fourth interviewee 
informed me that inefficient SOEs essentially resulted from poor efficiency of the 
bureaucracy and not the corporate structure (5, appendix 4).  The fifth interviewee 
deemed that speculation in public resources with the assistance of state agents should 
not be blamed because he regarded these phenomena as the essence of the market 
economy (8-9, appendix 5).  All these examples together essentially justify my 
argument that people in China only acknowledge the existence of regulative systems 
without necessarily believing that the rules are fair or justified, and therefore the 
maximization of personal utility determines the corresponding appropriateness and 
orthodoxy, not the other way around.  Ultimately, people in China are only 
concerned that the pursuit of wealth is associated with guilt or innocence rather than 
shame or honour and certainty or confusion.   
       
Without normative and cognitive pillars, the implementation of fiats issued by 
hierarchical administrations in China, become different from one place to another.  
For example, the second interviewee informed me that the investigation of 
counterfeit products has been strictly regulated by central government but the 
implementation of this investigation is deliberately ignored especially in Southern 
provinces and in the inner-lands (4, appendix 2).  In China, state agents in different 
areas often behave as though they are in different states (institutional environment).  
In other words, different bureaucrats in China (the same institutional environment) 
have different interpretations of formal rules, and then implement them differently 
because of decentralization. Within my interviews, I recognized that many HNWIs 
pursued their personal interests irrespective of honesty, morality, appropriateness, 
and orthodoxy.  As for the conflict between the market economy and communist 
ideology, it explicitly manifests itself particularly in those re-allocations of wealth.  
For example, although the market economy has been re-introduced into China after 
the reforms, many bureaucrats continue to use the out-dated thoughts derived from 
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the command economy era to allocate scarce economic resources, e.g. bank loans or 
permission to initiate business. 
 
In most societies, economic growth is highly related to income distribution (Kuznets 
1955).  Because an economic system often determines the way that social actors 
obtain income and wealth, any economic institutional change will inevitably affect 
the distribution of income and wealth.  In a market economy, both resource 
allocation and income distribution are often decided by the demands of market.  In 
transitional China, however, the government continually allocates these scarce public 
resources although the market dominates income distribution.  By this logic, income 
distribution will be highly distorted because of biased resource allocation.  
Consequently, the mixture of the previous two mechanisms makes wealth allocation 
biased towards those people who control resource distribution.  This statement 
explains why economic elites, in collusion with legitimate state agents, can impose 
formal constraints on other people, e.g. business competitors, ordinary people, or 
other state agents, and help themselves to achieve or retain their privileges.   
 
Under the circumstances, economic interest becomes the ultimate purpose for both 
economic and political elites in terms of institutional change. Meanwhile, economic 
elites offer tangible incentives to political elites, who will subsequently provide 
dependable and efficient frameworks to let economic elites access their economic 
interests.  In other words, neither an economic nor a political elite will and can create 
or change institutions independently without introducing external resources whether 
economic or political.  For example, in the fifth interview, the interviewee told me 
that many previous public servants started up their own businesses because of 
asymmetric information obtained from their incumbent colleagues or superiors (1-2, 
appendix 5).   She also mentioned that people could only become rich with prior 
acquaintance and monetary transaction, which should be regarded as friendship.  
This kind of monetary transaction is necessary because nobody will risk their lives to 
help friends without any tangible return (3-4, appendix 5).  In the sixth interview, the 
interviewee informed me that HNWIs share the benefits from the imperfect features 
and loopholes of transitions made by government agents (2, appendix 6).  She also 
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advised me that even those highly educated state agents continue in the footsteps of 
their predecessors but with more sophisticated scheme (3, appendix 6).            
 
Following my interviews, I have perceived many examples of even these economic 
elites being restrained from pursuing their personal economic interests.  In other 
words, these elites hardly can infinitely manipulate institutions but have to count on 
external resources to continue their exploitation in order to restrain their rivals, and 
so retain their existing privileges.  Thus, the interviews with these HNWIs confirm 
my research argument that elites can only exploit institutions to overcome all 
obstacles and force others to do what they want in order to achieve their economic 
purposes, with the assistance of external resources.   
 
7.3 SUMMARY 
I have by now studied most significant elements of China’s institutional changes, e.g. 
the cause, the path dependence effect, the reasons behind the pursuit of individual 
utility, the emergence of HNWIs, and the compromised institutional environment.  
The précis is that any innovative and regulative-abiding institution in transitional 
China is often not adhered to because political constraints exploit normative and 
cognitive parameters to rebuff those non-beneficial institutions whether they are law-
abiding or not.  By this logic, entrepreneurs in China can exploit their economic 
possessions for political influence and protections with existing figures in power, 
who once had claimed to bring up more wealth for society as a whole at the outset of 
institutional changes.  Without relying on coercion, as Olson (1971:33-34) argued, 
these entrepreneurs are a small group but are relatively more effective than the 
majority because these entrepreneurs have a more substantial portion of collective 
goods than those in the large group.  Olson’s statement and my argument are 
corresponded with each other that small interest groups (elites) in transitional China 
need no coerciveness and spontaneously sustain the survival of the ruling regime 
because their collective benefits cause a symbiotic relation between the political 
(ruling) elites and economic elites (HNWIs), which then result in the compromised 
institutional environment.  
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The intricate resource (power) dependence process arises in China amid the 
emergence of the compromised institutional environment.  Because of the scarcity of 
economic and political resources, those economic and political entrepreneurs either 
vie for those scarce resources or bring up new alternative resources to replace the 
existing expensive and scarce ones (see Fig 9).  Therefore, the process of seeking 
alternative new resources indicates that political power and economic wealth, which 
are scarce resources, are inter-dependent, and then form compromised institutional 
changes in transitional China that remain tightly controlled by the CCP to fit the 
political atmosphere while China’s economic environment has been increasingly 
changed from a command economy to a market economy.  By this logic, the 
transition from position-based rights to property-based rights remains incomplete and 
biased towards those people who can dominate the trend of formal regulations.  In 
the mean time, entrepreneurs from different industries have been allowed and 
motivated to pursue the maximization of personal utility.  Together with the re-
introduced private property rights, the economic elites can straightforwardly access 
more wealth with the assistance of those people who dominate the formal regulations 
in the compromised institutional environment.  This rationale explains the 
complicated institutional change process and the emergence of HNWIs in China.   
 
To strengthen my research argument, I use China’s housing market as a substantial 
exemplification to illustrate that institutional changes in China follow a compromised 
model.  In China, according to Forbes China, more than sixty per cent HNWIs have 
been involved in real estate industry whether directly or indirectly.  China’s housing 
industry, operating as many other monopolised industries (e.g. coalmining, 
wholesale), not only draws the most resources from different hierarchical 
governments and the populace but also has the most altered regulations applied to it 
(see Table 23, 42).  By this logic, this industry could perfectly embody the 
compromised institutional changes in China (Nee and Cao 2005 ;Bromley and Yao 
2006 ;Tsai 2006b).   
 
Within this industry, those frequently changed housing policies epitomise the 
heightened confrontation between different interest groups.  As noted, alienability 
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and exclusivity not only have been embodied in the market value and privileges of 
ownership respectively but also are two sides of property rights that are indispensable 
while people try to implement private property rights comprehensively.  Additionally, 
I have examined other associated property rights, e.g. mortgages, leases, and pawns, 
deriving from alienability, which is based upon the foundation of exclusivity.  
Consequently, I perceive that alienability and exclusivity could not comprehensively 
exist in China because of the conflicts between private ownership in a market 
economy and the allocation of scarce resources in a planned economy.  By this logic, 
people in China pursue by all means at their disposal, these scarce resources, e.g. 
house, money while property rights have been introduced and market value was 
added to those scarce resources.   
 
In China, every single housing policy was tightly controlled by the CCP before the 
economic reforms that indicated no alienability and exclusivity in the administrative 
housing allocation (Chan 1999 ;Ding 2003 ;Buckley and Kalarickal 2005).  On the 
contrary, the previous allocation system was dashed after the economic reforms 
because of the new economic goal: namely, the introduction of market mechanisms 
into effectual resource allocations to rectify government failures in housing allocation 
and to reduce the negative consequences of the land tenure system.  In general, 
housing reform, like other reforms in China, has been commenced unexpectedly 
because of time limits.  Additionally, there are many inconsistent measures inflicting 
massive damage on people that reflect the lack of purpose, guidelines, and on-going 
authoritative government in China’s housing reforms.  These inconsistent and lagging 
institutions of housing reform indicate that institutional change is difficult and costly 
and their emergence is constrained on the supply side (Balcerowicz 1994:163).  In 
other words, these constraints may greatly inhibit institutional innovation and the 
people in power have access to extraordinary opportunities, and can use the 
instrumentalities of governance to dominate the allocation of resources.     
 
As with other economic elites, most developers in China’s housing industry have the 
privilege of ignoring administrative measures issued by central government to 
restrain the housing market.  This deliberate ignorance actually results from political 
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decentralization and being protective of the benefits for themselves and their 
associated HNWIs. China’s housing reform essentially corresponds to the equilibrium 
of (1) the voluntary changes by a group of individuals in response to profitable 
opportunities arising from institutional disequilibria, and (2) the imposed changes 
introduced by government.  Politically, the CCP will not allow any beneficial and 
indispensable institution to persist if it jeopardizes the legitimacy and sustainability of 
the state-party polity.  Economically, the CCP hardly can impose any beneficial 
institution comprehensively without taking into account political considerations.  In 
this regard, the process of housing reform and other institutional changes in China 
could only be commenced within the political constraints.  Therefore, the institutional 
equilibrium, including the parameters and constituents of the institutional 
environment, will vary from one political situation to another.  This phenomenon 
justifies my main research argument that resource dependence is deeply embedded in, 
and plays the vital role in effecting the compromised institutional changes in China.   
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
It seems of paramount importance that the rise of China and her HNWIs and those 
conspicuous public and private external investments following the 2008 sub-prime 
credit crunch and the subsequent controversial sovereign debt crisis.  However, the 
end does not, and should not, justify the means (Dickerson 2001); likewise, people 
should not use China’s present-day economic performance to justify their ways of 
reaching it.  By reading this research, people should comprehend that the resource 
allocation mechanism in China has long been dominated by CCP, which is the only 
authority to establish and implement all formal rules.  To make laws for building a 
market economy has never been the only goal of the CCP (Hu 2012b:92) and there is 
no separation of powers and the legal system, which is directly subject to CCP power 
(Garrick 2012a:6).  By this logic, the essentials, which determine the rise of China 
and associated HNWIs, are that power elites not only make the rules of the game to 
assure their access to wealth but also to choose the arbitrator to justify their means 
(Stiglitz 2012:85).  Therefore, HNWIs in China only need to abide by the CCP’s 
instructions and undertake the responsibility for boosting the state economy, which is 
used to uphold the legitimacy of the CCP; these HNWIs therefore can retain existing 
privileges under the peculiar institutional environment.   
 
This research not only has thoroughly analyzed the transitions of role and power of 
those leading social actors and the associated institutional environment but also has 
explained the rise of China’s HNWIs and the emergence of the compromised 
institutional environment.  This specific process in China is complex, stop-and-go, 
and inheriting the legacy of proletarian ideologies, which are particularly embodied 
in the political domain.  By this logic, politics becomes the ultimate guideline for 
regulating nearly every operation in the cultural and economic spheres.  Nonetheless, 
those political leaders in China may provisionally tolerate the split interpretation and 
implementation of any activity if this tolerance eventually eases social discontent, 
toppling political rivals and maintaining the dominance of the CCP.  From this 
research, people can perceive this prevailing phenomenon permeating the ongoing 
economic reforms.  However, uncertainty arises because of previous processes 
whereby people were quick to consolidate personal interests as soon as possible 
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while their legitimate statuses remained  unjeopardized, and the plunder of wealth, 
results in many unwanted social discontents that endanger the sustainability of the 
regime.   
 
According to this research, people can learn that the institutional change process in 
China is embodied in the swing between the provisional disequilibrium and 
equilibrium of the stability and persistence of institutions that are ultimately used to 
sustain the legitimacy of CCP.  Additionally, this research has provided insightful 
perspectives that help people to analyze whether the swing will escalate to an 




By conducting this study, I have achieved my research purpose: to explain how the 
transition between these roles is played out during institutional changes and to 
explore the relations between the leading social actors and their institutional 
environment in China.  Furthermore, I have explored several unique and insightful 
findings and significant results.  Firstly, not every ordinary Chinese person can 
become a HNWI even if he or she obtains the opportunity and resource because 
HNWIs possess unique characteristics whether they are in a bureaucracy or business.  
That is, not only do they have good relations with political elites but also they are 
innovative and dare to take risks at any opportunity.  Secondly, not every 
institutional environment will spontaneously become a compromised one in any 
restrained institutional environment.  The key factor is the timing of the re-
introduction of private property rights accompanying economic reforms because 
market values were added to major existing resources that had become relatively 
expensive since the reforms.  Therefore, the higher the monetary value of the 
resource is, the stronger the pursuit of personal utility will be.  Certainly, the way to 
pursue personal utility is highly related to the formal rules of the game and the 
informal constraints as well.  Arguably, those existing interest groups will inevitably 
trade their obedience in exchange for the opportunity to acquire more wealth and the 
protection of their existing privileges in the restrained institutional environment.   
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Thirdly, to facilitate my research, I have synthesized the resource dependence theory 
and the institutional change theory, as it was difficult to explain the phenomena of 
mutually dependent/restrained and parasitized symbiosis in China’s institutional 
environment.  For example, North (1981) has asserted that institutions constrains 
individual behaviours in the pursuit of wealth and the maximization of individual 
utility but that may not explain China’s institutional changes adequately because 
many pursuits of wealth in China are not effectively constrained by institutions; 
essentially economic endeavour amounts to no more than enhancing the CCP’s 
control over people. Therefore, it is inadequate for elucidating China’s institutional 
changes merely from an institutional change perspective.  Moreover, institutional 
changes do not occur spontaneously in response to profitable opportunities as 
suggested by Lin’s (1988) argument.  Therefore, evolutionary theoretical 
frameworks (Hayek 1988) and economic purpose (Lin 1989) are hardly adequate for 
elucidating institutional changes in China.  Additionally, the theory of economic man, 
who will be rational in the course of being economic, also cannot fully explain 
China’s reforms because people display bounded rationality that constrains people’s 
ability to adapt themselves optimally to complex environments (Williamson 1975).  
By this logic, I could only efficiently justify my research proposition after integrating 
the resource dependence theory because the institutional change theory alone can 
explain neither China’s transition nor my research.   
  
In this research, I have indicated that China’s institutional changes became energised 
after Mao’s death in 1976, because the CCP regime lacked legitimacy; therefore, the 
ruling elites had to seek alternative performance-based legitimacy by improving the 
living standards of Chinese citizens living under a then broken economy.  Therefore, 
many previously existing resources became relatively expensive following the 
injection of market values and the market economy.  However, because of the 
restrained institutional environment, the legitimate status of HNWIs is actually 
determined by the central or local ruling elites rather than by impersonal, unpartisan 
and universal formal rules.  Therefore, China’s HNWIs have to maximize economic 
benefits as soon as they can when their legitimacy is not yet jeopardized.  In other 
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words, HNWIs may not know what rule they should follow but are on intimate terms 
with powerful bureaucrats in order to retain their existing privileges and pursue the 
maximization of utility.  For those rational choice institutionalists, they deem 
individual action motivated by maximization of personal utility (Rutherford 
1994:Ch.3;Langlois 2001).  However, when any uncertainty besets these social 
actors, they may not have time to collect sufficient information and make clear sense 
of their goals.  Therefore, they may not be rational in the pursuit of wealth and 
maximization of individual utility (North 1981,1990:45) in line with taken-for-
granted cognitive structures.  Thus, the normative and cognitive scripts not only 
constrain actors’ behaviours but also effectively enable their actions by providing 
actors with guidance (Clemens and Cook 1999).  Through these normative and 
cognitive scripts, actors interpret their institutional environment (Scott 1995:Ch.2).  
Nonetheless, neither rational institutionalists nor Scott explained how these social 
actors would behave in situations when any uncertainty comes to them and any of the 
three institutional pillars, normative, regulative, and cultural-cognitive, fail to 
function effectively.  As has been argued, the normative and cognitive pillars have 
been malfunctioning since the notorious Cultural Revolution and the regulative pillar 
is tightly under the control of the CCP.  Therefore, these social actors only need meet 
the criteria of regulative pillar, which is firmly under the ruling elites’ control, in 
order to pursue the maximization of personal utility. 
 
In my opinion, international change theory may only explain why people try to 
pursue the maximization of personal utility but fails to account for why some people 
become better off than others are.  This research also sets out to unpack the catalyst 
that makes some people better off.  As Tolbert (1985) argued, a stable flow of scarce 
resources from external sources determines the survival of the individual.  Thus, 
these external resources may resolve this problem.  Because of the inconsistent and 
lagging institutional changes, the piecemeal reforms, and the strong momentum from 
the re-introduced market economy, there are massive opportunities (institutional 
loop-holes) resulting from the discordance between them (reforms, institutional 
changes, and external momentum).  In this regard, those people who know how to 
exploit these opportunities to achieve their goals will become better off than others.  
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These massive opportunities are the main reason that some people are better off than 
others; on the other hand, they are the result of the interactions between 
decentralization, the re-introduction of private property rights and the market 
economy with Chinese characteristics.  In this regard, these opportunities 
(institutional loopholes) are the external resources for those people who then become 
economic elites.  Nonetheless, this resource will shortly become exhausted because 
resources are finite and widespread requests in specific institutional environments by 
these constituents, consequently make the resource more scarce and costly (Leblebici 
et al. 1991 ;Pfeffer 1992 ;Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003).  In the circumstances, 
people will vie for this scarce and expensive resource or look for alternative ones in 
order to survive (see Fig 9).  The replacement of previous resources with alternative 
ones provokes conflict and results in competition.  In this competition process, 
institutional change will become unpredictable and involves not only those resources 
but also those people who try to use them.  Because there are few institutions that are 
universally beneficial, powerful social actors will try to retain their preferred 
institutions or make institutional changes to the preferred path to benefit them in the 
preceding process of competition.  This analysis not only explains why those 
measures, regulations and policies have been changed frequently but also clarifies 
why there are certain unexpected replacements of officials in influential positions 
during China’s housing reforms.            
 
In time, those economic elites may have sufficient robust economic strength to 
influence and attract the political elites; consequently, political elites will 
prejudicially or wrongly translate any stipulated regulation in favour of these 
economic elites in order to assist them in acquiring massive wealth easily and 
inexpensively.  Consequently, the interaction between economic and political elites 
becomes unilateral, mutually restrained, and parasitically symbiotic that results in the 
compromised institutional environment and the rise of HNWIs in China.  For the 
time being, this research not only explains what causes people to pursue the 
maximization of personal utility but also accounts for why certain people can 
become better off than others can after the initiation of China’s economic reforms.     
    
  
Page 250 of 484 
In retrospect, the performance-based strategy was successful at the beginning of 
economic reforms but there are signs that it may not persist because of growing 
income inequality and the internal and external imbalances it has created.  The 
reason behind the inequality and discontent in China is the restrained institutional 
environment that was derived from the former proletarian ideology and other 
informal rules.  Consequently, misinterpretation and erroneous implementation result 
in multiple forms of state ownership together with murky and entangled property 
rights that made it impossible to trade and extract value from any public goods.  
Therefore, it is difficult to define who owns what in the institutional environment.  
Because the state is fully under the CCP’s control with its judicial discretion, people 
who have created tight relations with the political elites will take shortcuts to 
accessing massive wealth and become HNWIs.  Therefore, the compromised 
institutional changes and the rise of HNWIs will only be triggered in the CCP 
dominated environment while the CCP tries to re-introduce the market economy to 
China (see Fig 41).   
 
As argued previously, the main theoretical contribution of this research is to integrate 
resource dependence theory into institutional change theory in a way that not only 
explains China’s institutional changes but also displays how resource dependence 
can affect institutional change in the institutional change process.  This synthesis is 
the original contribution of my research and distinguishes it from conventional 
institutional change theory or resource dependence theory.  Institutional change 
theory alone cannot explain the means of pursuing the maximization of personal 
utility.  In other words, institutional change theory may give an account of why 
people pursue the maximization of personal utility but cannot explain how they exert 
external resources to affect institutional changes in order to maintain their dominant 
positions and existing privileges.  In Fig 41, I have illustrated that the interactions 
between economic and political elites enable people to access wealth easily.  For 
example, North (1990:6,33) mentioned that institutions are humanly devised rules of 
the game, that constrain and shape human interactions, and reduce uncertainty by 
providing dependable and efficient frameworks for economic exchange.  He vaguely 
but actually described resource dependence in his argument, e.g. humanly-devised 
  
Page 251 of 484 
indications that an institution is artificially imposed on people rather than 
spontaneously generated; the concept of constrain-and-shape indicates that 
institutions enforce people to do whatever institution’s purpose is; that of reduce-
uncertainty indicates that institutions will manage to overcome all obstacles; the 
dependable-and-efficient framework indicates that institutions will be legitimized to 
carry out the stipulated function; economic-exchange indicates that institutions will 
help people to access their economic interests.  In my opinion, the implication of 
North’s argument is that an institution is used to overcome all obstacles for powerful 
people, who can create or change institutions, and force others to do what they want 
in order to achieve their economic purposes.  The statement “who can create or 
change institutions, to force others to do what they want” explicitly indicates that 
people can exert their influence to reach their goals.  This argument essentially 
explains the main theoretical contribution of this research that the synthesis of 
institutional change and resource dependence theories can comprehensively explain 
China’s economic reforms.       
 
After employing the triangulation method in order to have an in-depth cross-
reference of interviews, collected secondary data and literature in section 7.4.1, I 
consequently assert that my research results effectively answer the research questions 
displayed in table 10.  These research questions can be characterized into three major 
categories, formal constraint, ideology and legitimacy that have been explained in 
chapter six.  Because institutions are humanly devised rules of the game to serve 
those people who are able to create or change institutions (North 1990:6,33) and to 
channel and regulate conflicts in order to ensure social stability but not necessarily 
enhance social efficiency (Campbell 2004:1), institutional changes actually involve 
various factors instead of the economy alone. However, institutional changes in 
China mainly focus on economic activities or are economic-interest-oriented.  In 
another words, the institutional changes embody the consequence of the interactions 
between culture, economy and politics although these changes are mainly manifested 
in an economic form.  As Kuznets (1955) argued economic growth is related to 
income distribution, which is the way social actors get their incomes and wealth.  
This account corresponds to my argument that China’s economic elites, in some way, 
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directly or indirectly sustain the economic growth, which upholds the legitimacy of 
the CCP.  However, the mechanism of resource allocation in China seriously affects 
income distribution because it is tightly controlled by the CCP instead of being 
determined by the market.  Thus, I can link those three main categories with 
preceding arguments coherently and get an incisive conclusion displayed as follows.  
From 1949 onwards, formal constraints began to permeate the society; however, the 
manifestation of these constraints varied from time to time.  For example, most of 
China’s people were equally poor and lived in a society with relatively low standards 
of living before the economic reforms; therefore, the formal constraints were mainly 
embodied in the political sphere, e.g. the loyalty to the proletarian dictatorship and 
the leadership of CCP.  After the economic reforms, the CCP has gradually 
introduced the market economy with Chinese characteristics that endowed selected 
people with privileges that helped them to access massive wealth and consequently 
improve the economy of the state.  At this stage, these formal constraints are 
embodied in economic, political and social spheres, e.g. the control of major resource 
allocations, the permission for major commercial activities, and the loyalty to the 
leadership of the CCP.  This entire process is that the legitimacy of the CCP endows 
them with formal constraints, which in turn enhance the legitimacy of the CCP.  
 
In previous sections, I have used the term legitimacy frequently; therefore, I have to 
define it appropriately.  Legitimacy, as some scholars (Johnson and Solomons 1984) 
argued, implies acceptability in the face of uncertainty, and that, in turn, implies 
institutional durability.  Schuman (1995) also argued that legitimacy is a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.  Therefore, people accept the legitimacy, which is a generalized 
perception assumption, when they encounter uncertainty in a specific institutional 
environment.  In China, the nature of legitimacy, however, varies from time to time 
across the spectrum of the restoration of national dignity, persisting with the 
proletarian ideology, the pursuit of prosperity, and maintaining social harmony in 
1949-1956, 1956-1976, 1978-2003, and 2003-up-to-now respectively.  For example, 
overtaking the UK and USA was the main purpose in the first period while the nature 
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of legitimacy was restoring national dignity; therefore, any way of completing major 
infrastructures and improvements in industrial output became the most essential 
institution.  In this regard, the movements of Backyard Furnaces, People’s 
Communes, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution are no longer 
astounding.  These phenomena, as some scholars (Buchanan and Tullock 
1962 ;Tullock 1967) argued, indicate that the legitimacy of a specific institutional 
arrangement cannot be meaningfully assessed without considering the propriety of 
the function it is intended to perform on behalf of the affected parties, and its ability 
to perform that function, given the environmental and other constraints under which 
it must operate. 
 
As Max Weber ([1947] 1964) argued that there are three general grounds on which 
authority can be based.  The first is the charismatic authority, which relies on the 
willingness of the constituency to follow a given individual.  The second is the 
traditional authority, which relies on the willingness of the constituency to follow a 
pre-established institutional structure or social order because it has been followed by 
previous generations.  The third is the national-legal authority, which relies on the 
willingness of the constituency to accept a particular institutional structure because 
of the logical secular advantages it offers.  In this regard, legitimacy in China was 
initially based on Mao’s charismatic authority after the establishment of the state in 
1949, and consequently became traditional authority based and then was national-
legal authority based.  After the death of Mao, the charismatic authority soon began 
to disappear.  The successors then needed to earn their own legitimacy; therefore, 
improving economic efficiency was the remedy not only to diversify people’s foci 
but also to overpower political rivals.  In my opinion, Deng Xiaoping successfully 
synthesized those three authorities (charismatic, traditional, and national-legal), to 
become a new one that not only varies from one institutional environment to another 
but also is tightly manipulated by the ruling elites.  In other words, the nature of the 
CCP’s legitimacy has not only been influenced by its pervasive controls and varied 
from time to time but also can sustain the CCP’s regime while it is necessary.   
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In China, legitimacy is unlike some scholars’ (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975: 122; 
Parsons, 1960: 175) argument in that there is no congruence between the social 
values associated with or implied by organizational activities and the norms of 
acceptable behaviour in the larger social system.  Rather, it is as Maurer (1971: 361) 
argued, a hierarchical, explicitly evaluative cast, asserting that legitimation is the 
process whereby an organization justifies to a peer or superordinate system its right 
to exist. 
 
Nevertheless, legitimacy requires acceptance of a particular institutional structure by 
all, or at least an adequate portion, of its constituency because of the logical secular 
advantages it offers (Suchman 1995).  In the circumstances, the CCP can 
successfully impose the ideology and constraint of one-party dominance on China’s 
people who consequently give their absolute loyalty to the CCP.  The rise of 
institutional change occurs because people try to have better-than-expected lives and 
consequently change current institutions.  In China, only certain people who were 
endowed with privileges that can access massive wealth because of the unjust social 
wealth re-allocation and re-distribution.  To be exact, these people have to rely on 
political power, which is an external resource to them, to retain their current 
privileges.  Therefore, these political elites have to rely on economic power, which is 
an external resource to them, to retain their political legitimacy; this strengthens the 
one-party dominance and indirectly endows these economic elites with privileges.  
The vicious cycle, which corresponds to my research findings, can adequately 
account for my research questions.                   
                  
The substantial significance of my research is that it not only explains the cause and 
the reason for China’s economic reforms and the rise of HNWIs but also clearly 
indicates that resource dependence plays an important role in effecting institutional 
changes.  Except for these theoretical arguments, I have employed the elite 
interviews and China’s housing market as the exemplification justifying my research 
arguments.  On the one hand, the elite interviews not only complement the 
insufficiency of secondary data but also verify the existence of the compromised 
institutional environment.  On the other hand, the housing market exemplification 
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symbolizes the interactions between institutional changes and power dependence in 
the CCP dominated environment that every interest group always needs to rely on to 
retain the status quo, or influence new institutional arrangements in its favour. On the 
contrary, there are people in the same institutional environment who possess 
relatively fewer benefits but also try to change existing institutions in order to pursue 
their expected better lives.  Consequently, the stability and persistence of existing 
institutional environment may incline towards provisional disequilibrium.  
 
As indicated previously, the essential resource cannot be sustainable in any 
institutional environment because this stable flow of resources may soon be 
exhausted because it is finite, and subject to widespread requests and thereby 
increases in cost. To reduce the dependence on these increasingly scarce and 
expensive resources, individuals or organizations will search for alternative resources, 
which will have similar effects on their survival.  Only certain individuals or 
organizations, which have the legitimacy to differ, and create legitimacy for those 
who follow, are able to develop and disseminate technical rationales for their 
innovations.  The replacement process essentially explains the interaction between 
resource dependence and institutional change.  Within such interaction, the members 
of small groups will be more effective and enthusiastic than those in the large groups 
because members in small group will have a more substantial portion of collective 
goods than in a large group without relying on coercion.  This phenomenon justifies 
my argument that small interest groups (HNWIs) in transitional China require no 
coercion but spontaneously sustain the survival of ruling regime because of their 
private benefits.   
     
Thus far, I have explained the significance and contribution that my research has 
made.  Although I have asserted that resource dependence is embedded in the 
institutional process, the way of relying on resources varies from one place to 
another.  For example, I have interviewed different people among many industries, 
e.g. housing industry, coal-mining industry, consumer electronic industry, and food 
industry.  In the food industry, for example, the initial investment is huge compared 
with the housing industry.  Therefore, these owners will not jeopardize their 
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investments by manipulating resources to change existing institutions arbitrarily in 
order to receive disproportionately small personal benefit.  On the contrary, those in 
the housing industry can manipulate resources to influence bureaucrats to 
discriminatorily or wrongly interpret or implement stipulated policy to favour them 
individually, thereby accruing extra massive benefits, because of the relatively less 
initial investment compared with the food industry.  Nonetheless, I need to explain 
the way of relying on resources explicitly that may leave to further study.   
 
8.2 FURTHER RESEARCH 
I cannot but ask myself what I would do if there were any chance of restarting this 
research. Alternatively, are there any changes l would suggest with regard to the 
structure, research proposition, or even the topic?  The reply to this question is that if 
I could start over from scratch knowing what I do now, I would devote further time 
to enhancing the research methods in the first place because every researcher needs 
the conceptual tools to interpret abstract philosophical theories, concepts and ideas 
and make them relevant and manageable.  Because dissertation backgrounds 
(research purpose) vary from person to person owing to their different interests and 
motivations it is unlikely that any fair judgment on different research purposes can 
be easily reached.  An appropriate research method can save a lot of time and cost 
for the researcher by shunning those redundant data collections and replicated 
literature reviews; a decent research method will provide the researcher with 
guidelines for essential data collection and the necessary literature for his or her 
study.  For example, lacking in an incisive research method, I actually spent an extra 
half year collecting unnecessary data and reviewing unnecessary literature.  After 
locating the accurate research approach, I collected sufficient data and conducted 
essential literature interview in a relatively short period.   
 
Secondly, I would devote more resources and time to interviewing more elites rather 
than trying to collect more secondary data; shortages and conflicts existing in 
China’s secondary data actually offset the credibility of this research.  In China, most 
secondary data was made by state agents, who had their own perspectives, 
preferences, and stand points and only started to record data systematically in the 
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1990s; therefore, these data can be prejudiced, judgmental and piecemeal.  Under the 
circumstances, there are natural defects existing in the secondary data.  Further, the 
most credible secondary data is from NBSC (National Bureau of Statistics of China).  
It was not necessary for me to find other sources of secondary data to fill in the gaps 
of the NBSC’s data because most official data are derived from NBSC.  Because of 
my acquaintance with these elites, I have learned a lot of inside and first-hand 
information that is regarded as taboo and not everybody can have it.  Thus, I should 
have taken more time to interview more elites in order to learn more inside or 
confidential information to complement the insufficiency of secondary data.  
Consequently, this knowledge gained from this research would have been more 
robust for the purposes of carrying over my findings to a greater context of the real 
world.   
 
Because research purpose varies from person to person, the contents and insights of 
research on the same topic vary as well.  In other words, rarely can any single 
research cover all associated areas of the research topic and so does this one.  
Therefore, although I have obtained many insightful findings and a promising result 
from this research, there remain some missing arguments that should be further 
discussed.  Except for applying my research to different industries, I also think I 
could apply my research results to a greater context, e.g. cultural or country level, 
making it available to more people.  For example, in a country with more impersonal, 
non-partisan and universal institutions, people may rely on resources less to make 
institutional changes because there will be less personal benefit gained in this 
environment.  On the contrary, people in a biased and particularistic institutional 
environment may rely heavily on resources to make institutional changes because of 
more private benefits gained.  Nonetheless, I should not draw any conclusion from 
these hypothetical propositions before conducting any further study.     
 
Nevertheless, I may be able to relate my research to a greater context by attaining 
generalizability.  Although this research is very much influenced by individual 
attributes and perspectives, some abstract generalizations in this research could be 
feasibly drawn as a worthy effort by attaining generalizability.  That is to say, 
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researchers may form their hypotheses, which could be transferred from the context 
described in my research to theirs depending upon the degree of fit between these 
different contexts (Johnson and Solomons 1984 ;Suchman 1995:119,120).  Because 
this research provides a substantial amount of information about the relations 
between institutional change and resource dependence, the rise of China’s HNWIs 
and China’s institutional changes, people can analyze the degree to which my 
research matches the context to which they are interested in applying the concepts 
and conclusions of this research.  Before applying my research results to a greater 
context, people need to comprehend the typical, the common and the ordinary in this 
research and pay attention to how present instances are likely to differ from their 
future realizations.   
 
There are some concerns that people should be informed before embarking on this.  
First, they need to know the truth of the findings in the specific context of my 
research.  The main them of this research is how China, a previously proletarian 
regime, has transferred from a command economy to a market economy (with 
Chinese characteristics) in a relatively short period without changing the political 
regime.  Secondly, they need to conduct their inquiry in ways that chronological and 
situational variations are irrelevant to the findings.  If that condition can be met, the 
findings obviously will have relevance in any context.  The main theoretical finding 
of this research is that people may manipulate and rely on resources to influence 
institutional changes according to their ideas in a restrained institutional 
circumstance.  In fact, every institutional environment is restrained albeit to varying 
degrees.  Therefore, they need to notice the pattern of resource dependence and the 
associated effects upon institutional changes of their research context.  For example, 
it should be possible to apply my research results to the private banking industry 
whether it is in a democratic or autocratic country. This is because this industry, to a 
large extent, manipulates external political resources to affect or change undesirable 
regulations by lobbying congress and parliament, by monetary contributions to 
favoured political candidates or incumbent politicians, or by exchanging partial 
economic interest for more institutional protection.  Once this industry can 
manipulate external resources to effect institutional change, the specific institutional 
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environment is somehow restrained.  Thus, I can compare the pattern of relationships 
between resource dependence and the regulation changes with my findings.  
Nonetheless, generalizability is not a comprehensive reason for explaining certain 
facts or certain common properties of objects.  Therefore, researchers should pay 
attention to the truth-value, the consistency, the applicability and the neutrality.   
   
In my opinion, there remain many intriguing topics regarding China’s reforms that 
may fascinate researchers, e.g. what would China look like if the CCP the had not 
initiated reforms in 1978, or if they had stopped the economic reforms after 1989, or 
if there the Tiananmen incident had not occurred in 1989; why did economic 
liberation proceed after 1992 without political liberation; why did the market 
economy not bring about democracy in China, etc?  These topics may acquire many 
useful insights from this research.  In this research, I have mentioned that the 
ultimate purpose of China’s reforms is to uphold the legitimacy of the CCP under the 
circumstances of one-party dominance.  If economic reforms were not initiated or if 
Deng Xiaoping had not been reinstated in the late 1970s, China’s reforms would 
presumably have taken place in time because of the worsening fiscal situation and 
the high unemployment rate that had already seriously endangered the then CCP’s 
regime.  But the reforms may have been implemented in an alternative way, e.g. 
much more slowly, more stop-and-go, dual tracking oriented and piecemeal, because 
of those conservative and proletarian-oriented political leaders.  As for the topic 
“why economic liberation proceeds after 1992 without political liberation”, 
researchers can get many insightful explanations from my research.  As noted 
previously, the ultimate purpose of China’s reforms is to uphold the legitimacy of the 
CCP under the one-party dominance circumstances.  After Deng’s reinstatement, he 
adopted the alternative way, namely improving the living standards of ordinary 
people, to uphold the CCP’s regime.  Therefore, within the political constraints, the 
market economy generally functions pleasingly with some minor problems.  Under 
the circumstances, the CCP separated the economy and politics successfully in the 
institutional environment.  Likewise, any economic growth in this regime will not 
spontaneously bring about democracy. 
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For the time being, I am convinced that this research is of help in the broader context 
because it not only contains comprehensive analyses of the relations of and 
interactions between resource dependence and institutional change but also provides 
a solid foundation for future researchers to build their theories.   
 
Therefore, those people who are interested in the topic of the institutional changes in 
China, the rise of China’s HNWIs, or the relations of and interactions between 
resource dependence and institutional change in China or other places, should be 
able to get useful information and insights by taking the knowledge based on my 
research.  Those people, who are interested in the context of China, may start their 
research by studying the introduction and dissertation background of this research 
and get useful information and insights regarding the cause and reasons for initiating 
reforms in the late 90s.  For those people who are interested in the resource 
dependence and institutional change, they might start their researches by examining 
the literature review of this research because of the incisive analysis regarding how 
people can rely on resources to effect institutional change.   
 
In addition to inspiring researchers, I truly wish that my research could deliver 
valuable implications to the political elites to improve the efficiency of the 
institutional environment in China, and consequently benefit ordinary people in 
China.  These political elites, to a significant extent, overlap with, but remain 
independent from, those economic elites.  They differ from those economic elites in 
that they include persons holding very important positions in the only legal authority 
of China.  Therefore, in China, they (economic and political elites) together seize not 
only great wealth and the ability to make decisions that affect the behaviours of non-
elites through political power, but they also exert a great deal of control over most 
essential resources such as education, prestige and social status, skills of leadership, 
information, knowledge of political processes, and the ability to communicate.  
Additionally, they are drawn disproportionately from the society’s upper classes, 
which are made up for those persons who own or control a disproportionate share of 
the societal institutions’ industry, commerce, finance, education, the military, 
communications, civil affairs, and the law.  Because the basis of a great 
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concentration of power and resource is the income and wealth possessed by these 
elites, any existing or potential institutional change will be biased towards these 
elites without any doubt.  That is, the social wealth will become concentrated in 
relatively few individuals and cause social disequilibrium.  
 
8.3 PUBLICATION 
In chapter seven, I have employed the housing industry as the exemplification to 
justify my research proposition.  In fact, next to the housing industry, I myself favour 
the topic of finance reforms because it is similar to the housing reforms in China.  
Hopefully, I will try to have papers on this topic published in the near future.  In this 
research, I have explored some insightful findings and promising results that specific 
people should know.  First, those people who are interested in China’s institutional 
changes and resource dependence.  Secondly, those people who are interested in the 
rise of China’s HNWIs.  Thirdly, those people who are currently engaging in or plan 
to be involved in the housing industry of China.  Nonetheless, the way to make these 
people aware of the research results should be efficient because of the diversity of the 
readership. This will be through the press media, which is the most economical way 
to spread knowledge efficiently to those readers who need it.  Nonetheless, people 
who have different interests, will favour different magazines and journals.  For those 
researchers who are interested in the relations between institutional change and 
resource dependence in China, I will try to have my paper published in the Australian 
Journal of Chinese Affairs, the China Journal, the China Quarterly, the China Review, 
the Cato Journal, and China Economic Review.  For other researchers who are 
interested in the housing industry, I will endeavour to have my paper published in the 
Journal of Real Estate Literature and Land Use Policy.  As for ordinary readers who 
are interested in general Chinese affairs, I will try to publish in the Caijing Magazine.  
The content of the papers will vary according the type of journal or magazine.  
Ultimately, I particularly wish this research might increase insight into those people 
who have the authority to improve the status quo and improve the lives of ordinary 
people and their prospects.          
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Fig 1 Primitive Concept: Vicious Cycle of One-sided Game in China 
Economic elites 






















Fig 2 Atypical Institutional Changes in China 
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Period Reform Objective 
Before 1979 A planned economy under the law of exchange value 
1979 – 1984.10 A planned economy supplemented by market regulations 
1984.10 – 1987.10 A planned commodity economy 
1987.10 – 1989.06 
An economy where the state regulates the market and the market regulates 
the enterprises 
1989.06 – 1991 
An economy with organic integration of the planned economy and market 
regulations 
1991 – present  A socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics 













Fig 3 Entrepreneurs and Politics in China 
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Data derived from 2010 Euromonitor International, IMF, WTO, CIA Factbook 
Fig 4 China vs. FSU (Russian Federation) GDP per capita 
  
 
Data derived from Global Market Information Database (GMID): Euromonitor International from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial 
Statistics and World Economic Outlook/UN/national statistics 



































Fig 6 Annual Rural and Urban Income and GDP growth rate 
 
Data derived from Global Market Information Database (GMID): Euromonitor International from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial 
Statistics and World Economic Outlook/UN/national statistics 
  
 

































Data derived from Global Market Information Database (GMID): Euromonitor International from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial 
Statistics and World Economic Outlook/UN/national statistics 




















 Bureaucrat (1) Bureaupreneur (2) HNWI (3) 
Bureaucrat (1) Configuration 1 
Power Imbalance: 0 
Mutual Dependence: 2 
Configuration 2 
Power Imbalance: 1 
Mutual Dependence: 3 
Configuration 3 
Power Imbalance: 2 
Mutual Dependence: 4 
Table 2 Configurations of Power Imbalance and Mutual Dependence in China 
 


































































































Property Rights  
Fig 12 Three Layers of Meaning between Organizations and Institutional Environment 
 
Fig 12 Three Layers of Meaning between Organizations and Institutional Environment 
 
Fig 12 Three Layers of Meaning between Organizati ns and Institutional Environment 
 
Fig 12 Three Layers of Meaning between Organizations and Institutional Environment 
 
Data derived from 2009 Statistic Book of National Bureau of Statistics of China 
Fig 11 Average Housing Price in China (1991 – 2008) 
  
 



















Concept derived from (Williamson 1985 ;North 1990 ;Powell and Dimaggio 1991 ;Rutherford 1994 ;Scott 
1995 ;Sherer and Lee 2002 ;Campbell 2004 ;Casciaro and Piskorski 2005 ;Marx [1906] 1990 ;Pfeffer and Salancik 
[1978] 2003) 




Fig 14 Circulation of Institutional Change and Resource Dependence in transitional China 






1. External Cognitive 
ideas and legitimate 
power 
2. Shifting cost 
3. Time 
Fig 13 Relationship between Different Path Dependence Processes 
Emerging Private 
Property Rights 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 Evolutionary Revolutionary 
Implementation  Continuous change that proceeds 
in small, incremental steps along a 
single path in a certain direction 
(North 1998:15-26). 
 Today’s institutional arrangements 
differ from but still closely resemble 
yesterday’s because they have in-
herited many of their predecessors’ 
characteristics (Nelson 
1982:116,206-233).  
Simultaneous changes across 
most dimensions of an 
institution over a given period of 
time (Campbell 2004:32-33). 
 Induced Imposed 
Accomplishment Voluntary changes are implemented 
by a group of individuals in response 
to profitable opportunities arising 
from institutional disequilibria (Lin 
1989).  
Changes that are introduced by 
government fiat (Lin 1989). 







Economic and Political Benefits from all kinds of transactions and distributions 
Political Constrains under CCP’s Governance 
State Agents at different hierarchical 
levels of PRC government 
Legitimate Organizations & 
Programmes 
(Non-Organic) 
Design based on state 
agents’ economic and 
political orientations 
All kinds of transactions, 
distributions of resources and 
power 
Framework of Economic and 
Political Rules 
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Table 5 the Evolution of Reforms Objectives  
 
 Concepts and Theories in 
the Foreground of the 
Debate 
Underlying Assumptions in 
the Background of the 
Debate 
 Programs Paradigms 
Cognitive  
(Outcome oriented) 
Ideas as elite prescriptions 
that enable politicians, 
corporate leaders, and other 
decision makers to chart a 
clear and specific course of 
action. 
Ideas as elite assumptions 
that constrain the cognitive 
range of useful programs 
available to politicians, 
corporate leaders, and 
decision makers. 
 Frames Public Sentiments 
Normative  
(Non-outcome oriented) 
Ideas as symbols and 
concepts that enable 
decision makers to legitimize 
programs to their 
constituents. 
Ideas as public assumptions 
that constrain the normative 
range of legitimate programs 
available to decision makers. 
















Table 8 Legal Correlates in Transitional China 
Period Reform Objective 
1949 – 1979 A planned economy under the law of exchange value 
1979 – 1984.10 A planned economy supplemented by market regulations 
1984.10 – 1987.10 A planned commodity economy 
1987.10 – 1989.06 
An economy where the state regulates the market and the market 
regulates the enterprises 
1989.06 – 1991 
An economy with organic integration of the planned economy and 
market regulations 
1991 – Present A socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics 
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 Fig 17 ANNUAL RURAL AND URBAN INCOME AND GDP GROWTH RATE 
 
Data derived from Global Market Information Database (GMID): Euromonitor International from International Monetary Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook/UN/national statistics 
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Exported (GMT): 05/04/2010 © 2010 Euromonitor International; International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
International Financial Statistics 
Figure 20 China GNI per capita, 1977 – 2009 
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(Veblen 1898b ;Commons 
1931 ;Alchian 







1985 ;Tullock 1988 ;Lin 
1989 ;Stiglitz and Heertje 
1989 ;North 1990) make 
institutional change 
endogenous to model of 
economic behaviour. 
Institutional changes in 
transitional China actually 
embody more than 
economic feature, e.g. 
culture (Davis et al. 1995), 
power and benefit 
structure (Chan 





2003,2004 ;Yang 2004), 
and others. 
What are the main 
features of China’s 
institutional changes 
except for economics? 
The aggregation of 
China’s institutional 
changes consists of the 
interactions between 
culture, economy, and 
politics.   
Many studies (Commons 
1931 ;Davis and North 
1970 ;Coase 
1984 ;Williamson 
1985 ;Lin 1989 ;North 
1990 ;Chen et al. 
1992 ;Hodgson 
1993b ;Child and Yuan 
1996 ;Blyth 2002 ;Nee 
2003 ;Zhou 2004) 
focusing on the impacts of 
regulative institutions and 
the pursuit of self-
interests regard 
institutional changes as 
economy-oriented or 
triggered by economic 
factors. 
Many critical economic 
problems and recessed 
economy do not really 
cause institutional 
changes in China.  For 
example, Great Leap 
Forward and Cultural 
Revolution followed by 
serious recessed 
economy and famine 
made hundreds of 
thousand people died.     
Which factor essentially 
causes institutional 
change in China? 
Some institutional 
entrepreneurs perceive 
changes that may 
threaten to hamper their 
access to resources or 
power and consequently 
affect the distribution of 
resources or power.  




(David 1985 ;North 
1990 ;Arthur 1994 ;Stark 
1994 ;North 1998 ;Pierson 
2000 ;Mahoney 2001) 
maintain that path 
dependent effects 
manifest in the process of 
institutional changes and 
regard the institutional 
framework of the 
economy in an 
evolutionary fashion. 
The path dependent 
effects are selectively 
manifest in the 
institutional changes in 
China.  In China, most 
institutional changes 
occur when political elites 
try to resolve problems 
that generate uncertainty 
over the distribution of 
resources and power.  
Therefore, changes are 
relatively revolutionary. 
What exactly does path 
dependence have effect 
on China’s institutional 
changes? 
Path dependence is 
especially manifest in the 
distribution of resources 
and power in China.  In 
terms of political 
institutions, China is 
arguably evolutionary 
than revolutionary.  
However, China is 
relatively revolutionary 
and less path-dependent 
in terms of economic 
institutions.     
The emergence of HNWIs 
can be attributed to the 
pursuits of maximization 
of individual utility and 
wealth (North 
1981,1990:45). 
The pursuit of 
maximization of individual 
utility and wealth is rather 
a cause or generalization 
than a reason.  This 
argument can hardly 
explain some former 
managers of SOEs were 
practically forced to take 
over then broken SOEs 
What is the real reason to 
make certain people to 
pursue individual utility 
and consequently become 
HNWIs in China? 
CCP devise unique 
private property rights 
through regulative 
mechanism in China.  
Lacking in appropriate 
normative and cultural-
cognitive mechanisms, 
the newly given property 
rights become distorted in 
the society.   
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Theory Reality Hypotheses  
Research Question 
(Gap) 
and consequently become 




2007 ;Goodman 2008) 
commented that China 
gradually started to 
loosen policy controls 
after the late 1970s, 
therefore, speculation, as 
the consequence of 
loosen policy control, 
became prevalent and 
people signed up to the 
changes and joined the 
affluent social strata 
becoming HNWIs in 
transitional China.  
In the process of China’s 
institutional changes, 
policy has not been 
loosened all the time.  
Sometimes, policies have 
been tightened up 
because of inflation, other 
economic issues, and 
political struggle.  
Nevertheless, HNWIs 
presence has never 
stopped along with 
China’s institutional 
changes after 1980s. 
Therefore, this argument 
hardly can adequately 
explain how people 
become HNWIs in 
contemporary China. 
How do some people 
exactly become HNWIs in 
China after economic 
reforms and who they 
are? 
To loosen policy control is 
a means rather than a 
reason to make people 
pursuing individual utility.  
Because of disarrayed 
institutional pillars of 
China’s institutional 
environment, people 
spontaneously pursue the 
maximization of individual 
utility especially when 
they have chances to get 
close to the centre of re-
allocation and re-
distribution of resources 
or power.  This arguably 
is the reason that how 
and why some people 
become HNWIs in China.  
Many scholars (Romer 
1990 ;Nee 
1991 ;Dewatripont and 
Roland 1992 ;Zhang 
2003 ;Yang 2004) regard 
China’s transition as 
partial, gradual, and 
spontaneous changes 
that associate with 
evolutionary reforms.  The 
uniqueness of the partial 
reforms in the transitional 
China, to some extent, is 




cannot be consciously 
and rationally man-made 
order. 
In China, no matter how 
urgent an induced 
institutional change is 
demanded, CCP will not 
allow it to persist if it will 
politically jeopardize the 
one-party polity.  
Relatively, China’s 
government and CCP will 
not recklessly impose any 
institutional change 
countrywide without 
conducting tests at 
selected points after the 
late 70s.  In this regard, in 
order to retain the balance 
of politics and economy, a 
compromised pattern of 
institutional changes 
therefore emerged.  
Why does compromised 
institutional change exist 
in China?  How does it 
help HNWIs in China and 
vice versa? 
After reforms, small 
degree of 
entrepreneurship is 
granted to ordinary people 
in China.  Relatively, party 
cadres and political elites 
were permitted a greater 
degree of entrepreneurial 
freedom.  Meanwhile, 
prominent political leaders 
advocate that when 
nation, city, community, 
and individual gain more 
economic capital, the 
social problems will be 
accordingly solved and 
people will experience 
higher standard of living.  
This argument 
deliberately glosses over 
many problems, e.g. 
inequitable redistribution 
of resources, profit-
oriented behaviour. Thus, 
to-get-rich become the 
only purpose in the 
society and people will 
trade their obedience for 
more resources or power 
derived from inequitable 
redistribution.  This 
vicious circle 
consequently causes the 
compromised institutional 
changes in China. 
Table 9 Gaps between Theory and Reality in China’s Institutional Changes 
 






What are the main 
features of China’s 
institutional changes 
except for economics? 
The aggregation of China’s institutional changes consists of the 
interactions between culture, economy, and politics.   
Which factor essentially 
causes institutional 
change in China? 
Some institutional entrepreneurs perceive changes that may threaten to 
hamper their access to resources or power and consequently affect the 
distribution of resources or power.  Therefore, some elites will 
precipitate institutional changes. 
What exactly does path 
dependence have effect 
on China’s institutional 
changes? 
Path dependence is especially manifest in the distribution of resources 
and power in China.  In terms of political institutions, China is arguably 
evolutionary than revolutionary.  However, China is relatively 
revolutionary and less path-dependent in terms of economic institutions.     
What is the real reason to 
make certain people to 
pursue individual utility 
and consequently become 
HNWIs in China?  How do 
some people exactly 
become HNWIs in China 
after economic reforms 
and who they are? 
CCP devise unique private property rights through regulative 
mechanism in China.  Lacking in appropriate normative and cultural-
cognitive mechanisms, the newly given property rights become distorted 
in the society.  To loosen policy control is a means rather than a reason 
to make people pursuing individual utility.  Because of disarrayed 
institutional pillars of China’s institutional environment, people 
spontaneously pursue the maximization of individual utility especially 
when they have chances to get close to the centre of re-allocation and 
re-distribution of resources or power.  This arguably is the reason that 
how and why some people become HNWIs in China. 
Why does compromised 
institutional change exist in 
China?  How does it help 
HNWIs in China, and vice 
versa? 
After reforms, small degree of entrepreneurship is granted to ordinary 
people in China.  Relatively, party cadres and political elites were 
permitted a greater degree of entrepreneurial freedom.  Meanwhile, 
prominent political leaders advocate that when nation, city, community, 
and individual gain more economic capital, the social problems will be 
accordingly solved and people will experience higher standard of living.  
This argument deliberately glosses over many problems, e.g. 
inequitable redistribution of resources, profit-oriented behaviour. Thus, 
to-get-rich become the only purpose in the society and people will trade 
their obedience for more resources or power derived from inequitable 
redistribution.  This vicious circle consequently causes the compromised 
institutional changes in China. 
Table 10 Research Questions and hypotheses 
 
Basic (Pure) Research Applied Research 
Purpose 
 Developing and testing theory or 
hypothesis 
 Expand knowledge of research 
subject 
 Findings of significance and value to 
society in general 
Purpose 
 Information gathered can be used in 
policy formulation, administration 
and the enhancement of 
understanding of a phenomenon 
 Improving understanding of 
problems 
 To solve problems with improved or 
new knowledge 
Context 
 Undertaken by people in academic 
institutes 
 Researcher may choose the topic 
and objectives of research 
Context 
 Undertaken by people in a variety of 
settings, e.g. think-tank, consulting 
firms, academic organizations 
 With targeted topic and objectives of 
research 
Concepts derived from (Saunders et al. 2003 ;Kumar 2005) 
Table 11 Research Orientations of Pure Research and Applied Research 
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1 
It is an important way of testing a proposed conclusion by looking for and 
analyzing discrepant data and negative cases.  Some scholars (Shweder 
1980 ;Miles and Huberman 1994a:263) contend that researchers have a strong 
and often unconscious tendency to notice supporting instances and ignore 
those do not fit their pre-established conclusions.  Researchers should make 
sure that they do not overlook data that can point out flaws in their conclusions.  
Nevertheless, those discrepant data itself can be flawed.  As a consequence, 
researchers should scrutinize both supporting and discrepant evidence to 
decide whether the conclusion in question is more plausible than the potential 
substitutes. 
2 
I have briefly discussed triangulation in previous sections.  As Maxwell 
(1998:93) argues, it can reduce the risk of systematic distortions inherent in the 
use of only one method because no single method is completely free from all 
possible validity threats.  Fielding and Fielding (1986:23-24,30) have detailed 
discussions regarding triangulation and emphasize the fallibility of any particular 
method and the need to devise triangulation strategies to manage specific 
validity threats.  For example, documents, interviews, and questionnaires may 
all be vulnerable to self-report bias or ideological distortion.  In this regard, 
practical researcher, who adopts triangulation strategy for validity test, would 
require an additional method that is not subject to this particular threat. 
3 
Triangulation strategy needs additional method, which can check the validity of 
conclusion.  Thereby, quasi-statistics, which refer to the use of simple numerical 
results that can be readily derived from the data (Becker, 1970 #2395@:31), 
would be a good method to be employed in terms of the validity test.  In fact, 
many of the conclusions of qualitative researches have an implicit quantitative 
component.  For example, there are many quantitative claims regarding 
economy, housing, income, and others used in my research in order to support 
the conclusion and assess the evidence collected in my research. 














Figure 22 An Interactive Model of Research Design (Maxwell 1998:72)  
 





I intend to unpack how the transition between these roles is played out during 
the institutional changes and to explore the relations between the leading 
social actors and their institutional environment.   
Conceptual 
Context 
My concept concerning institutional changes in China was inconsistent and 
obscure.  Because of the imbalanced development, unequal income 
distribution, political constraint, and severe corruption, I previously assumed 
the institutional changes in China would wind up chaos because of lacking 
comprehensive understanding of this country.  After staying in China for years, 
reading abundant literatures and empirical data, and having more in-depth 
interviews to elites, I therefore understand that institutional changes in China 
are neither difficult nor simple as I previously assumed.  All those changes 
may surround the centre of maximization of personal utility within a rigid 
political constraint.  That is to say, politics is the guiding principle in this 
country whether it is planned economy or market economy.  In this regard, 
there is no single theory can fairly explain those changes without other 
empirical and theoretical supplements.  In this regard, the main conceptual 
framework of this research, which is the institutional change theory, is 
reinforced by the resource dependence theory.  Therefore, I will try to justify 
my proposition under this conceptual context.   
Research 
Questions 
1. How and why institutional changes in China happened? 
2. How and why HNWIs emerged in China? 
3. Is there any relationship between institutional changes and HNWIs?  If 




In this research, I will adopt the qualitative-quantitative-qualitative approach 
because this composite approach is able to test the validity and reliability of 
qualitative research even without standardized and structured methods and 
procedures that are the bases of testing validity and reliability in quantitative 
research.  In this regard, I will start with qualitative methods to ascertain the 
spread of diversity, using quantitative methods to measure the spread, and 
then going back to qualitative methods to interpret the observed patters.  
Regarding those employed data in this research, I will adopt elite-interviews as 
first-hand data because of their comprehensive understanding and deep 
involvement of the institutional changes.  I also collect other empirical data, 
which is issued by public or semi-public organization, as second-hand data to 
reinforce the first-hand data. 
Validity 
In qualitative research, I have to try to rule out most validity threats after 
starting my study, and use evidence collected to make alternative hypotheses 
implausible.  In this regard, I may become subjectively biased in order to make 
alternative proposition(s) implausible, and stick to my proposition(s) even 
though it may be incorrect.  That is to say, I may have a strong and often 
unconscious tendency to notice supporting instances, e.g. documents, 
interviews, and questionnaires, which may all be vulnerable to self-report bias 
or ideological distortion, and ignore those do not fit my pre-established 
conclusions.  However, I will be able to reduce the risk of systematic 
distortions inherent in the use of only one method because no single method is 
completely free from all possible validity threats.  Therefore, triangulation 
strategy needs additional method, which can check the validity of conclusion.  
As previously mentioned, quasi-statistics, which refer to the use of simple 
numerical results that can be readily derived from the data, would be a good 
method to be employed in terms of the validity test. 
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1 Philosophical epistemology 
2 
The way to collect information (structured or 
unstructured) 
3 
The way to record information (descriptive, 
narrative, categorical, or numerical) 
4 
The way to analyze information (descriptive, 
categorical, or numerical) 
5 
The way to express findings (descriptive or 
numerical)  





Census, Economic Statistics, Labour Force Survey, Health 
Report, Demographical Information 
Earlier Research Journal Article, Academic Paper 
Personal Record Written History, Diary 
Mass Media Newspaper, Magazine, Internet 
Table 14 Main Types of Secondary Data (Sapsford and Jupp 1998:57-
105;Labuschagne 2003 ;Kumar 2005:139) 
 
Method Description Applicability and Appropriateness 
Observation 
This is a major technique to tackle the 
collection of primary data.  It is a 
purposeful, systematic, and selective 
method of watching and listening to an 
interaction or phenomenon while it 
happens.  When researchers are ore 
interested in the behaviours than in the 
perceptions of individuals, or respondents 
are subject to provide objective 
information, observation is the best 
approach to collect primary data. 
The purpose of my research intends to 
unpack the relationship between role 
transition of leading social actors and 
institutional changes in China.  The time 
span of this research is across thirty 
years.  Besides, this research not only 
tries to comprehend the behaviours of 
leading social actors, but also aims to 
understand their perceptions and 
interactions with China’s institutional 
changes as well.  On the other hand, it is 
not possible to observe those leading 
social actors either participant or non-
participant because of their exceptional 
socioeconomic status. Therefore, 
observation may not be appropriate to my 
research. 
Interviewing 
This is one of the most common methods 
used to collect information from people.  
In a word, interview indicates that 
interviewers read questions to 
respondents and record their answers 
(Monette et al. 1986:156), or a verbal 
interchange, often face-to-face in which 
an interviewer tries to elicit information, 
beliefs, or opinions from another person 
(Burns 1997:329).  By and large, any 
person-to-person interaction, either face-
to-face or otherwise, between two or more 
individuals with a specific purpose in mind 
is called an interview (Kumar 2005:144).  
In interview, researchers have the 
freedom to choose the design and content 
of questions to be asked of respondents, 
select the wording of questions, decide 
Likewise, I need to assure if interviewing 
method can achieve my research 
purpose.  Through in-depth interviewing 
with the leading social actors, I may 
clearly understand their role-transition, 
perceptions, and behaviours before and 
after reforms.  Apart from that, because 
these leading social actors have hectic 
lives and are inaccessible, therefore, 
interview may save their time and least 
intrude their privacy.  As a result, 
interview may be the appropriate method 
to collect primary information for this 
research.  However, as discussed 
previously, I need to prevent personal 
bias that may mislead the interviewees 
and distort the results of interviews. 
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Method Description Applicability and Appropriateness 
the way to ask respondents, and choose 
the order in which respondents are to be 
asked.  The process of asking questions 
can be either flexible (unstructured), 
where researchers have the freedom to 
think about and devise questions, or 
inflexible (structured), where researchers 
have to follow the questions designed 
beforehand including the wording, 
sequence, etc. 
Questionnaire 
Questionnaire is a written list of questions, 
the answers to which are recorded by 
respondents themselves (Kumar 
2005:145) and must be an integral part of 
the research design stage, yet not just a 
list of questions or forms to be filled in 
(Oppenheim 1992:10).  However, people 
should not judge a questionnaire unless 
they know what it was meant to do, e.g. 
purpose.  Researchers should specify a 
situation or criterion for their 
questionnaires in order to let their 
respondents to bear in mind when they 
making their answers (Oppenheim 
ibid:255).  Likewise, in questionnaire, 
respondents are requested to give their 
answers to those questions as they are 
asked in interview.  However, the 
difference is that respondents have to 
reply to the questions and record their 
answers by themselves in questionnaire; 
therefore, researchers are unable to 
explain the meaning of questions to 
respondents.  Hence, the layout of 
questionnaire should be pleasing to the 
eye, the sequence of questions should be 
easy to follow, and the questions should 
be clear and not vague as well.  In 
addition, a good questionnaire should be 
developed in an interactive style and 
make respondents feel as if researcher is 
talking to them. 
Presumably, if the layout, sequence, and 
focus of questionnaire are properly 
organized, researchers may get adequate 
and essential primary data from their 
respondents.  It seems that questionnaire 
could be another suitable method for me 
to use in this particular research.  
Because the respondents of this research 
have hectic lives and are inaccessible, 
therefore, any question to them may 
either intrude their privacy or explore 
something they are unwilling to reveal.  In 
this regard, questionnaire may not be the 
choice to this particular research. 
Table 15 Major Methods and Application/Appropriateness of Primary Data Collection 
 
Observation Interviewing 
Present Past and present 
Actions Attitudes 
Context Motivations 
Seeing Hearing and probing 
Table 16 Difference between Observation and Interviewing (Berger 2000:113)  
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Motivation of sharing 
required information 
It is essential for interviewees to be willing to share information with 
interviewers (researchers), who should try to motivate interviewees by 
explaining the objectives and relevance of their researches in clear 
terms.  In this research, I have established long-term relations with 
those respondents (elites) either directly or indirectly.  Therefore, 
before starting interviews, I have already explained my research 
questions and purposes to them straightforwardly.  Initially, I have 
contacted many interviewees than actually interviewed, however, some 
of them are unwilling to have formal interviews even in an unstructured 
way because they are sceptical about the confidentiality of interviews.  
Nevertheless, most of them are willing to share required information 




Even those respondents are willing to share information with 
interviewers, researchers have to make sure interviewees clearly 
understand those research questions and consequently share the 




Kammen and Stouthamer-Loeber suggest (1997:379) to conduct 
interviews in an interview room, which is with standardized setting in 
order to prevent other interferences, e.g. incoming calls, disturbances 
from other office staffs, unexpected noise, inadequate lighting, etc.  
Although those respondents (elites) of my research are willing to 
participate in interviews, however, they feel uncomfortable if they are 
interviewed in any place except their homes or offices.  In this regard, 
interview room will not be any practical option to my research.  
Nevertheless, I do need to deal with the potential risks of preceding 
interferences in my research. 
Table 17 The Prerequisites of Data Collection  
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Step Description Application 
1. Identify the main 
themes  
(Categorizing) 
This step is the most important one during data processing.  
Once researchers categorize responses into inappropriate 
themes, or wrongly identify them, it will deviate the data 
processing from the correct path and then get erroneous results.  
To avoid the unexpected results, researchers have to, 
cautiously, go through their descriptive responses given by 
respondents in order to comprehend the meaning of their 
communication accurately.  From these responses, researchers 
should perceive that respondents often use different wordings to 
express their own opinions about the same event, issue, or 
situation.  It is researcher’s responsibility to select appropriate 
wording (theme) to represent the meaning of those descriptive 
responses given by respondents and categorize them into 
suitable themes. 
As previously maintained, this step is the most imperative one.  
In comparison with other interviewees, I will thoroughly go 
through the interview with the particular one (interview #3), 
whose transition can mostly represent the changes of leading 
social actors in China along with institutional changes.  Before 
late 1970s, this particular interviewee was a party cadre and the 
manager of a typical SOE in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province.  
After economic reforms initiated in 1979, he not only has 
legitimately changed the SOE becoming a private-own 
enterprise but also himself become a HNWI as well.  I therefore 
assume his experience is an epitome of the changes of other 
contemporaneous HNWIs.  In this regard, his responses may be 
the most comprehensive one that I can categorize it into 
different main themes 
2. Assign codes to 
the main themes 
(Coding) 
After identifying the main themes, researchers may assign a 
code to each theme by using numbers or keywords, otherwise 
just identify the main themes.  However, if researchers do not 
want to count the number of times a theme has occurred in an 
interview, it is unnecessary for them to assign a code to a 
theme. 
As previously described, if I do not want to count the number of 
times a theme has occurred in an interview, it is unnecessary for 
me to assign a code to a theme.  In this research, I may not 
assign a code to a theme because the number of times of a 
theme sometimes is meaningless at all.  For example, every 
respondent mentioned “reforms and openness” during my 
interviews to them in this research.  However, these terms 
sometimes are adjunct and meaningless in their description.  It 
depends upon the question I asked and in what circumstances 
they mentioned it.  In this regard, if I count the number of times 
of a theme, it may distract my attention to these pointless 
numbers and misguide the research to wrong path 
3. Classify 
responses under 
the main themes 
(Sorting) 
After having identified the themes, researchers should go 
through the transcripts of all their interviews or notes and 
classify the responses or contents of the notes under the 
different themes. Some computer-aided programs may be much 
helpful for experienced researchers in terms of thematic 
analysis.  However, it is dependent upon the experience of 
After having identified the main themes in my research, I should 
go through the transcripts of all interviews and classify the 
responses under the different themes.  Because I recorded my 
transcripts in Chinese language and then translate them to 
English, therefore, I will identify the main themes and classify 
their responses from original transcripts to prevent any incorrect 
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researcher because inexperienced researcher may ignore some 
insightful themes by adopting these programs. 
theme-identification and response-classification.  In this 
research, I may not use computer-aid program because I am still 
inexperienced in using these programs without ignoring some 
insightful themes.  Nevertheless, in the future research, I may be 
able to adopt these programs to help me in terms of classifying 
4. Integrate themes 
and responses into 
text of report 
(Retrieving) 
After having identified responses falling within different themes, 
researchers should integrate them into the text of their reports.  
How researchers integrate them into reports is mainly 
dependent upon their own choices.  Some researchers use 
verbatim responses to keep the sense of the responses.  Others 
count the frequency of a theme having occurred, and then 
provide some samples of the response. 
After having identified responses falling within different themes, I 
will integrate them into the text of my dissertation.  In this 
research, I will use verbatim responses to keep the sense of the 
responses 
Table 18 Description and Application of Data Processing Process  
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Figure 23 Process of Data Analyzing (Giorgi 1975) 
 
1 Generalisation may mislead by de-historicizing.  
2 Generalisations may say nothing about whether a fact is necessary or contingent.   
3 Generalisations may be ambiguous because of the distributive unreliability (Harré 
1979:108-109), which may overlook the former possibility.  For example, eighty per cent 
of my interviewees partake in real estate investments, the rest twenty per cent focus on 
their own industries.  This can be interpreted either as an effect of the presence of two 
types of interviewees, one of which always does partake in real estate business and the 
other focus on their own industries, or else as a generalisation about a homogeneous 
population in which each member has the same propensity to partake in real estate 
business and own industry.   
4 Generalisation may make spurious inference of individual characteristics from group-
level characteristics or vice versa.  This can refer to the ecological fallacy, the fallacies of 
composition and division.   
5 Generalisation may stop in finding an abstraction or a pattern and generate meaningless 
data.   
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Thematizing The ultimate purpose of this interview study is beyond the pure scientific value 
of the knowledge sought but also tries to enhance people’s understandings of 
the institutional environment in China. 
Designing Before conducting this interview study, I need to get informed consent from 
my interviewees.  After these interviews, I will secure the confidentiality of 
interview data and respondents, and be aware of any negative consequence 
of respondents after reporting this study. 
Interview 
Situation 
During the interviewing, I need to clarify the confidentiality clause to my 
interviewees and inform them the possible consequences after reporting. 
Transcription At this stage, I have to be aware of the confidentiality of respondents’ 
identities and transcribe what respondents’ oral statements faithfully.  
Analysis I ought not to deliberately misinterpret interview data in order to satisfy my 
personal perspective.  
Verification My interviewees will have their say in the interpretation of the analysis. 
Reporting When reporting my final study, I need to, again, be aware of the confidentiality 
of the identities of my interviewees and other stakeholders as well in order to 
avert any unforeseen and unnecessary annoyance. 





Participants are not obliged to provide information.  Do not waste their 
time if researchers are not clear about the relevance and usefulness of 
their researches. 
Consent It is unethical to collect information without knowledge of participants, their 
expressed willingness, and informed consent. 




It is necessary and compulsory to tell participants beforehand regarding 
the sensitive questions asked, therefore, participants have enough time to 
decide if they want to share the information with participants with 
researchers.  It is unethical to ask participants any sensitive question 
without prior notice. 
Confidentiality It is unethical that researchers share information with others for any 
purpose other than research and identify any individual respondent 
without his/her consent. 
Table 21 Ethical Issues related to Participants  
 
Bias Avoid Bias is different from subjectivity, which is related to educational 
background, training and competence in research, and philosophical 
perspective.  It is unethical to attempt to hide what researcher has 





It is unethical to use inappropriate method to prove or disprove 
something that researcher wants to, e.g. biased sampling. 




It is unethical to use information obtained from respondents and against 
them later on without prior notice. 
Table 22 Ethical Issues related to Researcher  
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CHAPTER 6 
Property Rights (Barzel 1989, 2000), Power Process (Lawler 1992), Resource Dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) 
Figure 23 Conceptual Framework of Research 
 







Initial Reform Era 
Political Power 
Generating Economic Power 
 
Reform after 1990 
Political Power 
Economic Power 
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 Market Economy 
 Hyperinflation 
 Land and Housing transactions and mar-
kets were allowed and completely imple-
mented. 
 KMT retreated from Mainland Chin 
 





 Command Economy  
 Compelled Resources Reallocation through 
confiscating – with egalitarian conse-
quences 
 First time without free market system since 
thousands years back in China  
 
 “Land and Housing transactions and mar-
kets are not allowed” was stipulated in Chi-
nese Constitution. 
 Rural land and urban land were collectively 
owned and State owned respectively. 
Land-use rights are not transferable. 
 Administrative allocation was the only im-
plementation of urban land. 
 PRC was established on 1949.10.1 
 1958-1961 – Great Leap Forward, 20 – 43 
million people died in famine (Peng 1987) 
(official number is 14 million) 
 1966-1976 – Cultural Revolution, 30 million 











 1983: Anti-Spiritual Pollution movement 
 1983: TVEs mushrooming 
 1984: Inauguration of Economic Structure 
Reform 
 1985: Dual-track pricing emerged 
 Resources Reallocation through reforms – 
with inequitable consequences 
 Free markets revitalized partially 
 1978.9 – People are allowed to sell old 
housings and build new housings. 
 1979.7 – Laws of Land-use rights system 
(land leasehold) was adopted. Land-use 
rights fees emerged in SEZs
4
 
 Land-use rights and ownership were sepa-
rable since 1949  
 1984-1987: introduction of land-use fee and 
arable land occupation tax 
 To soothe the construction material supply 
and unleash the savings from people to in-
crease the capital liquidity of market 
 1978.12.22 - The Third Plenum of the 11th 
National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China is held in Beijing, with Deng 
Xiaoping reversing Mao-era policies to pur-
sue a program for Chinese economic re-
form. 
 1985-1988 Inflation 
 1985 – New entrepreneurs emerged due to 
dual-track pricing 
1986 – 1998 
GINI 
1986: 0.3178 
 1986: Abolishing of Anti-Spiritual pollution 
movement 
 1987: Reconcile to diversified interest and 
 1988-1995:  
a. Establishment of the legal foundation for 
the paid conveyance of LURs
7
 in State-
 1989.06.04 – Tiananmen Square Mas-
sacre, hundreds ~  thousands people died 
 1990 – First billionaire emerged from real 
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conflicts of society 
 1987: SOE
6
 responsibility contracting sys-
tem emerged 
 1992: Socialist Market Economy pro-
claimed 
 More free markets emerged 
 Huge Income Disparity emerged in 1986 
(GINI index increased 23.5% YoY) 
 1995: 40% SOEs in perennial deficit 
 Early 1996: 43.7% SOEs in perennial defi-
cit 
 Late 1996: Overall deficits of SOEs were 
over profits 
 1997: Dual-track pricing annulled 
 1998: 50% of state bureaucrats were lay-off 
owned urban land  
b. Introduction of the urban land-use tax 
 1987 - First land plot sold to land-users in 
Shenzhen SEZ 
 1988 – Housing and land Reform move-
ment emerged 
 1995 – Mortgage industry emerged in state 
banks 
 1990-now: Nation-wide development of the 
paid conveyance and transfer of LURs in 
State-owned urban land 
estate industry 




 1993 Inflation 
 Early 1999 – Tariffs on most goods would 
fall by nearly 3/5 
 1997 – Huge Corporate Frauds and Scan-
dals emerged  
 1998 – MBO
15
 and SOEs privatization were 
booming   
 








 1999: Security Laws proclaimed   
 2001: “Entrepreneurs are welcome to join 
CCP” proclaimed by Jiang Zemin; Becom-
ing member of WTO 
 Accessing Socialist Market Economy 
 Most free markets except few categories 
remain under State control 
 2006 – Developers started hoarding raw 
land, except few large developers 
 2007 – State put restrictions on land 
speculation 
 
 2000-2001 – More fraud and scandals of 
Public companies emerged 
 2001 – Emergence of Ultra-HNWIs 
 2007 – Developers put raw land on fire-sale  
 
1. KMT: Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party), current ruling party of Taiwan; 2. PRC: People of Republic of China; 3. TVE: Town Village Enterprise; 4. SEZs: Special Economic 
Zones; 5. BOC: People’s Bank of China; 6. SOE: State-Owned Enterprise; 7. LURs: Land-use rights; 8. OTC: Over-the-counter; 9. CSRC: China Security Regulatory Commission; 
10. IPO: initial Public Offering; 11. GINI incremental percentage: 1978-2005 45.04%; 12. QFII: Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor; 13. ETF: Exchanged Traded Fund; 14. QDII: 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor; 15. MBO: Management Buy-Out 
Table 23 Periodization of China’s Chronology (1949 – up-to-date) 
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Item Term Essence 
1 Allocation Economic and political 
2 Asset Economic 
3 Capitalism Economic and political 
4 Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics Economic and political 
5 Central government Economic and political 
6 China’s model Economic and political 
7 Collective Ownership Economic and political 
8 Chinese Communist Party (Ccp) Political 
9 Control Economic and political 
10 Deng Xiaoping Economic and political 
12 Development Economic and political 
14 Distribution Economic and political 
15 Head or Leader (yibashou or lingdao) Economic and political 
17 Institution Economic and political 
18 Labour  Economic 
22 Local government Economic and political 
23 Market Economy Economic and political 
27 Nouveau riche Economic 
28 Owner Economic 
29 Planned Economy Economic and political 
31 Private Enterprises Economic and political 
32 Private Ownership Economic and political 
33 Privatization Economic and political 
34 Property rights Economic and political 
35 Reforms and Openness Economic and political 
37 Restructure Economic and political 
38 Sloganeering Political 
39 Socialism Economic and political 
40 SOE Economic and political 
41 State Ownership Economic and political 
43 Wealth  Economic 




















































Allocation and Distribution 








1 Political Leader 






Capitalism with Chinese 
Characteristics 
Fig 26 Comprehensive Relations between Main Terms of table 6.9 






































1. Reforms and 
Opening 
2. Deng Xiaoping 
3. Development 
 




1. State Ownership 
2. CCP 
3. Control 





1. Market Economy 





1. Central Government 
2. Political Leader 
3. Local Government 
4. Privatization 
5. Private Ownership 
6. Private Enterprises 




2. Market Economy with 
Chinese 
characteristics 
3. China’s Model 
4. Institutional Changes 
5. Peasant Labours 
































Phase I Categorizing 
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frequency is not 
as often as it was 
initially.  
The frequency of 
allocation and 
distribution is not 
as often as it was 
before. 
CCP still effectively 
control China under 
the name of 
communism after 
reforms.   However, 
the frequency, 
intensity, and the 
extent of 
communist political 
activity are trivial.  
CCP has effectively 
ruled China since 
1949 until now.  
Planned economy 
and state 
ownership are no 
longer adorable 
except in political 
palace.  SOEs are 
very different from 
what they were and 
most of them have 
transformed into 
public companies 
after 1990.  
CCP still employ 
political sloganeering 
very often whenever 
they promote any 
policy or launch any 
political campaign.  
The restructuring of 
property rights is rare 
nowadays.  Although 
market economy is 
highly employed in 
China, however, the 
situation of state 
intervention remains 
largely prevailed.  
The extent and 
intensity of market 
economy are 




prevailed largely in 
reformed China.         
The Politburo 
Standing Committee 
of the Communist 
Party of China 
remains the highest 
authority in China 
since its 
establishment.  As 
always, those 
political leaders are 
not absolutely 
autocratic and need 
collaborations and 
supports from inferior 
party cadres.  Those 
corporate 
restructuring works 
were long gone; 
however, there are 
less restructuring 
works, which are with 
stronger intensity and 
to the higher extent, 
being carries out. 
China’s model is not 
as it is since the 
very beginning.  It 
varies from time to 
time and from one 
place to another.  
Market economy 
has gradually been 
accepted since 
1992.  The extent 
and intensity of 




1995 and therefore 
created many 
HNWIs.  The 
transition from 
planned economy to 
market economy 
was technically 
initiated in 1995. 
Intensity 
The intensity of 
reforms and 
opening is not as 
strong as it was. 
The intensity of 
allocation and 
distribution is 
stronger than it 
was. 
Extent 
The extent of 
reforms and 
opening has been 
increased 
dramatically.  
The extent of 
allocation and 
distribution is 






1979 although the 
path and tempo 




been carried out 
since the early 
1980s although 
path and tempo 
vary from time to 
time. 
Table 25 Relations between phase I Categorization (Fig 6.5) and Dimensions (Frequency, Intensity, Extent, and Duration) in Fig 6.4  
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Key Terms Category set Parameters 
Biased treatment 
Unplanned institutional changes 
Flexible institutional changes 
Backward advantages 
Huge domestic market 
Strong economic power  
Cheap labour force 
Inefficient protection 
Vague legal environment 
Political intervention 
Precedence of politics 
High cost for favourable institution 
Essentiality of reforms 
Inconsistent reforms 
Political power 
Mentality of bureaucrat 





Direction of reforms 









Unrestrained financial policy 




Adequate and essential connections with 
existing state agency 
Deng’s reforms 
Get some people rich first 
Speculation 
Market economy 
Sophisticated CCP structure 
Trivial individual 
Immovable political regime 
Deng’s trip to South in 1992 
Collective-owned enterprises/TVEs 
Private-owned enterprises 
Higher educated bureaucrats 
Unchanged bureaucratic behaviour 
Opportunitists 
HNWIs will not be restrained by regulation 
Chronic ideologies 
Social instability 
Unfairness and injustice 
Bureaucrats’ own wills 
Cost of making profit 
Allocation and 
distribution 
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Property right restructure 














Weak protection of private property 
Easier start-up 
Inherent advantage 
Connections with state agency 
Business expanding 
Influenced policy 
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Fig 29 phase II categorization 
Reform and Opening Property rights 
restructure  
China’s Model 
Unplanned institutional changes 
Flexible institutional changes 
Cheap labour force 
Vague legal environment 
Precedence of politics 
Essentiality of reforms 
Inconsistent reforms 
Political power 











Unrestrained financial policy 
Various reforms 
Deng’s reforms 
Get some people rich first 
Sophisticated CCP structure 
Immovable political regime 
Trial-and-error 
 
Precedence of politics 
Mentality of bureaucrat 


























High cost for favourable 
institution 
Deng’s trip to South in 1992 
Private-owned enterprises 




Huge domestic market 






Higher educated bureaucrats 
HNWIs will not be restrained by 
regulation 
Social instability 





















































Trial and error 
Inefficient 
SOE 
Fig 30 Details of Reform and Opening 
Immovable political regime  
Deinstitutionalizing 
  

























Fig 32 Private property right and derivative sub-categories 
 
 
Assigned Categories Formal Constraint 
Case Reference Interviewee #3 
A bit of Data As for the redundant workers, new enterprises had to lay off 
them within an approved range, e.g. 5% per annum in my 
company.   
Text Location Appendix 3/20 
Date 20/Dec/2010 



























































HNWIs and likes 
Constraints on 
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   CHAPTER 7 
 Theory Reality Deficiency Proposition 
1 
Many institutionalists (Veblen 
1898b ;Commons 1931 ;Alchian 
1950 ;Buchanan and Stubblebine 
1962 ;Demsetz 1964 ;Schultz 
1968 ;Cheung 1969 ;Coase 
1984 ;Williamson 1985 ;Tullock 
1988 ;Lin 1989 ;Stiglitz and 
Heertje 1989 ;North 1990) make 
institutional change endogenous 
to the model of economic 
behaviour. 
Institutional changes in 
transitional China actually 
embody more than economic 
feature, e.g. culture (Davis et al. 
1995), power and benefit 
structure (Chan 1996 ;Tang and 
Parish 2000), institutional 
change, resource dependence, 
and entrepreneurs (Walder 
2003,2004 ;Yang 2004), and 
others. 
What are the main features of 
China’s institutional changes except 
for economics? 
The aggregation of China’s 
institutional changes consist of the 
interactions between culture, 
economy, and politics.   
2 
Many studies (Commons 
1931 ;Davis and North 
1970 ;Coase 1984 ;Williamson 
1985 ;Lin 1989 ;North 1990 ;Chen 
et al. 1992 ;Hodgson 1993b ;Child 
and Yuan 1996 ;Blyth 2002 ;Nee 
2003 ;Zhou 2004) focusing on the 
impacts of regulative institutions 
and the pursuit of self-interests 
regard institutional changes as 
economy-oriented or triggered by 
economic factors. 
Many critical economic 
problems and recessed 
economy do not really cause 
institutional changes in China.  
For example, Great Leap 
Forward and Cultural Revolution 
followed by serious recessed 
economy and famine made 
hundreds of thousand people 
died.     
Which factor essentially causes 
institutional change in China? 
Some institutional entrepreneurs 
perceive changes that may threaten 
to hamper their access to resources 
or power and consequently affect the 
distribution of resources or power.  
Therefore, these elites will 
precipitate institutional changes. 
3 
Many institutionalists (David 
1985 ;North 1990 ;Arthur 
1994 ;Stark 1994 ;North 
1998 ;Pierson 2000 ;Mahoney 
2001) maintain that path 
dependent effects manifest in the 
process of institutional changes 
and regard the institutional 
framework of the economy in an 
The path dependent effects are 
selectively manifest in China.  In 
China, most institutional 
changes occur when political 
elites try to resolve problems 
that generate uncertainty over 
the distribution of resources and 
power.  Therefore, changes are 
relatively revolutionary. 
What exact effect does path 
dependence have effect on China’s 
institutional changes? 
Path dependence is especially 
manifest in the distribution of 
resources and power in China.  In 
terms of political institutions, China is 
arguably evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary.  However, China is 
relatively revolutionary and less 
path-dependent in terms of 
economic institutions.     
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evolutionary fashion. 
4 
The emergence of HNWIs can be 
attributed to the pursuit of 
maximization of individual utility 
and wealth (North 1981,1990:45). 
The pursuit of maximization of 
individual utility and wealth is a 
cause or generalization rather 
than a reason.  This argument 
can hardly explain how some 
former managers of SOEs were 
practically forced to take over 
the then broken SOEs and 
consequently become HNWIs in 
China.  
What is the real reason to making 
certain people to pursue individual 
utility and consequently becoming 
HNWIs in China? 
CCP devised unique private property 
rights through regulative 
mechanisms in China.  Lacking in 
appropriate normative and cultural-
cognitive mechanisms, the newly 
given property rights become 
distorted in the society.   
5 
Sinologists (Oi 1999 ;Chow 
2005,2006 ;Naughton 
2007 ;Goodman 2008) 
commented that China gradually 
started to loosen policy controls 
after the late 1970s. Therefore, 
speculation, as the consequence 
of loosened policy control, became 
prevalent and people signed up to 
the changes and joined the 
affluent social strata becoming 
HNWIs in transitional China.  
In the process of China’s 
institutional changes, policy has 
not been loosened all the time.  
Sometimes, policies have been 
tightened up because of 
inflation, other economic issues, 
and political struggle.  
Nevertheless, HNWIs presence 
has never stopped along with 
China’s institutional changes 
after 1980s. Therefore, this 
argument hardly can adequately 
explain how people become 
HNWIs in contemporary China. 
How exactly do some people 
exactly become HNWIs in China 
after economic reforms and who 
they are? 
To loosen policy control is a means 
rather than a reason to make people 
pursuing individual utility.  Because 
of disarrayed institutional pillars of 
China’s institutional environment, 
people spontaneously pursue the 
maximization of individual utility 
especially when they have chances 
to get close to the centre of re-
allocation and re-distribution of 
resources or power.  This arguably is 
the reason that how and why some 
people become HNWIs in China.  
6 
Many scholars (Romer 1990 ;Nee 
1991 ;Dewatripont and Roland 
1992 ;Zhang 2003 ;Yang 2004) 
regard China’s transition as 
partial, gradual, and spontaneous 
are changes that are associated 
with evolutionary reforms.  The 
uniqueness of the partial reforms 
in the transitional China, to some 
In China, no matter how 
urgently an induced institutional 
change is demanded, the CCP 
will not allow it to persist if it will 
politically jeopardizes the one-
party polity.  Relatively, China’s 
government and CCP will not 
recklessly impose any 
institutional change countrywide 
Why does compromised 
institutional change exist in China?  
How does it help HNWIs in China 
and vice versa? 
After reforms, a small degree of 
entrepreneurship is granted to 
ordinary people in China.  Relatively, 
party cadres and political elites were 
permitted a greater degree of 
entrepreneurial freedom.  
Meanwhile, prominent political 
leaders advocate that when nation, 
city, community, and individual gain 
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extent, is in response to Hayek’s 
Evolutionary perspective 
(1998:293-294) that institutional 
change cannot be consciously and 
rationally man-made to order. 
without conducting tests at 
selected points after the late 
70s.  In this regard, in order to 
retain the balance of politics and 
economy, a compromised 
pattern of institutional changes 
therefore emerged.  
more economic capital, social 
problems will be accordingly solved 
and people will experience higher 
standards of living.  This argument 
deliberately glosses over many 
problems, e.g. inequitable 
redistribution of resources, profit-
oriented behaviour. Thus, to-get-rich 
becomes the only purpose in the 
society and people will trade their 
obedience for more resources or 
power derived from inequitable 
redistribution.  This vicious circle 
consequently causes the 
compromised institutional changes in 
China. 
Table 36 Gap of Institutional Change Theory 
 
 





Source: Euromonitor International from national statistics 
Fig 37 China’s GINI Index (1990 – 2011) 
 
Type Reading Content 
1 Experiential 
To clarify the understanding the interviewees 
themselves had.  
2 Veridical 
To investigate the validity of the interviewees’ 
information.  Interviewees are regarded as witnesses 
and informants. 
3 Symptomatic 
To focus on the interviewees themselves and their 
reasons for making certain statement. 
4 Consequential 
To address the consequences of interviewees’ 
beliefs. 
Table 27 Interpretation Approach 
 
Source: Euromonitor International from International Monetary Fund (IMF)/2011  
Fig 38 GDP, Inflation, Newly completed housing and stock, Disposal Income growth in China (1977–2011) 
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Year Major Events in Housing Market 
1949-1978 To establish the socialist public ownership of land in then Chinese Constitution that 
not any organization or individual is allowed to embezzle, trade, lease or any other 
form to transfer land. The main features are uncompensated and indefinite LUR.  The 
ownership right and use right are not separated that result in substantial waste of 
scarce resource.  All land is administratively allocated in this era.  
1978. 9  The new policy of “sell old housings, build new ones” was adopted in the Third 
Plenum of the 11
th
 National Congress of CCP 
1979 China government starts using land as the registered capital in the Sino-foreign JV 
company and charges the land use fee from these JV companies. 
1980.1 The “Red Flag” journal propagandize the “raising rent, selling state flats to public” 
1982 4 testing point for raising rents and selling state flats to public 
1985.12 “Raising rents, selling flats” was adopted in 1604 cities and 300 counties and villages. 
SOEs raised 29% salary in order to compensate the rents 
1986 The Land Administration Law is passed and establishes the China Land 
Administration Bureau.  The use right and ownership right of land is separated and 
changes the uncompensated and indefinite LUR to compensated and time-limited.    
1987 1. The State Council proposes the LUR can be transferred with compensation.  In 
September, Shenzhen government transfers the 50-years LUR with compensation 
and gets the transfer of state-owned LUR with compensation started.   
2. In December, the first LUR was publicly auctioned in Shenzhen.  From this moment 
onward, governments are allowed to publicly auction state-owned land on the 
premise of keeping ownership right of land.  This is the first time to utilize market 
measure to allocate land resource. 
3. The trial of urban land valuation procedure is promulgated in this year.    
1988 1. The State Council starts collecting the land use fee in every town and village, tries 
the provision of paid-transfer LUR, and periodically transfers LUR. 
2. In April, the Seventh National People’s Congress amends the Chinese Constitution 
that removes the non-transferable regulation and stipulate the regulation of paid-
transfer of LUR. 
3. In December, the Congress amends the regulation that LUR can be transferred, 
rent, pawn. 
4. In this year, the real estate exchanges are established nationwide.  The 
departments of real estate credit are founded in many specialized banks.  
5. Hyper inflation, stop the “raising rents” movement 
1980-1990  1. 8.6% of occupiers bought public flats 
2. In May 1990, many foreign companies are allowed to invest in housing market and 
the State Council promulgate the “Interim Regulations of the PRC concerning the 
Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the 
urban areas” and “Interim Measures for the Administration of the Foreign-Invested 
Development and Management of Tracts of Land”.  
1991 Shanghai initiated the public accumulation fund of housing 
1992  1. In February, Deng Xiaoping finishes his renowned Southern Trip and makes the 
most famous speech in terms of continuing market economy and economic reforms 
in China.     
2. On 8
th
 of May, the first mortgage contract was signed in Shanghai, China 
1994-1997 1. 50% existing occupiers bough public flats 
2. In 1995, Hainan housing bubble blows up.  
3. In July 1995, the State Land Administration Bureau promulgates the Provisions on 
the Agreement-based Assignment of the Right to Use State-Owned Land that 
intensifies the state monopoly of LUR, insists the unified land planning, acquisition, 
management, and discussion, and implement one-chop approval, expand the area 
of land for transfer, and gradually transit the administrative allocated land to paid 
use.   
1997 30% of housing market were commercial housings, more than 60% were public 
housings 
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1998.7 Stop welfare-oriented public housing distribution system; the public housing market 
was up to the peak because government will stop the distribution soon; Public 
distribution stops in July partially 
2000.2 Public housing allocation was formally cancelled nationwide 
2002 Initiate public auction in land-use rights 
2003 State proclaimed the housing industry is the state piling industry  
2004 All land-use rights have to in the public auction system after 2004.8.31  
2004.Q2 Land-use rights fees surging 
2005.3 BOC cancelled the preferential mortgage package. 
2005.3.26 The State Council issued the number eighth document to control housing prices (the 
Old Eight articles). 
2005.5.9 The State Council issued the number twenty sixth document to increase the efforts to 
control soaring housing prices (the New Eight articles). 
2006.4 BOC raise the interest rate 
2006.5.16 The State Council issued a new measure, which consists of six articles, to control the 
soaring housing prices from the aspect of the structure of demand-and-supply, tax, 
bank loans, and land policy. 
2006.5.29 The State Council issued new measure, which consists of fifteen articles, to control 
soaring housing prices in terms of unit area, down-payment of first time buyer. 
2007.1 The Ministry of Land Resources started to check all land value-added tax. 
2007.3 BOC started raising interest rate (six times in this year) and deposit-reserve ratio of 
commercial banks (ten times in this year). 
2007.8 The number twenty-fourth document was issued to promote the low-rent housing 
system. 
2007.9 BOC issue the new measure to regulate the down-payment of second housing should 
not be lower than 40% and interest rate should not be lower than 1.1 time of prime 
rate. 
2007.11 State proclaim the new policy to guarantee the sufficient supply of economic 
commercial housings; increase interest rate 7 times in 2007; raise the down-payment 
percentage of 2
nd
 house  
2008 Worldwide credit crunch, housing market plummet 
2008.9 To lower interest rate 
2008.10 The Ministry of Finance issued a new measure to lower interest rate and deposit-
reserve ratio. 
2009.1 The four biggest commercial banks in China offered the discount rate for housing 
buyers. 
2010.1 The number eleventh document was issued that stipulated the down-payment of 




Housing price surging and higher than the highest in 2008 owing to huge internal 
investment to maintain GDP growth since 2009 
2010.4.17 The State Council regulated that the down-payment of the second housing should not 
be lower than 50% and of the first housing, which has area more than 90sqm/unit, 
should not be lower than 30%.  
2010.4.18 The State Council stop giving bank loans for the third housing buyers in those flourish 
areas. 
2011.1.26 The State Council issued the strictest regulation (the New Eight articles) to regulate 
the housing market. 
2011.9 Housing price start plunging manifestly because of the tight pricing control and 
insufficient cash liquidity of developers 
Source: News of the Communist Party of China (http://cpc.people.com/GB/64156/64157/4512167.html), The 
2010 National Statistics Bureau of PRC (NSBC), The Party (Sachs et al. 2000) 




Page 311 of 484 
 
 Stylized Fats Underlying Reasons 
1 
No consistent planning, method, and 
purpose of reform 
Time-limited 
2 No blueprint for reform Time-limited 
3 
Easy-to-Complicated reform pattern No reform purpose and guideline, no authoritative 
government and leader 
4 Dual-Track reform system No authoritative government and leader 
5 Local government dominating reform No authoritative government and leader 
6 
Stop-and-go institutional change 
process 
No reform purpose and guideline, no authoritative 
government and leader 
Table 29 the Stylized Facts and Underlying Reasons in China’s Reforms 
 
Source: 1996, 2000, 2010 National Statistics Bureau of PRC (NSBC) 
Fig 39 Important Economic Index in 1985-2009 
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Source: 2009 National Statistics Bureau of PRC (NSBC) 





Attributes of Change Major Events 
1978 - 1989 
Economic institution 
changes with least 
political institution 
changes 
 Rural reform and TVE (1978);  
 20% of SOE are perennially in deficit in 
1980’s;  
 SEZ (1980, 1981, 1982, 1988);  
 Government Bond (1981);  
 Corporate Bond (1982);  
 Anti-Spiritual-Pollution (1983);  
 TVEs booming (1983);  
 BOC become central bank (1983);  
 Ideology for becoming rich (1983);  
 Financial Bond (1984);  
 Economic Structure Reform (1984);  
 Dual-track price (1985);  
 Hyper-inflation (1985, 1988);  
 Shanghai OTC (1986);  
 Abolish anti-spiritual pollution (1986);  
 Recognize diversified interests and 
conflicts in society (1987);  
 SOE responsibility contracting (1987);  
 Housing and land reforms (1988);  
 Tiananmen Square Protest (1989); 
 New 
entrepreneurs 
emerged in 1985 
owing to dual-track 
price;  
 The real estate 
market produced 
all kinds of 
millionaires and 
also China’s first 
billionaire in late 
80s,  
1990 - 1999 
Economic and partial 
politic institution 
changes,  
 Inaugurating of Stock Exchange (1990);  
 CSRC established (1992);  
 Proclaiming Socialist Market Economy 
(1992);  
 All Purposed Banks becoming 
Commercial Banks (1993);  
 Hyper-inflation (1993);  
 30% of SOE are perennially in deficit 
 IPO amount 
increase largely 
since 1991;  
 MBO and 
Privatization of 
SOE is booming 
since 1998;  
 Huge Frauds of 
  




Attributes of Change Major Events 
before 1995;  
 40% of SOE are perennially in deficit 
(1995);  
 43.7% of SOE are perennially in deficit 
(1996);  
 Overall SOE deficit over profit (1996);  
 Decreeing Banking Laws (1995);  
 Emergence of mortgage industry in 
state banks (1995);  
 Proclaiming SOE stockholding system 
(1997);  
 Dual-track price annulled (1997);  
 Proclaiming SOE stockholding to be 
completed by 2001 (1998);  
 Government decrease staff up to 50% 
(1998);  
 Decreeing Security Laws (1999);  
Public companies 
in 1997 




 Entrepreneurs join CCP (2001);  
 Open Fund (2001);  
 Join WTO (2001);  
 QFII (2002);  
 Small & Medium Enterprise Board 
(2005);  
 Bond and Index Fund (2002);  
 Principle guaranteed Fund (2003); ETF 
(2004);  
 QDII Fund (2006);  
 Some developers start hoarding raw 
land for speculations, except few large 
developers (2006);  
 Government put strict restriction on land 
and real estate speculation (2007);  
 Worldwide credit crunch (2008); 
 Government implement a CNY 4,000 
billions special budget to revive 
economy and raise domestic demand 
(2009);   
 Housing price surging to the historical 
peak (2009); 
 Medias, intelligentsia, and public voices 
condemn the surging housing price 
(2009);  
 Government decide to regulate housing 
market dramatically (2010); 
 Emergence of 
Ultra-HNWIs in 
2001,  
 More Huge Frauds 
of Public 
companies in 
2000, 2001;  
 More volatilities in 
stock market since 
2001;  
 Developers start 
put raw land on 
fire sale (2007);  
 SOEs start to 
hoarding raw land 
and push the land-
use fee to 
historical high 
(2009); 
 Public voices and 
central 
government start 











to regulate the 
surging housing 
prices and finance 
market (2010); 
BOC: Bank of China; CSRC: China Securities Regulatory Commission; ETF: Exchange Traded Fund; IPO: Initial Public 
Offering; MBO: Manager-Buy-Out, OTC: Over-the-counter; QDII: Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor; QFII: Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investor; SEZ: Special Economic Zone; TVE: Town and Village Enterprise  
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 Market Economy 
 Hyperinflation 
 Land and Housing transactions and mar-
kets were allowed and completely imple-
mented. 
 KMT retreated from Mainland Chin 
 





 Command Economy  
 Compelled Resources Reallocation through 
confiscating – with egalitarian conse-
quences 
 First time without free market system since 
thousands years back in China  
 
 “Land and Housing transactions and mar-
kets are not allowed” was stipulated in Chi-
nese Constitution. 
 Rural land and urban land were collectively 
owned and State owned respectively. 
Land-use rights are not transferable. 
 Administrative allocation was the only im-
plementation of urban land. 
 PRC was established on 1949.10.1 
 1958-1961 – Great Leap Forward, 20 – 43 
million people died in famine (Peng 1987) 
(official number is 14 million) 
 1966-1976 – Cultural Revolution, 30 million 











 1983: Anti-Spiritual Pollution movement 
 1983: TVEs mushrooming 
 1984: Inauguration of Economic Structure 
Reform 
 1985: Dual-track pricing emerged 
 Resources Reallocation through reforms – 
with inequitable consequences 
 Free markets revitalized partially 
 1978.9 – People are allowed to sell old 
housings and build new housings. 
 1979.7 – Laws of Land-use rights system 
(land leasehold) was adopted. Land-use 
rights fees emerged in SEZs
4
 
 1982 – Land-use rights and ownership 
were separated since 1949  
 1984-1987: introduction of land-use fee and 
arable land occupation tax 
 To soothe the construction material supply 
and unleash the savings from people to in-
crease the capital liquidity of market 
 1978.12.22 - The Third Plenum of the 11th 
National Congress of the Communist Party 
of China is held in Beijing, with Deng 
Xiaoping reversing Mao-era policies to pur-
sue a program for Chinese economic re-
form. 
 1985-1988 Inflation 
 1985 – New entrepreneurs emerged due to 
dual-track pricing 
1986 – 1998 
GINI 
1986: 0.3178 
 1986: Abolishing of Anti-Spiritual pollution 
movement 
 1987: Reconcile to diversified interest and 
 1986 - The Provisional Regulation on the 
Granting and Transferring of the Land 
Rights over State-Owned Land in Cities 
 1989.06.04 – Tiananmen Square Mas-
sacre, hundreds ~  thousands people died 
 1990 – First billionaire emerged from real 
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conflicts of society 
 1987: SOE
6
 responsibility contracting sys-
tem emerged 
 1992: Socialist Market Economy pro-
claimed 
 More free markets emerged 
 Huge Income Disparity emerged in 1986 
(GINI index increased 23.5% YoY) 
 1995: 40% SOEs in perennial deficit 
 Early 1996: 43.7% SOEs in perennial defi-
cit 
 Late 1996: Overall deficits of SOEs were 
over profits 
 1997: Dual-track pricing annulled 
 1998: 50% of state bureaucrats were lay-off 
and Towns 
 1987 - First land plot sold to land-users in 
Shenzhen SEZ 
 1988-1995:  
a. Establishment of the legal foundation for 
the paid conveyance of LURs
7
 in State-
owned urban land  
b. Introduction of the urban land-use tax 
 1988 – Housing and land Reform move-
ment emerged 
 1995 – Mortgage industry emerged in state 
banks 
 1990-now: Nation-wide development of the 
paid conveyance and transfer of LURs in 
State-owned urban land 
estate industry 




 1993 Inflation 
 Early 1999 – Tariffs on most goods would 
fall by nearly 3/5 
 1997 – Huge Corporate Frauds and Scan-
dals emerged  
 1998 – MBO
15
 and SOEs privatization were 
booming   
 








 1999: Security Laws proclaimed   
 2001: “Entrepreneurs are welcome to join 
CCP” proclaimed by Jiang Zemin; Becom-
ing member of WTO 
 Accessing Socialist Market Economy 
 Most free markets except few categories 
remain under State control 
 2006 – Developers started hoarding raw 
land, except few large developers 
 2007 – State put restrictions on land 
speculation 
 
 2000-2001 – More fraud and scandals of 
Public companies emerged 
 2001 – Emergence of Ultra-HNWIs 
 2007 – Developers put raw land on fire-sale  
 
1. KMT: Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party), current ruling party of Taiwan; 2. PRC: People of Republic of China; 3. TVE: Town Village Enterprise; 4. SEZs: Special Economic 
Zones; 5. BOC: People’s Bank of China; 6. SOE: State-Owned Enterprise; 7. LURs: Land-use rights; 8. OTC: Over-the-counter; 9. CSRC: China Security Regulatory Commission; 
10. IPO: initial Public Offering; 11. GINI incremental percentage: 1978-2005 45.04%; 12. QFII: Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor; 13. ETF: Exchanged Traded Fund; 14. QDII: 
Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor; 15. MBO: Management Buy-Out. 
Table 31: Periodization of China’s Chronicle of Major Reforms (1949 – up-to-date)
  
  
Period Before 1949 1949 - 1978 1979 – 1985 1986 – 1998 1999 - Now 








































 Broad political and ideological thrust of successive 
reforms 
 Inconsistent changes in planning and resources 
allocation arrangements 
























 Reforms with 
more ambiguity 
than certainty 














Table 32:  Economic-Socio-Political Periodization 
 
 
Phase Time Cause Major Institutional Changes 
Phase I  
(1978 – 1992) 
1978 - 1985 All-Round Responsibility  Self-Employed, TVEs,  
1985 Dual-Track Pricing Dual-Track Speculation 
1987  Development of Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) First generation of HNWIs were 
emerged from Land & Real 
Estate Speculation 
1988 SOEs Shareholding 
1992 Land Transformation & Private 
Entrepreneur  
Phase II  
(1993 – 1998) 
1993 SOEs Privatization Second generation of HNWIs 
were emerged from 
Privatization, MBO, and IPO 
movement  
1995 IPO 
1998 Manager-Buy-Out (MBO) 
Phase III 
(1999 – 2007) 
2001 
Private Entrepreneurs join 
CCP; Encourage abroad 
Chinese entrepreneurs 
returning 
Ultra-HNWIs were emerged 
from IPO  
2002 Initiation of QFII 
2006 Initiation of QDII 
Data derived from China Securities Regulatory Commission, (Dickson 2003 ;Walter and Howie 2006 ;Hwang 2007) 
























In Minsky’s proposition (1986:293), a market cannot thrive without the visible hand 
of government, with norms, regulations, and institutions can be set up to enforce 
conformity whether it is in the command or market economy.  In other words, there is 
hardly any trade that can be confidently secured and implemented without 
government specific action.  In China, government on one hand is the guardian of 
institutions and makes markets prosperous but on the other hand, creates institutional 
holes (Yang 2004) and sabotages the rules of game repeatedly.  Consequently, the 
government policies have been changing very shortly and repeatedly since reforms 
initiated.  For example, the conflicting policies have been proclaiming in consecutive 
years in the housing and finance industries (see 2004 China Real Estate Finance 
Report).  In my view, economic purpose arguably is not the only explanation to 
initiate any new institutional arrangement in China by means of those inconstant 
policies.  In other words, grounding the evaluation of institutional change simply on 
such mechanical reason that economic benefit is the only purpose of reforms (North 
1990) may mislead the analysis. 
 
2 
The ideological foundation of Communism has long been viewed as a paradigm of 
statism and there should be no class distinction existing in the socialist utopia, which 
will only occur after a class struggle (Ding 1994).  Given that China was one of the 
most proletarian states before the late 70s, Communism (Maoism), which is alleged 
as Marxism or Leninism in China, is the only ideological belief of CCP.  However, 
the proletarian ideology not necessarily corresponds to the interests of the ruling 
class (Marx et al. 1991:41, 46, 64, 73).  In the perspective of Marxism, a society with 
oppression of one class by another is regarded as anomalous.  Durkheim (1986) 
asserts that the dichotomy of society is between the normal and the pathological, or 
alternatively, a perfect garden that is free of weeds (Reitzer 1996:22).  Therefore, a 
society with class distinctions is pathological rather than normal (Hamilton 
1995:155).  However, this argument is absurd because normal society should 
coincidently include both normal and pathological ones (Gane 1991).  From my 
  
  
viewpoint, a normal state must consist of heterogeneous classes rather than merely 
homogenous ones.  Even previous proletarian countries, namely FSU, CEE, China, 
that were allegedly class-free, consisted of more than single working class. 
 
3 
The bourgeoisie, as Marx and Engels ([1848] 2008:8) indicated, represents the class 
of modern capitalists, who are owners of the means of social production and 
employers of working class, and with  no means of production of their own  are 
reduced to selling their labour-power in order to survive.  In transitional China, the 
new bourgeoisie class may split into three different ranks - political elites, economic 
elites, and ordinary people.  Most social actors, whether they are political elites, 
economic elites, or ordinary people, cannot explicitly overrule main institutions made 
by upper tier(s).  For example, provincial agents have to follow the rules made by the 
Central Committee of CCP.  Like many countries, these main institutions are 
imposed by the top tier(s).  However, the fact is that state agents at different 
hierarchical level may interpret and implement reforms in a discretionary manner that 
results in various consequences. 
 
4 
In this research, I try to assist researchers to recognize the antecedents (indicators) of 
de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization in China in terms of institutional 
changes.  As Shirk (1993:21) argues Chinese political institutions have shaped 
economic reforms by creating incentives for political actors and the rules by which 
they make decisions; consequently, economic reforms may be best comprehended by 
focusing on the political institutions in which economic reform policies were made.  
In fact, Chinese experience of transition raises many questions about the relationship 
between economic and political reforms in communist states, and suggests that 
Chinese-style economic reforms are policy-equilibrium in the context of Chinese 
political institutions; therefore, this research argues that reforms in China follow a 
compromised path.  Of course, this research cannot tell the whole story of China’s 
reforms and so, it merely focuses on the role transitions of leading social actors, 
institutional changes, housing market, and their relationships within China.  
Consequently, it might be able to (1) explicate a broad range of institutional changes 
  
  
in China and to (2) understand when institutional pressures are least likely to exert an 
enduring influence on existing institutional environment. 
 
5 
Economic reforms in China were precipitated in early 80s without corresponding 
political, social, and cultural measures; therefore, the attained achievements were 
mainly in the economic domain.  In terms of a materialistic perspective, the social 
image of private entrepreneurs has been changing dramatically in an upwardly 
mobility manner from pariah. Further, with systematic propaganda aided by CCP, 
private entrepreneurs are now ideologically recognized to be an important pillar of 
China’s economic and social development.  In 2001, President Jiang Zemin officially 
declared that private entrepreneurs were accordingly acknowledged as an important 
pillar in China’s economic and social development.  It seems an epochal change that 
has occurred in a Communist (Leninist) state, which used to proclaim proletarian 
robustly.  In addition to the substantial assistances from state agents and party cadres, 
private entrepreneurs or HNWIs in transitional China utilize their powers of 
technological change and investment to exert downward pressure on non-national 
interests and open up opportunities for profitable deployment of their capital after the 
manner of traditional capitalism.  The so-called national interest is actually 
represented by corporations and their owners and high-ranking managers (Herman 
and Chomsky 1994:331) instead of ordinary people  or state.  I cannot help but 
question why the previously proletarian state would follow in the footsteps of 
capitalist states whilst other institutional changes have not moved in line with 
economic reforms in China.  Beesley (1997:26) contends that economic reform is not 
only the result of an efficiency-driven economic revolution but also reflects the 
prevailing political environment in any country.  However, because the prevailing 
political environment in China is communist-oriented, it seems that the economic 
reforms in China contradict Beesley’s argument insofar as they hardly reflect the 
prevailing communist political environment.  As previously mentioned, economic 
reforms in China are not closely related to politics, especially those that influence 
and dictate the allocation and distribution of scarce resources (Shih 2004a).  
Therefore, reforms in China can be categorised as  “plus ça change.” (White 1991:9) 
  
  
because every reform policy has to be implemented through entrenched and 
unwavering communist bureaucratic institutions (Shirk 1993:333). 
 
6 
In 2008, a Chinese activist, who investigated whether shoddy construction 
contributed to deaths in the Sichuan quake, has been sentenced to five years' jail on 
10 Feb, 2009 (BBC 2010).  Because this activist has disclosed too many corruptions 
that irritated ruling elites, therefore, he was put into prison.  Many similar contrasts 
essentially represent the paradoxes in China that continue to exist under the one-party 
political constraints since the late 70s.   
 
7 
The first China’s offshore IPO was initiated in Hong Kong stock market in 1993 that 
is the Qingdao Beer, which remains a SOE.  There are many examples of people 
generating substantial wealth through IPOs who then become HNWIs afterwards, e.g. 
Zhang Yin of Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings) Limited, Jack Ma of Alibaba Group, 
Robin Lin and Eric Xu of Baidu Inc, Charles Zhang of SOHU.     
 
8 
In retrospect, the tactics of early Chinese HNWIs of pursuing individual wealth were 
abrasive and maladroit.  For example, I compare the business scheme of Mou 
Qizhong of Nande Group (Liu 2001 ;Yang 2004) that was one of early HNWIs in 
China with current monetary speculations, people can hardly believe those pretty 
clumsy and implausible schemes had once existed in China.  Equally, we should not 
associate those crude reform policies at early stage with current intricate tactics  
 
9 
In order to assess the China’s transition accurately, the discussion of TVE in this 
study excludes the small individual-owned-enterprises (geh-ti-hu) and large private 
rural enterprises (siying qiye), unlike some official statistics that subsume both under 
the TVE label.  There are abundant literatures regarding China’s TVEs.  For example, 
Oi (1985) debates the politics and TVE in rural area; Nee (1989,1991,1992) focuses 
on the role of TVE in the market transition; Walder (2002) concentrates his 
  
  
attentions on the market opportunity of TVE and income determination in rural areas; 
Chow (2007) provides an overview over the transition of TVE.    
 
10 
At the outset of reforms, economic power was de-regulated gradually and decision-
making power was transferred to local state agents because of the inherited political 
decentralization.  Nonetheless, major political factions have been exhausted during 
the Cultural Revolution, so that no single political faction emerged as powerful as 
Mao Zedong was that was able to dominate CCP and China effectively.  Various 
minor factions tried to access the assumed power vacuum in order to seize political 
power.  Even Deng Xiaoping himself, who was the prominent leader in China, 
actually needed Chen Yun and Wang Zhen to support his impressive economic 
reform programs initiated in late 1970s.  From the resource dependence perspective, 
Deng Xiaoping and other supporters introduced economic reforms to China not only 
to restore depressed economy but also to marginalise political opponents. 
 
11 
These recriminations have been seeing frequently while Hu Jingtao was in power in 
2003.  Many of the previously top richest Chinese ranked by Forbes, were arrested 
after 2003 i.e. Hwang Guang-yu (2008 ranked 1
st
), Zhang Rong-kun (2005 ranked 
16
th
), Zhou Zen-yi (2002 ranked 11
th
), Zhu Guo-ping (2008 ranked 366
th
), Xie Guo-
sheng (2007 ranked 348
th
), and to name but a few.  Many people in China argued 
that certain previous schemes used to accumulate wealth could be condemned as 
illicit activities after the shift of political power.  Nonetheless, this assumption is 
paradoxical and the outcome to be contradictory.  Many of these accusations have 




There is a survey that was done by many prominent and respectable scholars on the 
development of private enterprise commenced by the China Academy of Social 
Science (Sunstein 1992-1993).  It records most relevant data from 1989 until now, 
and contains more information than official statistics.  In the 2002 survey, CASS 
  
  
conducted a comprehensive investigation of the last postings these private owners 
before starting their businesses (see Table 12.1, Fig 11.1, 12.2).   
 
Last Post Before 1992 1993-1996 1997-1999 2000-2001 
General cadres - 9.1 5.4 0.3 
Unit-level cadres - 1.5 0.8 3.1 
Section-level cadres 8.4 3.5 4.2 11.8 
County-level cadres 2.7 0.4 2.0 1.0 
Bureau-level cadres 0.7 0 0.6 0.3 
Executive of authorities above 
county-level 
1.1 - - - 
Rural commune leader 0.8 0.5 - 0.3 
Main leader of village 10.9 0.9 2.8 2.6 
Lessee of SOE 5.3 13.1 13.8 10.0 
Executive of SOE 23.6 - - - 
Manager of small-medium SOE 14.1 - - - 
Manager of large SOE 18.2 - - - 
Sales member of SOE 6.7 4.1 3.7 0.5 
Military cadres 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Others - 42.7 60.3 66.8 
Unemployed - 23 6.2 3.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number of People 736 917 355 391 
Data derived from (Zhu et al. 2003) 

















Data derived from Table 12.1 





Data derived from Table 12.1 
Fig 11.2: The percentage of people with resources controls 
 
In the table 12.1, lessees of SOE were the previous higher-ranked managers or 
directors of factories who were much condemned during the privatization process 
owing to their deliberate infringement on state assets (Kikeri et al. 1994 ;Nellis 
1994 ;Li et al. 1998 ;Ding 2000c ;Birdsall and Nellis 2003 ;Mak et al. 2007).  
Excluding the rows of unemployed and others in the table 12.1, those private owners, 
who had real control over resources in their last postings, account for 18%, 77%, 
76%, and 88% (or 18%, 28%, 23%, and 27% with all samples) in before 1992, 1993-
1996, 1997-1999, and 2000-2001 respectively.  The reason these people accounted 
for a lesser proportion in the first period because CASS did not put others and 
unemployed in the survey.  In addition, CASS lost lots of valuable information 
because many interviewees selected others as their last postings.  I presume their 
interviewees were reluctant to disclose their previous information for reasons of 
suspicion and uncertainty. 
 
13 
Since China was one of the proletarian countries before its economic reforms and 
still claims herself to be a communist and party-state country in the Constitution, the 
reforms in China are unlike the privatization in UK or Meiji Japan (Beesley 
  
  
1997 ;Norman 2000).  In fact, they (China’s reforms) are different since private 
ownership rights, pursuit of private interests, and fullest expression of self-interest is 
able to flourish along with a communist configuration (Zhang 2008:3).  The greatest 
difference in privatization between UK, Japan, and China is the rule-of-law instead 
of the rule-by-law.  In China, on one hand, there are laws but they lack decent 
enforcing mechanism; on the other, some vital laws are ambiguous or full of 
vagueness and uncertainty, especially property rights. This vagueness and 
uncertainty, in fact, generates speculative ideas for speculators and provides them 
with opportunities.  Therefore, unlike Hayek’s (1944) argument about the end of 
Communism, the explicit economic growth manifests in China while private choices 
remain within the political constraints. 
 
However, the institutional changes in China, that constitutes a departure from state 
socialism, rely not only on those compelling reforms but also on inconsistent and 
independent reforms.  Instead of that, the state should simultaneously take apart the 
institutions of central planning and put in its place the essential rules of a market 
economy, i.e. competition, rule-of-law.  In fact, the institutional changes actually 
perpetuate a close relationship between the state and the private economic agents in 
contemporary China because of its asynchronous and deficient reforms.  As Nee and 
Opper (2006b) argue, state agents in China are, on one hand, rarely willing to 
introduce a new economic systems that completely deprive them of direct control 
rights at  the level of the firm.  On the other hand, agents at firm level 
(bureaupreneurs, entrepreneurs, and HNWIs) often prefer the persistence of direct 
state-firm connections to gain access to public resources in a highly insecure and fast 
changing business environment.  That is to say, there still is a very different 
atmosphere of interaction between state agents and individuals in former socialist 
countries than in countries with a long tradition of free markets (Murrell 1996). 
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In fact, it is not easy for bureaucrats to get out of those structurally embedded 
behaviours.  Unless there are structural changes in the power relationship, it is 
unlikely these behaviours can hardly be altered completely.  As Fligstein (1991:313) 
  
  
argues, unless there is a new set of agents to gain power, the organization’s goals will 
persist.  This is the characteristic of structurally based conflicts in society (Lawler 
1992) that even there are newly formulated relations of property rights after reforms, 
these new relations can be neglected, distortedly implemented, or even falsified.  
Therefore, the persistence of these structurally embedded characteristics is, in effect, 
the core feature of China’s politicized capitalism (Nee and Opper 2006a).  In 
transitional China, the law is not what it says it is – it is what the bureaucrat says it is 
(Commons 1931:697).  Thus, it is more essential to know who the man is in control 
than it is to know what law is. 
 
15 
In pre-reform China, for example, urban land belonged to the government and 
agrarian land belonged to the people living in the rural areas as  stipulated in the 
Constitution of PRC.  Therefore,  no one then was able to speculate on this  land, 
whether they lived in urban or rural area.  Since the reforms , related property rights, 
namely land use rights, given to the established state wealth,  turned them into 
valuable assets that could be transformed into monetary value consequently.  It is 
notable that there is no physical difference in this land before and after the initiation 
of reforms; the sole distinction is the newly given use rights attached to these lands.  
The crux mentioned earlier is the transitional process of property rights, which 
creates new property rights for existing wealthy people yet lacks in integrity, 
transparence, and fairness.  It is alleged that such manipulation and intrigue results in 
the social disparity, embezzlement of state property, and emergence of HNWIs.  
After the initiation of reforms, new or revised property rights, namely privatization of 
SOEs, MBO (management-buy-out), auction of land use rights, were attached to 
existing state wealth and have been transformed this wealth into valuable assets and 
monetary value accordingly.   
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In fact, reforms in China were not a matter of time but were incurred by the critical 
social context in which people in China desperately longed for peaceful lives before 
the late 1970s.  Therefore, in the third Plenary Session of the 11
th
 Central Committee, 
  
  
ninety percent of the Central Committee members of CCP, who had witnessed the 
demise of the Manchu Dynasty, warlord chaos, the long march, the Japanese invasion, 
and long term social struggles, passed through the reform policy in order to ease 
society economically (Deng 1983).  Thus, I should not make any evaluation or 
assertion prior to the comprehension of the historical backdrop; otherwise, people 
may dogmatically assert that the provisional and biased reforms sowed the seeds of 
future predicaments in China.  For example, Wu Jinglian (2002:395,418), a highly 
respectable Chinese economist, mentioned that selecting the market economy does 
not mean solving all problems since a good market economy should be based on the 
foundation of rule-of-law and then become a rule-of-law market economy.  In 
retrospect, we should understand that to discuss the rule-of-law at the outset of the 
reforms is inconsequential and may jeopardize the progress of economic transition 
because of the then Kafkesque process in China.  That is to say, reforms in China 
actually give in to the external reality rather than mouthing about the ideal.  As 
previously asserted, China’s reforms, in truth, were compromised with the society 
situation rather than any persistence from the very outset. 
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That is to say, reforms appeared to be divergent at the very beginnings in China from 
those previous Communist countries.  Therefore, China is on the horns of a dilemma 
because she is not only different from those big-bang reforms adopted by previous 
Communist comrades, but also has to introduce market economy into the existing 
command economy system in order to restore the economy. Under these 
circumstances, China’s transition can neither resemble those in UK, Japan nor FSU 
and CEE because of the preceding restrictions.  Therefore, reforms in China can 
hardly be large scale but rather gradual in order to adapt to the dynamic institutional 
environment.   
 
18 
For example, private property rights, on one hand, have been granted to ordinary 
people by CCP but without corresponding institutional supports.  Thus, managers of 
SOEs may take personal ownership of public assets.  On the other hand, ordinary 
  
  
people are not allowed to improve their own vulnerable situation by changing 
existing inadequate institutional supports.  For example, even though ownership of 
agrarian land or urban housing were granted to people in China, economic elites may 
collude with state agents or cadres to confiscate rural lands or pull down urban 
housing and relocate the existing owners without sufficient compensation under the 
guise of reform policy, e.g. development of new industrial zone.  Therefore, 
embezzlement of public assets, which belong to everybody, and the infringement of 
people’s rights prevail in transitional China.  Arguably, this research argues that only 
powerful people can perpetuate their wealth once their assets are endowed with 
property rights and are legitimately protected by public coercion in a constant but 
fragmented institutional environment.  This argument may be pertinent from one 
country to another.  For example, after The Return of Owners of Land created in UK 
and Ireland in 1872, the top 10 private landowners of UK and Ireland remained in the 
dominant positions from then onward (see Table 14.1).   
 
 UK and Ireland (Acres)* Top 10 Landowners (Acres) % 
1872 71,871,992 4,301,935 5.98 
2001 72,557,919 1,297,500 1.79 
*Ireland (1872) and Republic of Ireland (2001); Data derived from (Cahill 
2001:7,359,379) 
Table 14.1 Top 10 Landowners of UK and Ireland  
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Because China’s reforms derive from the legacy of the previous planned economy, 
these legacy will draw the parameters for institutional change in China and make it 
become unique, being different from the model of free market economy that most 
schools of institutional change theory focus upon.  In this regard, formal institutions 
in China comprise numerous of ideological constraints and market opportunities, 
which may motivate actors to think up innovative institutional arrangements that are 
not officially sanctioned.  Therefore, institutional change in transitional China is not 
exempt from transformation.  With recurrence and diffusion, these new institutional 
arrangements - the adaptive informal institutions, may take on an institutional reality 
of their own.  Eventually, adaptive informal institutions may encourage political 
  
  
elites to change the original formal institutions (Tsai 2006a). 
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In previous sections, I have has described the parameters of institutional change 
theory and resource dependence theory, and their inter-relationships.  I also employ 
the framework drawn from resource dependence theory to analyze China’s 
institutional changes.  In this section, I tend to exemplify my arguments drawn from 
these two theories in terms of China’s reforms.  Previously, I have argued that 
property rights in China play a significant role in affecting institutional change and 
the consequences.  Apart from that, it also sets out how private property rights in 
China are deliberately exploited by powerful people in the first place.  In this regard, 
the situation in China is not likely to resemble de Soto’s (Economist 2006) argument 
that only given property rights can enrich poor people.  Without corresponding 
institutional arrangements, this research argues that granted property rights would be 
manipulated by powerful people and become a legitimate mechanism to legally 
convert public or disadvantaged people’s assets into those belonging to the powerful 
elites.   
 
Regarding man-made property artefacts, I have to discuss the degree of rationality by 
those involved.  Rational actors will act for sufficient reasons, such as the belief and 
desire to explain their actions appropriately (Elster 2009:2).  Because desires are the 
first cause of action, therefore, those rational actors would never have any problem to 
choose their desires (Elster ibid:34) that they prefer to own as much as possible while 
private property rights granted to social actors in China after reforms.  This 
preference is represented as a utility function with a numerical value such as amount 
of housing or money.  That is why people may say rational people try to maximize 
their utilities.  However, if there is no asymmetric information transaction costs and 
time constraint, rational actors could maximize personal utilities with no problem.  
Because social actor’s rationality is limited by his ability to receive, store, retrieve, 
and process information to make knowledge or feelings understood by others 
(Williamson 1975), therefore, it is not only unattainable for social actor to be rational 
to maximize utility but also need to cooperate with other people in the same 
  
  
institutional environment.   
 
Institutional change in China, as Karl Polanyi (1957:148-156) argued, has a ‘double 
movement” because it is difficult and expensive for rational actors to maximize 
personal utility and individual rationality does not inevitably imply group rationality 
(Demsetz 1967 ;Alchian and Demsetz 1972 ;Furubotn and Pejovich 
1972 ;Williamson 1975,1985).  The makers of new institutional arrangements, on 
one hand, try to introduce new institutions to build up new social orders; on the other 
hand, the new rules constrain the freedom to make new institutional arrangements for 
the ordinary people.  The double movement phenomena can be frequently seen in 
China’s transition (see Note 7).  From Note 7, I have perceived that even though 
private property rights have been granted to ordinary people, however, they are not 
allowed to improve their own vulnerable situations by changing existing inadequate 
institutional supports without corresponding institutional supports.  In this sense, 
powerful people in China can perpetuate their wealth once their assets are endowed 
with property rights and are legitimately protected by public coercion in a constant 
but fragmented institutional environment.   
 
Arguably, economic growth in China is supported by institutional change and 
existing institutional arrangements are gradually replaced due to shifts in the 
demand-and-supply of institutional services (Lin 1989).  Therefore, new institutional 
arrangements will be accordingly brought in to take advantage of lucrative 
opportunities associated with economic growth however, the change or transition 
from one existing institutional arrangement to another could be very costly 
(Williamson 1985).  That is to say, unless the net profits to individuals from the shift 
to the new arrangements outweighs the corresponding costs, spontaneous 
institutional change is unlikely to arise.  This argument justifies that evolutionary 
institutional change is rarely appropriate.  Because institutional arrangements are a 
means to realize the profits of collective actions, therefore, a new institutional 
arrangement would be easily accepted when it is initiated for public goods.  In other 
words, institutional changes often need collective actions.  However, free-riders 
issues, as North (1981,1990) argued, are inherent in institutional change and will 




As previously mentioned, institutions reflect the distribution of power and resources 
(Campbell 2004:1).  That is to say, human beings indeed hold the controls of 
distribution and re-distribution instead of the state or organizations; therefore, 
institutions are associated with people, who have the rights to distribute resources 
and power at their disposal.  In China, state bureaucrats and party cadres resemble 
people those who have rights to control resource distributions.  However, markets 
and bureaucracy should not be mixed together in a market economy, as despite the 
appearance of a market, the disadvantages of both market and bureaucracy remain 
(Kornai 1990:14).  Arguably, the current situation in China is that the market 
economic system has hardly been implemented with comprehensive associated 
political constraints.  Thus, this research hypothesises that China can hardly attain a 
comprehensive market economy within the current political constraints.  The partial 
reforms in this previously socialist economy continue to redefine the institutional 
parameters, which largely derive from the legacy of the previous command economy.  
Although vested interest groups endeavour to perpetuate the existing favourable 
institutional parameters, they may be toppled by those innovative institutions as they 
cannot cope with the pace of emerging economic reforms and may consequently 
reduce the market efficiencies or generate speculative opportunities or institutional 
holes (Yang 2004).   
 
Arguably, there are strong associations between institutional change and economic 
reforms in China, and vice versa (Chen et al. 1992 ;Bian and Logan 1996 ;Bromley 
and Yao 2006 ;Chow 2006); however, the institutional legacies derived from the 
practice of socialism strengthen the influence of party-state characterised by inertia 
during the transitional phase. Some intuitionalists (North 1990:93-95;Powell 
1991:192) define path-dependence as a process by which contingent events or 
decisions result in the establishment of institutions, prevailing over long periods of 
time, constraining actors’ options.  This phenomenon can be perceived as path-
dependence (North 1990:94) and continues to explicitly strengthen the privileges of 
existing economic and political elites in China.  As it is expensive to create and 
change institutions, once created, institutions tend to generate positive feedback and 
  
  
support from constituents and institutional elites, who derive increasing financial 
returns and other benefits from these arrangements (Campbell 2004:13).  Therefore, 
strong and privileged interest groups and commercialized local governments will 
endeavour to hamper equal distribution of benefits derived from economic growth 
throughout society, thereby rendering futile the CCP's strategy of trading economic 
growth for people's consent to its absolute rule (Yao 2010).  Under these 
circumstances, many positive institutional innovations in China, which have the 
potential to benefit the majority of the population but can also restrict privileged 
groups accessing their economic benefits, are deliberately obstructed. For example, 
since the first land-use fee was collected in Shenzhen SEZ in 1987, the publicly-
auctioned system of raw land was only enforced nationwide in 2004, nearly two 
decades after the first collection of land-use fee, and there have been a myriad of 
embezzlements and frauds ever since.  The reasons for deferring the nationwide land 
auction mainly stem from two sources.  First, local governments use it to increase the 
insufficient budgets allocated to them since decentralization. Obscure land transfers 
can be the most useful financial resource to assist with their deteriorated finances.  
Second, obscure land transfers can be a main source of private income for local 
agents therefore evolving into corruption and embezzlement (Foldvary 1998 ;Lau et 
al. 2000 ;Ding 2003).  Similar discrepancies have arisen in many unusual 
privatization processes such as Dual-Track Pricing, Manager-Buy-Out (MBO), 
which are de facto embezzlement of public assets disguised as improving economic 
efficiency (Lang et al. 1995). However, only a decade after it first appeared, this 
incongruous process has since been abolished.   
 
In contrast to the invisible hand of Adam Smith ([1776] 1982:264), Minsky 
(1986:293) argues that a market cannot thrive without the visible hand of 
government, which can set up norms, regulations, and institutions, enforcing people 
to conform, whether it be a command or market economy.  Without government’s 
stipulation (visible hand), Minsky argues that hardly any trade can be implemented 
confidently and securely.  Minsky’s argument corresponds to Polanyi’s (1957:148-
156) double-movement.  On one hand, China’s government has introduced 
innovative institutions and ensured a prosperous market; on the other hand, the same 
  
  
government creates institutional holes and repeatedly sabotages regulations, in part 
due to incomplete reforms.  In China, government policies have undergone many 
series of changes in a short period since their implementation. For example, there 
have been many conflicting policies implemented one after the other in the housing 
and finance industries (see 2004 China Real Estate Finance Report).  Because of 
these irreconcilable policies introduced into transitional China, it is possible that the 
reasons behind the new institutional arrangements are not solely economic.  As 
North (1990) points out, it is perhaps wrong to maintain that economic benefit was 
the only reason behind the institutional reforms. The institutional environment 
should underpin all institutions within it; therefore, a sound institution set within an 
inappropriate institutional environment either loses the support from its surrounding 
environment or deteriorates.  For example, although private property rights,  
(allegedly the reason behind the prosperity of most capitalist countries) were granted 
to the majority of Chinese people, the incomplete institutional environment has 
weakened and undermined the well-intentioned institution of private property rights.  
Therefore, private property rights have become a legitimate mechanism for powerful 
people to embezzle public assets and infringe the wealth of others.  However, due to 
the unstable institutional environment, elites’ assets may vary according to the 
changes of institutional parameters.  In these circumstances, elites must secure 
essential resources in order to become competitive within their surroundings.  Failure 
to do so could result in the inability to maintain their wealth and privileges. 
 
North (1990) gives one of the most prevalent definitions of institutional rules, both 
formal rules (constitution, laws and government decrees) and informal constraints 
(norms, conventions and codes of conduct) which provide the structure for human 
interaction.  From my experiences derived from several in-depth interviews with 
Chinese HNWIs and long-term residence in China, I have found this specific 
definition has been perceived in a different way.  Most of the Chinese I know simply 
recognize formal rules such as constitution and laws as constituting an institution.  
They neither notice nor are aware of the informal constraints, which constitute an 
institution.  Therefore, institutional change in China is only recognised as 
amendments to written documents, laws and policies, and not changes to ideological 
  
  
beliefs, norms and conventions.  That is to say, even though the Chinese government 
intends to make institutional changes to cope with the changing institutional 
environment, they cannot succeed in making comprehensive institutional changes as 
they do not recognise or perceive the informal constraints.  This is despite the effect 
these well-established informal constraints have on the written rules of institutional 
change, however inconspicuous or invisible they are. For example, as private 
property rights were not allowed in pre-reformed China, many collective and public 
assets as well as a very small number of private agrarian properties were considered 
as in being in absentee-ownership, and therefore belonging to everyone. .  Under 
these circumstances, the properties could be at the disposal of state agents and cadres 
with no legitimate reason.  As such, the granted formal private property rights remain 
fragile in reformed China because state agents and elites may consider keeping 
public assets and/or other’s property as their own over time.  Therefore, even 
economic elites try to access wealth as soon as possible due to future uncertainties; 
however, they may also endeavour to assimilate all possible resources to protect their 
existing privileges and wealth, whilst also keeping themselves competitive in within 
their surroundings.             
    
These institutionalized practices established before the reforms which seemed 
unsustainable or could not continue after reforms, as Christine Oliver (1992) 
contends, can be referred to as deinstitutionalization.  As prevailing political logic 
leads many Chinese bureaucracies to challenge previously legitimised or traditional 
activities post-reform, in turn, creating new rules, this research hypothesises that 
China’s transitions are composed of a series of deinstitutionalization and re-
institutionalization.   In short, deinstitutionalization refers to the de-legitimation of 
established organizational practices due to the organizational challenges of 
reproducing previously legitimated or traditional organizational actions.  In this 
regard, organizational behaviours and changes cannot be explained by social 
consensus regarding the meaning and value of an activity or by conforming to 
institutional pressures (Oliver ibid).  As a result, institutional pressures to conform 
and the shared interpretations of institutional rules and expectations do not have the 
predicted consequences on organizations.  Under these circumstances, the social 
  
  
patterns and practices may not “reproduce” (Jepperson and Meyer 1991:145) 
themselves, and consequently, , vested interest groups do not look to the future and 
try to collect as many essential resources as possible because of uncertainty.   
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For example, HNWIs in China first emerged in the early 90s.  Nonetheless, in the 
past decades, people have been bombard with widely differing approaches that 
explore the emergence of HNWIs such as opportunity, collusion, capital, or diligence.  
However, none of these approaches can independently explain either economic 
growth or emergences of HNWIs in China.  In fact, economic disparity and 
emergence of HNWIs persist in China because they are complex products of the 




In China, many state authorities, especially at the lower end of the hierarchies, adopt 
whatever practices they consider their institutional environment regards appropriate 
or legitimate whether it will enhance economic efficacy or not.  Nearly all my 
interviewees (except #8) had similar complaint that state policies are volatile, and 
these policies are often carried out at the discretion of lower authorities.  These 
policies applied to business can be implemented strictly or flexibly owing to the then 
social sphere and political atmosphere.  It all depends on who you are (foreign or 
local, SOE or private), where you are from (foreigner or home, offshore or inland), 
and who your local partner is (SOE, TVE, collective, or private).  If  any bureaucrat 
tries to translate these policies fairly and in a way that will possibly jeopardize the 
benefits of vested interest groups, he or she will soon be replaced, transferred, or 
downgraded from his/her existing post.  The best way to survive for bureaucrats is to 
follow the then prevailing pattern in society.      
 
A further manifest example in China is that of the Public Housing Project, which can 
provide the evidence of deviation from stated goals in organizations.  In 1950s, a 
Public Housing Project first originated in Beijing as a flagship project to prove that 
  
  
then China was an advanced state.  This project consisted of shops, schools, and 
medical stations as well.  Since the 1998 reforms, and as a consequence of income 
disparity, Public Housing Projects developed into accommodation for those destitute 
and medium-low income people.  Such projects mushroomed between 1999 and 2005 
but their nature is different from their original aims. There are an increasing number 
of mansions juxtaposed with very few real Public Housing in the same site and many 
owners of Public Housing increasingly display conspicuous consumption behaviours. 
 
For example, there are many owners of those Public Housings driving expensive 
imported cars.  According to Shenzhen Night Times (8
th
 March, 2010), in the third 
phase of Taoyuan village, which is designed to be an Public Housing community, 
16% of residents own their private cars valued more than CNY200,000 (equivalent 
to £19,500 according at the then exchange rate).  Since 2006 because of tax 
concessions and other benefits, especially in land acquisitions, there were even some 
mansions built under the guise of Public Housing in order that developers and local 
bureaucrats can increase their economic returns.  For Public Housing, government 
will adopt so-called administrative transfer to provide free land (2007).  As local 
state agents hold the right to allocate Public Housing, they can get real economic 
returns from the allocations.  This phenomenon corresponds to the previously 
mentioned one of political elites sabotaging the rules of game that determines how 
those valued forms of capital are allocated across occupations and positions.  In 2008, 
government started to stamp out the speculation with an iron fist; however, many 
maladies continue to exist in local authorities.  For example, owing to the 
suppression of housing speculation, central government policies now encourage the 
developments of Public Housing but discourage and restrict the constructions of 
luxury housing.  Some developers, under the banner of Public Housing, continue to 
construct mansions everywhere.  Many developers applied for Public Housing 
licenses in the first place; consequently, they undertake minor renovations to these 
units to produce a luxury mansion for sale after getting the occupancy license.  It is 
not surprising that Mao Yushi (2009), one of the esteemed public sector economists, 
advocates government should stop building affordable housing because local 
authorities and speculators unscrupulously manipulate the well intended central 
  
  
government provisions.  Mao contends that if there is any demand for affordable 
housing, there should not even be any private toilet and bathroom allowed inside the 
unit of affordable housing.  Instead, they should build public toilets and bathrooms in 
order to rule out the speculation and rent seeking.            
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For example, in the beginning of China’s reforms, CCP tried to introduce market 
influences into a centrally planned economy (Saich 2001:212).  However, as the 
statement of Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988:3), the outcomes of these reforms are 
the “negotiations, bargaining, and the seeking of consensus among affected 
bureaucracies”.  Therefore, in transitional China, there is no direct relationship 
between problem and solution, and the policy outcome may not reflect the problem 
that previously caused the decisional process (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988:4;Saich 2001:212).   
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Among these different types of ideas, this research starts by discussing concepts in 
the foreground and from programs because they have the most direct effects on 
institutional changes.  As Campbell (2004:98) comments, programs are found in both 
the public and private sectors and include such things as policy prescriptions and 
corporate strategies.  For example, property rights should be respected and abided by.  
However, the development of property rights in transitional China is different from 
those evident in other countries, e.g. Canada, United Kingdom, USA, Japan, South 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, etc.  In these countries, property rights are, as Rajan and 
Zingales (2004:131) state, a form of monopoly that gives the owner of an asset the 
exclusive right to use the asset and exclude others from its use.  In transitional China, 
however, the juxtaposition of market economy and command economy confused 
state agents who then had the leeway to exploit from the incomplete reforms.  The 
newly introduced private properties, which were at their (social elites) disposal 
during the early reforms, were definitely not the private properties they possessed 
before economic reforms.  Because the dividing line between what is public and what 
is private in transitional China is often still impossible to detect, a company could 
  
  
privately run one day and find itself claimed as a state asset the next, and vice versa 
(Mcgregor 2010:197,203).  Therefore, the introduction of private property rights that 
constitute a program and policy prescription serving to bolster the economy, became 
the mechanism to help social elites to legitimately transfer public assets and/or 
confiscate private properties to their owns.  In this regard, programs become the tool 
of decision makers or social elites to gain power and resources for themselves (Blyth 
2002:258).  Nevertheless, there is no discussion regarding why some programs are 
more attractive and effective than others.  Thus, this research tends to discuss frames 
in following paragraph to clarify this issue. 
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Politically, China is not different from FSU and CEE because they all derived 
legacies from Leninism (Fligstein 1990).  Therefore, the above description mainly 
differentiates economic transitions between these countries.  Demographically, China, 
which was unlike FSU, remained an agricultural society while they began to reform 
in late 70s (see Table 22.1).  
 
 Agriculture Industry Construction Transport Commerce Other 
China 
(1978) 
71% 15% 2% 2% 3% 7% 
Russia 
(1985) 
14% 32% 10% 10% 8% 26% 
Data derived from IMF (1992); China Statistical Yearbook 1992 
Table 22.1 Distribution of Employment by Sector 
 
Moreover, while economic reforms were first initiated in China in the late 1970s, the 
market economy was not a distant memory to most people since the command 
economy was only comprehensively implemented after 1956 (Wu 2002).  Unlike 
China, the planned economic system had been entirely put into practice in FSU since 
1912; therefore, the market economy, which had been regarded as evil and rivalry, 
has disappeared nearly a century while FSU first initiated economic reforms in early 
90s.  On the contrary, when Deng Xiaoping began his reforms in the late 70s, the 
planned economy had only been n place in China for thirty years.  Therefore, 
peasants, former entrepreneurs, as well as many others still remembered market 
economy practices and accordingly revived their previous market ties after the 
  
  
reforms.  On the contrary, in FSU, the Leninist communism was already fully 
brought into force for sixty-five years when Gorbachev initiated reforms in 1978 
(Merton 1967 ;Hall 1986).  That is to say, there were very few one-time 
entrepreneurs in early FSU still alive after 1978 unlike China does.  Therefore, 
Communism had been completely integrated in FSU unlike China.  As such, the 
path-dependent inertia of Communism has had less impact on China than on FSU. 
 
26 
The instruments of labour (or means of production) and the "subject of labour" refer 
to natural resources and raw materials, including land. The "instruments of labour" 
are tools, in the broadest sense. They include factory buildings, infrastructure, and 
other human-made objects that facilitate labour’s production of goods and services.  
According to Karl Marx's Theory of History, technical change can beget social 
change; in other words, changes in the means (and intensity) of production causes 
changes in the relations of production, i.e., in people's ideology and culture, their 
interactions with one another, and their social relationship to the wider world. 
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From Mao Zedong to Hu Jingtao, none of these supreme party leaders has 
promulgated laws or regulations clearly indicating their intended outcome. For 
example, the Hundred Flowers Campaign (Bai Hua Qi Fang) in 1956 was to 
promote pluralism of expression and criticism of the government.  This campaign 
was indeed a deliberate tactic to smoke out rightists and anti-government elements 
(Mo et al. 2007:179-189).  The notorious Proletarian Cultural Great Revolution, 
starting in 1966 and ending officially with Mao's death in 1976, resulted in nation-
wide chaos and economic disarray and stagnation.  This movement actually resulted 
from the Great Leap Forward (GLF) implemented in 1956. Generated by Mao’s 
grandiose intention to overtake the UK and USA (Chao Ying Gan Mei) in fifteen 
years, the GLF resulted in a pervasive famine, and was considered a serious 
humanitarian and economic disaster in China. The estimated number of famine 
victims was said to be between 20 and 43 million (Peng 1987).  In order to get rid of 
any accusation and discontent regarding the initiation of GLF, and to retain control 
over CCP, Mao consequently launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966 with the aim 
  
  
of purging the then President Liu Shaoqi and other political rivals.  In this context, 
any other high-sounding ideological reasons from Mao to explain the initiation of 
these movements can only be counted as sugar-coating in which to wrap up the ugly 
nature of his political intentions (Ho 2006:64-95).  Even the most praised economic 
reform programme led by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 was in part designed to overthrow 
then President Hua Guofeng (Shirk 1993:35-37).   
 
Furthermore in 2006, the doctrine of “Harmonious Society” officially endorsed by 
President Hu Jingtao effectively enshrined him in the same pantheon as Mao Zedong, 
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and other predecessors in such political chicanery as it 
shifted the party's focus from promoting all-out economic growth to solving 
worsening social tensions.  In fact, one month before this doctrine was declared, the 
Communist Party Chief of Shanghai was dismissed from post and arrested for 
allegedly helping plunder the city's pension fund of hundreds of millions of dollars.  
Chen Liangyu, a protégé of Hu's predecessor, Jiang Zemin, was the first member of 
the 23-member Politburo to lose his job since 1995.  Before Chen Liangyu, the latest 
arrested member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China was Chen Xitong, 
who was previous Mayor of Beijing and removed from office by then President Jiang 
Zemin and on charges of corruption in 1995.  Analysts have speculated that Chen 
was targeted because he and other protégées of Jiang advocated unregulated 
economic growth (Fan 2006). 
 
28 
In China, political elites do not brazenly take economic interests directly by using 
their political influence owing to the effective regulative rules.  Instead, they 
normally trade their political influence with economic elites for economic benefits.  
For example, state agents will help specific developers to acquire land cheaply or 
raise the floor area ratio in order in an exchange for individual benefits.  In this sense, 
the power market (capitalized power) is similar to any commodity market in that it 
needs buyer and seller, and the premise of a successful transaction is interests.  
Although the power market is not identical to any commodity market, political elites 
will pursue the maximization of capitalized power in a situation that lacks effective 
constraining mechanisms as in transitional China.  Since the process of capital 
  
  
accumulations for economic elites is realized mostly through the exchange of power 
with local political elites, both economic and political elites are together vying with 
the people for scarce resources.  In this sense, the scarcity of resources results in a 
zero-sum situation between those elites and ordinary people in the society. 
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This research also tries to analyze the specific scenario in China from two major 
perspectives.  First, it is the multi-faceted characteristic of businesspeople in China’s 
long history.  Businesspersons in China have played influential roles in politics for 
nearly two thousands odd years.  For instance, Lu Buwei (291-235 BC), then 
chancellor, in Qin dynasty, Shanxi businesspersons in Chin dynasty, and T. V. Soong 
in Chiang Kai-Shek regime (1911 -1949 AD) together resemble the worst and best 
examples of collusion and enrichment in China, respectively.  Nevertheless, there has 
never been any single economic elite in contemporary China that can match these 
historical magnates, and wielding independent influence on then state policy and 
monopoly of social resources.  Nevertheless, the contemporary economic elites,  such 
as they are, collude with different political factions and entrenched interest groups in 
order to maximize their profits.  Some commonalities can be discerned between these 
ancient economic elites (hongding shangren) and contemporary businesspersons to 
the extent that they all have tight-knit and deliberate political-business relationships 
that can dramatically influence state policy and are able to exploit important social 
resources to accumulate their wealth continuously.  In fact, these ancient economic 
elites’ behaviours and thoughts remain attractive to modern Chinese people.  For 
example, one of the best-selling autobiographies of entrepreneurs in China remains 
“Hu Xueyan” (1823 – 1885 AD), who was the most influential magnate in late 
Manchu dynasty.  Owing to embedded patterns, any successful business, no matter 
how the business people accumulate their wealth, will often have entailed collusion 
with politics.   
 
Second, the complexity of the political-business relationships has partly originated in 
the long-term centralization for thousands of years.  Arguably, China is the only 
country with political centralization that has endured for more than two thousand 
  
  
years and the nature of the governing structure has never been radically changed 
since the Emperor Qin.  Because of political centralization, the CCP controls and 
monopolises nearly every strategic resource and is considered as supporting 
industries at the present; therefore, the important economic power and resources are 
explicitly under the controls of state agents.  In this regard, the logic of Political 
Centralization → Resource Control → Elite Business becomes an unassailable 
structure.  In fact, this peculiar logic is well known as corruption for a long time in 
China.  Some leading economists (Qian and Wu 2000) in China introduced the 
concept of rent-seeking to define this system; in this way, corruption spreads through 
the administrative interventions in micro-economic activities that enable individuals 
to get easy rents through political power.  In other words, there yet are many 
opportunities for them to gain profits from indirect production.  That is to say, the 
institutional arrangement through capitalized power or monetized power extensively 
created a rent-seeking environment and sowed the seeds of future corruption.     
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Some (Kuznets 1988 ;Unger and Chan 1995) scholars contend that the economy in 
China resembles the East-Asian Model, which was initiated after WWII in Asia, e.g. 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  The salience of East-Asian model is that states set 
rules for economic development and are involved in major economic events.  That is 
to say, these states, on one hand, are the players; on the other, they are referees.  In 
this particular model, modernization is based on two main systems: the government 
and the market.  The former is dominant and the latter is subordinate to the former 
one.  Nonetheless, there is a significant distinction, namely the origin of market, 
between China and East Asian countries.  In China as well as East-Asian countries, 
the market framework is based on the foundation of strong government capability.  
However, the market system in China is not indigenous or naturally occurring but 
rather it is artificially devised by political elites even though China’s model of 
economic reforms, to some extent, resembles those East-Asian countries.  In East-
Asian countries, their markets are mostly indigenous and spontaneous.   
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As described previously, the institutional environment in China is solely sustained by 
  
  
regulatory pillar, therefore, political elites have the power to design and implement 
regulations at will in this specific institutional environment that is without normative 
and cultural-cognitive constraints.  They therefore can trade their power for 
individual economic benefits with economic elites.  Because the incomplete 
ownership rights were artificially designed by these political elites, they therefore 
impose their will on the ownership rights during the privatization.  Lacking in 
independent normative and cultural-cognitive constraints, private owners have no 
power to bargain with those political elites.  As soon as political elites alter their 
minds, the private ownership rights will consequently become different.  For example, 
many previously top ranked richest Chinese by Forbes (Epstein 2009) have been 
arrested after 2003 due to perplexing charges, i.e. Hwang Guang-yu (2008 ranked 
2
nd
), Zhang Rong-kun (2005 ranked 16
th
), Zhou Zen-yi (2002 ranked 11
th
), Zhu Guo-
ping (2008 ranked 366
th
), Xie Guo-sheng (2007 ranked 348
th
), to name but a few. 
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There is data in relation to rice consumption that looks irrelevant to my study but is 
indeed enlightening that brought forth by one of my interviewees (#6).  She advised 
me that once any minor parameter of the institutional environment changes, it would 
accordingly motivate different human needs, either forward or backward.  For 
example, she told me that seeking safety for one’s life was the most imperative issue 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) and no one then cared about whether 
economic conditions were decent or terrible.  Her argument absolutely conforms to 
the Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (1943) (see Fig 30.1).  People remained in the 
level of safety, only seeking security of body during the Cultural Revolution era in 
China. At this point the social structure of needs had in fact moved backwards to the 
primitive period in that Dark Age. My interviewee informed me that people were 
unable to fend for themselves during that period; consequently, there was only one 
political faction, Mao and his followers that survived after the Cultural Revolution.  
Her argument exactly corresponds to the contentions of different researchers (Gold 

















Concept derived from (Maslow 1943) 
Fig 30.1 Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
 
Consequently, she told me that people in China consume less rice now than they did 
previously, but what is the association?  She motivated me to find out the possible 
answers to this question that might be any help of my research.  At that moment, I 
only perceived that people in China might move ahead from safety to esteem level in 
terms of Maslow’s hierarchy.  After finishing my interviews, I then acquired details 
of Income Elasticity in the 1980s and 1990s from official data issued by the China 
State Statistics Bureau.  From the data, Income Elasticity of rice in urban areas has 
had negative values since the 1980s, indicating that rice is now seen as an inferior 
commodity in these areas (Table 29.1).  That is, popular demands have been moved 
upwardly three strata from safety to esteem only in a decade of time (see Fig 30.1). 
 
Food 
Urban Area Rural Area 
1981-1991 1992-2000 1981-1991 1992-2000 
Rice -0.27 -0.35 0.15 -0.16 
Vegetable Oil 0.42 0.33 0.97 0.59 
Pork 0.17 -0.18 0.44 0.55 
Beef/mutton 1.39 (0.03)* 0.43 1.23 
Poultry 1.43 0.4 0.97 1.59 




Urban Area Rural Area 
1981-1991 1992-2000 1981-1991 1992-2000 
Marine products (0.06)* 0.51 0.79 1.14 
Data derived from CSSB (2001) and (Hsiaoping, 2005 #2198)  
*Numbers in parentheses indicate poor statistical fit 
Table 29.1: Income Elasticity in staple foods 
 
In the 1980s, the Income Elasticity of rice in rural areas was 0.15 (meaning that 
when income increases by 10%, rice consumption rises by 1.5%), demonstrating that 
rice was still a valued commodity.  However, in the 1990s, Income Elasticity of rice 
in rural areas developed negative values, and rice consumption, as in urban areas, 
showed a downward tendency despite increased income.  By and large, changes in 
rice consumption are influenced by consumers’ incomes, price, and other available 
staple foods.  That is to say, food diversification is only one factor in this decrease of 
rice consumption and increase in consumption of livestock products is considered 
another influence factor.  This research considers that these trends reflect the recent 
emergence of health-conscious attitudes, better economic conditions impacting on 
lifestyles, and  greater variety of food choices in urban China.  For any sake, all of 
the foregoing assumptions can only happen after enhancing individual economic 
conditions.  
 
Rice has been the major staple food for Chinese people for thousands of years ago.  
If this traditional behavior can be altered in a decade owing to economic 
improvement, the associations between human needs and economic benefits in 
transitional China will be more delicate than were perceived previously.   
 
From her enlightenment, I therefore have grasped that why my interviewee asked me 
to notice every parameter that might possibly affect the economic returns.  From my 
past research, I found that there are many parameters that actually impinge on 
economic returns.  This research identifies that the trajectory of China’s transition, as 
Walder (2004) mentions, is essentially different from those that emerged in CEE and 
FSU in terms of instruments and settings although they all tried to improve economic 
efficiencies and derived legacy of Leninism.  This understanding helps me to exclude 
many insignificant parameters.  Apart from those reforms in previous Communist 
  
  
countries, the reforms in China are not only different from the traditional Western 
path taken by those industrialized countries but also different from those reforms 
initiated after WWII in Asia, for example, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  Of 
course, the comparisons between China’s model and the Asian models, the former 
model is similar to the latter ones but can hardly be alike.  As I mentioned earlier,  
China’s model also differs from those developed in Communist countries after the 
cold war (Walder 2004 ;Ding 2010).  I therefore cannot help but wonder what 
exactly the pattern of China’s institutional change is.  
 
As mentioned earlier, although FSU, former CEE socialist countries, and China are 
all derived legacies from Marxism; however, China’s model is different from the 
former two patterns.  Unlike conventional neoclassical economics, which takes the 
institutions of the modern Western economies for granted (Sweezy 1970), the study 
of institutions and its evolutions is one of the crucial point of Marxist economics.  In 
fact, in the real-world economies, there are different institutions existing alongside 
various markets.  In addition, the government is also far from the “minimal state,” 
which is limited to the functions of providing law and order, and simply protecting 
property rights.  Different institutions are de facto competing in the institutional 
markets.  As noted by Schultz (1968:1114) that: 
  
It is obvious that particular institutions really matter, that they are 
subject to change and are, in fact, changing, and that people are 
trying to clarify social choices with regard to alternative 
institutional change to improve the economic efficiency and the 
welfare performance of the economy.   
 
Therefore, I have arrived at the second research argument that China’s institutional 
changes are more likely to resemble compromised institutional changes instead of 
other patterns, e.g. imposed or induced institutional changes (Lin 1989).  Certainly, 
he has exquisitely explained the definitions of these two patterns that induced 
institutional changes referring to the voluntary changes by a group of individuals in 
response to profitable opportunities arising from institutional disequilibria; on the 
  
  
other, imposed institutional changes refer to changes that are introduced by 
government fiat (Lin ibid).  Nonetheless, from my point of view, there is no 
institutional change, whether induced or imposed, in China that can exist alone. No 
matter how well and how essential an induced institutional change might be, CCP 
will not allow it to persist if it politically jeopardizes the one-party polity. Essentially, 
China’s government and the CCP would not recklessly impose any institutional 
change countrywide without conducting tests at selected points after the late 70s.  As 
mentioned earlier, to retain the balance of politics and economy, many discouraged 
and forbidden local implementations of state policies were deliberately ignored.  
That is to say, a compromised pattern of changes arose accordingly.  For example, 
dual-track pricing system, collective enterprises (TVEs), and SOE privatization went 
awry and, in turn, were translated into profiteering (Guan Dao), embezzlement, and 
collusion respectively. I hall now turn to the explanation of the institutional change 
process in contemporary China in order to justify and test my second hypothesis.   
 
There are diverse institutional arrangements, varying from the simple to the 
sophisticated, that have been characterised transitional China since the late 1970s.  
These new institutional arrangements can be regarded as the relevant medium that 
shape different trajectories of local development and the outcomes that have been 
formed.  For example, the local implementation and enforcement of state policies are 
extremely different in Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Henan in terms of scale, trend, and 
path (Walder 1995c ;Wu 1997 ;Wu and Hu 2002).   That is to say, China granted 
preferential policies to different regions and changed the policies over time under the 
scheme of partial reform.  Consequently, these different policies presumably induced 
cadres to employ varied institutional innovations that reflect policy prejudices, 
regional endowments, and relative bargaining power.  However, this may not be the 
accurate sequence but rather the other way around.    
        
In this regard, the institutional changes in China appear to be more sophisticated than 
envisaged.  However, if we look at it separately, the individual analysis is very 
simple.  Economically, it is straightforward that the institutional changes in China are 
likely to be similar to any market economy in terms of pursuit of private interests.  
  
  
There are continuous quests from capitalists and entrepreneurs for government 
protection from competition and to retain their existing privileges to access public 
resources with least cost (Rajan and Zingales 2004:311).  Politically, the nature of 
any institutional changes continues to encircle the one-party polity.  That is to say, no 
matter how and where the trend of economic institutional changes goes, it is always 
confined within the political framework, which, by all means, necessitated 
supporting CCP and its legitimacy.   
 
Under the circumstances of unpredictability, people, who are in pursuit of private 
interests, will unavoidably endeavor to grab short-term interests instead of investing 
in any long-term ventures.  Therefore, this volatility will enhance the manipulation 
and exploitation through institutional changes.  As Saich (2001:213) asserts the 
fragmented bureaucratic structure makes the CCP ineligible to play the vital role of 
integrating the bureaucracy to improve both the formulation and implementation of 
policy.  On top of that, each organization attempts to bend policy to its own 
advantage and extensive bargaining leaves the legal framework poorly developed 
(Lampton 1992:58).  The definition of organization here is as Burns and Stalker 
(1961) argue, whether they are public organizations (SOE), private organizations, 
small or large organizations, and bureaucratic or organic organizations (government), 
they all attempt to develop ways to tackle their low controls in constrained situations 
(new entrants in open markets) and protect their controlled advantages in opportunity 
relations (transitional socialist societies).  Thus far, this research may draw a 
conclusion that policy-making process of reforms in transitional China is 
compromised and consists of responsibility shirking, power scrambling, bargaining, 
and negotiations.   
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Any reform arguably implies that existing interest groups may lose their privileges 
because they can be replaced by emerging counterparts.  In this sense, reform may 
inevitably encounter a number of difficulties inflicted by different existing interest 
groups from time to time.  However, between 1978 and 1985, China had successfully 
overcome these difficulties when rural reforms were initiated.  The most prominent 
  
  
achievement within this period was the establishment of the Household Contract 
Responsibility System that expedited the disintegration of People’s Communes and 
unleashed billions of workers, who started to have independent decision-making 
power of production and management.  This particular achievement achieved the 
unity of responsibility, right, and interest for the rural population.  Subsequently, the 
foci of reforms had been shifted from rural areas to cities after 1985.  Arguably, 
China’s authority had been increasingly confronting fierce backlashes from these 
new interest groups, who had grabbed their power and wealth after 1978, following 
the initiation of urban economic reforms.  These new interest groups, unlike those in 
the pre-reform era, are able to exploit more resources, e.g. economic and political 
ones (see Fig 23), to adjust subsequent reforms, which may deprive them of their 
existing privileges.  The confrontations between these existing interest groups and 
pro-reform authorities can therefore result in income disparity, social inequality, and 
concentration of wealth (see Fig 7).  The foregoing argument, which essentially 
demonstrates the reform context in China, will be justified through the interviews to 
HNWIs in China.   
 
In China, the transformation from planned economy to market economy not only 
symbolizes the institutional changes but also reforms people’s interests.  This 
perspective exactly indicates the emphasis of China’s institutional changes because 
any economic system whether market economy or planned economy is composed of 
a particular series of allocation and ownership of resource.  In this regard, the 
fundamental institutional factors of any economic system are (1) the institutional 
arrangement of possession of resource (property rights system), (2) the institutional 
arrangement of allocation of resource (economic system) and (3) informal 
institutional arrangement of economic system (morality, convention, ideology).  
Moreover, the economic system is a kind of institutional arrangement that not only 
arranges the competition and cooperation among different economic organizations 
(individual, family, village, company, or entire society) but also resolves conflicts of 




The scarcity of resource is the foremost premise of resource allocation.  The pattern 
of allocation decides the mode of ownership of scarce resource.  As described in 
section 1.1, institutional change in China is a series of re-allocation and re-
distribution of scarce resource, therefore, the ownership right of scarce resource 
becomes fundamentally critical.  Demsetz (1988:21) argues that ownership right 
consists of two vital components, alienability and exclusivity, the former refers to the 
right to re-assign ownership to someone else and the latter refers to the right to 
determine who may use the scarce resource.  In this sense, who else has the 
ownership right of the scarce resource also has the right to offer for sale at any price 
and no one other than the “owner” can use the scarce resource.  In China, those de 
facto owners (bureaucrats and cadres) of public or state properties (scarce resources) 
have the right to sell them at any price as well as to determine who may use them 
because they control the interpretations and implementations of allocations and 
possessions of scarce resources. Therefore, these people are the most likely modern 
HNWIs in China.  The previous statement can be justified through my research 
conceptual framework (see Fig 23) and corresponds to the evolution of reform (see 
Fig 23).     
            
Up to now, I have elucidated China’s economic reforms, which essentially embodied 
institutional changes and played a critical role regarding the emergence of modern 
HNWIs.  Because the economic system is the dominant mechanism for production 
and distribution of wealth, people who command the economic system can possess 
the scarce resources and therefore have more opportunities to become HNWIs.  As 
Alchian and Demsetz (1973) propose, property rights actually define people’s 
positions and the relationship between economy and society while people employ 
scarce resource in a society.  Furthermore, they (Alchian and Demsetz 1972) deem 
property rights as a bundle of rights instead of any single right.  In China, certain 
parts of this bundle of rights, e.g. alienability and exclusivity, were deliberately 
grasped by CCP during the economic reforms because they retained the mentality 
and restraint of planned economy that essentially control the allocation and 
distribution of resources.  Finally yet importantly, there were no private property 
rights before the economic reforms in terms of resources, e.g. house, land, car, etc.  
  
  
Private property rights were bestowed on people by CCP after the economic reforms; 
however, the retroactive legality was exclusively interpreted and implemented by 
senior state agents and CCP cadres.  In this sense, they can directly transfer public or 
state property to favourable recipients, who have better relationships with or can 
benefit those incumbents, and benefit themselves or likes indirectly.   
 
Because the state is the only legal organization to exert coercion and potential force 
to acquire appropriate economic rent (North 1991:204) and people rationally pursue 
the maximization of personal utility, institutions can, therefore, provide a framework 
for competition and cooperation in order to retain the economic order for society 
(North 1981:226).  In this sense, governments and state agents have the exclusive 
rights to make and regulate institutions during the economic transformation that can 
restrain people’s behaviour in terms of the pursuit of personal utility.  Thus, these 
institutions can be made exclusively beneficial to those incumbents and recipients 
who have rights to design or affect institutions.  Under the circumstances, these 
incumbents are under no obligation to devise incentive mechanism to enhance social 
efficiencies because they can deliberately devise any favourable institution to grab 
more power and resources.  As CCP wants to attain their specific goals, which are 
often irrelevant to market competition or social welfare, it and affiliated authorities 
consistently devise the path or make the decisions for individuals, companies or 
markets that should be defined as intervention rather than regulation, which is only a 
guideline or rule for people to follow or framework for market competition that 
people operate social activities under these rules. 
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In China, many counter-competitive or monopoly-like policies restrain the 
competitiveness of privately owned enterprises.  In the 1990s, for example, the 
government considered that there was redundant manufacturing and cutthroat 
competition in the industries of DVD player, white goods and colour TV, and so, the 
administration introduced a series of price-control mechanisms to control market 
prices so that any price-reduction had to be reported to and justified by the 
authorities.  As well, government repeatedly introduced various mechanisms in 
  
  
recent years to restrain housing prices, to little effect.  These contradictions are 
mainly derived from the triple roles of the state as (1) the administrator of society, (2) 
the administrator of the market, and (3) the owner of enterprise.  Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult for any government to avoid conflicts between these 
roles.  In fact, governments not only have more power after combining these three 
roles but also intervene in the market operation deliberately.   
 
35 
This is due in part to those people who benefit from these regulations trying to 
strengthen them in order to retain their existing interests that is know as the Capture 
Theory (Economic Theory of Regulation) (Stigler 1971).  Stigler deemed that some 
regulators and regulated subjects eventually become supporters of regulations and 
will try to make excuses to create more regulations that are usually implemented 
under the disguise of the maintenance of social order, market stability, or public 
interests, to protect their existing interests by exploiting their power.  In this sense, 
these interest groups may fabricate various reasons to justify their means that market 
is incomplete and need more regulation.  As long as there is no public supervision to 
oversee China’s state agents, this monopoly power hardly can be challenged or 
threatened even though these agents’ purposes of utility maximization are not 
compatible with those of the majority. 
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After late 1978, fractional reforms were initiated in rural areas on a small scale that 
obtained excellent results.  From 1990 onward, sweeping reforms were implemented 
in urban areas that largely privatized public assets through arbitrary private property 
rights, resulting in unprecedented and unexpected ill effects, e.g. collapsed health 
care and social security systems, surging housing price, injustice wealth allocation 
rather than income disparity, and the emergence of HNWIs with Chinese 
characteristics.  All these consequences are sequentially connected to each other in a 
way that symbolises my research proposition – namely, the introduction of distorted 
and vague private property rights brought forth those HNWIs in China after 
sweeping economic reforms.  In other words, China’s reforms embody the transition 
  
  
from control right to ownership right with Chinese characteristics that is low 
individual costs for those emerging HNWIs but high price for the entire society. 
 
The preceding argument, however, is not inferred between categories, which are 
based on separate events, but rather on the corresponding links in the data.  That is to 
say, links per se should be regarded as a kind of “connecting mechanism” (Sayer 
1992:18) between events that people in China have experienced, e.g. why private 
property rights were largely introduced; when sweeping reforms started in urban area; 
what public assets were privatized after sweeping reforms; how HNWIs emerge after 
sweeping reforms.  In the era of command economy, there was no due market value 
attached to those public assets in China that subsequently became valuable after 
reforms, e.g. factories, land, dwellings, industrial output.  After late 1978, fractional 
market values were added to these public assets while reforms were initiated in rural 
areas.  In order to unleash the potential economic power to strengthen and continue 
the legitimacy of CCP’s regime, political leaders increasingly privatized a large 
number of public assets through arbitrary private property rights.  As a result, 
sweeping reforms essentially increased economic growth in China after 1990; 
however, those people who held power were able to manipulate the privatization 
through the exploitation of distorted private property rights, without adequate 
supervision and appropriate legality and become HNWIs in China.    
 
Nonetheless, these existing elites have to constantly vie for scarce resources or 
defend the legitimacy of their own alternative resources in order to manipulate the 
privatizing process to protect their existing privileges from emerging rivals who have 
long coveted any chance to grab these privileges (see Fig 9).  In fact, the preceding 
process has resulted in many devastating effects, e.g. empty property rights (lack of 
alienability, exclusivity, and tenure), inadequate bank autonomy in management, too 
many non-performing loans, lack of competition mechanism and unfair layout.  In 
my view, if we consider these problems in all aspects, empty property rights 
arguably are the main cause of the remaining problems.  In general, property is 
consisted of real property and virtual one.  The former is money, land, buildings or 
other tangible property; the latter mostly exist in the political domain, e.g. 
  
  
sovereignty of the people.  In fact, people, who are under the rule of government, 
hold all the rights that were conferred by government.  However, these rights in 
China were otherwise obtained by CCP.  In terms of private property rights, China’s 
government hardly protects the major components (alienability, exclusivity and 
tenure) to the utmost.  Consequently, the empty property rights result in quasi-
absentee-owners that de jure but not essentially, because their private properties still 
can be taken away by potentates without justification after reforms.       
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There are two pro and con examples in transitional China that precisely represent the 
above arguments with regard to the roles of entrepreneurs.  First, Deng Xiaoping, a 
political entrepreneur, essentially had more extensive ties to different political 
factions than Hua Guofeng, who was then President of PRC and held all top political 
positions did.  However, people may wonder if Deng’s sense of mission, voluntary 
whims, or creative genius stimulated him to initiate reforms or there was more to be 
said.  In my view, it was Deng’s supreme position within CCP enabled him to 
commence economic reforms rather than other considerations.  Deng essentially had 
charisma or talent in terms of leadership; however, personal qualities are insufficient 
to make reforms stick in then factionalism atmosphere.  Based on the Conference 
Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, Deng 
acquired support from most senior party cadres and then started to initiate reforms.  
Because he was a senior CCP member since the Great March in 1934 and had held 
various positions in the central CCP previously, Deng could have far-reaching 
connections beyond his immediate social, organizational and institutional location.  
As such, Deng’s institutional location provided him with wide range of innovations 
that could be imagined cognitively, and he therefore had a wide range of innovations 
that would be normatively appropriate or legitimate (Campbell 2004:75) in China.  
In general, Deng’s position helped him slot his demands for institutional change into 






First interview  






Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. In principal, large enterprises have their own 
ways to adapt to institutional changes.  For 
small-medium enterprise (SME), they could only 
try to follow the existing institutions, but cannot 
absolutely assure that they obey all regulations 
because of bounded capability.   
 
2. At this moment, China, in all aspects, are 
prosperous that resembles Taiwan between the 
late 70s and the end of 80s.   
 
3. In fact, I do not feel many institutional changes 
since the establishment of my company (2004).  
If I really have to say, the China’s government 
will propose a general directional institutional 
change without any detail.  Maybe the reforms 
and openness can be regarded as a large 
change, but I did not experience it myself 
because I was too young.  Maybe there is any 
institutional change, however, I do not feel it 
because my company is not big and therefore 
cannot be affected.   
 
4. Nevertheless, I do feel some encouraging 
institutional changes recently, e.g. protection of 
national industries, support domestic 
enterprises, etc.  These changes are more 
constructive than previous one that emphasis 
on virtual industries, e.g. Internet, trade 
company.   
 
5. Because of the expansions of domestic 
demand, we, as a SME, hardly feel anything 
about the financial crisis.  However, banks 
remain very strict to SMEs and request 
collateral for any loan.  It is unlike the loans to 
SOEs, they can easily get billion yens.  To state 
banks, whether a million or billion loan, they are 
same jobs in terms of the audit, regulation, or 
procedure.  In China, it is very difficult to get any 
bank loan for SME, unlike the ones in Taiwan or 
Western countries.   
 
6. China’s SMEs resemble the government in 
many aspects.  They all, for example, adopt the 
way of “crossing the river by feeling the stones”; 
1. In China, unlike large enterprises, 






2. China is prosperous and resembles 
Taiwan between the 70s and 80s. 
 
 
3. Institutional changes in China is 











4. G agrees with some institutional 







5. It is very difficult for SMEs to get 
bank loan in comparison with 
SOEs or large enterprises because 









6. G positively regards the lack of 
prior preparation as the flexibility in 
terms of institutional changes in 
  
  
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
therefore, they never have any specific 
blueprint, plan for the task, or have their 
preparations in one-step.  In this regard, any 
repeat or waste becomes inevitable, but it is 
worthwhile because they would not invest a lot 
in the first place.   
 
7. What I just mentioned that is the China’s model.  
Maybe we are not so strong in the first place, 
but we have the backwardness advantages, 
which can save us lots of time and money, 
eventually, we can exceed the Western 
countries or companies.  This is our underlying 








7. G regard that China fully utilizes 
her backward advantage and will 









Second interview  
Interviewee: Mr. H 





Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. No matter what, I do believe China is the 
biggest market in the world.  The domestic 
demand will be the largest one in the world.  
Therefore, we do not need to grab the seat in 
those countries with economic bubbles, e.g. 
Japan, USA.  The development of China in 
recent years are largely improved, especially 
the domestic demands derived from the 
improvement of living standards of China’s 
populace.  We can find that the Western 
companies and countries eager to jump on the 
prosperous bandwagon to China.  China has 
demonstrated her strong economic power to the 
world in the last decade.   
 
2. Many companies, however, set up their 
manufacturing capacities in China for foreign 
demands by utilizing the cheap labour forces 
and neglect domestic market.  In this regard, 
they cannot reap the reward of economic 
growth, especially after the increasing shortage 
of cheap labour force.  They did not see and 
expect the swift changes beforehand.   
 
3. In China, if you want to be successful in your 
own professional field, you have to become the 
number one because it is extremely competitive 
in China’s market.  If you are not the number 
one, you will either be marginalized or have to 
reduce your profit to survive owing to the 
crowding-out effect.   
 
4. In the food industry, China’s government set up 
a series of strict regulation to eliminate the 
irregular ones and protect the qualified 
companies.  However, these regulations are 
without effect to those copycat products.  Their 
products are the same as ours, except the 
telephone number.  Local governments will only 
do all their best to crack down those counterfeit 
products for those famous companies, e.g. 
Master Kong, Wahaha, Coca Cola, Mont Blanc, 
Channel, but not for ordinary companies.  We 
have to crack them down by ourselves.  In fact, 
this rule can be applicable to many government 
issues.   
1. H thinks that people just need to 
focus on China instead of other 
countries because of the huge 
domestic market.  He also believes 
has presented her strong economic 










2. H deems that the mode of utilizing 
cheap labour force for exporting is 
no longer practical.  He yet again 





3. H believes that being the strongest 








4. H thinks that local government 
cannot effectively prevent SMEs 














Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
 
5. In another word, in China, people are equal 
before the law but not behind the law.  
Everything becomes too intricate behind the 
law.  Nevertheless, the credibility and position of 
law and the quality of officials have been 
improved dramatically in terms of business 
environment, but not in other places.   
 
6. After all, China considers her international 
image since she became rich.  In the past, they 
did not care too much about the image as long 
as they had money.   
 
7. However, China government will ignore the 
economy and implement all possible means at 
all costs once political interests could be 
jeopardized.  In my opinion, we do not expect 
any institutional change would be helpful to us 
permanently.  People eventually have to pay a 
high price for any transitorily favourable 
institution because there is no consistent or 
coherent policy of institutional change in China. 
 
5. H believes that the position and 
quality of the laws and enforcers 
have been improved only in 





6. China government pays more 
attention to her international image 
after economic growth. 
 
 
7. China government will retain 
control of regime at the cost of 
economy.  Any favourable 
institution comes with high cost and 
is never permanent.     





Third interview  
Interviewee: Mr. Q 
Age: 55-60 
Gender: Male 
Previous Bureaupreneur and senior cadre 
Conventional Industry 
Pre-reform Generation 
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. I have experienced the transition from 
planned economy to market economy and 
regard the reform and openness as the 
second regime of China, and the country 
would otherwise fall behind without them.  
If people look back, they can comprehend 
that reform is necessary and both Deng’s 
path and insistence are right.  Seclusion 
will only lead the country to death, just like 
the Qing dynasty.   
 
2. There once were serious debates in higher 
lever, however, theory and practice are 
extremely different in terms of reform and 
openness.  When the municipal party 
secretary initiated the reforms, he must 
already get approval from someone among 
the central leadership.  This is a matter of 
principle because CCP attach great 
importance to principle.   
 
3. As every movement in China, they initially 
put forward a slogan of “not seeking 
ownership, but seeking whereabouts” that 
local authorities did not want to own the 
SOEs but keep them staying there.  
Therefore, the corporate tax still can be 
levied by local authorities and make local 
prosperity.   
 
4. In my opinion, the main purpose of reform 
and openness is to change people’s 
perspectives, especially those of CCP 
cadres.  Once the perspective altered, the 
improvement and growth of economy will 
be the matter of time.  For example, there 
are many people like me becoming rich 
overnight after reform.   
 
5. Of course there are many political leaders 
are jealous, but this is the result of reform.  
As always, CCP initiate every movement 
with a typical model, so does reform.  In 
our province, unlike a universal model in 
other areas, CCP put forward the “one 
policy for one plant”, which is a scientific 
1. Reform and openness is 









2. Reforms were not consistent 
and have to be endorsed by 








3. Sloganeering is vital in China 








4. Reforms were mainly used to 
change the mentalities of party 
cadres.  Once the mentality 





5. Political leaders did envy the 
success of HNWIs.  There is 
no single model for reform in 
China.  It varies from one 







Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
approach and actually activate then doom 
economy.   
 
6. The status quo of then SOEs was generally 
in deficit.  If you deduct that negative 
equity, those SOEs had nothing at all and 
no one else could get any penny back.  
Thus, banks had to hang their bad debts 
on their accounts until these SOEs, or the 
restructuring enterprises, make profits.   
 
7. As for the redundant labours, new 
enterprises had to lay off them within an 
approved range, e.g. 5% per annum in my 
company.  Those local authorities also 
worried if we lay off all labours and sold the 
properties, e.g. land, buildings, machinery.   
 
8. Not all transitions, however, were 
successful.  Some political leaders had 
serious interest conflicts with plant 
managers; therefore, they were frequently 
replaced and resulted in poor efficiency.  In 
general, unlike those heavy industries in 
Northeast provinces, all SOEs including 
collective-owned enterprises and TVEs 
were gone in one year once the direction of 
reforms was made in our province.   
 
9. Nowadays, from the central government to 
local village, they all are economy-oriented 
instead of the class struggle oriented.  In 
my opinion, China is definitely with market 
economy or a quasi-capitalist country.  
However, the path of reforms is not as 
smooth as it is now.  Between 1989 and 
1992, I was worried about the direction and 
path of reform.  However, I do believe that 
the development has to go on and cannot 
stop.   
 
10. In China, the slogan of movement is very 
important and has to be loud and clear to 
let populace understand.  Deng then 
proposed the “Capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics” and “development is the 
absolute principle” that were apparent and 
indicated the direction without a doubt.   
 
11. For those Western capitalist countries, they 
have spent three hundred years to reach 
existing economic positions.  We only 
spent three decades to juxtapose with 
them.  This is the advantage of 
backwardness advantage and we should 
take advantage of it.   
 
6. Before reforms, most SOEs 
were insolvent and heavily 
relied on the assistances of 
state banks; all debts can only 




7. Restructuring enterprise has to 
deal with the issue of 
redundant labours because 
CCP repudiate their 
commitments to those labours.   
 
 
8. Some restructuring SOEs 
wound up in failure because of 
state intervention.  Except 
heavy industrial SOEs that 
cannot be transferred owing to 
large debt, most SOEs or likes 
were restructured once reform 
direction had been decided.    
 
 
9. China almost is a capitalist 
country now unlike 1989-1992.  
Nevertheless, openness has 








10. Sloganeering is vital to 
promote any political 







11. The tempo of China’s 
transition is swift and adorable 
that exceeds what Western 
countries did hundreds years 




12. China should not accept all 
Western institutions because 
  
  
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
 
12. In China, some people advocate the multi-
party competitive democratic system that 
will bring this country to a dead end.  For 
example, the unemployment benefits and 
pension systems in the Western countries 
make their countries uncompetitive and 
none of those political parties can change 
the status quo.   
 
13. I would say most China’s people agree the 
existing political system and regard the 
multi-party system will destroy what we 
have now.  This existing model actually 
plays the role that guides China on the 
right track.  We have our own flexibility, 
e.g. one policy for one plant, which is very 
successful; therefore, it is unnecessarily for 
us to take the wholesale westernization in 
our reform.                                                                       
some of them are awful or 





13. China should adhere to the 
existing road, which has led us 
to the existing success, and 







Fourth interview  
Interviewee: Mr. N 
Age: 55-60 
Gender: Male 
Incumbent bureaupreneur and senior cadre 
Conventional Industry 
Pre-reform Generation 
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. The holding company of this SOE, which was 
established in 1986 and was only a factory of 
SOE, is Shanghai Building Materials Group 
(SBMG), which is another SOE.  This SOE was 
established followed the planned economy 
system even though reform already initiated 
seven years ago.   
 
2. Undoubtedly, the efficiency of this SOE was 
terrible before I was assumed to the post.  
SBMG wanted to sell this company to foreign 
investors or JV with them in early 1990s.  
Nonetheless, then intensity of FDI was not very 
strong and SBMG could not find any interested 
investor or buyer and that is the reason why this 
is the only SOE in the industry nowadays.  The 
rest SOEs in this industry were insolvent and 
the reason to result in their insolvencies mainly 
because of poor management and outdated 
technology.   
 
3. I have been assumed to this post for nearly ten 
years and there was very little profit in the 
company then.  The scale, revenue, and profit 
are completely different from what we had in ten 
years ago.  Before 2005, this company 
remained shaky because the business direction 
was not clear owing to the higher rank 
management.   
 
4. In 2005, the higher authority once wanted to sell 
the company to foreign investor.  I sent an 
analysis pro and con to higher management 
regarding this transaction.  They finally took my 
advice and I therefore initiated the management 
restructuring since then.  By the end of 2010, 
we will have the most profit after tax in this 
industry and I receive higher income than many 
foreign peers, who work at the same trade, do.   
 
5. SOEs are generally regarded as inefficient; 
however, this inefficiency is mainly derived from 
poor management but not because of the 
corporate structure, e.g. shareholding, state-
owned, private-owned, or foreign-owned.  An 
efficient and practical management, from my 
1. Some SOEs were established after 
reforms but they still followed the 






2. SOE remains inefficient if there is 
no change, whether structure or 
management, and will end up with 










3. SOEs with efficient management 








4. Most SOEs in China were destined 
to be sold to private individuals or 
FDI because of inefficient and 
incapable management.  With 
decent management, SOEs can 





5. The reason that results in 
inefficient SOE is the poor 
management but not the corporate 
structure.  A SOE with efficient and 
practical management, which 
varies according to time and place, 
  
  
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
perspective, should vary in accordance with the 
time and the place.   
 
6. To my way of thinking, the worst problems in 
SOE are, in my opinion, the labour and financial 
issues.  Most labours are not highly educated 
and reluctant to learn new skills and were 
assigned to this SOE while they were at early 
twenties because of the full employment policy.  
Now, governments repudiate all responsibilities 
for these labours and let them run their own 
courses.  Hence, I have to deal with this issue 
and take care of those labours appropriately, 
otherwise, there will result in huge social 
problems.   
 
7. As for the financial problem, they mainly 
resulted from depreciation and the bad debts, 
which were caused by other SOEs.  After 
financial restructuring, the asset quality of this 
company is very high.   
 
8. People wondered why we did not take over this 
company.  It is not easy to transfer SOE to 
private-owned enterprise in Shanghai because 
the municipal government, on one hand, is very 
cautious and tries to avoid doing anything that 
may arouse suspicion, and Shanghainese 
labours, on the other hand, have higher rights 
awareness than others.   
 
9. Because the higher management can redeploy 
me at any moment, therefore, I maintain the 
state of mind to leave.  Although the 
performance of any company is not its corporate 
structure but rather the corporate culture and 
management, SOE manager still need to double 
the effort to improve the performance because 
CCP obstinately stick to regulation and 
procedure.  Most of the time, regulation and 
procedure are the obstacles to implementation 
because SOE is not free of unnecessary 
interference during implementation.          
can also makes lots of profit. 
 
 
6. The most prolonged problems of 
SOEs are redundant labors and 
unrestrained financial policies.  
During restructuring, governments 
pass the buck to the SOE itself and 








7. Bad debts of SOEs resulted from 





8. There is no universal rule of 
corporate restructuring in China 







9. State interventions have seriously 
affected the performances of SOEs 










Fifth interview  
Interviewee: Ms W 
Age: over 60 
Gender: Female 
Previous senior cadre 
Housing Industry 
Pre-reform Generation  
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. In 1985, I was assigned to the State Bureau of 
Surveying Mapping, which was merged to the 
Land and Resources Bureau in 1998, as a 
surveying engineer.  With few former colleagues 
and superior, we initiated our company in the 
late 1997 when we learnt the allocation of 
welfare-oriented public housing would cease in 
next year.   
 
2. At the very outset, my company was focusing 
on the buy-and-sell of existing public housing 
and had primitive accumulation of capital within 
the first three years.  We then involved in the 
auction of land-use right from 2002 and made 
our capital hundred-fold in short period because 
only very few companies involved in that 
industry.   
 
3. I never deny that I have close connections with 
people working in related state agencies and 
regard these connections as friendship rather 
than collusion although that involves money.  It 
is not possible for anyone to risk their lives to 
help friends but not at a price.   
 
4. So far, we seldom involve in substantial housing 
development projects but mainly focus on the 
buy-and-sell of lad-use rights because of long 
period and uncertainty.  We sometimes have 
package deals that entail construction permits 
and the lad-use rights.   
 
5. I have to say that nobody can access wealth if 
there was no reform and openness in the late 
1970s.  As Deng Xiaoping said, reforms can 
make some people getting rich first; 
consequently, these rich people can push 
forward the economic growth.  In light of Deng’s 
argument, we are those people who get rich 
first.   
 
6. In 2004, because of the soaring housing price, 
correspondingly, it pull the land-use right 
surging and make our profit no longer attractive.  
We therefore formed a syndicate to lobby 
various state agencies for controlling housing 
1. During transition, many previous 
civil servants started up their own 







2. Because of lots of insider 
information, previous civil servants 
can find unique niches in the 






3. Connecting with incumbent state 
agencies is essential for business 
operations and is difficult to be built 




4. With adequate connections and 
insider information, people remain 





5. W accredits her wealth to Deng’s 
reforms and regards herself as one 







6. In China, many HNWIs are low 
profile and can overcome 





Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
price; hence, there were serious conflicts 
between those housing developers and us.  
Because we always had our business 
operations behind the scenes, populace 
therefore put their foci on those housing 
developers instead of us.  Subsequently, we 
utilized the public media and academia to 
deepen the anger of populace regarding the 
soaring housing price.  In order to quell public 
outrage, the State Council eventually initiated 
housing price control nationwide.  
Consequently, the control was again on our 
hands.   
 
7. In general, people in our industry are different 
from those in the housing industry.  Except for 
adequate capital, sufficient connections with 
various agencies and bureaucrats are 
imperative in our business.   
 
8. Unlike those entrepreneurs in the manufacturing 
industry, we are, to some extent, like raw 
material suppliers or coal miners.  We pay 
government to get the land-use rights and 
housing developers therefore pay us for the lad-
use rights and build their houses.  Like coal 
miners, we are not the only two speculators in 
the market.  However, we are with very light 
burden of labour cost.   
 
9. Nevertheless, people have rights to make 
money with planned schemes and correct 
implementations as long as the market is with 
free competition.  This is the core spirit of free 
market and no one should and could blame us.  
We may influence the trend of housing market 
but only government can decide where it should 
go.  We are normal people who know better 
about how to utilize the opportunity.   
 
10. I do not think there will be any change in the 
political system in my life.  People do not 
comprehend how complicated the structure of 
CCP is and how difficult to operate this giant 
political machine.  Too many parts compose this 
machine and we are only few small bolts.  
Perhaps we are vital to the machine, but we still 
are bolts and can be replaced by those peers in 















7. In some industries, it is difficult to 





8. Some China’s HNWIs, who are 
essentially one-man band, make 








9. No one should blame HNWIs’ 
opportunistic practices because 








10. Bureaupreneur HNWI in China 
regards s/he-self as trivial in the 
huge political machine and does 
not believe that there will be any 
change on the existing model 





Six interview  






Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. In my opinion, the real “reform and openness” 
were initiated in the early 1990s, before then 
were mainly trials-and-errors or agricultural 
reforms.  Why do I say that?  When Deng 
Xiaoping carried out his Southern Trip in 1992, 
people just dared to remove those pseudo 
collective-owned camouflages.  Those 
collective-owned and TVEs all became private-
owned enterprises overnight.  
 
2. Within these transitions, there are full of 
imperfects and loopholes and we actually share 
the benefits from them.  Who made these 
imperfects and loopholes?  It is not the 
government because it is not any living being 
but those people who control the government, 
e.g. bureaucrats, party cadres, and other 
interest groups like us.   
 
3. People think that bureaucrats were highly 
educated in recent years; however, they simply 
follow their predecessors but with more 
sophisticated schemes and ruthless means to 
restrain the populace.  For example, the 
nationwide land auction should be put in effect 
in 2005 according to the Ministry of 
Construction; however, the process is 
capricious and inconsistent because of too 
many interest conflicts inside.   
 
4. I was not well educated and became the self-
employed since 1993.  I would say that I do not 
have any fluke mind but just simply follow the 
opportunities (institutional change) to run my 
business.  You may say these opportunities 
derived from those faults (imperfects and 
loopholes).  People who can make real money 
in this country are those who know how to make 
use of these faults.  They are not bad people 
but just foresee the opportunities.  Some people 
just do not know how to make use of them even 
the opportunities were in front of them.   
 
5. For those regulations, they are not set up to 
restrain those people who know how to make 
use of faults; on the contrary, those regulations 
1. Technically speaking, reforms were 
initiated since 1992 after Deng’s 
visit to Shenzhen.  Nearly all 
collective-owned enterprises and 






2. HNWI made her profit through 
institutional holes, which created by 







3. Better education and sophisticated 
administration do not improve the 
performances of state agencies in 








4. HNWI is not well educated but just 
know how to utilize the 
opportunities by making use of 
institutional holes in comparison 









5. HNWIs will never be restrained by 
any institutions because they 
already knew how to cope with 
  
  
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
are set up to restrain ordinary populace.  We will 
never be restrained by these regulations 
because we already know the loopholes before 
regulations are promulgated.   
 
6. In my opinion, China has more critical 
regulations than other advanced countries in 
terms of curbing speculation, however, 
government hardly comprehensively implement 
theses regulations because of chronic 
ideologies, which are not proletarian or 
communist ideologies but ideologies 
accumulated of thousand years, e.g. to drift and 
muddle along, emperor mentality, etc.  For 
example, there were several self-immolation 
incidents nationwide owing to the violent and 
forbidden demolition.  The causality is that 
housing developers always have to give tributes 
to local officials; however, bureaucrats have to 
make sure all preliminary works are well 
prepared and bureaucrats have to demolish all 
existing ground materials.  The controversial 
point is the compensation.  For those 
bureaucrats, they regard the previous public 
housings were sold to those ordinary people 
with great favours.  On the other hand, populace 
already paid for these housing and regard them 
as their lifetime properties.  Nevertheless, no 
one is allowed to take away other people’s 
properties without appropriate compensation 
because of the law.  However, government, on 
one hand, are the law enforcers, on the other 
hand, they are surveyors to decide the amount 
of compensation.  As a result, the tragedy 
happened.   
 
7. In my opinion, the cost is too high for people 
making money derived from such cruel 
environment.  That is why I want to make less 
money in a better place with more reasonable 
institutions.   
 
8. If governments do not change their concepts, 
ideologies, and behaviours, populace will 
eventually become rebels and incur unexpected 
comprehensive rebellion.   
 
9. From my perspective, the laws become less 
effective and money becomes more effective 
since 2000.  The laws enforcers just blur the line 
between right and wrong and many rich people 
do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On the 
contrary, they do deem breaking-law as a social 
status, the more crimes they committed without 
punishment, and the higher social status they 






6. Any strict regulation cannot offset 
the ineffective implementations of 
state agencies that follow many 
chronic ideologies.  These chronic 
ideologies result in many serious 
social problems and instabilities.  In 
addition, lacking of fairness and 
justice, bureaucrats can act on 























7. HNWI can no longer afford the cost 




8. China will encounter large 





9. Many people do not have the 
concept of rule-of-law, especially 









Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
 
10. In my opinion, the best period after reforms is 
between 1995 and 2005.  We made money 
without too many restraints and people would 
actively help each other without asking returns 
in advance.  After then, people are isolated from 
each other and the society without cohesion.  
They only take care of themselves without 
considering other people, families, and friends.  
In these days, guanxi (relations) just like some 
groceries that can be easily bought through 
money.           
 
10. The golden era of China was 
between 1995 and 2005.  
Nowadays, people are isolated 










Seventh interview  
Interviewee: Mr. R 





Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. I really cannot remember how long I have been 
involving in the coal mining industry.  All my 
relatives, neighbours, and families of friends 
and classmates have been engaged in the coal 
mining industry since I was a kid.  Most of them 
including myself had little schooling and were 
mineworkers before the restructuring of the 
exploitation right in our province.   
 
2. To the best of my knowledge, China has the 
most coal production, which accounts for nearly 
30 per cent of world production.  However, 
Chine is also the biggest coal-consuming 
country in the world and accounts for 35 per 
cent of world coal consumption.  Therefore, 
China is a net import country of coal.  The 
reason results in the net import of coal because 
it is the most important energy, which accounts 
for 70 per cent of energy supply in China.   
 
3. I know exactly every number regarding coal 
mining industry like the back of my hand.  I 
regard myself as one of the most ethical miners 
in this county although people regard us as coal 
boss (mei-lao-pan).  As for the legality, I do not 
think any miners in this country can completely 
meet those strict requirements whether they are 
SOE or private and legal or illegal miners.   
 
4. Nonetheless, I have to close several small 
coalmines, each of them has less than 400,000 
tons production per annum, and lost RMB150 
million per year for each coalmine because of 
the provincial consolidation of small coal mines.   
 
5. I would like to say that the ownership right in 
this country is useless because government can 
take away your ownership anytime by means of 
any high-sounding excuse.   
 
6. What can I say?  After all, they just take away 
something that they gave to us beforehand.  
They presume that we have made enough profit 
through them and it is the truth.   
 
7. In fact, we have many extra costs that nobody 
1. R was a previous mineworker and 
grown-up in the environment highly 
related to coal mining industry.  He 






2. Owing to the energy policy, China 
is a net coal import country 
although she has the biggest coal 








3. Although R is not well educated, he 
has a good command of 
knowledge relating to coal mining 
industry.  He regards himself as an 
ethical employer and the 
regulations of coal mining are too 
strict in China. 
 
 
4. R complains about the 
consolidation of small coalmines 




5. R regards the implementation of 
ownership rights as useless that 
can be changed. 
 
 
6. R regards that his properties were 
given by governments, therefore, 
they can take back after certain 
time. 
 
7. Because coalminers are high 
  
  
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
knows, e.g. tribute to local and central 
administrators, law enforcers, fire safety 
department, media, and even academia.  You 
probably would not believe that a local patrol 
chief owns a Rolls Royce and other dozen cars 
worth millions.  This is only a tip of the iceberg.  
We actually are the prey to everybody.   
 
8. I think that we cannot blame them because we 
do have earned a lot of money through the coal 
mining.  I just want to complain of the 
implementation of property right in terms of CCP 
that they gave you something and consequently 
take away it from you because of some 
ridiculous and unacceptable accounts.   
 
9. CCP just do everything without preliminary 
preparation and study, and always adopt the 
trial-and-error model.  As a ruling party, this is 
not right and cannot be accepted at all.   
 
10. In next year, we are forced to sell all our 
coalmines to a big private company and other 
SOEs.  This is backward transition actually 
against Deng’s reform and openness policy and 
I presume he will never agree with that if he was 
alive.  Anyway, in next year, my family and I will 
move to other country after selling my business.       
profile, they have to pay for many 
extra costs and nobody knows 






8. R does not complain too much 
about paying for the extra cost 
because he has earned enough 
profit.  He yet again complains 




9. R complained that CCP, as a ruling 
party, never prepared before 
initiating any policy change. 
 
 
10. R is forced to sell his coalmines to 









Eighth interview  
Interviewee: Mr. Z 
Age: 55-60 
Gender: Male 
Previous bureaupreneur and senior cadre 
Mining Industry 
Pre-reform Generation 
Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
1. I was first assigned to the Ministry of Geology 
and Mineral Resources in 1987, which was 
merged to the Ministry of Land and Resource in 
1998, and transited to the Department of 
Minerals Exploitation Administration, which is a 
subordinate unit of the Ministry of Land and 
Resource, in 1999.  In the end of 2000, I was 
redeployed to a government-affiliated institute 
that helped provincial government to survey all 
coalmines in terms of safety and productions.   
 
2. In 2001, I acquired this small institute and the 
exploitation license from province through 
corporate restructuring movement.  Meanwhile, 
I rented some pervious state-owned coalmines 
through the restructuring of provincial coal 
mining market.  That is an epochal transition in 
terms of property rights that government 
actually attributed the public properties to the 
populace.   
 
3. Because I have engaged in related works for a 
long time, I therefore know exactly which 
coalmines are with best quality and can be 
exploited less costly.  Unlike many other illegal 
coal miners (mei-lao-pan), who have to worry 
about their status quo and need to give tributes 
to many agencies and law enforcers, we can 
focus on the coal mining per se and hire more 
sophisticated technologies.   
 
4. In 2004, we successfully merged several small-
medium coalmines, each has annual production 
approximately half million tons, through the 
provincial restructuring of coal mining industry.  
Frankly speaking, we used to experience certain 
illegal mining in my company, e.g. multitude of 
coal-pit with the same permit, beyond-boundary 
exploitation; however, all these issues have 
been resolved after the provincial consolidation 
of mining industry.   
 
5. Apart from that, we expect to start exploiting in 
Xingjian province after the completion of 
nationwide railway network in 2015.  In 
comparison with Xingjian, our coal reserve is 
1. Z was a bureaucrat before initiating 










2. Z acquired his existing company 
and affiliated valuable permit and 
information through SOE 







3. Because of insider information, Z 
initiated his company with lots of 
advantages that is on the right 
track without any delay in 
comparison with other companies 





4. With lots of valuable information 
that nobody has, Z overcame 
problems that other people of the 
same profession encountered and 







5. Owing to that financial foundation 





Natural Meaning Unit Central Theme 
actually trivial.  Therefore, I also expect the 
price of thermal coal will drop after 2015; 
however, I will not worry too much because the 
large-scale exploitation in Xingjian can reduce 
the mining cost dramatically.   
 
6. In this year, owing to the consolidation of 
coalmines, there were 10 per cent slump in the 
annual coal production and therefore resulted in 
the surging price of thermal coal for 170 per 
cent.  I assume the provincial and nationwide 
consolidation of coal mining industry is the only 
way forward regarding the improvement of 
mining production, safety, and technology.   
 
7. As for those illegal small coalmines, they should 
be shut down at once in order to maintain 
industry standards and avoiding more tragedies.  
There are more than 80 per cent fatalities of 
coalmines worldwide are happened in China but 
we only account for 30 per cent of world coal 
productions.   
 
8. From my perspective, to keep only few large 
enterprises, whether private or public, in this 
industry is the only means to ameliorate the 
efficiency, increase the productions, and resolve 







6. With inherent advantages, 
assistances of state policy, and 
technical power, Z then acquires 
other small competitors to extend 





















Essential Descriptions and key terms of all interviewees 
 Essential Descriptions Key Terms 
1 
In China, unlike large enterprises, SMEs can 
only follow existing institutions.  China is 
prosperous and resembles Taiwan between the 
70s and 80s.  Institutional changes in China is 
lacking of prior planning.  G agrees with some 
institutional changes, which partially benefit his 
company.  It is very difficult for SMEs to get 
bank loan in comparison with SOEs or large 
enterprises because of discrimination.  G 
positively regards the lack of prior preparation 
as the flexibility in terms of institutional changes 
in China.  G regard that China fully utilizes her 
backward advantage and will exceed other 
countries.  
1. Biased treatment 
2. Unplanned institutional changes 
3. Flexible institutional changes 
4. Backward advantages 
2 
H thinks that people just need to focus on China 
instead of other countries because of the huge 
domestic market.  He also believes has 
presented her strong economic power for a 
decade.  H deems that the mode of utilizing 
cheap labour force for exporting is no longer 
practical.  He yet again emphasizes the huge 
domestic market.  H believes that being the 
strongest is the only way to be successful in 
China’s market.  H thinks that local government 
cannot effectively prevent SMEs from illegal 
activities.  H believes that the position and 
quality of the laws and enforcers have been 
improved only in business environment.  China 
government pays more attention to her 
international image after economic growth.  
China government will retain control of regime 
at the cost of economy.  Any favourable 
institution comes with high cost and is never 
permanent.     
1. Huge domestic market 
2. Strong economic power  
3. Cheap labour force 
4. Inefficient protection 
5. Vague legal environment 
6. Political intervention 
7. Precedence of politics 
8. High cost for favourable institution 
3 
Reform and openness is imperative for China’s 
survival.  Reforms were not consistent and 
have to be endorsed by higher rank political 
leader.  Sloganeering is vital in China and 
consists of important meanings.  Reforms were 
mainly used to change the mentalities of party 
cadres.  Once the mentality has been changed, 
everything becomes improved.  Political leaders 
did envy the success of HNWIs.  There is no 
single model for reform in China.  It varies from 
one place to another.  Before reforms, most 
SOEs were insolvent and heavily relied on the 
assistances of state banks; all debts can only 
be paid off through reforms.  Restructuring 
enterprise has to deal with the issue of 
redundant labours because CCP repudiate their 
commitments to those labours.  Some 
restructuring SOEs wound up in failure because 
1. Essentiality of reforms 
2. Inconsistent reforms 
3. Political power 
4. Mentality of bureaucrat 
5. Diverse reform model 
6. Insolvent SOE 
7. Redundant labour 
8. State intervention 
9. Bad debt 
10. Direction of reforms 
11. Pseudo collective-owned 
enterprises 
12. Sloganeering 
13. Swift reforms 
14. Backward advantages 
15. One-party regime 
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of state intervention.  Except heavy industrial 
SOEs that cannot be transferred owing to large 
debt, most SOEs or likes were restructured 
once reform direction had been decided.  China 
almost is a capitalist country now unlike 1989-
1992.  Nevertheless, openness has to be 
carried on in China.  Sloganeering is vital to 
promote any political movement in China.  The 
tempo of China’s transition is swift and adorable 
that exceeds what Western countries did 
hundreds years ago because of backward 
advantage.  China should not accept all 
Western institutions because some of them are 
awful or inapplicable to us.  China should 
adhere to the existing road, which has led us to 
the existing success, and neglect those 
inapplicable Western models. 
4 
Some SOEs were established after reforms but 
they still followed the planned economic 
system.  SOE remains inefficient if there is no 
change, whether structure or management, and 
will end up with sale or insolvency.  SOEs with 
efficient management will also become 
lucrative.  Most SOEs in China were destined to 
be sold to private individuals or FDI because of 
inefficient and incapable management.  With 
decent management, SOEs can benefit both 
employees and the state.  The reason that 
results in inefficient SOE is the poor 
management but not the corporate structure.  A 
SOE with efficient and practical management, 
which varies according to time and place, can 
also makes lots of profit.  The most prolonged 
problems of SOEs are redundant labors and 
unrestrained financial policies.  During 
restructuring, governments pass the buck to the 
SOE itself and repudiate all their commitments.  
Bad debts of SOEs resulted from unpaid bill of 
other SOEs.  There is no universal rule of 
corporate restructuring in China that varies from 
one place to another.  State interventions have 
seriously affected the performances of SOEs 
and the implementations of their managers.  
1. Inefficient SOE 
2. Planned economy 
3. Insolvent SOE 
4. Inefficient management 
5. Practical management 
6. Profit 
7. Unrestrained financial policy 
8. Repudiation of state responsibility 
9. Various reforms 
10. Bad debt 
 
5 
During transition, many previous civil servants 
started up their own companies because of 
asymmetric information.  Because of lots of 
insider information, previous civil servants can 
find unique niches in the market to make profits.  
Connecting with incumbent state agencies is 
essential for business operations and is difficult 
to be built without prior acquaintance and 
monetary transactions.  With adequate 
connections and insider information, people 
remain access wealth without substantial 
financial investment.  W accredits her wealth to 
Deng’s reforms and regards herself as one of 
1. Previous bureaucrat 
2. Insider information 
3. Adequate and essential 
connections with existing state 
agency 
4. Deng’s reforms 
5. Get some people rich first 
6. Speculation 
7. Market economy 
8. Sophisticated CCP structure 
9. Trivial individual 
10. Immovable political regime 
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those people who get rich first.  In China, many 
HNWIs are low profile and can overcome 
adversities by utilizing their diverse 
connections.  In some industries, it is difficult to 
become successful without adequate 
connections.  Some China’s HNWIs, who are 
essentially one-man band, make lots of profit 
through speculations in public resources.  No 
one should blame HNWIs’ opportunistic 
practices because China is a market economic 
country.  Bureaupreneur HNWI in China 
regards s/he-self as trivial in the huge political 
machine and does not believe that there will be 
any change on the existing model because the 
complexity of CCP. 
6 
Technically speaking, reforms were initiated 
since 1992 after Deng’s visit to Shenzhen.  
Nearly all collective-owned enterprises and 
TVEs became private-owned.  HNWI made her 
profit through institutional holes, which created 
by state agencies, cadres, and interest groups.  
Better education and sophisticated 
administration do not improve the performances 
of state agencies in China.  HNWI is not well 
educated but just know how to utilize the 
opportunities by making use of institutional 
holes in comparison with ordinary people.  
HNWIs will never be restrained by any 
institutions because they already knew how to 
cope with that.  Any strict regulation cannot 
offset the ineffective implementations of state 
agencies that follow many chronic ideologies.  
These chronic ideologies result in many serious 
social problems and instabilities.  In addition, 
lacking of fairness and justice, bureaucrats can 
act on their own wills without punishment.  
HNWI can no longer afford the cost of making 
money in China and plan to leave.  China will 
encounter large discontents if there is no 
change on existing system.  Many people do 
not have the concept of rule-of-law, especially 
those upper class people and law enforcers.  
The golden era of China was between 1995 
and 2005.  Nowadays, people are isolated from 
each other. 
1. Deng’s trip to South in 1992 
2. Collective-owned enterprises/TVEs 
3. Private-owned enterprises 
4. Higher educated bureaucrats 
5. Unchanged bureaucratic behaviour 
6. Opportunitists 
7. HNWIs will not be restrained by 
regulation 
8. Chronic ideologies 
9. Social instability 
10. Unfairness and injustice 
11. Bureaucratic own wills 
12. Cost of making profit 
13. Social discontents 
14. Rule-of-law 
15. Upper class 
16. Aloof 
7 
R was a previous mineworker and grown-up in 
the environment highly related to coal mining 
industry.  He and other likes are not well 
educated.  Owing to the energy policy, China is 
a net coal import country although she has the 
biggest coal production in the world.  Although 
R is not well educated, he has a good 
command of knowledge relating to coal mining 
industry.  He regards himself as an ethical 
employer and the regulations of coal mining are 
too strict in China.  R complains about the 
1. Peasant labour 
2. Property right restructure 
3. Less educated  
4. Ethical employer 
5. Consolidation  
6. Monopoly 
7. Merged by SOEs 
8. Ownership right 
9. Wealth distribution 
10. Collusion 
11. Extort bribe 
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consolidation of small coalmines that results in 
huge profit loss.  R regards the implementation 
of ownership rights as useless that can be 
changed.  R regards that his properties were 
given by government, therefore, they can take 
back after certain time.  Because coalminers 
are high profile, they have to pay for many extra 
costs and nobody knows about it.  R does not 
complain too much about paying for the extra 
cost because he has earned enough profit.  He 
yet again complains CCP and the weak 
protection of his property.  R complained that 
CCP, as a ruling party, never prepared before 
initiating any policy change.  R is forced to sell 
his coalmines to other SOEs and 
conglomerates.  
12. State agents 
13. Weak protection of private property 




Z was a bureaucrat before initiating his own 
business in a related industry.  Z acquired his 
existing company and affiliated valuable permit 
and information through SOE restructuring.  
Because of insider information, Z initiated his 
company with lots of advantages that is on the 
right track without any delay in comparison with 
other companies in the same industry.  With 
lots of valuable information that nobody has, Z 
overcame problems that other people of the 
same profession encountered and accessed 
wealth effortlessly.  Owing to that financial 
foundation laid before, Z expands his business 
operations efficiently.  With inherent 
advantages, assistances of state policy, and 
technical power, Z then acquires other small 
competitors to extend his business nationwide.  
Z states the reason to consolidate the industry.  
Z advocates the monopoly on his industry 
plausibly. 
1. Previous bureaucrat 
2. Insider information 
3. Easier start-up 
4. Inherent advantage 
5. Connections with state agency 
6. Business expanding 









Assigned Categories Formal Constraint 
Case Reference Interviewee #1 
A bit of Data Unlike those conglomerates or SOEs, we, as SME, are in general 
in compliance with regulations devised by governments.     
Text Location Appendix 1/6 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Before 2008, government still gave many favours to FDI in terms 
of tax abatement.  
Text Location Appendix 1/22 
Date 20/Dec/2010 
A bit of Data It’s very difficult for SMEs to get bank loans in China.  
Text Location Appendix 1/23 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In China, banks are biased toward SMEs and favoured SOEs or 
conglomerates.    
Text Location Appendix 1/23 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Most banks in China are state-owned; therefore, they have lots of 
red tape and less flexibility.   
Text Location Appendix 1/57 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government only give bank loans to certain people, e.g. overseas 
returnees.  
Text Location Appendix 1/65 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #2 
A bit of Data State agency promulgated extremely strict specifications 
regarding foods and drugs to regulate these industries and 
eliminate those less competitive companies.       
Text Location Appendix 2/22 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Unless the superior authorities or those agencies of other 
provinces or cities involve directly.  State agencies will not 
actively crackdown those counterfeit products once those 
manufacturers pay adequate bribes to those corresponding 
agencies.   
Text Location Appendix 2/31 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Local agencies will not clear those backlog of reported counterfeit 
cases unless they are forced to clear.    
Text Location Appendix 2/34 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data We have to draw on the pressure from higher authority to 
oppress local state agencies in order to reach our goals.  Doing 
business in China, it is more important build up better 
connections than to understand the laws.    
Text Location Appendix 2/36 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China remains a rule-by-men society.  We too exploit this 
disadvantage to benefit ourselves.   
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Text Location Appendix 2/38 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Everybody is equal before the law is an everlasting law.  
However, behind the law, people’s positions vary with their 
power.       
Text Location Appendix 2/40 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Corporate regulations are only valid while employees are working 
within.  Once they leave the company, we have to use the law to 
impose sanction against them.    
Text Location Appendix 2/42 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data We still regard the laws positively if we apply them to the right 
place, e.g. signing contracts, corporate competition.   
Text Location Appendix 2/43 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If we did not pass the inspection, we would be fined a lot of 
money by state agencies.  We knew that would be a big trouble 
to us.  We would approach them and paid bribes when they were 
off-duty.  Say, we were fined fifty thousands Yuan.  We paid them 
one thousand Yuan bribe and they would reduce the amount of 
ticket to twenty thousands Yuan.  This kind of situation has not 
been improved a lot since 1999.      
Text Location Appendix 2/55 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data This kind of extortion is even worst in the inner-land areas 
because of less transparency. 
Text Location Appendix 2/56 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data It cannot be denied that both the law enforcement and the quality 
of bureaucrats have been improved in recent years.     
Text Location Appendix 2/65 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Then China government tried to save her face and embargo all 
roasted eels shipments to Japan.   
Text Location Appendix 2/71 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China government lifted an embargo on the roasted eels industry 
for one year.  Every maker in this industry was forced to 
restructure the capabilities in all aspects.  China government said 
that we would rather not make this foreign exchange because we 
already have too much of it.  They did not need to rely on the 
roasted eels industry to make foreign exchange.     
Text Location Appendix 2/72 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China government did not give us any buffer time to 
accommodate to the newly promulgated food safety law.  We 
spent six months to change the entire manufacturing process in 
order to fit into the new law.     
Text Location Appendix 2/74 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data We have to replace nearly all addictives that had been used for 
years overnight.  This change raised our cost dramatically.  The 
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worst thing was that we could not raise our selling price to the 
market.  The third impact is the labour law.     
Text Location Appendix 2/75 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data As a regular company, we were not largely impacted by the new 
labour law; however, it costed a lot of time and money for us to 
sign the new contracts with all employees in all factories.        
Text Location Appendix 2/77 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In Dongguan, there were around three hundreds factories were 
closed nearly overnight because of the new labour law.    
Text Location Appendix 2/83 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #3 
A bit of Data Then ownership right was state ownership, party secretary 
sloganeered the “without ownership, with residence” for SOEs.  
They did not persist in holding the ownership of SOEs but rather 
keeping them locally to prosper local economy and pay tax to 
local government.      
Text Location Appendix 3/8 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data When Premier Zhu was incumbent, he advocated and 
implemented the tax reform in terms of “without ownership, with 
residence”.  Why should I own the SOEs, right?  I always keep 
the burden.  Holding the ownership of SOEs would cause great 
burden to then governments.  Any big SOE would have nearly 
twenty thousands employees.  When SOE was not able to pay 
salaries to employees, they would seek help from political leaders 
and asked them “how to do?”  The city mayor would call for a 
meeting with state banks and asked them to lend money to 
SOEs.  If state banks did not want to do so, political leaders 
would say “you are the state banks, if you do not help them to 
solve the issues, what to do?  Then if populace uprise, you still 
need to deal with this issue, right?        
Text Location Appendix 3/9 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Then was under planned economy.  Most leaders of SOEs were 
inert because everything was collective-owned, therefore, they 
knew their positions were temporary and could be sacked 
anytime.        
Text Location Appendix 3/10 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If we did not want to participate reforms, we would be fired on the 
spot and had to stay in that SOE without leaving for at least three 
years.        
Text Location Appendix 3/12 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If the SOE’s leader didn’t want to participate the reform, local 
government had the authority to assign a new person to replace 
the existing SOE leader immediately.      
Text Location Appendix 3/16 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In any case, CCP always make a case model for everything.  
Government would assign several work teams from different 
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department to expedite SOEs’ restructuring, e.g. tax, banking, 
business management, labour union, social security, etc.        
Text Location Appendix 3/23 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government had a schedule for the restructuring.  Say, when we 
had to call for a meeting of the whole plant, how to organize a 
working platform, what is the next step and after, etc.  
Government also has scheduled meeting with leader.  For 
example, they set a date to have a meeting with me for 
discussing the reform policy of my plant.       
Text Location Appendix 3/25 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In Northern Suzhou, they only had one reform model unlike what 
we had in Zhejiang.         
Text Location Appendix 3/27 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data After reform, I went to Northern Suzhou and Northeast provinces 
and still saw the signboard with “State-owned victory hotel.”  At 
that time, we Zhejiang people resembled as nowadays 
Taiwanese.  I was laughing when I saw the signboard because 
there was no any state-owned collective in Suzhou.  Not al all!                
Text Location Appendix 3/33 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There were eighty per cent SOEs were losing money or in deficit.  
If you take out the negative equity, those SOEs actually held 
nothing but debt!  Thus, government forced state-owned banks to 
handle the debts of SOEs as bad debts.              
Text Location Appendix 3/35 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government asked those restructuring SOEs that layoff could not 
exceed five per cent every year.  
Text Location Appendix 3/48-49 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In the planned economy, the management of SOE had no right to 
sack any labour.  They had to report from one level of authority to 
another.         
Text Location Appendix 3/57 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Replace the manager!  The local political leaders assumed the 
manager was with bad intentions because of disobedience.  How 
could we handle the situation, right?  Replace him!            
Text Location Appendix 3/64 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Within one year, all collective-owned, state-owned, and TVEs 
were restructured and transferred to shareholding companies.          
Text Location Appendix 3/27 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data They all supported reforms!  Japanese shareholders never say 
any word about reforms because they know this is our national 
policy.  They understood it.         
Text Location Appendix 3/92 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There were certain adverse effects.  Say their investments.  What 
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if reforms failed?  They would lose all their investments. 
Text Location Appendix 3/93 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Reforms have been implemented for several decades since it’s 
beginning.  Those political sloganeering, from local authority to 
central government, clearly encompass the centre of economic 
growth.  Unlike Mao’s era, he positioned the class struggle as the 
centre.  That is why most people thought Deng Xiaoping was 
brilliant.  He clearly established the general direction of this 
nation.  That is economic development!  Just neglect whatever 
ism!!                   
Text Location Appendix 3/102 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Except Deng Xiaoping, who else dares to say that?          
Text Location Appendix 3/104 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Most Chinese people agree with existing one-party political 
system.  The multi-party competition system will not benefit China 
because we have too many people and unbalanced 
development.  If you say the multi-party competition system… 
120: immediately… 
121: The country will be messed up overnight!  One point four 
billions people!  That will be in chaos…             
Text Location Appendix 3/119-121 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #4 
A bit of Data Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained 
following the planned economic system in 1989.  There mainly 
are two processes since I become the GM of this plant in 2000.  
Between 2000 and 2005, I had limited power because of the 
middle tier of bureaucracy between this plant and the holding 
company.  In 2005, the middle tier company was eliminated and 
this plant became under the direct control of holding company 
since then.  Thus, we have more power in management.  I think 
the corporate structure of SOE has very little to do with its 
performance whether Chinese-foreign JV or shareholding 
system.  It is not saying that SOE is less efficient than private 
enterprise; there is no direct relation with the corporate structure 
in terms of the performance.       
Text Location Appendix 4/3 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data When I first came to this plant, the worst problem was what to do 
with these redundant employees.  Be honest to you, about half of 
those employees were useless in terms of work.  As a manager, I 
could not use them.  What was worse was that they were not just 
useless but jeopardize the normal operation in the company, and 
brought many negative effects.  However, the company, or I 
should say the country has to be responsible for what they 
become.  The country repudiate her responsibility to these people 
she committed before.  We cannot just complain them. 
Text Location Appendix 4/4 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There were two processes of repudiation for government.  The 
first one was initiated in 1988.  It was dual tracking.  What is that?  
Those employees hired before 1988 were lifetime employed and 
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cannot be fired or laid off.  Those employees hired after 1988 
were under the contract system.  In general, those employees 
hired after 1988 were not different from those hired before 1988.  
Maybe there were slightly different in terms of welfare.       
Text Location Appendix 4/6 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Policy indeed exists; however, it does not mean that you will be 
entitled to the benefit.  SOEs have to apply for the approval from 
government.  To get the approval, SOEs must fulfil a lot of 
provisions.  It is so difficult!    
Text Location Appendix 4/9 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Wow! Why this plant was not privatized?  This question has been 
asked hundred times already!  The situation is that people deal 
with corporate restructuring cautiously in Shanghai.  It is very 
difficult.  There are two reasons.  The first one is, from the 
government perspective, Shanghai political leaders are more 
prudent than other places.  Alternatively, I should say those 
political leaders in other places are bolder than those in 
Shanghai.  Corporate restructuring… Especially those SOEs 
transferred to private-owned enterprises were rare in Shanghai.  
If any, they were TVEs or county-owned enterprises.  
Shanghainess political leaders are very cautious and do not wan 
to take risk of being gossiped.  Sometimes they even do not do 
the right thing in order to avoid arousing suspicion!               
Text Location Appendix 4/14 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data To put it bluntly, the higher ranked political leaders may transfer 
me to other position in next meeting.  Who know?  They just need 
to summon a meeting and with the approvals from few major 
leaders.  That’s it!  
Text Location Appendix 4/17 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Yes!  I need to discuss with the party secretary assigned to this 
plant for most important decisions, e.g. human resource or other 
major issues.  In this plant, we make a collective decision.  
Alternatively, it is under the collective leadership.    
Text Location Appendix 4/25 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Our authority is limited.  For example, we are not allowed to 
finance and invest independently.  All these activities need to be 
approved by holding company.  If we are allowed to invest now, I 
will find a bigger place, e.g. one to two hundred acres, to expand 
the factory.  Next, I will establish another subsidiary.  But we just 
don’t have the authority to do it.  Theoretically speaking, we can 
discuss the authority issue with higher ranked leaders.  However, 
it is literally difficult.  The higher leaders are cautious about new 
investment.  Besides, the decision is made collectively.  It is bad 
that once there is any single vote against the proposal, there is 
no so-called majority rule for the subsequent discussion.  That is 
to say, the decision of the proposal either will adjourn indefinitely 
or disapproved because of the minority views.       
Text Location Appendix 4/28 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In SOE, people need to double the effort than in private-owned 
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enterprise in order to reach the same goal.   
Text Location Appendix 4/29 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I do not feel right about their way to deal with problem in terms of 
higher raked leaders.  They focus too much on the procedure and 
institution.  Definitely, they both are indispensable but only under 
the circumstance of no intervention.  Once procedure or 
institution is intervened, they will move oppositely!  Institution or 
procedure cannot make sure the decision is right.  Very often in 
China that the decision was wrong but the procedure and 
institution were faultless!        
Text Location Appendix 4/30 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #5 
A bit of Data I majored in chemistry engineering during college and was 
assigned to the State Bureau of Survey Mapping as an engineer 
in 1985 even though I had no idea what leveller or transit was.   
Text Location Appendix 5/3 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data It is very difficult to get the ticket to attend the land-use right 
auction.  Through the assistances of my former superior and 
colleagues, we got the ticket effortless in comparison with other 
competitors.  Most of them were unable to get the ticket to attend 
the auction because my colleagues deliberately make things 
difficult to my competitors in order to reduce the number of 
bidders.  Yes, they were more financially qualified than we were 
then.  Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not all up to 
financial capability.  Alternatively, financial capability sometimes 
became the Achilles’ hill to them.  When the panel did the 
eligibility assessment, they might be questioned or put low 
marking because they were too rich and were suspected about 
their motivations, which were land speculation.  Certainly, this is 
not a universal rule that can be applied nationwide.  However, it is 
our territory and people have to play in accordance with our rules 
of game.             
Text Location Appendix 5/8 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data So far, we seldom involve in substantial housing development 
projects but mainly focus on the buy-and-sell of lad-use rights 
because of long period and uncertainty of investment.  Because 
we often were denounced as land speculators by competitors (we 
actually are, hahaha!), therefore, we sometimes are forced to 
pretend to develop substantial housing projects.  Nevertheless, 
we never did spend our time and money on construction; instead, 
we have package deals that entail construction permits and the 
lad-use rights.  Definitely, our connections will freeze the approval 
of construction permits when we want to trade the on-hand 
package deals.     
Text Location Appendix 5/12 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data National policies will definitely affect our business operations; 
however, these affections are not lethal at all!  Those policies can 
only delay the schedule progresses but never can change them.  
You have to know all policies in China are rhetorical and 
ambiguous but without very less substantial effects.  Most 
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policies will leave loopholes for us to exploit except some with 
serious political intentions.  We are not the only speculator in this 
country.  There are bigger speculators in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and other major cities.  They already formed a 
syndicate to lobby and influence central government.  We are 
nothing but unwittingly harboured by their efforts.  National policy 
will be discounted always by local governments.  Central 
government knows that, we know that, banks know that, and local 
authorities know that!  Who do not know that?  People! Ordinary 
people always assume they play seriously. 
Text Location Appendix 5/17 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data So far, we only encountered one risk that could severely 
jeopardize our business in 2004 because of the soaring housing 
price.  There was a national syndicate formed within this industry 
in one month of time.  Each of us paid money proportionately to 
the convener as hush money to key persons among media, 
academia, state agencies, and law enforcers as well.  Definitely, 
those housing developers also made similar efforts as we did.  At 
last, we overpowered them because populace could no longer 
stand the soaring housing price at all.   
Text Location Appendix 5/23 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I do not think there will be any change in the political system in 
my life.  People do not comprehend how complicated the 
structure of CCP is and how difficult to operate this giant political 
machine.  Too many parts compose this machine and we are 
only few small bolts.  Perhaps we are vital to the machine, but we 
still are bolts and can be replaced by those peers in the market if 
we are not wary enough. 
Text Location Appendix 5/27 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #6 
A bit of Data Alas!  If you compare Western countries with China, just these 
two kinds of countries, the problem is the government rather than 
the people.  The real reason to restrain the perfection of 
institution that is the government but not the populace.  The 
incompletion is owing to some people in the government that are 
deficient.      
Text Location Appendix 6/2 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I have been self-employed since 1993.  From then onward, I 
always follow the trend in terms of running business.  I always 
change the business operation along with the trend.  Is there any 
institutional loophole?  Yes, there is a lot of it!         
Text Location Appendix 6/7 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data People, who really manipulate the institutions, are not on the top 
level or the lowest level.  They are on the middle level.  They are 
those people holding real power of implementation.   
Text Location Appendix 6/13 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In fact, not everybody makes use of the institutional loopholes.  
Reform and opening is a huge project.  Who has capability, 
whoever can make money, right?       
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Text Location Appendix 6/17 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data You must remember.  No matter what institution is, it will never 
impact those people who manipulate institution.  All these 
institutions never cause impact on the middleman.         
Text Location Appendix 6/19 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China has more regulations than other advanced countries have 
in terms of curbing speculation.  However, is anybody obeying?  
Is institution functioning properly?  Government themselves 
hardly comprehensively implement theses regulations because of 
chronic ideologies, which are not proletarian or communist 
ideologies but ideologies accumulated of thousand years, e.g. to 
drift and muddle along, emperor mentality, etc.  We have lots of 
institutions.   
Text Location Appendix 6/25 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government themselves create the institutional loopholes but not 
the populace.        
Text Location Appendix 6/34 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government only change institutions if they have to.      
Text Location Appendix 6/35 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The housing market has been recessed in last two years.  
Government therefore issue certain new rules to reduce related 
taxes in order to prosper the market.  They reduce taxes, people 
will start to buy and sell houses and the market become booming 
again.  Is this called policy or institution?  I personally don’t think 
so!            
Text Location Appendix 6/66 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There were self-immolation incidents in this city as well.  It is 
because of the violent and forbidden demolition.  Housing 
developers always have to pay bribes to local officials but 
bureaucrats have to make sure all preliminary works are well 
prepared and bureaucrats have to demolish all existing ground 
materials.  The controversial point is the compensation.  For 
those bureaucrats, they regard the previous public housings were 
sold to those ordinary people with great favours.  On the other 
hand, populace already paid for these housing and regard them 
as their lifetime properties.   
Text Location Appendix 6/85 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Nobody is allowed to take away other people’s properties without 
appropriate compensation because of the law.  However, 
government, on one hand, are the law enforcers, on the other 
hand, they are surveyors to decide the amount of compensation.  
As a result, the tragedy happened.   
Text Location Appendix 6/86 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data As for the law, my personal experience is a very good example.  
At the outset, I was very timid but dare to break the law.  
Everybody actually breaks the law while they are doing business.  
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There is no exception in this country.  Nonetheless, if you are in 
the gray area, you can always break the law.      
Text Location Appendix 6/125 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I sued someone else, also sued by others and went to the court 
sometimes.  Those law enforcers just blur the line between right 
and wrong.  The legal constraints are based on personal 
relationship with those law enforcers, e.g. prosecutors, judges, 
policemen, etc.         
Text Location Appendix 6/135 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data From my perspective, Mr. Hwang of Gome Electrical Appliances 
is a scapegoat.  When he initiated his business, there were many 
people help him.  Without those assistances, he can never reach 
the existing position.  He definitely is not the only speculator in 
the stock market.  
Text Location Appendix 6/139 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In my opinion, it entails both economic and political interests and 
conflicts.  Hwang has to step forward to take all blames.  In 
China, you can never be ingratitude.  Hwang will be fine few 
years later.  Just like Lai Changxing of Yuanhua group.  He has 
to stay in Canada and never come back to protect some people’s 
heads.       
Text Location Appendix 6/139 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Many rich people do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On the 
contrary, they do deem breaking-law as a social status, the more 
crimes they committed without punishment, and the higher social 
status they are.   
Text Location Appendix 6/145 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In my opinion, people don’t build up relations with those agents 
nowadays.  Who else has money, whoever has relation, right?  
The old-fashioned guanxi is no longer available.      
Text Location Appendix 6/145 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #7 
A bit of Data There are many safety inspections in our coal pits and others as 
well.  Some of these inspections are mere formalities and 
useless.  We have been told prior to their spot checks.  These 
inspectors would never go deeper and we actually did their jobs 
for them.  In comparison with large mining companies or SOEs, 
we are, most of the time, as good as they are because I was a 
coal miner.  However, government always can find fault with us 
and give us low marking.  It’s unfair!   
Text Location Appendix 7/3 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Those large and state-owned mining companies also have small 
mines that produce less than four hundred thousand tons of coal; 
nevertheless, inspectors put together several small coalmines 
become a large one that can meet the basic requirement.  That’s 
why they do not need to close the small coalmines but we have 
to.  Government just don’t want let small coalminer existing.  
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They think we are troublemakers.              
Text Location Appendix 7/15 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data So fat as I know, those large and state-owned mining companies 
have had severe catastrophes than we do.  However, they are 
able to pay hush money to the press, law enforcers, local 
authorities, and victims’ families.  Under the circumstances, 
people hardly know what happen there.  As for us, once we 
encounter any similar disaster, our powerful rivals will endeavour 
to disclose everything to the public.  In this respect, I regard 
myself as a victim!          
Text Location Appendix 7/17 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Government just take away something that they gave to us 
beforehand.  They presume that we have made enough profit and 
it is the truth.   
Text Location Appendix 7/20 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data I just want to complain the implementation of property rights in 
terms of CCP that they gave you something and consequently 
take away it from you because of some ridiculous and 
unacceptable accounts. 
Text Location Appendix 7/23 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data CCP just do everything without preliminary preparation and study, 
and always adopt the trial-and-error model.  As a ruling party, this 
is not right and cannot be accepted at all.  This is backward 
transition actually against Deng’s reform and openness policy 
and I presume he will never agree with that if he was alive.  
Text Location Appendix 7/27 
Date 15/July/2010 
Case Reference Interviewee #8 
A bit of Data The consolidation of state agency in the late 1990s was, on one 
hand, a disaster regardless of responsibilities, and still kept, on 
the other hand, redundant employees.  In fact, the efficiency of 
each department became worse after consolidation.  It was 
mainly political spoils.  What can we do?  I was only a small 
potato and could not be much of help.  But this misfortune 
becomes an actual blessing on my future indeed.       
Text Location Appendix 7/3 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data When I worked for the state agency, I had surveyed nearly eighty 
per cent of coalmines in this provinces and collected adequate 
information that nobody would able to access, including my 
superior and colleagues.  When I was assigned to the subsidiary, 
I supposed that I was disparaged and therefore brought all these 
valuable information with me.  Do you know what happen?  
Nobody in my previous working unit knows there is such valuable 
information.  Nobody knows!  This information helps me to select 
the best coalmines when we start our own business in this 
industry.  That’s why I can pick the best coalmines during the 
consolidation.               
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A bit of Data Before coalmine restructuring, we had no idea what it would be.  
One of my previous superior just asked us to apply for the SOE 
restructuring for then working unit.  I was scared because we 
didn’t have enough money and plan at all.  My superior gave us 
money as his share in the new company then we started the new 
company up.  It’s so simple!  My superior has a senior relative in 
central agency.  I assumed this is the reason he always knows 
everything precisely in advance.  Anyway, the exploiting license 
was transferred to the new company because it’s a package deal.  
I didn’t know that all these restructuring were for the exploiting 
license after several years later.  You have asked me why my 
superior picks me as his representative instead of others?  I 
assume because we both were from the same village.  A very 
small village!              
Text Location Appendix 7/8 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data We first rented the coalmines from SOEs.  Frankly speaking, I 
never knew there is such a good deal in the world. Hahaha!  If I 
knew it, I probably will do it myself.  Anyway, we only need to pay 
some money to those SOEs and get the right to use all their 
mining facilities.  You probably have no idea how expensive 
those facilities are.  Anyway, this bargain occurs only once in a 
thousand years.  In comparison with the profit, the rent paid to 
those SOEs was nothing at all.  I can even afford thousand-fold of 
that rent and still be very profitable.  All I have now are accredited 
to reforms and CCP.  Without them, I am still nobody.      
Text Location Appendix 7/11 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Some of my friends, who own other large mining companies, and 
myself actually plan all consolidation and give it to the state 
agency.  We together convince government that only 
consolidation will rescue the mining industry and eradicate those 
small coalminers.  They are rats and make bloody money! 
Text Location Appendix 7/15 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Every single private coalminer has his own influential power.  We 
have different connections with local and central state agencies.  
We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies 
to protect ourselves.  The favourable policies mean my 
favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable 
policy will always against someone’s existing benefits.  It is 
inevitable.  This is a race of connection, power, money, etc.  With 
favourable policies, coalminers can make incredible profit from it.  
Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  This is a universal 
hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket profit without sharing with 
others, especially when you made your commitment to them.  
Otherwise, you will lose everything, including your life.     
Text Location Appendix 7/17 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data The plan, which had been made by us, entails current coalmine 
consolidation as well as the expanding part.  We already target 
the bigger coalmine in Mongolia and Xingjian.  I have surveyed 
the coalmines there.  Comparing with them, the coalmines we 
have now are nothing at all.  We actually started exploitation 
there already with local people and agents.  We just simply apply 
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the same rule of the games to different place.  After all, it’s China 
and we all are Chinese, right?  Chinese knows what another 
Chinese needs.  
Text Location Appendix 7/20 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data The new policy applied to Mongolia and Xingjian will not allow 
small coalminers like what happened here before.  All coalminers 
there are SOEs and conglomerates only.  You may say we 
dominate this industry.  But I think we make this industry more 
regulated without vicious competition.  In the end, it helps the 
mining industry.  I deeply believe so.    
Text Location Appendix 7/23 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I 
should say there is no big change will be made.  This country 
needs economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, there 
is no development at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or 
development at the expense of stability.  The Western multiparty 
model or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.  You see 
the Western societies are chaotic.      




Databits assigned to the category ‘Formal Constraints’ 
1. Unlike those conglomerates or SOEs, we, as SME, are in general in compliance with regulations devised 
by governments.     
2. Before 2008, government still gave many favours to FDI in terms of tax abatement.  
3. It’s very difficult for SMEs to get bank loans in China.  
4. In China, banks are biased toward SMEs and favoured SOEs or conglomerates.    
5. Most banks in China are state-owned; therefore, they have lots of red tape and less flexibility.   
6. Government only give bank loans to certain people, e.g. overseas returnees.  
7. State agency promulgated extremely strict specifications regarding foods and drugs to regulate these 
industries and eliminate those less competitive companies.       
8. Unless the superior authorities or those agencies of other provinces or cities involve directly.  State 
agencies will not actively crackdown those counterfeit products once those manufacturers pay adequate 
bribes to those corresponding agencies.   
9. Local agencies will not clear those backlog of reported counterfeit cases unless they are forced to clear.    
10. We have to draw on the pressure from higher authority to oppress local state agencies in order to reach 
our goals.  Doing business in China, it is more important build up better connections than to understand 
the laws.    
11. China remains a rule-by-men society.  We too exploit this disadvantage to benefit ourselves.   
12. Everybody is equal before the law is an everlasting law.  However, behind the law, people’s positions 
vary with their power.       
13. Corporate regulations are only valid while employees are working within.  Once they leave the company, 
we have to use the law to impose sanction against them.    
14. If we did not pass the inspection, we would be fined a lot of money by state agencies.  We knew that 
would be a big trouble to us.  We would approach them and paid bribes when they were off-duty.  Say, 
we were fined fifty thousands Yuan.  We paid them one thousand Yuan bribe and they would reduce the 
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amount of ticket to twenty thousands Yuan.  This kind of situation has not been improved a lot since 
1999.      
15. This kind of extortion is even worst in the inner-land areas because of less transparency. 
16. Then China government tried to save her face and embargo all roasted eels shipments to Japan.   
17. China government lifted an embargo on the roasted eels industry for one year.  Every maker in this 
industry was forced to restructure the capabilities in all aspects.  China government said that we would 
rather not make this foreign exchange because we already have too much of it.  They did not need to rely 
on the roasted eels industry to make foreign exchange.     
18. China government did not give us any buffer time to accommodate to the newly promulgated food safety 
law.  We spent six months to change the entire manufacturing process in order to fit into the new law.     
19. We have to replace nearly all addictives that had been used for years overnight.  This change raised our 
cost dramatically.  The worst thing was that we could not raise our selling price to the market.  The third 
impact is the labour law.     
20. In Dongguan, there were around three hundreds factories were closed nearly overnight because of the 
new labour law.   
21. When Prime Minister Zhu was incumbent, he advocated and implemented the tax reform in terms of 
“without ownership, with residence”.  Why should I own the SOEs, right?  I always keep the burden.  
Holding the ownership of SOEs would cause great burden to then governments.  Any big SOE would 
have nearly twenty thousands employees.  When SOE was not able to pay salaries to employees, they 
would seek help from political leaders and asked them “how to do?”  The city mayor would call for a 
meeting with state banks and asked them to lend money to SOEs.  If state banks did not want to do so, 
political leaders would say “you are the state banks, if you do not help them to solve the issues, what to 
do?  Then if populace up rise, you still need to deal with this issue, right?               
22. If we did not want to participate reforms, we would be fired on the spot and had to stay in that SOE 
without leaving for at least three years.        
23. There were eighty per cent SOEs were losing money or in deficit.  If you take out the negative equity, 
those SOEs actually held nothing but debt!  Thus, government forced state-owned banks to handle the 
debts of SOEs as bad debts.              
24. Government asked those restructuring SOEs that layoff could not exceed five per cent every year.  
25. In the planned economy, the management of SOE had no right to sack any labour.  They had to report 
from one level of authority to another.         
26. Within one year, all collective-owned, state-owned, and TVEs were restructured and transferred to 
shareholding companies.          
27. There were certain adverse effects.  Say their investments.  What if reforms failed?  They would lose all 
their investments. 
28. Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained following the planned economic system in 
1989.  There mainly are two processes since I become the GM of this plant in 2000.  Between 2000 and 
2005, I had limited power because of the middle tier of bureaucracy between this plant and the holding 
company.  In 2005, the middle tier company was eliminated and this plant became under the direct 
control of holding company since then.  Thus, we have more power in management.  I think the corporate 
structure of SOE has very little to do with its performance whether Chinese-foreign JV or shareholding 
system.  It is not saying that SOE is less efficient than private enterprise; there is no direct relation with 
the corporate structure in terms of the performance.       
29. When I first came to this plant, the worst problem was what to do with these redundant employees.  Be 
honest to you, about half of those employees were useless in terms of work.  As a manager, I could not 
use them.  What was worse was that they were not just useless but jeopardize the normal operation in 
the company, and brought many negative effects.  However, the company, or I should say the country 
has to be responsible for what they become.  The country repudiate her responsibility to these people she 
committed before.  We cannot just complain them. 
30. There were two processes of repudiation for government.  The first one was initiated in 1988.  It was dual 
tracking.  What is that?  Those employees hired before 1988 were lifetime employed and cannot be fired 
or laid off.  Those employees hired after 1988 were under the contract system.  In general, those 
employees hired after 1988 were not different from those hired before 1988.  Maybe there were slightly 
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different in terms of welfare.       
31. Wow! Why this plant was not privatized?  This question has been asked hundred times already!  The 
situation is that people deal with corporate restructuring cautiously in Shanghai.  It is very difficult.  There 
are two reasons.  The first one is, from the government perspective, Shanghai political leaders are more 
prudent than other places.  Alternatively, I should say those political leaders in other places are bolder 
than those in Shanghai.  Corporate restructuring… Especially those SOEs transferred to private-owned 
enterprises were rare in Shanghai.  If any, they were TVEs or county-owned enterprises.  Shanghainese 
political leaders are very cautious and do not wan to take risk of being gossip.  Sometimes they even do 
not do the right thing in order to avoid arousing suspicion!               
32. To put it bluntly, the higher ranked political leaders may transfer me to other position in next meeting.  
Who know?  They just need to summon a meeting and with the approvals from few major leaders.  That’s 
it!  
33. Yes!  I need to discuss with the party secretary assigned to this plant for most important decisions, e.g. 
human resource or other major issues.  In this plant, we make a collective decision.  Alternatively, it is 
under the collective leadership.    
34. My authority is limited.  For example, we are not allowed to finance and invest independently.  All these 
activities need to be approved by holding company.  If we are allowed to invest now, I will find a bigger 
place, e.g. one to two hundred acres, to expand the factory.  Next, I will establish another subsidiary.  But 
we just don’t have the authority to do it.  Theoretically speaking, we can discuss the authority issue with 
higher ranked leaders.  However, it is literally difficult.  The higher leaders are cautious about new 
investment.  Besides, the decision is made collectively.  It is bad that once there is any single vote 
against the proposal, there is no so-called majority rule for the subsequent discussion.  That is to say, the 
decision of the proposal either will adjourn indefinitely or disapproved because of the minority views.       
35. I do not feel right about their way to deal with problem in terms of higher raked leaders.  They focus too 
much on the procedure and institution.  Definitely, they both are indispensable but only under the 
circumstance of no intervention.  Once procedure or institution is intervened, they will move oppositely!  
Institution or procedure cannot make sure the decision is right.  Very often in China that the decision was 
wrong but the procedure and institution were faultless!        
36. I majored in chemistry engineering during college and was assigned to the State Bureau of Survey 
Mapping as an engineer in 1985 even though I had no idea what leveller or transit was.   
37. It is very difficult to get the ticket to attend the land-use right auction.  Through the assistances of my 
former superior and colleagues, we got the ticket effortless in comparison with other competitors.  Most of 
them were unable to get the ticket to attend the auction because my colleagues deliberately make things 
difficult to my competitors in order to reduce the number of bidders.  Yes, they were more financially 
qualified than we were then.  Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not all up to financial capability.  
Alternatively, financial capability sometimes became the Achilles’ hill to them.  When the panel did the 
eligibility assessment, they might be questioned or put low marking because they were too rich and were 
suspected about their motivations, which were land speculation.  Certainly, this is not a universal rule that 
can be applied nationwide.  However, it is our territory and people have to play in accordance with our 
rules of game.             
38. So far, we seldom involve in substantial housing development projects but mainly focus on the buy-and-
sell of lad-use rights because of long period and uncertainty of investment.  Because we often were 
denounced as land speculators by competitors (we actually are, hahaha!), therefore, we sometimes are 
forced to pretend to develop substantial housing projects.  Nevertheless, we never did spend our time 
and money on construction; instead, we have package deals that entail construction permits and the lad-
use rights.  Definitely, our connections will freeze the approval of construction permits when we want to 
trade the on-hand package deals.     
39. National policies will definitely affect our business operations; however, these affections are not lethal at 
all!  Those policies can only delay the scheduled progresses but never can change them.  You have to 
know all policies in China are rhetorical and ambiguous but without very less substantial effects.  Most 
policies will leave loopholes for us to exploit except some with serious political intentions.  We are not the 
only speculator in this country.  There are bigger speculators in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other 
major cities.  They already formed a syndicate to lobby and influence central government.  We are 
nothing but unwittingly harboured by their efforts.  National policy will be discounted always by local 
governments.  Central government knows that, we know that, banks know that, and local authorities know 
that!  Who do not know that?  People! Ordinary people always assume they play seriously. 
40. So far, we only encountered one risk that could severely jeopardize our business in 2004 because of the 
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soaring housing price.  There was a national syndicate formed within this industry in one month of time.  
Each of us paid money proportionately to the convener as hush money to key persons among media, 
academia, state agencies, and law enforcers as well.  Definitely, those housing developers also made 
similar efforts as we did.  At last, we overpowered them because populace could no longer stand the 
soaring housing price at all.   
41. Alas!  If you compare Western countries with China, just these two kinds of countries, the problem is the 
government rather than the people.  The real reason to restrain the perfection of institution that is the 
government but not the populace.  The incompletion is owing to some people in the government that are 
deficient.      
42. You must remember.  No matter what institution is, it will never impact those people who manipulate 
institution.  No institution ever causes impact on the powerful middleman.         
43. The housing market has been recessed in last two years.  Government therefore issue certain new rules 
to reduce related taxes in order to prosper the market.  They reduce taxes, people will start to buy and 
sell houses and the market become booming again.  Is this called policy or institution?  I personally don’t 
think so!            
44. There were self-immolation incidents in this city as well.  It is because of the violent and forbidden 
demolition.  Housing developers always have to pay bribes to local officials but bureaucrats have to make 
sure all preliminary works are well prepared and bureaucrats have to demolish all existing ground 
materials.  The controversial point is the compensation.  For those bureaucrats, they regard the previous 
public housings were sold to those ordinary people with great favours.  On the other hand, populace 
already paid for these housing and regard them as their lifetime properties.   
45. However, government, on one hand, are the law enforcers, on the other hand, they are surveyors to 
decide the amount of compensation.  As a result, the tragedy happened.   
46. I sued someone else, also sued by others and went to the court sometimes.  Those law enforcers just 
blur the line between right and wrong.  The legal constraints are based on personal relationship with 
those law enforcers, e.g. prosecutors, judges, policemen, etc.         
47. In my opinion, people don’t build up relations with those agents nowadays.  Who else has money, 
whoever has relation, right?  The old-fashioned guanxi is no longer available.      
48. There are many safety inspections in our coal pits and others as well.  Some of these inspections are 
mere formalities and useless.  We have been told prior to their spot checks.  These inspectors would 
never go deeper and we actually did their jobs for them.  In comparison with large mining companies or 
SOEs, we are, most of the time, as good as they are because I was a coal miner.  However, government 
always can find fault with us and give us low marking.  It’s unfair!   
49. Those large and state-owned mining companies also have small mines that produce less than four 
hundred thousand tons of coal; nevertheless, inspectors put together several small coalmines become a 
large one that can meet the basic requirement.  That’s why they do not need to close the small coalmines 
but we have to.  Government just don’t want let small coalminer existing.  They think we are 
troublemakers.              
50. So fat as I know, those large and state-owned mining companies have had severe catastrophes than we 
do.  However, they are able to pay hush money to the press, law enforcers, local authorities, and victims’ 
families.  Under the circumstances, people hardly know what happen there.  As for us, once we 
encounter any similar disaster, our powerful rivals will endeavour to disclose everything to the public.  In 
this respect, I regard myself as a victim!          
51. Government just take away something that they gave to us beforehand.  They presume that we have 
made enough profit and it is the truth.   
52. I just want to complain the implementation of property rights in terms of CCP that they gave you 
something and consequently take away it from you because of some ridiculous and unacceptable 
accounts. 
53. The consolidation of state agency in the late 1990s was, on one hand, a disaster regardless of 
responsibilities, and, on the other hand, kept redundant employees.  In fact, the efficiency of each 
department became worse after consolidation.  It was mainly political spoils.  What can we do?  I was 
only a small potato and could not be much of help.  But this misfortune becomes an actual blessing on 
my future indeed.       
54. When I worked for the state agency, I had surveyed nearly eighty per cent of coalmines in this provinces 
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and collected adequate information that nobody would able to access, including my superior and 
colleagues.  When I was assigned to the subsidiary, I supposed that I was disparaged and therefore 
brought all these valuable information with me.  Do you know what happen?  Nobody in my previous 
working unit knows there is such valuable information.  Nobody knows!  This information helps me to 
select the best coalmines when we start our own business in this industry.  That’s why I can pick the best 
coalmines during the consolidation.               
55. Before coalmine restructuring, we had no idea what it would be.  One of my previous superior just asked 
us to apply for the SOE restructuring for then working unit.  I was scared because we didn’t have enough 
money and plan at all.  My superior gave us money as his share in the new company then we started the 
new company up.  It’s so simple!  My superior has a senior relative in central agency.  I assumed this is 
the reason he always knows everything precisely in advance.  Anyway, the exploiting license was 
transferred to the new company because it’s a package deal.  I didn’t know that all these restructuring 
were for the exploiting license after several years later.  You have asked me why my superior picks me as 
his representative instead of others?  I assume because we both were from the same village.  A very 
small village!              
56. We first rented the coalmines from SOEs.  Frankly speaking, I never knew there is such a good deal in 
the world. Hahaha!  If I knew it, I probably will do it myself.  Anyway, we only need to pay some money to 
those SOEs and get the right to use all their mining facilities.  You probably have no idea how expensive 
those facilities are.  Anyway, this bargain occurs only once in a thousand years.  In comparison with the 
profit, the rent paid to those SOEs was nothing at all.  I can even afford thousand-fold of that rent and still 
be very profitable.  All I have now are accredited to reforms and CCP.  Without them, I am still nobody.      
57. Some of my friends, who own other large mining companies, and myself actually plan all consolidation 
and give it to the state agency.  We together convince government that only consolidation will rescue the 
mining industry and eradicate those small coalminers.  They are rats and make bloody money! 
58. Every single private coalminer has his own influential power.  We have different connections with local 
and central state agencies.  We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies to protect 
ourselves.  The favourable policies mean my favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any 
favourable policy will always against someone’s existing benefits.  It is inevitable.  This is a race of 
connection, power, money, etc.  With favourable policies, coalminers can make incredible profit from it.  
Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  This is a universal hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket 
profit without sharing with others, especially when you made your commitment to them.  Otherwise, you 
will lose everything, including your life.     
59. The plan, which had been made by us, entails current coalmine consolidation as well as the expanding 
part.  We already target the bigger coalmine in Mongolia and Xingjian.  I have surveyed the coalmines 
there.  Comparing with them, the coalmines we have now are nothing at all.  We actually started 
exploitation there already with local people and agents.  We just simply apply the same rule of the games 
to different place.  After all, it’s China and we all are Chinese, right?  Chinese knows what another 
Chinese needs.  
60. The new policy applied to Mongolia and Xingjian will not allow small coalminers like what happened here 
before.  All coalminers there are SOEs and conglomerates only.  You may say we dominate this industry.  
But I think we make this industry more regulated without vicious competition.  In the end, it helps the 
mining industry.  I deeply believe so.    
61. As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I should say there is no big change will be 
made.  This country needs economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, there is no development 
at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or development at the expense of stability.  The Western 
multiparty model or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.  You see the Western societies are 
chaotic.      
 
Appendix 9-3 
Assigned Categories Ideology 
Case Reference Interviewee #1 
A bit of Data It may be related to the ideological modal, we don’t like to borrow 
money from bank.     




Assigned Categories Ideology 
A bit of Data This is a conventional idea.  We don’t borrow money from others.  
If the business fails, we only lose our own money.   
Text Location Appendix 1/37 
Date 20/Dec/2010 
A bit of Data It’s very difficult for SMEs to get bank loans in China.  
Text Location Appendix 1/23 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If you say the manufacturing industry, Chinese companies may be 
behind Taiwanese competitors.  If you say R&D, I think Chinese 
companies are better than Taiwanese companies.  
Text Location Appendix 1/49 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data It’s the cultural behaviours.  People in China don’t like to borrow 
money from others.   
Text Location Appendix 1/56 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Even when encountered difficulty, we did not want to borrow 
money from banks.  
Text Location Appendix 1/60 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Those overseas returnees have more interaction with foreign 
countries; therefore, their ideological ideas are inclined to foreign 
business operation.  
Text Location Appendix 1/62 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #2 
A bit of Data You must know there is a complex between China and Japan.  
Once China government negotiate with Japanese government, 
they will set up a trade barrier.        
Text Location Appendix 2/7 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Chinese domestic market will be the biggest one in the world in the 
near future.  Why we grab the market with bubble economy in 
Japan?   
Text Location Appendix 2/8 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There are one point three billion people in China.  How can you not 
recruit adequate labours?  It’s impossible! 
Text Location Appendix 2/9 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data No matter which industry you are, only the strongest one can 
survive.  You have to be the number one in the industry!    
Text Location Appendix 2/18 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The counterfeit problems are prevailed everywhere in China!   
Text Location Appendix 2/30 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China remains a rule-by-men society.  
Text Location Appendix 2/38 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Everybody is not equal before the law.    
Text Location Appendix 2/39 
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Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The situation of extorting bribery doesn’t change too much.   
Text Location Appendix 2/52 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Do not expect China government will issue any institution or policy 
to benefit your business.  If you expect that, sooner or later, the 
expectation will end up with nothing!       
Text Location Appendix 2/92 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I just criticize government a lot.  You must be very careful in 
handling the interview.  Don’t set me up!  
Text Location Appendix 2/96-97 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #3 
A bit of Data Reform is imperative.  Deng’s path is right!  Seclusion will end up 
with death.  Just like the Qing dynasty in China history, they were 
on the track to seclusion.        
Text Location Appendix 3/4 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Those old people, who experienced war before 1949, think they 
just wasted time and lives to fight for proletarian if CCP move 
forward to reform and opening.         
Text Location Appendix 3/6 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Then ownership right was state ownership, party secretary 
sloganeered the “without ownership, with residence” for SOEs.  
They did not persist in holding the ownership of SOEs but rather 
keeping them locally to prosper local economy and pay tax to local 
government.      
Text Location Appendix 3/8 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Deng had the experience of studying abroad.  Surely he had this 
experience.  That’s why send our children studying abroad to 
accept some new concept.  I don’t think we can learn any 
academic knowledge abroad.  What can they learn any academic 
knowledge abroad?  Our children already have very good level of 
mathematics when they graduated from high school in China.          
Text Location Appendix 3/11 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Unlike Mao’s era, he positioned the class struggle as the centre.  
That is why most people thought Deng Xiaoping was brilliant.  He 
clearly established the general direction of this nation.  That is 
economic development!  Just neglect whatever ism!                   
Text Location Appendix 3/102 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Deng is very influential in terms of reforms.  There is no other 
political leader knows or dares to say anything like Deng said.         
Text Location Appendix 3/104 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Only through reforms can help or restructure then China.  
Development is the priority principle.  Any slogan must be 
understandable like Deng said.  No matter what political party, they 
must have a loud and clear slogan.  Populace must know that.  If 
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you put forward a vague slogan, who else knows the content?  
Deng put forward the slogan; he also mentioned that China is on a 
different track as those Western countries do.  That’s why Deng 
put forward that we will persist in the Capitalist Socialism economy 
with Chinese characteristics!            
Text Location Appendix 3/105 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I should say that Chinese traditions are smart and brilliant.  When 
we go abroad, we can see foreign people are not as brilliant as 
Chinese are, right?         
Text Location Appendix 3/106 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In addition, Chinese are undeniably thrift and industrious.                  
Text Location Appendix 3/107 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The ways foreign people educate their children are different as we 
do.  It’s absolutely different from ours.               
Text Location Appendix 3/112 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Because foreign welfare system is too good, they don’t need to 
work after being working for four to five years.  After that, you don’t 
need to worry about your meals.  You can have something to eat 
even sitting at home!  
Text Location Appendix 3/113 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There are very few industrious young men in those Western 
countries.  They have too much freedom!  If I don’t want to work, 
government has to give me unemployment pension as well as 
meals.  Government will never let me die in starvation.  Why 
should I work eight hours a day?  Why should I go to work?  I just 
want to get a suntan!           
Text Location Appendix 3/114 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In three hundred years later, those foreign countries can never 
compete with us, definitely!  They cannot have those institutions as 
Chinese have.  We definitely can exceed them!            
Text Location Appendix 3/115 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Because those Western people already have the bad habit, it’s 
very difficult for them to get rid of it! 
Text Location Appendix 3/116 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There is not any political party can and dare to correct the welfare 
system.         
Text Location Appendix 3/117 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There are both advantage and disadvantage of multi-party 
competition system. In China, however, most people agree to 
accept current political mode.  There too many people and the 
development are unbalanced in China.  If we adopt multi-party 
system in China, it will end up with chaos.  




Assigned Categories Ideology 
A bit of Data We do not follow the wrong path of other advanced countries.  
China is on her own path.                      
Text Location Appendix 3/128 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If we buy a Japanese punching machine, it will cost us two million 
and seven hundred thousand dollars.  It is not worth of that at all.  
We made our own punching machine, which is exactly the same 
as Japanese one, by copying their blue print.  The performance is 
even better than Japanese one, let alone the cost!             
Text Location Appendix 3/129 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Those advanced countries take hundreds of years to their current 
positions.  For us, we may only need to spend a decade to reach 
that position.              
Text Location Appendix 3/130 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #4 
A bit of Data Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained 
following the planned economic system in 1989.  The superior 
political leaders were not quite sure about the position of SOEs 
after economic reforms.  People mainly regard SOEs as inefficient.     
Text Location Appendix 4/3 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data When I first came to this plant, the worst problem was what to do 
with these redundant employees.  Be honest to you, about half of 
those employees were useless in terms of work.  As a manager, I 
could not use them.  What was worse was that they were not just 
useless but jeopardize the normal operation in the company, and 
brought many negative effects.  However, the company, or I 
should say the country has to be responsible for what they 
become.  The country repudiate her responsibility to these people 
she committed before.  We cannot just complain them. 
Text Location Appendix 4/4 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Those superior political leaders like to see labours being on the 
hop.  If they saw labours were at ease, these political leaders 
would regard those labours shirked.       
Text Location Appendix 4/9 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There were several blind spots in SOEs’ management.  They 
always tried to save their faces by covering should-proposed 
costs.  Therefore, the net profit shown on the accounting book 
looked great.     
Text Location Appendix 4/11 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data SOEs were in arrears with accounts payable due as possible as 
they could.                  
Text Location Appendix 4/12 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data They focus too much on the procedure and institution.  Definitely, 
they both are indispensable but only under the circumstance of no 
intervention.  Once procedure or institution is intervened, they will 
move oppositely!  Institution or procedure cannot make sure the 
decision is right.   
  
  
Assigned Categories Ideology 
Text Location Appendix 4/30 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #5 
A bit of Data I majored in chemistry engineering during college and was 
assigned to the State Bureau of Survey Mapping as an engineer in 
1985 even though I had no idea what leveller or transit was.   
Text Location Appendix 5/3 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not all up to financial 
capability.  Alternatively, financial capability sometimes became 
the Achilles’ hill to them.  When the panel did the eligibility 
assessment, they might be questioned or put low marking because 
they were too rich and were suspected about their motivations, 
which were land speculation.   
Text Location Appendix 5/8 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Most of our money is made from the buy-and-sell of lad-use rights, 
therefore, ordinary people or housing developers regard we as 
speculators.  To buy and sell something is not speculation at all.  
Chinese people just do not want to see other people become rich 
quickly than them.  They were just jealous.  That American old 
man… What’s his name?  Buffet! Yes.  He also buys and sells 
company stocks but no one regards his as speculator, right?         
Text Location Appendix 5/11 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data You have to know all policies in China are rhetorical and 
ambiguous but without very less substantial effects.  Most policies 
will leave loopholes for us to exploit except some with serious 
political intentions.  National policy will be discounted always by 
local governments.  Central government knows that, we know that, 
banks know that, and local authorities know that!  Who do not 
know that?  People! Ordinary people always assume they play 
seriously. 
Text Location Appendix 5/17 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Most policies in China are propaganda campaigns promoted by 
government.  They mainly serve for one purpose – efficiently ruling 
this country.  Policy only occurs when there are unresolved new 
contradictions among different social classes and may jeopardize 
CCP.  Policy is the best way to put CCP’s wills into effect with least 
cost, e.g. money, killing people, struggles of different social 
classes or political lines. 
Text Location Appendix 5/19 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Any economic policy is used to bailout those economically 
important elites trapped in existing institutions or to eradicate 
economic elites who are politically incorrect.  Definitely, these 
policies always save or destroy some people at the expense of 
most ordinary people. 
Text Location Appendix 5/22 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I do not think there will be any change in the political system in my 
life.  People do not comprehend how complicated the structure of 
CCP is and how difficult to operate this giant political machine.   
  
  
Assigned Categories Ideology 
Text Location Appendix 5/27 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #6 
A bit of Data Alas!  If you compare Western countries with China, just these two 
kinds of countries, the problem is the government rather than the 
people.  The real reason to restrain the perfection of institution that 
is the government but not the populace.  The incompletion is owing 
to some people in the government that are deficient.      
Text Location Appendix 6/2 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Ordinary people cannot and should not fight their corner even on 
just grounds.  Ordinary people can never beat them (government 
and bureaucrats) under the socialist system.  This is Mao’s legacy! 
Text Location Appendix 6/3 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data People, who really manipulate the institutions, are not on the top 
level or the lowest level.  They are on the middle level.  They are 
those people holding real power of implementation.   
Text Location Appendix 6/13 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In fact, those housing developers are not so bad.  They do not 
really make money through negative means.  On the other hand, I 
should say that means are not as tricky as people thought are.   
Text Location Appendix 6/16 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China has more regulations than other advanced countries have in 
terms of curbing speculation.  However, is anybody obeying?  Is 
institution functioning properly?  Government themselves hardly 
comprehensively implement theses regulations because of chronic 
ideologies, which are not proletarian or communist ideologies but 
ideologies accumulated of thousand years, e.g. to drift and muddle 
along, emperor mentality, etc.  We have lots of institutions.   
Text Location Appendix 6/25 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Chinese people are always inclined to make personal profit.      
Text Location Appendix 6/35 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Institutions in those developed countries are better than those in 
China.  Why?  Because they are not such old countries as China 
is.  They do not need to stick to old things and therefore can deal 
with the task swiftly.            
Text Location Appendix 6/36 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Now, those institutions in China are becoming better.  Passably, 
they are not perfect.  If they are perfect, people like us can no 
longer exist.  Even we exist; we need to have brainstorms more 
than ever. Hahaha!       
Text Location Appendix 6/37 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The country has to protect those people who get rich first.  Why?  
These people are the essence of the country.  They are something 
that we can declare to the world.       
Text Location Appendix 6/49 
  
  
Assigned Categories Ideology 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I do not believe that central government does not know about tax 
evasion.  They definitely do know this.  Right?  Even the Central 
Government Information Bureau cannot regulate the local TV 
programme.               
Text Location Appendix 6/72 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I think those people who are intelligent and capable will try to make 
institutions better.  
Text Location Appendix 6/73 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data For those bureaucrats, they regard the previous public housings 
were sold to those ordinary people with great favours.  On the 
other hand, populace already paid for these housing and regard 
them as their lifetime properties.   
Text Location Appendix 6/85 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The laws become less efficient than ever.    
Text Location Appendix 6/113 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Money becomes more useful and efficient than ever.    
Text Location Appendix 6/115 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Everybody actually breaks the law while they are doing business.  
There is no exception in this country.  Nonetheless, if you are in 
the gray area, you can always break the law.      
Text Location Appendix 6/125 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Many rich people do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On the 
contrary, they do deem breaking-law as a social status, the more 
crimes they committed without punishment, and the higher social 
status they are.   
Text Location Appendix 6/145 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In my opinion, people don’t build up relations with those agents 
nowadays.  Who else has money, whoever has relation, right?  
The old-fashioned guanxi is no longer available.      
Text Location Appendix 6/145 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data People, who are able to make quick money, become more 
arrogant and disregard the laws.  They regard themselves as the 
lawmakers.      
Text Location Appendix 6/169 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If you regard the quality of people’s thoughts as the quality of the 
country, then China becomes worst than before.      
Text Location Appendix 6/179 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government makes the quality of people, who only need to say 
long live Mao.  People actually become what government taught 
them.       




Assigned Categories Ideology 
A bit of Data Nobody cares about morality and ethics.  Government only 
focuses on reform and opening.  Who else mention about the 
quality of thoughts?      
Text Location Appendix 6/198 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #7 
A bit of Data Most of inspections in China are useless.  Government and 
bureaucrats just fake that they also have inspections in order to 
demonstrate to the world.  The contents and scopes of these 
inspections, undeniably, are parallel to those in advanced 
countries.  However, the implementation of these inspections is 
nothing but feint.      
Text Location Appendix 7/4 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data In China, there is political purpose behind every new movement or 
policy.  I should say that this kind of behaviour actually has existed 
since our ancestor.  It’s a chronically cultural disadvantage.  
Incumbent rulers only try to keep their throne at the expense of 
populace.  They never really care about people’s lives, whether 
you are Chinese or Taiwanese.              
Text Location Appendix 7/12 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data As long as you have connections with incumbent ruler and are of 
help to keep their thrones, you can do whatever you want.  
However, once you may jeopardize their thrones, directly or 
indirectly, you will be eradicated soon without any justified means.          
Text Location Appendix 7/18 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Government just take away something that they gave to us 
beforehand.  They presume that we have made enough profit and 
it is the truth.   
Text Location Appendix 7/20 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data I just want to complain the implementation of property rights in 
terms of CCP that they gave you something and consequently take 
away it from you because of some ridiculous and unacceptable 
accounts. 
Text Location Appendix 7/23 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Powerful people can always bend the rules.  Or I should say, any 
law to these people is flexible.  
Text Location Appendix 7/23 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data The reform and opening is nothing but a sugar coating.  CCP use it 
to legitimately transfer public properties to certain incumbent 
political elites and their families.  
Text Location Appendix 7/25 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data CCP just do everything without preliminary preparation and study, 
and always adopt the trial-and-error model.  As a ruling party, this 
is not right and cannot be accepted at all.  This is backward 
transition actually against Deng’s reform and openness policy and 
I presume he will never agree with that if he was alive.  
Text Location Appendix 7/27 
  
  
Assigned Categories Ideology 
Date 15/July/2010 
Case Reference Interviewee #8 
A bit of Data The consolidation of state agency in the late 1990s was, on one 
hand, a disaster regardless of responsibilities, and still kept, on the 
other hand, redundant employees.  In fact, the efficiency of each 
department became worse after consolidation.  It was mainly 
political spoils.  What can we do? 
Text Location Appendix 8/3 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Once CCP want to implement a new policy nationwide, they 
actually already have the policy realized in many testing spots with 
least resistance.  The result depends on the determination of 
highest political leaders.  The lower bureaucracy may implement 
the policy passively but they cannot object it at all even the policy 
is without legitimate foundation.              
Text Location Appendix 8/6 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data I assumed this is the reason he always knows everything precisely 
in advance.   
Text Location Appendix 8/8 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data All I have now are accredited to reforms and CCP.  Without them, I 
am still nobody.      
Text Location Appendix 8/11 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Without CCP, people in China remain poor or even worst.  Since 
CCP granted reform and opening, we all can share the benefits of 
economic development. 
Text Location Appendix 8/12 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies 
to protect ourselves.  The favourable policies mean my favourable 
not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable policy will 
always against someone’s existing benefits.  With favourable 
policies, coalminers can make incredible profit from it.  Certainly, 
we have to share with many stakes.  This is a universal hidden 
rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket profit without sharing with others, 
especially when you made your commitment to them.  Otherwise, 
you will lose everything, including your life.     
Text Location Appendix 8/17 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Chinese knows what another Chinese needs.  
Text Location Appendix 8/20 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Once you know their needs, it is more convenient for further 
communication and cooperation.  This will enhance the efficiency 
of implementation.  I think this is the main reason to improve 
Chinese economic growth because of time and cost saving.    
Text Location Appendix 8/22 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data You may say we dominate this industry.  But I think we make this 
industry more regulated without vicious competition.  In the end, it 
helps the mining industry.  I deeply believe so.    
Text Location Appendix 8/23 
  
  
Assigned Categories Ideology 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I 
should say there is no big change will be made.  This country 
needs economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, there is 
no development at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or 
development at the expense of stability.  The Western multiparty 
model or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.  You see the 
Western societies are chaotic.      




Databits assigned to the category ‘Ideology’ 
1. It may be related to the ideological modal, we don’t like to borrow money from bank.     
2. This is a conventional idea.  We don’t borrow money from others.  If the business fails, we only lose our 
own money.   
3. If you say the manufacturing industry, Chinese companies may be behind Taiwanese competitors.  If you 
say R&D, I think Chinese companies are better than Taiwanese companies.  
4. It’s the cultural behaviours.  People in China don’t like to borrow money from others.   
5. Even when encountered difficulty, we did not want to borrow money from banks.  
6. Those overseas returnees have more interaction with foreign countries; therefore, their ideological ideas 
are inclined to foreign business operation.  
7. You must know there is a complex between China and Japan.  Once China government negotiate with 
Japanese government, they will set up a trade barrier.        
8. Chinese domestic market will be the biggest one in the world in the near future.  Why we grab the market 
with bubble economy in Japan?   
9. There are one point three billion people in China.  How can you not recruit adequate labours?  It’s 
impossible! 
10. No matter which industry you are, only the strongest one can survive.  You have to be the number one in 
the industry!    
11. The counterfeit problems are prevailed everywhere in China!   
12. China remains a rule-by-men society.  
13. Not everybody is equal before the law.    
14. The situation of extorting bribery doesn’t change too much.   
15. Do not expect China government will issue any institution or policy to benefit your business.  If you expect 
that, eventually, the expectation will end up with nothing!       
16. I just criticize government a lot.  You must be very careful in handling the interview.  Don’t set me up!  
17. Reform is imperative.  Deng’s path is right!  Seclusion will end up with death.  Just like the Qing dynasty in 
China history, they were on the track to seclusion.        
18. Those old people, who experienced war before 1949, think they just wasted time and lives to fight for 
proletarian if CCP move forward to reform and opening.         
19. Deng had the experience of studying abroad.  Surely he had this experience.  That’s why send our 
children studying abroad to accept some new concept.  I don’t think we can learn any academic 
knowledge abroad.  What can they learn any academic knowledge abroad?  Our children already have 
very good level of mathematics when they graduated from high school in China.          
20. Unlike Mao’s era, he positioned the class struggle as the centre.  That is why most people thought Deng 
Xiaoping was brilliant.  He clearly established the general direction of this nation.  That is economic 
  
  
Databits assigned to the category ‘Ideology’ 
development!  Just neglect whatever ism!                   
21. Deng is very influential in terms of reforms.  There is no other political leader knows or dares to say 
anything like Deng said.         
22. Only through reforms can help or restructure then China.  Development is the priority principle.  Any 
slogan must be understandable like Deng said.  No matter what political party, they must have a loud and 
clear slogan.  Populace must know that.  If you put forward a vague slogan, who else knows the content?  
Deng put forward the slogan; he also mentioned that China is on a different track as those Western 
countries do.  That’s why Deng put forward that we will persist in the Capitalist Socialism economy with 
Chinese characteristics!            
23. I should say that Chinese traditions are smart and brilliant.  When we go abroad, we can see foreign 
people are not as brilliant as Chinese are, right?         
24. In addition, Chinese are undeniably thrift and industrious.                  
25. The ways foreign people educate their children are different as we do.  It’s absolutely different from ours.               
26. Because foreign welfare system is too good, they don’t need to work after being working for four to five 
years.  After that, you don’t need to worry about your meals.  You can have something to eat even sitting 
at home!  
27. There are very few industrious young men in those Western countries.  They have too much freedom!  If I 
don’t want to work, government has to give me unemployment pension as well as meals.  Government will 
never let me die in starvation.  Why should I work eight hours a day?  Why should I go to work?  I just 
want to get a suntan!           
28. In three hundred years later, those foreign countries can never compete with us, definitely!  They cannot 
have those institutions as Chinese have.  We definitely can exceed them!            
29. Because those Western people already have the bad habit, it’s very difficult for them to get rid of it! 
30. There is not any political party can and dare to correct the welfare system.         
31. There are both advantage and disadvantage of multi-party competition system. In China, however, most 
people agree to accept current political mode.  There too many people and the development are 
unbalanced in China.  If we adopt multi-party system in China, it will end up with chaos.  
32. We do not follow the wrong path of other advanced countries.  China is on her own path.                      
33. If we buy a Japanese punching machine, it will cost us two million and seven hundred thousand dollars.  It 
is not worth of that at all.  We made our own punching machine, which is exactly the same as Japanese 
one, by copying their blue print.  The performance is even better than Japanese one, let alone the cost!             
34. Those advanced countries take hundreds of years to their current positions.  For us, we may only need to 
spend a decade to reach that position.              
35. Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained following the planned economic system in 
1989.  The superior political leaders were not quite sure about the position of SOEs after economic 
reforms.  People mainly regard SOEs as inefficient.     
36. However, the company, or I should say the country has to be responsible for what they become.  The 
country repudiate her responsibility to these people she committed before.  We cannot just complain 
them. 
37. Those superior political leaders like to see labours being on the hop.  If they saw labours were at ease, 
these political leaders would regard those labours shirked.       
38. There were several blind spots in SOEs’ management.  They always tried to save their faces by covering 
payable costs.  Therefore, the net profit shown on the accounting book looked great.     
39. Most of our money is made from the buy-and-sell of lad-use rights, therefore, ordinary people or housing 
developers regard we as speculators.  To buy and sell something is not speculation at all.  Chinese 
people just do not want to see other people become rich quickly than them.  They were just jealous.  That 
American old man… What’s his name?  Buffet! Yes.  He also buys and sells company stocks but no one 
regards his as speculator, right?         
40. You have to know all policies in China are rhetorical and ambiguous but without very less substantial 
effects.  Most policies will leave loopholes for us to exploit except some with serious political intentions.  
National policy will be discounted always by local governments.  Central government knows that, we know 
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that, banks know that, and local authorities know that!  Who do not know that?  People! Ordinary people 
always assume they play seriously. 
41. Most policies in China are propaganda campaigns promoted by government.  They mainly serve for one 
purpose – efficiently ruling this country.  Policy only occurs when there are unresolved new contradictions 
among different social classes and may jeopardize CCP.  Policy is the best way to put CCP’s wills into 
effect with least cost, e.g. money, killing people, struggles of different social classes or political lines. 
42. Any economic policy is used to bailout those economically important elites trapped in existing institutions 
or to eradicate economic elites who are politically incorrect.  Definitely, these policies always save or 
destroy some people at the expense of most ordinary people. 
43. I do not think there will be any change in the political system in my life.  People do not comprehend how 
complicated the structure of CCP is and how difficult to operate this giant political machine.   
44. Alas!  If you compare Western countries with China, just these two kinds of countries, the problem is the 
government rather than the people.  The real reason to restrain the perfection of institution that is the 
government but not the populace.  The incompletion is owing to some people in the government that are 
deficient.      
45. Ordinary people cannot and should not fight their corner even on just grounds.  Ordinary people can never 
beat them (government and bureaucrats) under the socialist system.  This is Mao’s legacy! 
46. People, who really manipulate the institutions, are not on the top level or the lowest level.  They are on the 
middle level.  They are those people holding real power of implementation.   
47. China has more regulations than other advanced countries have in terms of curbing speculation.  
However, is anybody obeying?  Is institution functioning properly?  Government themselves hardly 
comprehensively implement theses regulations because of chronic ideologies, which are not proletarian or 
communist ideologies but ideologies accumulated of thousand years, e.g. to drift and muddle along, 
emperor mentality, etc.   
48. Chinese people are always inclined to make personal profit.      
49. Institutions in those developed countries are better than those in China.  Why?  Because they are not 
such old countries as China is.  They do not need to stick to old things and therefore can deal with the 
task swiftly.            
50. The country has to protect those people who get rich first.  Why?  These people are the essence of the 
country.  They are something that we can declare to the world.       
51. I do not believe that central government does not know about tax evasion.  They definitely do know this.  
Right?  Even the Central Government Information Bureau cannot regulate the local TV programme.               
52. I think those people who are intelligent and capable will try to make institutions better.  
53. For those bureaucrats, they regard the previous public housings were sold to those ordinary people with 
great favours.  On the other hand, populace already paid for these housing and regard them as their 
lifetime properties.   
54. The laws become less efficient than ever.    
55. Money becomes more useful and efficient than ever.    
56. Everybody actually breaks the law while they are doing business.  There is no exception in this country.  
Nonetheless, if you are in the gray area, you can always break the law.      
57. Many rich people do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On the contrary, they do deem breaking-law as 
a social status, the more crimes they committed without punishment, and the higher social status they are.   
58. In my opinion, people don’t build up relations with those agents nowadays.  Who else has money, 
whoever has relation, right?  The old-fashioned guanxi is no longer available.      
59. People, who are able to make quick money, become more arrogant and disregard the laws.  They regard 
themselves as the lawmakers.      
60. If you regard the quality of people’s thoughts as the quality of the country, then China becomes worst than 
before.      
61. People actually become what government taught.       
62. Nobody cares about morality and ethics.  Government only focuses on reform and opening.  Who else 
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mention about the quality of thoughts?      
63. Most of inspections in China are useless.  Government and bureaucrats just fake that they also have 
inspections in order to demonstrate to the world.  The contents and scopes of these inspections, 
undeniably, are parallel to those in advanced countries.  However, the implementation of these 
inspections is nothing but feint.      
64. In China, there is political purpose behind every new movement or policy.  I should say that this kind of 
behaviour actually has existed since our ancestor.  It’s a chronically cultural disadvantage.  Incumbent 
rulers only try to keep their throne at the expense of populace.  They never really care about people’s 
lives, whether you are Chinese or Taiwanese.              
65. As long as you have connections with incumbent ruler and are of help to keep their thrones, you can do 
whatever you want.  However, once you may jeopardize their thrones, directly or indirectly, you will be 
eradicated soon without any justified means.          
66. Government just take away something that they gave to us beforehand.  They presume that we have 
made enough profit and it is the truth.   
67. I just want to complain the implementation of property rights in terms of CCP that they gave you 
something and consequently take away it from you because of some ridiculous and unacceptable 
accounts. 
68. Powerful people can always bend the rules.  Or I should say, any law to these people is flexible.  
69. The reform and opening is nothing but a sugar coating.  CCP use it to legitimately transfer public 
properties to certain incumbent political elites and their families.  
70. CCP just do everything without preliminary preparation and study, and always adopt the trial-and-error 
model.  As a ruling party, this is not right and cannot be accepted at all.  This is backward transition 
actually against Deng’s reform and openness policy and I presume he will never agree with that if he was 
alive.  
71. The consolidation of state agency in the late 1990s was, on one hand, a disaster regardless of 
responsibilities, and still kept, on the other hand, redundant employees.  In fact, the efficiency of each 
department became worse after consolidation.  It was mainly political spoils.  What can we do? 
72. Once CCP want to implement a new policy nationwide, they actually already have the policy realized in 
many testing spots with least resistance.  The result depends on the determination of highest political 
leaders.  The lower bureaucracy may implement the policy passively but they cannot object it at all even 
the policy is without legitimate foundation.              
73. All I have now are accredited to reforms and CCP.  Without them, I am still nobody.      
74. Without CCP, people in China remain poor or even worst.  Since CCP granted reform and opening, we all 
can share the benefits of economic development. 
75. We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies to protect ourselves.  The favourable 
policies mean my favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable policy will always against 
someone’s existing benefits.  With favourable policies, coalminers can make incredible profit from it.  
Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  This is a universal hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket 
profit without sharing with others, especially when you made your commitment to them.  Otherwise, you 
will lose everything, including your life.     
76. Chinese knows what another Chinese needs.  
77. Once you know their needs, it is more convenient for further communication and cooperation.  This will 
enhance the efficiency of implementation.  I think this is the main reason to improve Chinese economic 
growth because of time and cost saving.    
78. As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I should say there is no big change will be 
made.  This country needs economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, there is no development 
at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or development at the expense of stability.  The Western 
multiparty model or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.  You see the Western societies are 





Assigned Categories Legitimacy 
Case Reference Interviewee #1 
A bit of Data Unlike those conglomerates or SOEs, we, as SME, are in general in 
compliance with regulations devised by governments.   
Text Location Appendix 1/6 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government tries to protect national industries and support domestic 
industries.     
Text Location Appendix 1/8 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government starts subsiding manufacturing industries since few years 
ago.     
Text Location Appendix 1/20 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Before 2008, government still gave many favours to FDI in terms of tax 
abatement.  These policies had been cancelled already. 
Text Location Appendix 1/22 
Date 20/Dec/2010 
A bit of Data In China, banks are biased toward SMEs and favoured SOEs or 
conglomerates.    
Text Location Appendix 1/23 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government only give bank loans to certain people, e.g. overseas 
returnees.  
Text Location Appendix 1/65 
Date 20/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #2 
A bit of Data State agency promulgated extremely strict specifications regarding 
foods and drugs to regulate these industries and eliminate those less 
competitive companies.       
Text Location Appendix 2/22 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Unless the superior authorities or those agencies of other provinces or 
cities involve directly.  State agencies will not actively crackdown those 
counterfeit products once those manufacturers pay adequate bribes to 
those corresponding agencies.   
Text Location Appendix 2/31 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Local agencies will not clear those backlog of reported counterfeit 
cases unless they are forced to clear.    
Text Location Appendix 2/34 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data We have to draw on the pressure from higher authority to oppress local 
state agencies in order to reach our goals.  Doing business in China, it 
is more important build up better connections than to understand the 
laws.    
Text Location Appendix 2/36 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China remains a rule-by-men society.  We too exploit this disadvantage 
to benefit ourselves.   




Assigned Categories Legitimacy 
A bit of Data Everybody is not equal before the law.    
Text Location Appendix 2/39 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Everybody is equal before the law is an everlasting law.  However, 
behind the law, people’s positions vary with their power.       
Text Location Appendix 2/40 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Corporate regulations are only valid while employees are working 
within.  Once they leave the company, we have to use the law to 
impose sanction against them.    
Text Location Appendix 2/42 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data We still regard the laws positively if we apply them to the right place, 
e.g. signing contracts, corporate competition.   
Text Location Appendix 2/43 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The situation of extorting bribery doesn’t change too much.   
Text Location Appendix 2/52 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data This kind of extortion is even worst in the inner-land areas because of 
less transparency. 
Text Location Appendix 2/56 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data It cannot be denied that both the law enforcement and the quality of 
bureaucrats have been improved in recent years.     
Text Location Appendix 2/65 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Then China government tried to save her face and embargo all roasted 
eels shipments to Japan.   
Text Location Appendix 2/71 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China government lifted an embargo on the roasted eels industry for 
one year.  Every maker in this industry was forced to restructure the 
capabilities in all aspects.  China government said that we would rather 
not make this foreign exchange because we already have too much of 
it.   
Text Location Appendix 2/72 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China government did not give us any buffer time to accommodate to 
the newly promulgated food safety law.  
Text Location Appendix 2/74 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data As a regular company, we were not largely impacted by the new labour 
law; however, it costed a lot of time and money for us to sign the new 
contracts with all employees in all factories.        
Text Location Appendix 2/77 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In Dongguan, there were around three hundreds factories were closed 
nearly overnight because of the new labour law.    
Text Location Appendix 2/83 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Do not expect China government will issue any institution or policy to 
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benefit your business.  If you expect that, sooner or later, the 
expectation will end up with nothing!       
Text Location Appendix 2/92 
Date 21/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #3 
A bit of Data Reform is imperative.  Deng’s path is right!  Seclusion will end up with 
death.   
Text Location Appendix 3/4 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Then ownership right was state ownership, party secretary 
sloganeered the “without ownership, with residence” for SOEs.  They 
did not persist in holding the ownership of SOEs but rather keeping 
them locally to prosper local economy and pay tax to local government.      
Text Location Appendix 3/8 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Within one year, all collective-owned, state-owned, and TVEs were 
restructured and transferred to shareholding companies.          
Text Location Appendix 3/27 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Then ownership right was state ownership, party secretary 
sloganeered the “without ownership, with residence” for SOEs.  They 
did not persist in holding the ownership of SOEs but rather keeping 
them locally to prosper local economy and pay tax to local government.      
Text Location Appendix 3/8 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If we did not want to participate reforms, we would be fired on the spot 
and had to stay in that SOE without leaving for at least three years.        
Text Location Appendix 3/12 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If the SOE’s leader didn’t want to participate the reform, local 
government had the authority to assign a new person to replace the 
existing SOE leader immediately.      
Text Location Appendix 3/16 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In any case, CCP always make a case model for everything.  
Government would assign several work teams from different 
department to expedite SOEs’ restructuring, e.g. tax, banking, 
business management, labour union, social security, etc.        
Text Location Appendix 3/23 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government had a schedule for the restructuring.  Say, when we had 
to call for a meeting of the whole plant, how to organize a working 
platform, what is the next step and after, etc.  Government also has 
scheduled meeting with leader.  For example, they set a date to have a 
meeting with me for discussing the reform policy of my plant.       
Text Location Appendix 3/25 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In Northern Suzhou, they only had one reform model unlike what we 
had in Zhejiang.         
Text Location Appendix 3/27 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data After reform, I went to Northern Suzhou and Northeast provinces and 
still saw the signboard with “State-owned victory hotel.”  At that time, 
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we Zhejiang people resembled as nowadays Taiwanese.  I was 
laughing when I saw the signboard because there was no any state-
owned collective in Suzhou.  Not al all!  Legitimacy varies from one place to 
another and from time to time.              
Text Location Appendix 3/33 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government asked those restructuring SOEs that layoff could not 
exceed five per cent every year.  
Text Location Appendix 3/48-49 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In the planned economy, the management of SOE had no right to sack 
any labour.  They had to report from one level of authority to another.         
Text Location Appendix 3/57 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Reforms have been implemented for several decades since it’s 
beginning.  Those political sloganeering, from local authority to central 
government, clearly encompass the centre of economic growth.  Unlike 
Mao’s era, he positioned the class struggle as the centre.  That is why 
most people thought Deng Xiaoping was brilliant.  He clearly 
established the general direction of this nation.  That is economic 
development!  Just neglect whatever ism!!                   
Text Location Appendix 3/102 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Deng is very influential in terms of reforms.  There is no other political 
leader knows or dares to say anything like Deng said.         
Text Location Appendix 3/104 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Only through reforms can help or restructure then China.  Development 
is the priority principle.  Deng put forward the slogan; he also 
mentioned that China is on a different track as those Western countries 
do.  That’s why Deng put forward that we will persist in the Capitalist 
Socialism economy with Chinese characteristics!            
Text Location Appendix 3/105 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There is not any political party can and dare to correct the welfare 
system.         
Text Location Appendix 3/117 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There are both advantage and disadvantage of multi-party competition 
system. In China, however, most people agree to accept current 
political mode.  There too many people and the development are 
unbalanced in China.  If we adopt multi-party system in China, it will 
end up with chaos.  
Text Location Appendix 3/119 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Most Chinese people agree with existing one-party political system.  
The multi-party competition system will not benefit China because we 
have too many people and unbalanced development.  If you say the 
multi-party competition system… 
120: immediately… 
121: The country will be messed up overnight!  One point four billions 
people!  That will be in chaos…             




Assigned Categories Legitimacy 
A bit of Data We do not follow the wrong path of other advanced countries.  China is 
on her own path.                      
Text Location Appendix 3/128 
Date 22/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #4 
A bit of Data Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained following 
the planned economic system in 1989.  I think the corporate structure 
of SOE has very little to do with its performance whether Chinese-
foreign JV or shareholding system.  It is not saying that SOE is less 
efficient than private enterprise; there is no direct relation with the 
corporate structure in terms of the performance.       
Text Location Appendix 4/3 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data When I first came to this plant, the worst problem was what to do with 
these redundant employees.  Be honest to you, about half of those 
employees were useless in terms of work.  As a manager, I could not 
use them.  What was worse was that they were not just useless but 
jeopardize the normal operation in the company, and brought many 
negative effects.  However, the company, or I should say the country 
has to be responsible for what they become.  The country repudiate 
her responsibility to these people she committed before.  We cannot 
just complain them. 
Text Location Appendix 4/4 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data There were two processes of repudiation for government.  The first one 
was initiated in 1988.  It was dual tracking.  What is that?  Those 
employees hired before 1988 were lifetime employed and cannot be 
fired or laid off.  Those employees hired after 1988 were under the 
contract system.  In general, those employees hired after 1988 were 
not different from those hired before 1988.  Maybe there were slightly 
different in terms of welfare.       
Text Location Appendix 4/6 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Policy indeed exists; however, it does not mean that you will be entitled 
to the benefit.  SOEs have to apply for the approval from government.  
To get the approval, SOEs must fulfil a lot of provisions.  It is so 
difficult!    
Text Location Appendix 4/9 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The situation is that people deal with corporate restructuring cautiously 
in Shanghai.  It is very difficult.  There are two reasons.  The first one 
is, from the government perspective, Shanghai political leaders are 
more prudent than other places.  Alternatively, I should say those 
political leaders in other places are bolder than those in Shanghai.  
Corporate restructuring… Especially those SOEs transferred to private-
owned enterprises were rare in Shanghai.  If any, they were TVEs or 
county-owned enterprises.  Shanghainese political leaders are very 
cautious and do not wan to take risk of being gossiped.  Sometimes 
they even do not do the right thing in order to avoid arousing suspicion!               
Text Location Appendix 4/14 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data To put it bluntly, the higher ranked political leaders may transfer me to 
other position in next meeting.  Who knows?  They just need to 
summon a meeting and with the approvals from few major leaders.  
That’s it!  
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Text Location Appendix 4/17 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Yes!  I need to discuss with the party secretary assigned to this plant 
for most important decisions, e.g. human resource or other major 
issues.  In this plant, we make a collective decision.  Alternatively, it is 
under the collective leadership.    
Text Location Appendix 4/25 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data we are not allowed to finance and invest independently.  All these 
activities need to be approved by holding company.  If we are allowed 
to invest now, I will find a bigger place, e.g. one to two hundred acres, 
to expand the factory.  Next, I will establish another subsidiary.  But we 
just don’t have the authority to do it.  Theoretically speaking, we can 
discuss the authority issue with higher ranked leaders.  However, it is 
literally difficult.  The higher leaders are cautious about new 
investment.  Besides, the decision is made collectively.  It is bad that 
once there is any single vote against the proposal, there is no so-called 
majority rule for the subsequent discussion.  That is to say, the 
decision of the proposal either will adjourn indefinitely or disapproved 
because of the minority views.       
Text Location Appendix 4/28 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #5 
A bit of Data Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not all up to financial 
capability.  Alternatively, financial capability sometimes became the 
Achilles’ hill to them.  When the panel did the eligibility assessment, 
they might be questioned or put low marking because they were too 
rich and were suspected about their motivations, which were land 
speculation.   
Text Location Appendix 5/8 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data National policies will definitely affect our business operations; 
however, these affections are not lethal at all!  Those policies can only 
delay the schedule progresses but never can change them.  You have 
to know all policies in China are rhetorical and ambiguous but without 
very less substantial effects.  Most policies will leave loopholes for us 
to exploit except some with serious political intentions.  We are not the 
only speculator in this country.  There are bigger speculators in 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities.  They already 
formed a syndicate to lobby and influence central government.  We 
are nothing but unwittingly harboured by their efforts.  National policy 
will be discounted always by local governments.  Central government 
knows that, we know that, banks know that, and local authorities know 
that!  Who do not know that?  People! Ordinary people always assume 
they play seriously. 
Text Location Appendix 5/17 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Most policies in China are propaganda campaigns promoted by 
government.  They mainly serve for one purpose – efficiently ruling this 
country.  Policy only occurs when there are unresolved new 
contradictions among different social classes and may jeopardize CCP.  
Policy is the best way to put CCP’s wills into effect with least cost, e.g. 
money, killing people, struggles of different social classes or political 
lines. 
Text Location Appendix 5/19 
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Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Any economic policy is used to bailout those economically important 
elites trapped in existing institutions or to eradicate economic elites 
who are politically incorrect.  Definitely, these policies always save or 
destroy some people at the expense of most ordinary people. 
Text Location Appendix 5/22 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data So far, we only encountered one risk that could severely jeopardize our 
business in 2004 because of the soaring housing price.  There was a 
national syndicate formed within this industry in one month of time.  
Each of us paid money proportionately to the convener as hush money 
to key persons among media, academia, state agencies, and law 
enforcers as well.  Definitely, those housing developers also made 
similar efforts as we did.  At last, we overpowered them because 
populace could no longer stand the soaring housing price at all.   
Text Location Appendix 5/23 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I do not think there will be any change in the political system in my life.  
People do not comprehend how complicated the structure of CCP is 
and how difficult to operate this giant political machine.  Too many 
parts compose this machine and we are only few small bolts.  Perhaps 
we are vital to the machine, but we still are bolts and can be replaced 
by those peers in the market if we are not wary enough. 
Text Location Appendix 5/27 
Date 23/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #6 
A bit of Data Alas!  If you compare Western countries with China, just these two 
kinds of countries, the problem is the government rather than the 
people.  The real reason to restrain the perfection of institution that is 
the government but not the populace.  The incompletion is owing to 
some people in the government that are deficient.      
Text Location Appendix 6/2 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Ordinary people cannot and should not fight their corner even on just 
grounds.  Ordinary people can never beat them (government and 
bureaucrats) under the socialist system.  This is Mao’s legacy! 
Text Location Appendix 6/3 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data People, who really manipulate the institutions, are not on the top level 
or the lowest level.  They are on the middle level.  They are those 
people holding real power of implementation.   
Text Location Appendix 6/13 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data You must remember.  No matter what institution is, it will never impact 
those people who manipulate institution.  All these institutions never 
cause impact on the middleman.         
Text Location Appendix 6/19 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data China has more regulations than other advanced countries have in 
terms of curbing speculation.  However, is anybody obeying?  Is 
institution functioning properly?  Government themselves hardly 
comprehensively implement theses regulations because of chronic 
ideologies, which are not proletarian or communist ideologies but 
ideologies accumulated of thousand years, e.g. to drift and muddle 
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along, emperor mentality, etc.  We have lots of institutions.   
Text Location Appendix 6/25 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government themselves create the institutional loopholes but not the 
populace.        
Text Location Appendix 6/34 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government only change institutions if they have to.      
Text Location Appendix 6/35 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Institutions in those developed countries are better than those in 
China.  Why?  Because they are not such old countries as China is.  
They do not need to stick to old things and therefore can deal with the 
task swiftly.            
Text Location Appendix 6/36 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The country has to protect those people who get rich first.  Why?  
These people are the essence of the country.  They are something that 
we can declare to the world.       
Text Location Appendix 6/49 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The housing market has been recessed in last two years.  Government 
therefore issue certain new rules to reduce related taxes in order to 
prosper the market.  They reduce taxes, people will start to buy and 
sell houses and the market become booming again.  Is this called 
policy or institution?  I personally don’t think so!            
Text Location Appendix 6/66 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I do not believe that central government does not know about tax 
evasion.  They definitely do know this.  Right?  Even the Central 
Government Information Bureau cannot regulate the local TV 
programme.               
Text Location Appendix 6/72 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data I think those people who are intelligent and capable will try to make 
institutions better.  
Text Location Appendix 6/73 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data For those bureaucrats, they regard the previous public housings were 
sold to those ordinary people with great favours.  On the other hand, 
populace already paid for these housing and regard them as their 
lifetime properties.   
Text Location Appendix 6/85 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Nobody is allowed to take away other people’s properties without 
appropriate compensation because of the law.  However, government, 
on one hand, are the law enforcers, on the other hand, they are 
surveyors to decide the amount of compensation.  As a result, the 
tragedy happened.   
Text Location Appendix 6/86 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data The laws become less efficient than ever.    
Text Location Appendix 6/113 
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Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Money becomes more useful and efficient than ever.    
Text Location Appendix 6/115 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Everybody actually breaks the law while they are doing business.  
There is no exception in this country.  Nonetheless, if you are in the 
gray area, you can always break the law.      
Text Location Appendix 6/125 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Those law enforcers just blur the line between right and wrong.  The 
legal constraints are based on personal relationship with those law 
enforcers, e.g. prosecutors, judges, policemen, etc.         
Text Location Appendix 6/135 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data From my perspective, Mr. Hwang of Gome Electrical Appliances is a 
scapegoat.  When he initiated his business, there were many people 
help him.  Without those assistances, he can never reach the existing 
position.  He definitely is not the only speculator in the stock market.  
Text Location Appendix 6/139 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Many rich people do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On the 
contrary, they do deem breaking-law as a social status, the more 
crimes they committed without punishment, and the higher social 
status they are.   
Text Location Appendix 6/145 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data In my opinion, people don’t build up relations with those agents 
nowadays.  Who else has money, whoever has relation, right?  The 
old-fashioned guanxi is no longer available.      
Text Location Appendix 6/145 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data People, who are able to make quick money, become more arrogant 
and disregard the laws.  They regard themselves as the lawmakers.      
Text Location Appendix 6/169 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data If you regard the quality of people’s thoughts as the quality of the 
country, then China becomes worst than before.      
Text Location Appendix 6/179 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Government makes the quality of people, who only need to say long 
live Mao.  People actually become what government taught them.       
Text Location Appendix 6/197 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
A bit of Data Nobody cares about morality and ethics.  Government only focuses on 
reform and opening.  Who else mention about the quality of thoughts?      
Text Location Appendix 6/198 
Date 26/Dec/2009 
Case Reference Interviewee #7 
A bit of Data Government and bureaucrats just fake that they also have inspections 
in order to demonstrate to the world.  The contents and scopes of 
these inspections, undeniably, are parallel to those in advanced 
countries.  However, the implementation of these inspections is nothing 
but feint.      
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Text Location Appendix 7/4 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Incumbent rulers only try to keep their throne at the expense of 
populace.  They never really care about people’s lives, whether you 
are Chinese or Taiwanese.              
Text Location Appendix 7/12 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Those large and state-owned mining companies also have small mines 
that produce less than four hundred thousand tons of coal; 
nevertheless, inspectors put together several small coalmines become 
a large one that can meet the basic requirement.  That’s why they do 
not need to close the small coalmines but we have to.  Government 
just don’t want let small coalminer existing.  They think we are 
troublemakers.              
Text Location Appendix 7/15 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data So fat as I know, those large and state-owned mining companies have 
had severe catastrophes than we do.  However, they are able to pay 
hush money to the press, law enforcers, local authorities, and victims’ 
families.  Under the circumstances, people hardly know what happen 
there.  As for us, once we encounter any similar disaster, our powerful 
rivals will endeavour to disclose everything to the public.  In this 
respect, I regard myself as a victim!          
Text Location Appendix 7/17 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data As long as you have connections with incumbent ruler and are of help 
to keep their thrones, you can do whatever you want.  However, once 
you may jeopardize their thrones, directly or indirectly, you will be 
eradicated soon without any justified means.          
Text Location Appendix 7/18 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Government just take away something that they gave to us 
beforehand.  They presume that we have made enough profit and it is 
the truth.   
Text Location Appendix 7/20 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data I just want to complain the implementation of property rights in terms of 
CCP that they gave you something and consequently take away it from 
you because of some ridiculous and unacceptable accounts. 
Text Location Appendix 7/23 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data Powerful people can always bend the rules.  Or I should say, any law 
to these people is flexible.  
Text Location Appendix 7/23 
Date 15/July/2010 
A bit of Data The reform and opening is nothing but a sugar coating.  CCP use it to 
legitimately transfer public properties to certain incumbent political 
elites and their families.  
Text Location Appendix 7/25 
Date 15/July/2010 
Case Reference Interviewee #8 
A bit of Data The consolidation of state agency in the late 1990s was, on one hand, 
a disaster regardless of responsibilities, and still kept, on the other 
hand, redundant employees.  In fact, the efficiency of each department 
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became worse after consolidation.  It was mainly political spoils.  What 
can we do? 
Text Location Appendix 8/3 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Once CCP want to implement a new policy nationwide, they actually 
already have the policy realized in many testing spots with least 
resistance.  The result depends on the determination of highest 
political leaders.  The lower bureaucracy may implement the policy 
passively but they cannot object it at all even the policy is without 
legitimate foundation.              
Text Location Appendix 8/6 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Before coalmine restructuring, we had no idea what it would be.  One 
of my previous superior just asked us to apply for the SOE 
restructuring for then working unit.  I was scared because we didn’t 
have enough money and plan at all.  My superior gave us money as 
his share in the new company then we started the new company up.  
It’s so simple!  My superior has a senior relative in central agency.  I 
assumed this is the reason he always knows everything precisely in 
advance.  Anyway, the exploiting license was transferred to the new 
company because it’s a package deal.  I didn’t know that all these 
restructuring were for the exploiting license after several years later.  
You have asked me why my superior picks me as his representative 
instead of others?  I assume because we both were from the same 
village.  A very small village!              
Text Location Appendix 8/8 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data All I have now are accredited to reforms and CCP.  Without them, I am 
still nobody.      
Text Location Appendix 8/11 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Without CCP, people in China remain poor or even worst.  Since CCP 
granted reform and opening, we all can share the benefits of economic 
development. 
Text Location Appendix 8/12 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data Some of my friends, who own other large mining companies, and 
myself actually plan all consolidation and give it to the state agency.  
We together convince government that only consolidation will rescue 
the mining industry and eradicate those small coalminers.  They are 
rats and make bloody money! 
Text Location Appendix 8/15 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies to 
protect ourselves.  The favourable policies mean my favourable not 
other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable policy will always against 
someone’s existing benefits.  With favourable policies, coalminers can 
make incredible profit from it.  Certainly, we have to share with many 
stakes.  This is a universal hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket profit 
without sharing with others, especially when you made your 
commitment to them.  Otherwise, you will lose everything, including 
your life.     
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A bit of Data The plan, which had been made by us, entails current coalmine 
consolidation as well as the expanding part.  We already target the 
bigger coalmine in Mongolia and Xingjian.  I have surveyed the 
coalmines there.  Comparing with them, the coalmines we have now 
are nothing at all.  We actually started exploitation there already with 
local people and agents.  We just simply apply the same rule of the 
games to different place.  After all, it’s China and we all are Chinese, 
right?  Chinese knows what another Chinese needs.  
Text Location Appendix 8/20 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data The new policy applied to Mongolia and Xingjian will not allow small 
coalminers like what happened here before.  All coalminers there are 
SOEs and conglomerates only.  You may say we dominate this 
industry.  But I think we make this industry more regulated without 
vicious competition.  In the end, it helps the mining industry.  I deeply 
believe so.    
Text Location Appendix 8/23 
Date 17/July/2010 
A bit of Data As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I 
should say there is no big change will be made.  This country needs 
economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, there is no 
development at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or 
development at the expense of stability.  The Western multiparty model 
or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.  You see the Western 
societies are chaotic.      




Databits assigned to the category ‘Legitimacy’ 
1. Unlike those conglomerates or SOEs, we, as SME, are in general in compliance with regulations devised 
by governments.   
2. Government tries to protect national industries and support domestic industries.     
3. Government starts subsiding manufacturing industries since few years ago.     
4. Before 2008, government still gave many favours to FDI in terms of tax abatement.  These policies had 
been cancelled already. 
5. In China, banks are biased toward SMEs and favoured SOEs or conglomerates.    
6. Government only give bank loans to certain people, e.g. overseas returnees.  
7. State agency promulgated extremely strict specifications regarding foods and drugs to regulate these 
industries and eliminate those less competitive companies.       
8. Unless the superior authorities or those agencies of other provinces or cities involve directly.  State 
agencies will not actively crackdown those counterfeit products once those manufacturers pay adequate 
bribes to those corresponding agencies.   
9. We have to draw on the pressure from higher authority to oppress local state agencies in order to reach 
our goals.  Doing business in China, it is more important build up better connections than to understand 
the laws.    
10. Everybody is equal before the law is an everlasting law.  However, behind the law, people’s positions vary 
with their power.       
11. We still regard the laws positively if we apply them to the right place, e.g. signing contracts, corporate 
competition.   
  
  
Databits assigned to the category ‘Legitimacy’ 
12. This kind of extortion is even worst in the inner-land areas because of less transparency.     
13. Then China government tried to save her face and embargo all roasted eels shipments to Japan.   
14. China government lifted an embargo on the roasted eels industry for one year.  Every maker in this 
industry was forced to restructure the capabilities in all aspects.  China government said that we would 
rather not make this foreign exchange because we already have too much of it.   
15. China government did not give us any buffer time to accommodate to the newly promulgated food safety 
law.  
16. Reform is imperative.  Deng’s path is right!   
17. Then ownership right was state ownership, party secretary sloganeered the “without ownership, with 
residence” for SOEs.  They did not persist in holding the ownership of SOEs but rather keeping them 
locally to prosper local economy and pay tax to local government.      
18. Within one year, all collective-owned, state-owned, and TVEs were restructured and transferred to 
shareholding companies.          
19. If we did not want to participate reforms, we would be fired on the spot and had to stay in that SOE without 
leaving for at least three years.        
20. Government had a schedule for the restructuring.   
21. In Northern Suzhou, they only had one reform model unlike what we had in Zhejiang.           
22. Government asked those restructuring SOEs that layoff could not exceed five per cent every year.  
23. In the planned economy, the management of SOE had no right to sack any labour.  They had to report 
from one level of authority to another.         
24. That is why most people thought Deng Xiaoping was brilliant.  He clearly established the general direction 
of this nation.  That is economic development!  Just neglect whatever ism!!                   
25. Deng is very influential in terms of reforms.  There is no other political leader knows or dares to say 
anything like Deng said.         
26. Only through reforms can help or restructure then China.  Development is the priority principle.  Deng put 
forward the slogan; he also mentioned that China is on a different track as those Western countries do.  
That’s why Deng put forward that we will persist in the Capitalist Socialism economy with Chinese 
characteristics!            
27. There is not any political party can and dare to correct the welfare system.         
28. In China, however, most people agree to accept current political mode.  There too many people and the 
development are unbalanced in China.  If we adopt multi-party system in China, it will end up with chaos.  
29. Most Chinese people agree with existing one-party political system.   
30. We do not follow the wrong path of other advanced countries.  China is on her own path.                      
31. Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained following the planned economic system in 
1989.   
32. There were two processes of repudiation for government.  The first one was initiated in 1988.  It was dual 
tracking.         
33. Policy indeed exists; however, it does not mean that you will be entitled to the benefit.  SOEs have to 
apply for the approval from government.  To get the approval, SOEs must fulfil a lot of provisions.  It is so 
difficult!    
34. The situation is that people deal with corporate restructuring cautiously in Shanghai.  It is very difficult.  
There are two reasons.  The first one is, from the government perspective, Shanghai political leaders are 
more prudent than other places.  Alternatively, I should say those political leaders in other places are 
bolder than those in Shanghai.  Corporate restructuring… Especially those SOEs transferred to private-
owned enterprises were rare in Shanghai.  If any, they were TVEs or county-owned enterprises.  
Shanghainese political leaders are very cautious and do not wan to take risk of being gossiped.  
Sometimes they even do not do the right thing in order to avoid arousing suspicion!               
35. Yes!  I need to discuss with the party secretary assigned to this plant for most important decisions, e.g. 
human resource or other major issues.  In this plant, we make a collective decision.  Alternatively, it is 
  
  
Databits assigned to the category ‘Legitimacy’ 
under the collective leadership.    
36. We are not allowed to finance and invest independently.  All these activities need to be approved by 
holding company.  Theoretically speaking, we can discuss the authority issue with higher ranked leaders.  
However, it is literally difficult.  The higher leaders are cautious about new investment.  Besides, the 
decision is made collectively.  It is bad that once there is any single vote against the proposal, there is no 
so-called majority rule for the subsequent discussion.  That is to say, the decision of the proposal either 
will adjourn indefinitely or disapproved because of the minority views.       
37. Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not all up to financial capability.  Alternatively, financial capability 
sometimes became the Achilles’ hill to them.  When the panel did the eligibility assessment, they might be 
questioned or put low marking because they were too rich and were suspected about their motivations, 
which were land speculation.   
38. National policy will be discounted always by local governments.  Central government knows that, we know 
that, banks know that, and local authorities know that!  Who do not know that?  People! Ordinary people 
always assume they play seriously. 
39. Most policies in China are propaganda campaigns promoted by government.  They mainly serve for one 
purpose – efficiently ruling this country.  Policy only occurs when there are unresolved new contradictions 
among different social classes and may jeopardize CCP.  Policy is the best way to put CCP’s wills into 
effect with least cost, e.g. money, killing people, struggles of different social classes or political lines. 
40. I do not think there will be any change in the political system in my life.  People do not comprehend how 
complicated the structure of CCP is and how difficult to operate this giant political machine.  Too many 
parts compose this machine and we are only few small bolts.  Perhaps we are vital to the machine, but we 
still are bolts and can be replaced by those peers in the market if we are not wary enough. 
41. Ordinary people cannot and should not fight their corner even on just grounds.  Ordinary people can never 
beat them (government and bureaucrats) under the socialist system.  This is Mao’s legacy! 
42. China has more regulations than other advanced countries have in terms of curbing speculation.  
However, is anybody obeying?  Is institution functioning properly?  Government themselves hardly 
comprehensively implement theses regulations because of chronic ideologies, which are not proletarian or 
communist ideologies but ideologies accumulated of thousand years, e.g. to drift and muddle along, 
emperor mentality, etc.   
43. The country has to protect those people who get rich first.  Why?  These people are the essence of the 
country.  They are something that we can declare to the world.       
44. Government therefore issue certain new rules to reduce related taxes in order to prosper the market.  
They reduce taxes, people will start to buy and sell houses and the market become booming again.   
45. For those bureaucrats, they regard the previous public housings were sold to those ordinary people with 
great favours.   
46. Nobody is allowed to take away other people’s properties without appropriate compensation because of 
the law.  However, government, on one hand, are the law enforcers, on the other hand, they are surveyors 
to decide the amount of compensation.  
47. Everybody actually breaks the law while they are doing business.  There is no exception in this country.  
Nonetheless, if you are in the gray area, you can always break the law.      
48. Those law enforcers just blur the line between right and wrong.  The legal constraints are based on 
personal relationship with those law enforcers, e.g. prosecutors, judges, policemen, etc.         
49. Many rich people do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On the contrary, they do deem breaking-law as 
a social status, the more crimes they committed without punishment, and the higher social status they are.   
50. Government and bureaucrats just fake that they also have inspections in order to demonstrate to the 
world.  The contents and scopes of these inspections, undeniably, are parallel to those in advanced 
countries.  However, the implementation of these inspections is nothing but feint.      
51. Those large and state-owned mining companies also have small mines that produce less than four 
hundred thousand tons of coal; nevertheless, inspectors put together several small coalmines become a 
large one that can meet the basic requirement.  That’s why they do not need to close the small coalmines 
but we have to.   
52. As long as you have connections with incumbent ruler and are of help to keep their thrones, you can do 
whatever you want.  However, once you may jeopardize their thrones, directly or indirectly, you will be 
  
  
Databits assigned to the category ‘Legitimacy’ 
eradicated soon without any justified means.          
53. Government just take away something that they gave to us beforehand.   
54. Powerful people can always bend the rules.  Or I should say, any law to these people is flexible.  
55. Once CCP want to implement a new policy nationwide, they actually already have the policy realized in 
many testing spots with least resistance.  The result depends on the determination of highest political 
leaders.  The lower bureaucracy may implement the policy passively but they cannot object it at all even 
the policy is without legitimate foundation.              
56. All I have now are accredited to reforms and CCP.  Without them, I am still nobody.      
57. Without CCP, people in China remain poor or even worst.  Since CCP granted reform and opening, we all 
can share the benefits of economic development. 
58. We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies to protect ourselves.  The favourable 
policies mean my favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable policy will always against 
someone’s existing benefits.  With favourable policies, coalminers can make incredible profit from it.  
Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  This is a universal hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket 
profit without sharing with others, especially when you made your commitment to them.  Otherwise, you 
will lose everything, including your life.     
59. The new policy applied to Mongolia and Xingjian will not allow small coalminers like what happened here 
before.  All coalminers there are SOEs and conglomerates only.  You may say we dominate this industry.  
But I think we make this industry more regulated without vicious competition.  In the end, it helps the 
mining industry.  I deeply believe so.    
60. As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I should say there is no big change will be 
made.  This country needs economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, there is no development 
at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or development at the expense of stability.  The Western 
multiparty model or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.  You see the Western societies are 





Appendix 10-1 Subcategorized databits for the category “Formal Constraints” 
Formal Constraints 
Formal Constraints inflicted by HNWIs or Likes Formal Constraints from Government 
Constraints imposed on 
Government 
Constraints imposed on 
HNWIs and likes 
Constraints imposed on 
ordinary people 
Constraints imposed on 
Government 
Constraints imposed on 
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14 If we did not 
pass the 
inspection, we 
would be fined 
a lot of money 
by state 
agencies.  We 
knew that 
would be a big 
trouble to us.  
We would 
approach them 
and paid bribes 
when they were 
off-duty.   
5 Most banks 




lots of red 




































21 When SOE 
was not able 







“how to do?”  
The city 
mayor would 




them to lend 
money to 










directly.   
17 China 
government 
said that we 
would rather 





too much of it.  
They did not 
need to rely 


















1 We, as SME, 





governments.     
 





The first one 
was initiated 
in 1988.  It 
was dual 
tracking.  
What is that?  
Those 
employees 
 18 China 
government 








22 If we did 




fired on the 
spot and had 
to stay in that 
SOE without 
leaving for at 
least three 
years. 
2 Before 2008, 
government 
still gave many 
favours to FDI 
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fired or laid 
off.   




this industry in 
one month of 
time.  Each of 
us paid money 
proportionately 
to the convener 
as hush money 





as well.   





13 we have to 








to handle the 
debts of SOEs 
as bad debts. 
 19 We have to 
replace nearly 
all addictives 
that had been 





dramatically.   
 16 Then China 
government 
tried to save 






 10 We have 









goals.   
37 Most of 
them were 
unable to get 







difficult to my 
competitors in 
order to 
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every year 













 3 It’s very 
difficult for 
SMEs to get 
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bidders.   
competitive 
companies 
37 Through the assistances of 
my former superior and 
colleagues, we got the ticket 
effortless in comparison with 








we want to 
trade the on-
hand package 
deals.     
   34 the 








views.     


















42 No matter what institution is, 
it will never impact those people 
who manipulate institution.   
48 In comparison with large 
mining companies or SOEs, 
we are, most of the time, as 
good as they are because I 
was a coal miner.  However, 
government always can find 
fault with us and give us low 
marking.  It’s unfair!   




of SOE had 
no right to 
sack any 
labour.   
 37 It is very 
difficult to get 
the ticket to 
attend the 
land-use right 
auction.   
 6 Government 






44 Housing developers always 
have to pay bribes to local 
officials but bureaucrats have to 
make sure all preliminary works 
are well prepared and 
bureaucrats have to demolish all 
existing ground materials. 
49 That’s why they do not 
need to close the small 
coalmines but we have to.  
Government just don’t want let 
small coalminer existing.   
  31 Shanghainese political leaders are very cautious and do not want to take risk of being gossip.  
Sometimes they even do not do the right thing in order to avoid arousing suspicion!   
46 Those law enforcers just blur 
the line between right and 
wrong.  The legal constraints are 
based on personal relationship 
with those law enforcers, e.g. 
prosecutors, judges, policemen, 
etc.         
54 This information helps me 
to select the best coalmines 
when we start our own 
business in this industry.   
  35 I do not 
feel right 
about their 
way to deal 
with problem 
in terms of 
higher raked 
leaders.  They 
 27 What if 
reforms 
failed?  They 
would lose all 
their 
investments. 
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much on the 
procedure and 
institution.   
Survey 
Mapping as an 
engineer in 
1985 even 
though I had 
no idea what 
leveller or 
transit was.   
 
47 Who else has money, 
whoever has relation, right?   
57 We together convince 
government that only 
consolidation will rescue the 
mining industry and eradicate 
those small coalminers.   











 51 Government just take away 
something that they gave to us 
beforehand.   
Beforehand.   
44 For those 
bureaucrats, 
they regard the 
previous public 
housings were 
sold to those 
ordinary 
people with 
great favours.   
 
48 There are many safety 
inspections in our coal pits and 
others as well.  Some of these 
inspections are mere formalities 
and useless.  We have been told 
prior to their spot checks.   
58 That is to say, any 
favourable policy will always 
against someone’s existing 
benefits. 
  28 Between 
2000 and 
2005, I had 
limited power 
because of 




plant and the 
holding 
company.   
 52 CCP that they gave you 
something and consequently 
take away it from you because 




on one hand, 
are the law 
enforcers, on 





compensation.   
 
49 Those large and state-owned 
mining companies also have 
small mines that produce less 
than four hundred thousand tons 
of coal; nevertheless, inspectors 
60 The new policy applied to 
Mongolia and Xingjian will not 
allow small coalminers like 
what happened here before.   
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put together several small 
coalmines become a large one 
that can meet the basic 





not lethal at 
all!   
50 So fat as I know, those large and state-owned mining companies have had severe catastrophes 
than we do.  However, they are able to pay hush money to the press, law enforcers, local 
authorities, and victims’ families.  Under the circumstances, people hardly know what happen there.   




independently.   
     
53 The consolidation of state 
agency in the late 1990s was, 
on one hand, a disaster 
regardless of responsibilities, 
and, on the other hand, kept 
redundant employees.   
    41 The real reason to restrain the perfection of institution that is the government but not the 
populace.  The incompletion is owing to some people in the government that are deficient. 







It was mainly 
political 
spoils.   
    43 The housing market has been recessed in last two years.  Government therefore issue certain 
new rules to reduce related taxes in order to prosper the market.  They reduce taxes, people will 
start to buy and sell houses and the market become booming again.  Is this called policy or 
institution?  I personally don’t think so!            
55 My superior gave us money 
as his share in the new 
company then we started the 
new company up.  It’s so simple!  
My superior has a senior relative 
in central agency.  I assumed 
this is the reason he always 
knows everything precisely in 
advance.   
    61 As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I should say there is no big 
change will be made.  This country needs economic growth but also stability.  Without stability, 
there is no development at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or development at the 
expense of stability.  The Western multiparty model or voting system definitely doesn’t fit to China.   
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money to those SOEs and get 
the right to use all their mining 
facilities. 
57 Some of my friends, who own 
other large mining companies, 
and myself actually plan all 
consolidation and give it to the 
state agency.   
          
58 Every single private coalminer has his own influential power.  We have different connections with 
local and central state agencies.  We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies 
to protect ourselves.  
      
59 The plan, which had been 
made by us, entails current 
coalmine consolidation as well 
as the expanding part.   
          
60 I think we make this industry more regulated without vicious 
competition.   
        
 
Appendix 10-2 Subcategorized databits for the category “Ideology” 
Ideology 
Inherited Ideology Imposed Ideology 
Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect 
7 You must know there is a 
complex between China and 
Japan.   
 1 It may be related to the 
ideological modal, we don’t 
like to borrow money from 
bank.     
12 China remains a rule-by-
men society. 
3 If you say the manufacturing 
industry, Chinese companies 
may be behind Taiwanese 
competitors.  If you say R&D, I 
think Chinese companies are 
better than Taiwanese 
companies 
6 Those overseas returnees 
have more interaction with 
foreign countries; therefore, 
their ideological ideas are 
inclined to foreign business 
operation 
17 Just like the Qing dynasty in 
China history, they were on the 
track to seclusion. 
 2 This is a conventional idea.  
We don’t borrow money from 
others.  If the business fails, 
we only lose our own money 
13 Not everybody is equal 
before the law. 
5 Even when encountered 
difficulty, we did not want to 
borrow money from banks 
14 The situation of extorting 





Inherited Ideology Imposed Ideology 
Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect 
37 Those superior political 
leaders like to see labours being 
on the hop.  If they saw labours 
were at ease, these political 
leaders would regard those 
labours shirked. 
 4 It’s the cultural behaviours.  
People in China don’t like to 
borrow money from others. 
17 Reform is imperative.  
Deng’s path is right!  Seclusion 
will end up with death.   
9 There are one point three 
billion people in China.  How 
can you not recruit adequate 
labours?  It’s impossible! 
18 Those old people, who 
experienced war before 1949, 
think they just wasted time 
and lives to fight for 
proletarian if CCP move 
forward to reform and 
opening. 
52 I think those people who are 
intelligent and capable will try to 
make institutions better. 
 19 I don’t think we can learn 
any academic knowledge 
abroad.  What can they learn 
any academic knowledge 
abroad?  Our children already 
have very good level of 
mathematics when they 
graduated from high school in 
China. 
7 Once China government 
negotiate with Japanese 
government, they will set up a 
trade barrier 
8 Chinese domestic market 
will be the biggest one in the 
world in the near future.  Why 
we grab the market with 
bubble economy in Japan? 
19 Deng had the experience 
of studying abroad.  Surely he 
had this experience.  That’s 
why send our children 
studying abroad to accept 
some new concept.   
64 In China, there is political 
purpose behind every new 
movement or policy.  I should 
say that this kind of behaviour 
actually has existed since our 
ancestor. 
 23 I should say that Chinese 
traditions are smart and 
brilliant.  When we go abroad, 
we can see foreign people 
are not as brilliant as Chinese 
are, right? 
16 I just criticize government a 
lot.  You must be very careful 
in handling the interview.  
Don’t set me up! 
10 No matter which industry 
you are, only the strongest 
one can survive.  You have to 
be the number one in the 
industry 
 
  23 In addition, Chinese are 
undeniably thrift and 
industrious. 
20 Unlike Mao’s era, he 
positioned the class struggle 
as the centre.   
11 The counterfeit problems 
are prevailed everywhere in 
China! 
 
  39 Chinese people just do not 
want to see other people 
become rich quickly than 
them.  They were just jealous.   
21 Deng is very influential in 
terms of reforms.  There is no 
other political leader knows or 
dares to say anything like 
Deng said. 
15 Do not expect China 
government will issue any 
institution or policy to benefit 
your business.  If you expect 
that, eventually, the 
expectation will end up with 
nothing! 
 
  48 Chinese people are 
always inclined to make 
personal profit. 
22 Only through reforms can 
help or restructure then China.  
Development is the priority 
principle.  Any slogan must be 
understandable like Deng said.  
No matter what political party, 
they must have a loud and 
clear slogan.  Populace must 
20 That is why most people 
thought Deng Xiaoping was 
brilliant.  He clearly 
established the general 
direction of this nation.  That is 
economic development!  Just 
neglect whatever ism!                   
26 Because foreign welfare 
system is too good, they don’t 
need to work after being 
working for four to five years.  
After that, you don’t need to 
worry about your meals.  You 
can have something to eat 




Inherited Ideology Imposed Ideology 
Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect 
know that.  If you put forward a 
vague slogan, who else knows 
the content?  Deng put forward 
the slogan; he also mentioned 
that China is on a different 
track as those Western 
countries do.  That’s why Deng 
put forward that we will persist 
in the Capitalist Socialism 
economy with Chinese 
characteristics!         
  49 They do not need to stick 
to old things and therefore 
can deal with the task swiftly. 
25 The ways foreign people 
educate their children are 
different as we do.  It’s 
absolutely different from ours. 
31 There are too many people 
and the development are 
unbalanced in China.   
29 Because those Western 
people already have the bad 
habit, it’s very difficult for them 
to get rid of it! 
  
76 Chinese knows what 
another Chinese needs.  
 
27 There are very few 
industrious young men in 
those Western countries.  
They have too much freedom!  
If I don’t want to work, 
government has to give me 
unemployment pension as well 
as meals.  Government will 
never let me die in starvation.  
Why should I work eight hours 
a day?  Why should I go to 
work?  I just want to get a 
suntan!  
35 Yes, then was open and 
under reformed but SOEs 
remained following the 
planned economic system in 
1989.  The superior political 
leaders were not quite sure 
about the position of SOEs 
after economic reforms.  
33 If we buy a Japanese 
punching machine, it will cost 
us two million and seven 
hundred thousand dollars.  It 
is not worth of that at all.  We 
made our own punching 
machine, which is exactly the 
same as Japanese one, by 
copying their blue print.  The 
performance is even better 
than Japanese one, let alone 
the cost! 
 
77 Once you know their needs, it is more convenient for further 
communication and cooperation.  This will enhance the 
efficiency of implementation.  I think this is the main reason to 
improve Chinese economic growth because of time and cost 
saving.   
28 In three hundred years 
later, those foreign countries 
can never compete with us, 
definitely!  They cannot have 
those institutions as Chinese 
have.  We definitely can 
exceed them! 
35 People mainly regard 
SOEs as inefficient.  
40 Ordinary people always 
assume they play seriously. 
   30 There is not any political 
party can and dare to correct 
the welfare system. 
36 However, the company, or 
I should say the country has to 
be responsible for what they 
become.  The country 
repudiate her responsibility to 
49 Institutions in those 
developed countries are better 




Inherited Ideology Imposed Ideology 
Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect Political Aspect Economic Aspect Cultural Aspect 
these people she committed 
before.  We cannot just 
complain them. 
   31 There are both advantage 
and disadvantage of multi-
party competition system. In 
China, however, most people 
agree to accept current 
political mode.  If we adopt 
multi-party system in China, it 
will end up with chaos. 
38 There were several blind 
spots in SOEs’ management.  
They always tried to save their 
faces by covering payable 
costs.  Therefore, the net 
profit shown on the accounting 
book looked great 
57 Many rich people do not 
regard breaking-law as a 
shame.  On the contrary, they 
do deem breaking-law as a 
social status, the more crimes 
they committed without 
punishment, and the higher 
social status they are.   
   32 We do not follow the wrong 
path of other advanced 
countries.  China is on her own 
path. 
40 You have to know all 
policies in China are rhetorical 
and ambiguous but without 
very less substantial effects.   
58 The old-fashioned guanxi 
is no longer available.  
   34 Those advanced countries 
take hundreds of years to their 
current positions.  For us, we 
may only need to spend a 
decade to reach that position. 
42 Any economic policy is 
used to bailout those 
economically important elites 
trapped in existing institutions 
or to eradicate economic elites 
who are politically incorrect.   
59 People, who are able to 
make quick money, become 
more arrogant and disregard 
the laws.  They regard 
themselves as the lawmakers.  
   40 National policies will be 
discounted always by local 
governments.   
43 I do not think there will be 
any change in the political 
system in my life.  People do 
not comprehend how 
complicated the structure of 
CCP is and how difficult to 
operate this giant political 
machine.   
60 If you regard the quality of 
people’s thoughts as the 
quality of the country, then 
China becomes worst than 
before. 
   41 Most policies in China are 
propaganda campaigns 
promoted by government.  
They mainly serve for one 
purpose – efficiently ruling this 
country.     
44 Alas!  If you compare 
Western countries with China, 
just these two kinds of 
countries, the problem is the 
government rather than the 
people.  The real reason to 
restrain the perfection of 
institution that is the 
government but not the 
populace.  The incompletion is 
61 People actually become 
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owing to some people in the 
government that are deficient 
   46 People, who really 
manipulate the institutions, are 
not on the top level or the 
lowest level.  They are on the 
middle level.  They are those 
people holding real power of 
implementation. 
45 Ordinary people cannot 
and should not fight their 
corner even on just grounds.   
62 Nobody cares about 
morality and ethics.  Who else 
mention about the quality of 
thoughts? 
   
50 The country has to protect 
those people who get rich first.  
Why?  These people are the 
essence of the country.  They 
are something that we can 
declare to the world.       
47 Government themselves 
hardly comprehensively 
implement theses regulations 
because of chronic ideologies, 
which are not proletarian or 
communist ideologies but 
ideologies accumulated of 
thousand years, e.g. to drift 
and muddle along, emperor 
mentality, etc. 
63 The contents and scopes 
of these inspections, 
undeniably, are parallel to 
those in advanced countries.  
However, the implementation 
of these inspections is nothing 
but feint. 
   54 The laws become less 
efficient than ever. 
51 I do not believe that central 
government does not know 
about tax evasion.  They 
definitely do know this.   
64 It’s a chronically cultural 
disadvantage.   
   58 In my opinion, people don’t 
build up relations with those 
agents nowadays.  Who else 
has money, whoever has 
relation, right?   
53 For those bureaucrats, 
they regard the previous 
public housings were sold to 
those ordinary people with 
great favours.   
78 You see the Western 
societies are chaotic.  
   62 Government only focuses 
on reform and opening.   
55 Money becomes more 
useful and efficient than ever. 
 
   64 Incumbent rulers only try to 
keep their throne at the 
expense of populace.  They 
never really care about 
people’s lives, whether you are 
Chinese or Taiwanese. 
56 Everybody actually breaks 
the law while they are doing 
business.   
 
   65 As long as you have 
connections with incumbent 
ruler and are of help to keep 
their thrones, you can do 
63 Most of inspections in 
China are useless.  
Government and bureaucrats 
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whatever you want.  However, 
once you may jeopardize their 
thrones, directly or indirectly, 
you will be eradicated soon 
without any justified means. 
inspections in order to 
demonstrate to the world.   
   66 Government just take away something that they gave to us 
beforehand.  They presume that we have made enough profit 
and it is the truth.   
 
   67 I just want to complain the implementation of property rights 
in terms of CCP that they gave you something and consequently 
take away it from you because of some ridiculous and 
unacceptable accounts. 
 
   68 Powerful people can 
always bend the rules.  Or I 
should say, any law to these 
people is flexible.  
69 CCP use it to legitimately 
transfer public properties to 
certain incumbent political 
elites and their families.  
 
   69 The reform and opening is 
nothing but a sugar coating. 
70 This is backward transition 
actually against Deng’s reform 
and openness policy and I 
presume he will never agree 
with that if he was alive.  
 
   70 CCP just do everything 
without preliminary preparation 
and study, and always adopt 
the trial-and-error model.   
71 The consolidation of state 
agency in the late 1990s was, 
on one hand, a disaster 
regardless of responsibilities, 
and still kept, on the other 
hand, redundant employees.   
 
   71 In fact, the efficiency of each department became worse after 
consolidation.  It was mainly political spoils.  What can we do? 
 
   72 Once CCP want to implement a new policy nationwide, they actually already have the policy 
realized in many testing spots with least resistance.  The result depends on the determination of 
highest political leaders.  The lower bureaucracy may implement the policy passively but they 
cannot object it at all even the policy is without legitimate foundation.              
   
74 Since CCP granted reform 
and opening, we all can share 
the benefits of economic 
development. 
73 All I have now are accredited to reforms and CCP.  Without 
them, I am still nobody.  
    74 Without CCP, people in 
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worst.   
   75 We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable 
policies to protect ourselves.  The favourable policies mean my 
favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable 
policy will always against someone’s existing benefits.   
 
    75 With favourable policies, coalminers can make incredible 
profit from it.  Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  
This is a universal hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket profit 
without sharing with others, especially when you made your 
commitment to them.  Otherwise, you will lose everything, 
including your life.     
    77 Once you know their needs, it is more convenient for further 
communication and cooperation.  This will enhance the 
efficiency of implementation.  I think this is the main reason to 
improve Chinese economic growth because of time and cost 
saving.   
   78 As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I should say there is no big 
change will be made.   
   78 This country needs economic growth but also stability.  
Without stability, there is no development at all.  We don't want 
to pursue any growth or development at the expense of stability.    
 
   78 The Western multiparty 
model or voting system 
definitely doesn’t fit to China. 
  
 
Appendix 10-3 Subcategorized databits for the category “Legitimacy” 
Legitimacy 
Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Rule, Law, Sanction Appropriateness Certification, Accreditation Prevalence Isomorphism 
1 Unlike those conglomerates or SOEs, we, as SME, are in 
general in compliance with regulations devised by governments. 
13 Then China government 
tried to save her face and 
embargo all roasted eels 
shipments to Japan. 
33 it does not mean that you 
will be entitled to the benefit.  
SOEs have to apply for the 
approval from government.  To 
get the approval, SOEs must 
fulfil a lot of provisions.  It is so 
difficult! 
3 Government starts subsiding 
manufacturing industries since 
few years ago. 
1 Unlike those conglomerates 
or SOEs, we, as SME, are in 
general in compliance with 
regulations devised by 
governments. 
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toward SMEs and favoured 
SOEs or conglomerates. 
hardly comprehensively 
implement theses regulations 
because of chronic ideologies, 
which are not proletarian or 
communist ideologies but 
ideologies accumulated of 
thousand years, e.g. to drift 
and muddle along, emperor 
mentality, etc. 
3 Government starts subsiding manufacturing industries since 
few years ago. 
14 China government said that 
we would rather not make this 
foreign exchange because we 
already have too much of it. 
 6 Government only give bank 
loans to certain people, e.g. 
overseas returnees. 
 
4 Before 2008, government still gave many favours to FDI in terms of tax abatement.  These 
policies had been cancelled already. 
 8 Unless the superior authorities or those agencies of other 
provinces or cities involve directly.  State agencies will not 
actively crackdown those counterfeit products once those 
manufacturers pay adequate bribes to those corresponding 
agencies. 
7 State agencies promulgated extremely strict specifications regarding foods and drugs to regulate these industries and eliminate 
those less competitive companies. 
9 Doing business in China, it is 
more important build up better 
connections than to 
understand the laws. 
 
9 We have to draw on the pressure from higher authority to 
oppress local state agencies in order to reach our goals.   
15 China government did not 
give us any buffer time to 
accommodate to the newly 
promulgated food safety law. 
 10 Everybody is equal before 
the law is an everlasting law.  
However, behind the law, 
people’s positions vary with 
their power. 
 
11 We still regard the laws positively if we apply them to the right 
place, e.g. signing contracts, corporate competition. 16 Reform is imperative.  
Deng’s path is right!   
 
 12 This kind of extortion is even worst in the inner-land areas 
because of less transparency. 
14 China government lifted an embargo on the roasted eels 
industry for one year.  Every maker in this industry was forced to 
restructure the capabilities in all aspects. 
21 In Northern Suzhou, they 
only had one reform model 
unlike what we had in 
Zhejiang. 
 17 They did not persist in 
holding the ownership of SOEs 
but rather keeping them locally 
to prosper local economy and 
pay tax to local government. 
 
17 Then ownership right was state ownership, party secretary sloganeered the “without ownership, with residence” for SOEs. 18 Within one year, all collective-owned, state-owned, and TVEs 
were restructured and transferred to shareholding companies. 
19 If we did not want to participate reforms, we would be fired on the spot and had to stay in that 
SOE without leaving for at least three years. 
 23 In the planned economy, 





Regulative Normative Cultural-Cognitive 
Rule, Law, Sanction Appropriateness Certification, Accreditation Prevalence Isomorphism 
no right to sack any labour.  
They had to report from one 
level of authority to another. 
20 Government had a schedule for the restructuring. 25 Deng is very influential in 
terms of reforms.  There is no 
other political leader knows or 
dares to say anything like 
Deng said. 
 23 That is why most people 
thought Deng Xiaoping was 
brilliant.  He clearly 
established the general 
direction of this nation.  That is 
economic development!  Just 
neglect whatever ism!! 
 
22 Government asked those restructuring SOEs that layoff could not exceed five per cent every 
year. 
 26 Deng put forward the 
slogan; he also mentioned that 
China is on a different track as 
those Western countries do.  
That’s why Deng put forward 
that we will persist in the 
Capitalist Socialism economy 
with Chinese characteristics! 
 
23 In the planned economy, the management of SOE had no 
right to sack any labour.  They had to report from one level of 
authority to another. 
26 Only through reforms can 
help or restructure then China.  
Development is the priority 
principle. 
 29 Most Chinese people agree 
with existing one-party political 
system. 
 
27 There is not any political party can and dare to correct the welfare system.  31 Yes, then was open and under reformed but SOEs remained 
following the planned economic system in 1989. 
28 In China, however, most people agree to accept current political mode.  There too many people 
and the development are unbalanced in China.  If we adopt multi-party system in China, it will end 
up with chaos. 
 36 Besides, the decision is made collectively.  It is bad that once 
there is any single vote against the proposal, there is no so-
called majority rule for the subsequent discussion.  That is to 
say, the decision of the proposal either will adjourn indefinitely or 
disapproved because of the minority views. 
33 Policy indeed exists 29 Most Chinese people agree 
with existing one-party political 
system. 
 
38 National policy will be discounted always by local 
governments.  Central government knows that, we know that, 
banks know that, and local authorities know that!  Who do not 
know that?  People! Ordinary people always assume they play 
seriously. 
 
36 We are not allowed to finance and invest independently.  All 
these activities need to be approved by holding company.   
30 We do not follow the wrong 
path of other advanced 
countries.  China is on her own 
path. 
 45 For those bureaucrats, they regard the previous public 
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32 There were two processes of repudiation for government.  The first one was initiated in 1988.  It 
was dual tracking. 
 46 Nobody is allowed to take away other people’s properties 
without appropriate compensation because of the law.  However, 
government, on one hand, are the law enforcers, on the other 
hand, they are surveyors to decide the amount of compensation. 
37 Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not all up to financial 
capability. 
34 The situation is that people 
deal with corporate 
restructuring cautiously in 
Shanghai.  It is very difficult.  
There are two reasons.  The 
first one is, from the 
government perspective, 
Shanghai political leaders are 
more prudent than other 
places.  Alternatively, I should 
say those political leaders in 
other places are bolder than 
those in Shanghai.  Corporate 
restructuring… Especially 
those SOEs transferred to 
private-owned enterprises 
were rare in Shanghai.  If any, 
they were TVEs or county-
owned enterprises.  
Shanghainese political leaders 
are very cautious and do not 
wan to take risk of being 
gossiped.  Sometimes they 
even do not do the right thing 
in order to avoid arousing 
suspicion! 
 47 Everybody actually breaks the law while they are doing 
business.  There is no exception in this country.  Nonetheless, if 
you are in the gray area, you can always break the law. 
35 Yes!  I need to discuss with the party secretary assigned to this plant for most important 
decisions, e.g. human resource or other major issues.  In this plant, we make a collective decision.  
Alternatively, it is under the collective leadership.    
 
 48 Those law enforcers just 
blur the line between right and 
wrong.  The legal constraints 
are based on personal 
relationship with those law 
enforcers, e.g. prosecutors, 
judges, policemen, etc. 
 
42 China has more regulations than other advanced countries 
have in terms of curbing speculation. 
36 Theoretically speaking, we 
can discuss the authority issue 
with higher ranked leaders.  
 49 Many rich people do not regard breaking-law as a shame.  On 
the contrary, they do deem breaking-law as a social status, the 
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However, it is literally difficult.  
The higher leaders are 
cautious about new 
investment. 
social status they are.   
 37 Alternatively, financial capability sometimes became the 
Achilles’ hill to them.  When the panel did the eligibility 
assessment, they might be questioned or put low marking 
because they were too rich and were suspected about their 
motivations, which were land speculation.   
50 Government and bureaucrats just fake that they also have 
inspections in order to demonstrate to the world.  The contents 
and scopes of these inspections, undeniably, are parallel to 
those in advanced countries.  However, the implementation of 
these inspections is nothing but feint. 
39 Most policies in China are propaganda campaigns promoted 
by government.  They mainly serve for one purpose – efficiently 
ruling this country.   
39 Policy only occurs when 
there are unresolved new 
contradictions among different 
social classes and may 
jeopardize CCP.  Policy is the 
best way to put CCP’s wills 
into effect with least cost, e.g. 
money, killing people, 
struggles of different social 
classes or political lines. 
 51 Those large and state-owned mining companies also have 
small mines that produce less than four hundred thousand tons 
of coal; nevertheless, inspectors put together several small 
coalmines become a large one that can meet the basic 
requirement.  That’s why they do not need to close the small 
coalmines but we have to. 
40 I do not think there will be any change in the political system in my life.  People do not 
comprehend how complicated the structure of CCP is and how difficult to operate this giant political 
machine.  Too many parts compose this machine and we are only few small bolts.  Perhaps we are 
vital to the machine, but we still are bolts and can be replaced by those peers in the market if we 
are not wary enough. 
 52 As long as you have 
connections with incumbent 
ruler and are of help to keep 
their thrones, you can do 
whatever you want. 
 
41 Ordinary people cannot and should not fight their corner even on just grounds.  Ordinary people 
can never beat them (government and bureaucrats) under the socialist system.  This is Mao’s 
legacy! 
 54 Powerful people can 
always bend the rules.  Or I 
should say, any law to these 
people is flexible. 
 
52 However, once you may jeopardize their thrones, directly or 
indirectly, you will be eradicated soon without any justified 
means. 
43 The country has to protect 
those people who get rich first.  
Why?  These people are the 
essence of the country.  They 
are something that we can 
declare to the world. 
 56 All I have now are 
accredited to reforms and 
CCP.  Without them, I am still 
nobody. 
 
53 Government just take away something that they gave to us 
beforehand. 
44 Government therefore 
issue certain new rules to 
reduce related taxes in order 
to prosper the market.  They 
reduce taxes, people will start 
to buy and sell houses and the 
 57 Without CCP, people in 
China remain poor or even 
worst.  Since CCP granted 
reform and opening, we all can 
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market become booming 
again. 
55 Once CCP want to implement a new policy nationwide, they actually already have the policy 
realized in many testing spots with least resistance.  The result depends on the determination of 
highest political leaders.  The lower bureaucracy may implement the policy passively but they 
cannot object it at all even the policy is without legitimate foundation. 
 58 We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable 
policies to protect ourselves.  The favourable policies mean my 
favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable 
policy will always against someone’s existing benefits.  With 
favourable policies, coalminers can make incredible profit from it.  
Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  This is a 
universal hidden rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket profit without 
sharing with others, especially when you made your commitment 
to them.  Otherwise, you will lose everything, including your life.   
58 We all endeavour to persuade them to issues favourable policies to protect ourselves.  The 
favourable policies mean my favourable not other people’s.  That is to say, any favourable policy 
will always against someone’s existing benefits.  With favourable policies, coalminers can make 
incredible profit from it.  Certainly, we have to share with many stakes.  This is a universal hidden 
rule, right?  Don’t try to pocket profit without sharing with others, especially when you made your 
commitment to them.  Otherwise, you will lose everything, including your life.   
   
 59 The new policy applied to Mongolia and Xingjian will not allow 
small coalminers like what happened here before.  All coalminers 
there are SOEs and conglomerates only.  You may say we 
dominate this industry.  But I think we make this industry more 
regulated without vicious competition.  In the end, it helps the 
mining industry.  I deeply believe so. 
  
60 As long as CCP is the ruling party, nothing will be changed.  Or I should say there is no big change will be made.  This country needs economic growth but also 
stability.  Without stability, there is no development at all.  We don't want to pursue any growth or development at the expense of stability.  The Western multiparty 
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APPENDIX 11 – AGRICULTURAL REFORMS 
Before the establishment of PRC, only small parts of the agricultural surplus 
were used to afford the industrialization in China.  Therefore, when Mao and 
his comrades built PRC, they transferred more agricultural residual to 
industrialize China.  In another word, they not only have to control the 
agricultural residual to the extreme extent, but also take over the positions of 
landowners in order to collect more land taxes (see table 11.1).   
 
Qing Dynasty 
(1750 – 1911) 
2% - 4%2  
The Northern Warlord 
Government  
(1912 – 1936)  
2% - 5%3  
Puppet Government under 
Japanese control 
(1937 – 1945)  
6% - 8%4 
50% in Southern 
region of Yangzi 
River 
KMT Government 
(1937 – 1945)  
20%5 
PRC 
(1949 – 20056) 
11%7 
1. The percentage is the proportion to the total land output; 2. (Wang 1973); 3. (Huang 1985); 4. 
(Habermas 1990:172); 5. (Selden 1971:181-183); 6. In 2005, the 10
th
 National People’s Congress 
passed the resolution to repeal the agricultural tax; 7.(Habermas 1990:170-171) 
Table 11.1 Agricultural Tax Rate in China 
 
From the table 7.3, it seems CCP is never satisfied with this relatively 
impressive performance.  In addition, to impose the high agricultural levy on 
peasants, CCP actually coveted more from this enticing financial source in 
order to expedite China’s industrialization progress.  According to Lippit’s 
study (1974), agricultural tax and land rent accounted for 30% of peasants’ 
total outputs before the establishment of PRC.  Therefore, after taking off the 
agricultural tax levied on peasants by CCP, there were approximately 20% 
agricultural residual remained at peasants’ disposals after land reforms.  
These remaining agricultural residuals become extremely enticing to the 
potentates.  Before land reforms initiated in 1950, landlord and other higher 
hierarchies effectively controlled the farmland in rural areas (see table 11.2).  
Therefore, landlord and other likes actually took most agricultural outputs 
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away from those peasants.  From 1950 to 1953, CCP implemented the land 
reforms that they had promised to equitably distributing farmland to peasants 
during civil war (Chen et al. 2008:20-24).  By implementing land reforms, the 
self-owned ratio of farmland was raised more than three-fold, which was from 
14% to 47%, in four years (1950 – 1953) (see table 11.3).  This impressive 
performance of land reforms indeed intensified the supports to CCP from 
peasants, who represent then vast majority of people in China (see table 2).  
In this contradictory circumstance, CCP, on one hand, are desperately eager 
for the supports to their legitimacy from the majority of people in China, one 
the other hand, they urgently need, by all means, financial resources to 
intensify the process of industrialization.   
 
Since it is unfeasible to eat the cake and have it at the same time, CCP had 
to make their final decisions to choose their political priority.  Therefore, CCP 
decided, at first, to tackle industrialization and correspondingly collect high 
agricultural tax from peasants in mid-50s.  The consequences of the high 
agricultural tax, however, incurred various collective protests everywhere in 
rural areas (Bo 1991:239,258,281).  As a result, there comes to a clear 
conclusion that CCP, as a traditional tax collector, cannot tie together the 
already distributed agricultural residual, which were distributed to all 
peasants, again owing to the exorbitant high transaction cost.  In this regard, 
CCP had an innovative scheme, which was other than any conventional state 
mechanism, to effectively accumulate sufficient capital to achieve their 
political aims.  In other words, CCP began to penetrate the private ownership 











































325 3.08 2,144 4.66 20,566 13.66 63.23 
9.59 
  

































Landlord 400 3.79 2,188 4.75 57,588 38.26 144.11 26.32 
Others 686 6.49 2,344 5.09 4,300 2.86 6.27 1.83 
Total 10,554 100.00 46,059 100.00 150,534 100.00 14.26 3.27 
Data derived from (Nbsc 1980) 









Poor Peasant 54.50 52.20 47.10 
Middle peasant 39.30 39.90 44.30 
Rich Peasant 3.10 5.30 6.40 
Landlord 2.40 2.60 2.20 
Others 0.70 - - 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Data derived from (Nbsc 1980) 
Table 11.3 The Possession of Arable Land in PRC after land reforms 
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